Comments by "Dave M A C" (@davemac1197) on "A Bridge Too Far | Military History Book Review" video.

  1. There is only the word of two American officers, T. Moffatt Burriss (commander I Company 504th PIR) and one of his Lieutenants (LaRiviere?) that this confrontation even took place, and both claim to have been the officer that confronted Captain Carrington in his tank (he was hardly the XXX Corps commander but second in command of No.1 Squadron 2nd (Armoured) Battalion Grenadier Guards. When asked about the incident, Carrington denied it even happened and called the story "extraordinary". These are the known facts (timestamps are the date in September and 24-hour clock from an 82nd Airborne sketch map of the operation): 1. The bridge was crossed by a Troop of Grenadier Guards tanks led by Sergeant Peter Robinson at 201830. 2. While crossing the bridge, Lance-Sergeant Pacey's tank knocked out a German 7.5cm Pak 40 anti-tank gun situated on the north bank between the rail and highway bridges. 3. The two surviving tanks of Sergeants Robinson and Pacey carried on into the village of Lent, machine-gunning German troops who were "running about like rabbits" silhouetted against a backdrop of burning buildings as the light was failing. 4. Robinson and Pacey reached the rail overpass where Robinson's tank was stopped by an American Hawkins anti-tank mine and the troops surrounding them were from 'G' Company 504th. The paratroopers had reasoned that resistance on the riverbank between the two bridges was too strong and elected to move inland following the rail embankment until it crossed the road, and then proposed to double back down the road to take the highway bridge from the rear. After establishing the roadblock in the underpass tunnel, two tanks came up the road from Lent that turned out to be British. 5. A German StuG IIIG assault gun further up the road had an enfilade position on the underpass exit and shot at anything that moved out of the tunnel. The Americans had no bazooka rounds left with which to stalk the vehicle. 6. Captain Burriss in his account says he passed an abandoned German anti-tank gun on the riverbank between the two bridges, proving that his movement was after Sergeant Pacey's gunner had put the gun out of operation as they crossed the bridge. 7. Elements of 'H' Company and Burriss' 'I' Company 504th reached the far end of the highway bridge at 201915, where Burriss claimed he arrived in time to see Sergeant Robinson's tanks cross over the bridge. This is obviously incorrect. He did arrive at the same time Captain Carrington crossed over the bridge in his tank, and the reason he stopped at the far end (as a Troop of four Achilles tank destroyers passed him to reinforce the bridgehead) was to maintain the radio 'rear link' between Robinson half a mile away in Lent and his squadron commander, Major Trotter, half a mile away back in Nijmegen. 8. The planned stop line for the 504th between Fort Benedon-Lent (aka Fort Hof van Holland) and Fort Lent (Fort Het Lauuwik) was achieved at 202000, which is full dark in September. The alleged confrontation was filmed in broad daylight for A Bridge Too Far, where the British were accused by Robert Redford's Major Julian Cook of stopping to drink tea. Obviously a contrived situation and remark written by screenwriter William Goldman, and Julian Cook was embarrased by Redford's entire fictional performance after the river crossing. Battalion commanders commanded their battalions, not led company or platoon assaults (see Winters vs Sink during the attack on Foy in Band of Brothers episode 9, which is much more accurate). 9. The British Army drinks tea when it has to stop, not has to stop to drink tea. There's a difference. 10. Tanks could not fight at night in WW2 (apart from some experimental Panther equipment used by I./Panzer-Regiment 24) and were rarely even advanced at night, so it was normal procedure to laager for the hours of darkness behind the infantry line. XXX Corps commander Brian Horrocks in his book Corps Commander (1977) wrote that he advanced tanks at night on only two occasions, and both times it paid off. He felt during MARKET GARDEN that gambling a third time would be pushing his luck, and he was already unnerved by the fact the operation started on a Sunday, because in his experience operations starting on a Sunday usually didn't go well. 11. German tanks had already started forcing a crossing of the Arnhem bridge about midday on 20 September and the Germans were constructing a defence line between the villages of Oosterhout-Ressen-Bemmel, which were also formed into 'hedgehog' positions. After the line was breached on the main road between Oosterhout and Ressen, there were 11 ex-French Schneider M.36 7.5cm Flak guns repositioned in the anti-tank role, and evidence of tracks and spent 8.8cm shell casings that two Tiger tanks had been present in the line, as well as the StuG IIIG - the 10.SS-Panzer-Division had four StuGs at Nijmegen and lost only one in the city. The defence line was confirmed by reconnaissance conducted overnight by 2nd Household Cavalry Regiment, so XXX Corps knew there could be no quick advance to Arnhem in those circumstances, either during the night or the next day, as events later proved. 12. If Carrington's denial the confrontation at gunpoint took place was false, it would only be motivated by unwillingness to expose the American officer's unprofessional conduct, no doubt emotive after losing many of his men in the assault crossing, but his alleged anger did not alter the facts on the ground. 13. The assault crossing of the Waal by the 504th PIR was only done at the insistence of Gavin, no doubt to make amends for his blunder in assigning the 508th to take the bridge on the first day. Colonel Lindquist failed to interpret his instructions correctly, thinking he had to clear the drop zone and secure his other objectives before sending a large force to the bridge. This mistake allowed 10.SS-Panzer-Division to feed elements into Nijmegen and delay XXX Corps for 36 hours, in what should have been a clear run through Nijmegen to Arnhem on 19 September. The default plan for this scenario of the bridges remaining in enemy hands was an assault crossing to be conducted by 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division with one or two brigades up (operations BESSIE or BASIL respectively). The insults about tea breaks and not moving quickly are American in origin and designed only to cover their own "asses".
    1
  2. Very good question. I would recommend Special Bridging Force - Engineers Under XXX Corps in Operation Market Garden, by Canadian author John Sliz (2021) in his speciality series of books on engineers in MARKET GARDEN. It contains details on all the engineering preparations and contingency plans for scenarios in which a bridge crossing was lost, with all the permutations: bridge intact and in Germans hands, bridge demolished and site in Allied hands, or demolished and site in German hands, etc.. The responsibility for bridging up to the river Maas exclusive was with the Royal Engineers in Guards Armoured Division (covered by John Sliz in his volume Bridging The Club Route – Guards Armoured Division’s Engineers During Operation Market Garden, 2015, 2016), which is why they conducted the Son bridge replacement with their own Bailey bridge column. For the river Waal and Maas-Waal canal sector, the responsibility was with 1st Canadian AGRE (Army Group Royal Engineers). The default plan for an opposed crossing of the Waal if the Nijmegen rail and road bridges were still in enemy hands, as was the case, was for an assault crossing to be conducted to the west by 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division with either one brigade (operation BESSIE) or two brigades (operation BASIL). Each operation had an engineering column of allocated vehicles with the required assault boats and rafts as well as bridging equipment needed to make the assault crossing and replace demolished bridge(s) as required. 43rd Division (and this answers your question) was equipped with sufficient DUKW amphibious trucks to fully mobilise one infantry battalion in each of two brigades. The idea being that if an assault crossing was required with one or two brigades making the crossing, the DUKW battalion(s) would make the initial assault(s) and the two other battalions in the brigade would follow on in assault boats. If suitable launching and landing ramps for the DUKWs were not available at the site, the initial assault battalions would also have to make their crossing in assault boats. Why neither of these plans (BESSIE or BASIL) were implemented was down to politics, which frankly plagued the entire operation and compromised it at Nijmegen for reasons outside the scope of your question, but Royal Engineers in 43rd Division were put on a warning order for operation BASIL, but the division was not called up to undertake it because General Gavin had persuaded I Airborne and XXX Corps commanders to use his own troops (504th PIR) instead, if the assault boats could be provided for them. The story about the assault boats used by the Americans is also another interesting one, and it's also covered in John Sliz's Guards Armoured Engineers volume, since their boats were already in Nijmegen, but an engineer officer was not present at the conference (a mistake as it turned out) where Gavin's proposal was accepted, and it was assumed by commanders incorrectly the boats would have to be brought up the corridor from the engineer supply dumps in Belgium. As I said, the best laid plans were compromised by politics.
    1