Comments by "Lavender Eucalyptus" (@lavendereucalyptus3225) on "" video.
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I disagree with the American narratives on several points.
(1)Americans have long taken advantage of the cheap manufacturing cost and the high manufacturing capacity to support a lavish lifestyle compared to the rest of the world, while gouging on over-consumption.
(2) When talking about trade surplus and deficit, Americans never mention the enormous amount of money made from other countries from services in finance, legal, tech, software, entertainment industries, among
other things.
(3) While advocating
"rule-based order," every time the competition gets tough, the US would change the rules to bring down the competition.
(4) The US would point fingers at others for subsidy, but the US just does it differently and call it something legal. What do you think all that campaign contribution does? Not to mention all the bailouts when
someone screws up.
The bottom line is that the US has never played fair, but always screamed the loudest.
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I disagree with the American narratives on several points.
(1)Americans have long taken advantage of the cheap manufacturing cost and the high manufacturing capacity to support a lavish lifestyle compared to the rest of the world, while gouging on over-consumption.
(2) When talking about trade surplus and deficit, Americans never mention the enormous amount of money made from other countries from services in finance, legal, tech, software, entertainment industries, among
other things.
(3) While advocating
"rule-based order," every time the competition gets tough, the US would change the rules to bring down the competition.
(4) The US would point fingers at others for subsidy, but the US just does it differently and call it something legal. What do you think all that campaign contribution does? Not to mention all the bailouts when
someone screws up.
The bottom line is that the US has never played fair, but always screamed the loudest.
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@michah321
Do your own study and research, don’t take the words from the orange habitual liar.
You MAGA seems to conveniently ignore the fact that your beloved orange liar initiated trade war with China during his 1st term in 2018, he initiated tariff and trade war with China, and he escalated the war this year. China is fed up by US bully and disregard of WTO framework which US signed on for. The international community are fed up by U.S. unilaterally breaking every law that was agreed and signed by US. How do you expect people to work with you if you lost trust and credibility?!
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Before the escalation of tariffs in 2025 under the second Trump administration, the U.S. had a complex tariff structure on Chinese goods resulting from the earlier trade war initiated during Trump’s first term (2017–2021). Here’s a summary of the pre-2025 tariffs:
1. **Section 301 Tariffs**:
During Trump’s first term, the U.S. imposed tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, targeting Chinese goods deemed to benefit from unfair trade practices. By the end of 2020, *60% of U.S.-China trade* was subject to tariffs averaging **20%**, covering approximately $370 billion worth of Chinese imports annually . These tariffs remained largely in place under the Biden administration, with some exemptions and reviews but no major rollbacks .
2. **Product-Specific Tariffs**:
- **Steel and Aluminum**: Tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum were imposed in 2018 under Section 232 (national security grounds) .
- *Electric Vehicles (EVs)**: The Biden administration maintained **100% tariffs* on Chinese EVs under Section 301, a rate that predated the 2025 escalation .
3. **Retained Tariffs Post-2020**:
Despite the change in administration, most tariffs from the first trade war persisted. For example, the U.S. continued to apply *7.5% tariffs* on approximately $120 billion worth of Chinese goods (e.g., consumer electronics) and *25% tariffs* on $250 billion of industrial and technological products .
4. **Exceptions and Adjustments**:
Some exemptions were granted for specific products (e.g., medical supplies during the COVID-19 pandemic), but these were temporary and did not alter the overall tariff framework .
### Key Contrast with 2025 Tariffs:
The 2025 Trump tariffs escalated these rates dramatically, combining existing Section 301 tariffs with new "reciprocal" and "national security" levies, resulting in total rates as high as *145–245%* for certain Chinese goods . Prior to 2025, the highest effective tariffs on Chinese goods were generally capped at **25%**, except for niche categories like EVs .
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@michah321
You are terribly misinformed, following are the US tariff imposed on China before April 2nd, 2025.
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Before the escalation of tariffs in 2025 under the second Trump administration, the U.S. had a complex tariff structure on Chinese goods resulting from the earlier trade war initiated during Trump’s first term (2017–2021). Here’s a summary of the pre-2025 tariffs:
1. **Section 301 Tariffs**:
During Trump’s first term, the U.S. imposed tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, targeting Chinese goods deemed to benefit from unfair trade practices. By the end of 2020, *60% of U.S.-China trade* was subject to tariffs averaging **20%**, covering approximately $370 billion worth of Chinese imports annually . These tariffs remained largely in place under the Biden administration, with some exemptions and reviews but no major rollbacks .
2. **Product-Specific Tariffs**:
- **Steel and Aluminum**: Tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum were imposed in 2018 under Section 232 (national security grounds) .
- *Electric Vehicles (EVs)**: The Biden administration maintained **100% tariffs* on Chinese EVs under Section 301, a rate that predated the 2025 escalation .
3. **Retained Tariffs Post-2020**:
Despite the change in administration, most tariffs from the first trade war persisted. For example, the U.S. continued to apply *7.5% tariffs* on approximately $120 billion worth of Chinese goods (e.g., consumer electronics) and *25% tariffs* on $250 billion of industrial and technological products .
4. **Exceptions and Adjustments**:
Some exemptions were granted for specific products (e.g., medical supplies during the COVID-19 pandemic), but these were temporary and did not alter the overall tariff framework .
### Key Contrast with 2025 Tariffs:
The 2025 Trump tariffs escalated these rates dramatically, combining existing Section 301 tariffs with new "reciprocal" and "national security" levies, resulting in total rates as high as *145–245%* for certain Chinese goods . Prior to 2025, the highest effective tariffs on Chinese goods were generally capped at **25%**, except for niche categories like EVs .
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@
The answer lies in the history, perhaps dedicating yourself on learning world and Chinese history is a good start.
Start with Prof Kenneth Hammond, Ken Hammond received his B.A. from Kent State University in History and Political Science. In 1982 he traveled to China and spent the next five years working with American student programs and educational delegations in Beijing. Dr. Hammond received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in History and East Asian Languages in 1994 and has taught at New Mexico State University ever since. He specializes in the history of China in the Early Modern period, especially the 16th century. He has published numerous books and articles on Chinese intellectual and political history, and his book Pepper Mountain: The Life, Death and Posthumous Career of Yang Jisheng, 1516-1555 came out in 2007. In 1999 Dr. Hammond was a research fellow at the Institute of History at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, and in 2002-03 he was a visiting fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies in Leiden, the Netherlands. From 2007 to 2015 he was co-director of the Confucius Institute at New Mexico State. Since 2017 he has been affiliated with the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin. He has been a lecturer for the National Geographic Society and for the Smithsonian Institution in China, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. His latest book, China’s Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future was published in May 2023.
Dr. Hammond’s current research is on China’s historical political economy, especially in the early modern period (900-1800), and on the history of market towns and urban development in China.
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