Comments by "Cary Black" (@caryblack5985) on "The Soviet Tormosin Offensive | BATTLESTORM STALINGRAD E42" video.

  1.  @Edax_Royeaux  It was propaganda. The soviets would have pushed the Germans back or defeated them much earlier if they could. The idea of encircling the Germans only became plan in Sept 1942. This does not take away from the fact that the Soviets carried out the plan successfully.
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  2. Up till the 1990s and the release of official Soviet archives the West traditionally did not trust the Soviet versions. On top of that much of the history was written by German officers who were the "guests" of the US Army. On top of that he cold war and the language barrier had an effect. It was wasn't till Glantz and the Russian historians of the 2000s that we got much of the Soviet story. Citino and other historians have commented on this.
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  3.  @KironManuelCards  You made a public claim. The evidence should also be public for everyone.
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  4. The Soviets (not Russians) did not realize the number trapped which was much greater than expected. Also the Germans fought fiercely mostly out of fear but they should be credited with doing all in their power to resist the Soviets.
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  5. At this point in the war the Soviets had only a little success against the German Army. They did not know exactly what conditions were in the pocket and were surprised by the fierce resistance which may have given the Soviets the idea that the troops in the pocket were in better shape than what we know today. It may have been a case that we trapped them and we will make sure they are destroyed rather than taking troops away for a full scale attack elsewhere. I think it was a case of making sure this victory does not slip away.
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  6. They were around because the combat troops were greatly reduced in the fighting in the city and at the Kotluban attacks. These were head quarters. supply, transport, medical , people to care for the horses, signals and other vital areas. All divisions depend on a number of noncombat troops to enable the combat troops to function.
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  7. I think so. They took all the wounded they could on return flights and also those who were ordered to leave. In some cases the full loads of wounded were a hazard in takeoffs.
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  8. The Germans had to protect slow flying and unarmed transports which really burdened them and were flying out of poorly organized airfields. The Germans were effective to the extent they could but in this case the Soviet air force was getting stronger and could be resupplied with fresh plaens while the German got weaker and were undersupplied
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  9. They should have but the transportation of a Tank Corps from the west takes weeks and such a decision needs to be made so there is lead time. Why they failed to do this I do not know.
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  10. Not enough troops and parachute attacks are not a good idea in below freezing weather. Also no armor to deal with Soviet armor in parachute attacks.
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  11. The Germans were in a desperate situation for troops once the 6th Army was no longer able to participate in the south of the USSR. It is obvious Manstein was trying to get any and every soldier he could into the counterattack. Clearly most were tied up in fending off other attacks along the Chir and the ones in the center were fighting in Rzhev. Even the ones in the Caucasus were supposed to get oil but were also in a standstill. Troops in France and the West would take weeks to reach the Stalingrad. The Germans attacked with what hey had but it was hardly likely to be successful.
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  12. All this information is already available in books. Most from Glantz along with Hayward and Isaev that is where the information comes from.
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  13.  @chrishoff402  This would not be practical and have reduced even further the supplies the 6th Army received. Night drops are very tricky and night navigation in the middle of winter in the Soviet Union would be a nightmare.
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  14. Because of the great attrition in the battles for the city and along the Kotluban region many combat troops were lost and so the number of rear area troops compared to combat troops began to be extreme.
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  15. What secret help?
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  16.  @Spiderfisch  Yes the US was very active in supplying aid to the USSR but I could not understand what he thought was secret. The US aid was very well publicized and well known.
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  17. You summed it up pretty well. One thing you left out. Hitler was convinced they would win and his generals with exceptions did likewise. Perhaps their confidence was based on only what they knew. The terrible showing the Soviets had against the Finns and the quick German victory over the French. You pointed out what they did not know or were too arrogant to consider.
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  18. They had all the fighting they could manage holding the Soviets off at Rzhev.
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  19. The Germans were in a desperate situation for troops once the 6th Army was no longer able to participate in the south of the USSR. It is obvious Manstein was trying to get any and every soldier he could into the counterattack. Clearly most were tied up in fending off other attacks along the Chir and the ones in the center were fighting in Rzhev. Even the ones in the Caucasus were supposed to get oil but were also in a standstill. Troops in France and the West would take weeks to reach the Stalingrad. The Germans attacked with what hey had but it was hardly likely to be successful.
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  20. At this point in the war the Soviets had only a little success against the German Army. They did not know exactly what conditions were in the pocket and were surprised by the fierce resistance which may have given the Soviets the idea that the troops in the pocket were in better shape than what we know today. It may have been a case that we trapped them and we will make sure they are destroyed rather than taking troops away for a full scale attack elsewhere. I think it was a case of making sure this victory does not slip away. Your question was not stupid.
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  21. No
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  22. You are correct but the public would not accept that no attempt to relieve the pocket would be made. Even Hitler knew that the Germans must try even if it is likely they would fail The failure would be bad enough but not to try would be a disaster for the regime. I also believe Manstein would also want to try the relief attempt no matter how likely it would fail.
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  23.  @calengr1  I have never seen a list of the 5000 POWcould access s that had returned from the USSR published. I would say that such information could be obtained through the current German government. As to 900 doctors that again might be information you could access by contacting the German government.
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  24. Yes in hindsight it would be a better choice.
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  25. You are most probably right. However it was the 6th Army 's only chance with the airlift failing so there would be no alternative.
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  26. From the reserve the Soviets had been building since September 1943 when the plan to encircle Stalingrad was proposed rather than to keep attacking in the Kotluban region.
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  27. Correct and sending fuel which has a great weight, just pick up a jug of milk, can show you how much a half filled plane carrying fuel supplies would weigh.
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  28. They were not good guys .
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  29.  @jussim.konttinen4981  Germany won WWII ? And all the while I thought they unconditionally surrendered.
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  30.  @JAMESBONG100  Well unless you are a racist the Germans were not the good guys.
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  31. You do the best with what you got but you are doing the right thing by comparing sources. You are right to be skeptical but with the newer sources we get closer. And hopefully 10years from now we will be closer still. It is a gradual cumulative process.
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  32. They only conquered one oil filed and that the least important one. It was destroyed in such a way that it would be many months before the Germans got any significant amount of oil.
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  33.  @akk-nd3vj  In theory but unlikely as soon as the 6th Army was no longer available.
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  34. No. The German front in the south was in a perilous position and you will see that in future episodes.
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  35. The Heinkels were used because there were not enough JU 52s They could not cxarrry as much cargo and were not ideal for loading and unloiading supplies.
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  36.  @deanwilliams2353  The situation of the Luftwaffe is more complex than TIK portrays. On p 264 Hayward Stopped At Stalingrad points out they had to supply the 6th Army and at the same time provide close support to Manstein's operation and close support to the troops fighting desperately on the Chir. Fighters and bombers (HE 111) often had to be taken away from their role of supply for the other roles. Also it is pointed out the operational rate of the various aircraft was less than 50%. Hayward goes into great detail about the airlift and I don't know if just listing what was delivered and number of aircraft available or how much an aircraft can theoretically carry accurately portrays the airlift in its complexity and difficulty. I would recommend the above book as he devotes a couple hundred pages to the airlift among his discussion of the Luftwaffe at Stalingrad.
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  37. Because of the great attrition in the battles for the city and along the Kotluban region many combat troops were lost and so the number of rear area troops compared to combat troops began to be extreme.
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