Comments by "William Morris" (@williammorris584) on "The Telegraph" channel.

  1. Is there reason to believe that a successor regime in Russia would be a parliamentary democracy friendly to the West and apologetic about Ukraine?
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  2. Every army learns from defeat. The question is how quickly, and whether that is fast enough.
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  3. They did not do “everything they could” if they not suspend climbing and turn every effort to rescuing him.
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  4. Todays’s term for retreating from multiple locations is “changing dynamically”.
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  5. Not making any judgement about whether this is actually what it is purported to be. Historically, it’s fairly rare for one or a few soldiers to survive an attempt to surrender in combat. Most survivors of surrenders were groups or units that had some parley or at least communication with the enemy facing them before surrendering.
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  6. Europe should consider the possibility that Ukraine is their responsibility in the event that US interest turns primarily towards Israel.
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  7. Ukraine inserted a reserve brigade, which was perhaps their only fresh reserve, to break the encirclement of Avdiivka and extract what they can of the defenders who must choose between surrender or flight across ground swept by Russian artillery and air-delivered ordnance. An appalling military decision presumably made for the sake of the information space. This debacle had been predictable, and was predicted by many for weeks. And with the Europeans disarmed by decades of fecklessness, Ukraine’s main hope is staked on the US House, which is in recess and whose Speaker has no inclination to bring the passed Senate bill to the floor. Unless cutoff positions have been prepared, the Ukrainians have just left their most heavily fortified positions on the whole front to face the Russians in unimproved terrain with battered units, albeit on a shorter line, and the Russians have cleared Donetsk as a logistical hub for further operations.
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  8. Yeah, we’re noticing the contradictions. Dom desperately clings to the claim of human wave attacks with more and more convoluted rationalizations. He apparently believes the change in tactics has nothing to do with lessons learned, but an inability to raise enough men to carry out their preferred ‘have a full division rise up out of the trench and run forward’. Morale may indeed be low, but so is that of the Ukrainians, as is related by the guest. No Ukrainian wants to go to the Ostfront to face an enemy that just comes on and on and on, aided by a hail of artillery and FABs. The pod today was a combo of winging it and shaming by the regulars, followed by a sharply contrasting sobriety from the guest.
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  9. Lack of escalatory parity has been a continuous problem for Ukraine.
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  10. The pod's apparent policy is to omit coverage of the actual fighting when all Ukrainian movement is retrograde.
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  11. I can think of a quite good military reason for the drone attacks on Kyiv. By attacking an area the Ukrainians cannot afford not to defend, the drone attacks tie Ukrainian ADA assets to Kyiv, keeping them from the front. Any drone that leaks through the lower-cost air defenses (Gepard, etc) produces a trade of a $30k drone for a $4million Patriot missile. When every piece of your opponent’s major military equipment is produced elsewhere, writing his inventory down is advantageous, and forcing him to use disproportionately expensive assets is even better.
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  12. Keep an eye on the UK Parliament after this revelation by Scholz.
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  13. Bakhmut has become a mini- Verdun. The defenders are disadvantaged by near encirclement, but fight on for symbolic reasons. The attackers use the opportunity to inflict favorable attrition and gain a logistical advantage since the defenders’ access routes are increasingly constrained.
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  14. Night ‘attacks’ may have just been trials of night infiltration preparatory to a more major attack. Whether or not a firefight was intended is uncertain.
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  15. Ukraine can stop it tomorrow.
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  16. Any mention of what is happening in the combat areas has almost disappeared from the podcast. Wonder why.
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  17. Today the actual military situation got a two minute gloss, confined to air events. Perhaps it would be too time consuming to mention the dozen towns and villages that have been taken in the last week or are currently being attacked by the Russians on multiple axes across the entire southern half of Ukraine. An interesting thing I noticed is that several Russian units that fought in the reduction of Avdiivka are participating in the attacks spreading radially from that area. Apparently they weren’t rendered combat ineffective at Avdiivka, or they were rested and brought up to strength in less than a week, neither of which is heartening for Ukraine. I saw that Scholz promptly and categorically nixed Macron’s musings. I guess Macron can send just French assets, perhaps the Foreign Legion would obey. Who knows what the Russian reaction would be. Some rapid connection with reality by the Europeans is necessary to save Ukraine, rather than gabbling about the Americans needing to save them all. The problem is that it may not be within their means, having disarmed in order to coast under the umbrella of the US deterrent.
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  18. 2:01 As if the same isn’t true of the degradation of Ukrainian air defenses. Remember that with respect to deep strikes, Russian missile and aviation strikes inside Ukraine are consistently more numerous and with heavier warheads than those made by Ukraine against Russia. There are more and more Ukrainian areas without power or experiencing rolling blackouts, which isn’t true of Russia. The diesel generator has become the folk music of Ukraine. Ukrainian officials are already warning their citizens about a cold, dark winter.
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  19. When your interview with Zelensky is profoundly and deeply about yourself.
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  20. Russia advancing in multiple areas of Ukraine and continuing to dismantle the Ukrainian power grid; Telegraph: “Meanwhile, in Africa…”
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  21. It looks like the Ukrainians are driving the Russians out of Crimea and into Kherson 😀
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  22. Your arms control guest was very informative, and such a cheery soul. Some interesting points he made 1) Russia wins a attrition war 2) he didn’t seem to think that either side would militarily defeat the other, just that the position for negotiation could be swayed 3) Russia possesses conventional escalatory options, but these would be a marker of relative desperation.
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  23. No, they just outfitted Avdiivka for years as a fortress and an artillery position to fire on Donetsk, and declared they would “defend it to the last”. No significance at all, just like the tiny and not-too-distant Prokhorovka had long ago.
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  24. Russians pushing forward on multiple axes with increased scope and tempo, and about to start what looks like their largest operation yet: an attack along the entire Kupyansk-Liman line. ISW has extensive analysis of this on their site, and concludes: “An operation to push Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River offers the Russian military an attainable goal that would generate operationally significant effects.”
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  25. Further Russian advances, elite Ukrainian brigades pushed back, losing quantities of top Western kit. Parts of Kharkiv area being evacuated by Ukraine. Continued Russian air strikes on Kharkiv and vicinity. Possible Ukrainian own-goal shootdowns. Russians using fiber optic reels to render their FPV drones immune to ECM. Smuggling of Ukrainian men attempting escape to Moldova is a thing. Podcast: victory through DEI. Come on, folks. Time, as in a couple of years, could favor Ukraine, but will they last that long?
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  26. I suppose that in his fervid dreams, Ukraine is as important as Israel.
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  27. I’m wondering what “stopped” means with respect to the geolocations I’m looking at from yesterday and today.
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  28.  @philipmain5701 have a look at the map lol.
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  29. Perun is talking about doing an extra YT episode on this. Looking forward to his usual objective, in-depth analysis. ISW already has some interesting commentary. Up for grabs are Wagner’s personnel. I would have thought that Putin would have hoped to extract a couple brigade sets of fighters, but that looks unlikely. Perhaps they will go to some other PMC, but getting them into MOD formations will be improbable without substantial concessions / sweeteners.
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  30. ISW’s appreciations seem to indicate that neither side appears able to produce the means necessary to achieve its victory conditions, and neither is willing to negotiate. Russia appears unable to ramp up its defense industrial base sufficiently to prevail, but is probably able to produce enough for a defensive campaign, and Ukraine cannot get from the West what it will eventually need most: more Ukrainians. One hopes for a Russian regime collapse, it’s probably the only alternative to a long war finally settled by negotiations over the division of the ruins.
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  31. The Ukrainians’ shortage of troops is now complicated by a shortage of munitions, while the Russians are attacking on multiple axes. And the largest Russian attack yet appears to be imminent from the Kupyansk-Liman direction. ISW talks about it at length and concludes: “An operation to push Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River offers the Russian military an attainable goal that would generate operationally significant effects.”
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  32. The air raid sirens in Kyiv went off a full fifteen seconds before the Zircons arrived. Depleted Ukrainian units with depleted air defenses steadily retreat deeper into a darker Ukraine while the Russian air forces operate with greater freedom and the Russians fill out new army formations. But Ukraine hit a couple ships, all is well. An immense amount has to change for Ukraine to keep the territory it still has, much less reach their stated war aims.
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  33. Ukraine “switching to a defensive strategy”, as if they had a choice. Russia has settled in to grind, grind, grind until Ukraine effectively runs out of troops and the front breaks. I’ve posted for over a year that Ukraine’s most pressing need is for something the West can’t give them: more Ukranians.
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  34. The Ukrainians are under severe pressure and the line of contact is still moving backwards over a frontage of around 100 km, but let’s talk some more about a sunken patrol ship, and give it a promotion it to “assault ship”.
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  35.  @RyanBrown-nx8dw He’s correct, this has been true from the start. Some of the former Warsaw Pact countries had some and donated Grad systems and rockets, but that’s pretty much tapped.
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  36. AFU retreating on every major axis. The rate of Russian advance has increased every month since this summer, and the rasputitsa and snow haven’t slowed it.
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  37. Casualties exist in a context rather than as an absolute measure. The Russian historical paradigm is to lose several times the casualties as their enemy right up until the day that Russia wins.
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  38. I did the ‘Tommy Lee Jones newspaper meme face’ over Dom’s assertion that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was a Soviet demonstration of ideological congruity with Nazism. The Soviets and Germans shared some common interests briefly with respect to Poland and other issues, but both Hitler and Stalin believed they would be at war with one another relatively soon. Stalin’s participation was to get a buffer in Poland, a free hand with the Baltics and Finland, and a respite for military buildup. Their shared disregard for human rights was a feature of totalitarianism, not shared ideology.
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  39. Your guest makes Kyiv sound like Carnaby Street in the ‘60’s. I would think drone operator isn’t the idyllic existence imagined by most. There are a lot of different types of drones, but I expect that a lot of drone operators are close to infantry formations at the front and assiduously hunted by the enemy, much as snipers draw special attention.
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  40.  @drewmalesky9869  Which way is it moving, and hasn’t it been speeding up? October was the largest monthly gain in a couple years. And whose territory is close to 25% occupied?
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  41.  @easymoneeey That old and tired trope was a US general’s prediction.
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  42. “The Ukrainians are under severe pressure and the line of contact is moving backwards over a frontage of over 100 km, but let’s talk about a sunk patrol ship”. The Ukrainians would devoutly wish the current situation was a stalemate. Let’s have serious commentary about serious situations.
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  43. It was extensively fortified and close enough to Donetsk to serve as an artillery interdiction position. At some point it was useful to produce attrition vs the Russians, since the attackers sustain more losses than the defenders. But at a certain point, as positions are degraded and the position is flanked, a salient becomes increasingly costly to the defenders, and difficult to supply as the neck of the salient narrows. And at the point that the position collapses, the defenders lose many more than the attackers, either as killed or captured. There is a balance point in such defenses when it becomes preferable to pull out and establish a straighter, shorter and less vulnerable line to the rear. Unfortunately Ukraine got politically invested in Avdiivka as a symbol that they could resist the Russians successfully. The Russians accepted the challenge, hammered in the flanks, ranged artillery all about, stormed the town, and won both the battle because they had more forces, more choices, and the Ukrainians were stubbornly anchored to a symbol.
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  44. The front is going so dismally for the AFU that it is seldom mentioned anymore.
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  45. The continued cruise missile strikes by Russia seem to be more about writing down Ukrainian inventories of SAM’s and impeding SEAD maintenance cycles that having actual effect. A strike aimed at specific effect would more concentrated in numbers and time. This might be intended to allow Russia to use its superior air assets closer to the front when Ukraine attacks. I haven’t heard this possibility addressed in the context of the continued ALCM attacks.
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  46. For something that can’t be ruled out, that got ruled out extremely swiftly.
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  47. Check the mapping. Russian forces have been crumpling the western side of the Kursk salient while continuing to advance in other areas. Making it was an accomplishment, holding it is proving harder.
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  48. Dependence upon aid is an extremely volatile weakness in a war effort.
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  49. We’re now down to semantics about a single route. Whether or not it is actually occupied by Russian troops, it’s clearly interdicted by fire to a greater or lesser degree. The road’s approach to the town is even within range of 12cm mortars. The ability to resupply by such a conduit is dependent upon two things: what degree of loss of vehicles is acceptable to the Ukrainians, and how much howitzer, mortar, or Grad ammunition can be allocated to interdiction by the Russians. The defense of Bakhmut looks all but untenable, barring a major counter by Ukrainian forces from outside the city. The unfathomable level of importance placed on this small town’s fate implies that someone believes that symbology is crucially important in sustaining material Western support for Ukraine.
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  50. A considerable amount of 155 has already been supplied, and Ukraine continues to fire daily about 1/4 of the West’s monthly production. Reserve stocks may be available from a few countries, but the Ukrainian position look much less favorable than the Russians, who apparently have maybe a bit less than half of the ~17 million artillery rounds of all types that they started the war with, not counting their production. Even things like barrel wear are coming into play, so old 152 and 122 guns are being limbered up, and the reserve stocks of these old systems are just not comparable. Some fun is made of this against the Russians, but an elderly 122 is still a round downrange; the Ukrainians would do the same if they had significant stocks of ammo for these old pieces. They are making arrangements for the west to make some 152mm shells for the Russian guns they use, but basically they are dependent on western 155 and rocket munitions. I doubt they have access to a change of barrels for the many Russian 152mm pieces that they are using. In the absence of air superiority, this is an artillery war, and Russia has an artillery army, disguised by the fact that they also have a lot of tanks.
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  51. Please also consider an interview with the preeminent historian Stephen Kotkin.
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  52. From an analytical point of view, I’ve been surprised that Russia hasn’t attacked the ports in force before now. It’s always been their best escalatory option with respect to results versus consequences. Apparently they were saving it as a retaliatory move so that it seems less escalatory in context, and the Kerch bridge attack was the opportunity.
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  53. An alternative view is that, at least for some while, Bakhmut has been a mini-Verdun for the Ukrainians. They are disadvantaged by near-encirclement, but fight on for primarily symbolic reasons. The Russians have been leveraging the situation for attrition, and doing so from a favorable logistical position since the defenders’ supply routes are increasingly constrained.
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  54. Meanwhile Pokrovsk is within range of Russian 12cm mortars, to say nothing of all tubed artillery systems. UTL points out a raindrop while ignoring a flood, and Pokrovsk is about to be declared of no strategic importance.
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  55. Ukraine is losing in all of Ukraine, not just on the front. They face an increasingly cold and dark winter in more and more areas without power. Meanwhile, Zelenskyy rearranges the deck chairs.
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  56. Three continuing problems for Ukraine are that they do not have escalatory parity, that the Russians can afford 4:1 attrition, and that both the UKR economy and military are dependent on donations from sovereign actors with other priorities.
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  57. It’s a divisional level attack using Ukraine’s last reserves. Meh.
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  58.  @anthonyhulse1248 The Russians just advanced in two days roughly the depth of the 2023 Ukrainian offensive. On two recent occasions, elements of two AFU brigades have taken a runner to a degree that can’t be disguised. That’s an ebb tide.
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  59. Assuming Ukraine has raised nine brigades of reserves, two to three have already suffered significant attrition without reaching the MLR of the first of multiple Russian defensive belts. It’s early yet, but it looks a reasonable observation that it’s really really difficult to conduct combined arms ops WITHOUT ONE OF THE ARMS ( ie, fixed wing air) especially when it is into dense mine belts covered by the worlds largest artillery park. Another problem is a lack of strategic surprise, since everyone knows the locations that would be the goals of the Ukrainian military, since they are political objectives. This means that the Russians will be dug in at and along every approach to these objectives, pretty much ruling out the hope of reducing losses via maneuver operations. The only relative strategic surprise would be the order in which the objectives are attacked. The one thing that would truly surprise me in this war would be to see a meeting engagement in a major theater. Yet more problems for a longer war are the relative demographic disparity and that Ukraine does not produce any major weapon systems. Russia is both wrong and bad here, and all decent people would prefer for Ukraine to win. But absent regime change in Russia, or a unexpected collapse of its army’s will to fight, this looks like a war that will be settled by an armistice, not a victory. And to your armor pal, Creighton Abrams might rightly be considered a patriarch of the US armor force, but not so far in the past for our MBT to be named the “Abraham”.
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  60. With respect to Ukrainian men in Poland, don’t refugees have Geneva protection against forced repatriation?
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  61. It’s called warfare. My country bombed hell out of everything useful to Germany and Japan including their homes. We sank virtually the entire Japanese merchant marine to starve their industry and people, while we mined all their sea approaches and harbors in order to sink anything that got through. Our British allies used incendiaries on Germany at night that started fire storms that warped metal and caused casualties to be estimated from the quantity of ash in inadequate shelters. We emulated this over Japan after our standard practices returned too-prosaic results. Once we ran out of targets in Europe as low on the priority list as train cars, train stations and trucks, our fighter-bombers strafed things like individual barns and farm equipment. One of our generals as early as 1864 said that war is hell and cannot be mitigated, so he made its effects as severe as possible in his theater in the hopes of shortening its duration.
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  62. In the US, the border disaster has become the defining issue and it is demonstrably the result of Democratic policy over the past few years. Initially, Republicans sought a way to do something about the border, and since there was already some resistance to Ukraine aid, linking the two was seen by the Biden Admin as a path to doing a deal for Ukraine aid. As time has passed, two things have happened. First, resistance to further Ukraine aid has solidified, primarily over the long-term resentment against most members of NATO for consistently failing to meet financial commitments. Second, the border situation has gained in public concern to the point that the Democrats are willing to do anything to cover their tracks on immigration, dropping both the linkages to Ukraine aid and to their formerly ironclad allegiance to a pathway to citizenship for illegals. Now, the Republicans sense the possibility of an absolute legislative win on the border issue, but will do it in a relatively leisurely/cynical fashion, so as to have a winning electoral issue to bash over the Democrats’ heads. Ukraine aid is a distant second place behind the border issue, and public opinion generally is that we’ve done enough and it’s Europe’s turn. Our defense priorities are shifting toward China. Trump’s part in this is that he’s certainly involved, particularly in some Congressional arm-twisting, but mostly he has jumped out in front of the parade to be seen as leading it, and if possible, being its originator.
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  63. I was completely stunned to hear an argument that free speech should be limited based on the relative veracity of the speech. If that’s the case, the First Amendment in the US is subject to the judgement of some nebulous entity. The legal tradition in the US has been to vigorously uphold the right to express even the most outlandish speech, and our courts have universally and promptly overturned hate speech statutes. Only direct incitement is actionable here, and there’s a lot of leeway given as to what constitutes direct incitement.
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  64.  @Mimi.the.Capybara  The Russians are constantly reconstituting units and their force is growing, which is why the AFU warns that they are ‘increasingly outnumbered’ and being pushed back everywhere. It’s Ukraine that is in extremis with respect to personnel shortage.
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  65. As tough as it looks in the Senate, Ukraine support is increasingly being delinked from border security in the House, with a growing outright opposition to aid. If there were a 180 degree policy shift to extremely vigorous interception and repatriation at the southern border, that might tantalize the hardliners back to a package linked with Ukraine aid.
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  66. Comments on successful Russian attacks are always accompanied by statements that heavy losses were sustained. Are we to assume that successful Ukrainian attacks had light losses since their losses are very seldom mentioned? And is the relative tolerance of each side to attrition considered in these characterizations? I realize that this podcast is rightly helping to fight for Ukraine in the information space, but I’d kind of like to know what’s actually happening. Attrition has as much to do with Ukrainian success as ground gained. I realize that info about losses is closely held by both sides, but a deeper examination of this would be welcome.
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  67. Another determined effort to avoid talking about the actual battles underway; it’s that ugly for AFU.
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  68. The Russians are using their air forces more and more aggressively, rather than less so. Recently they have been dropping glide FAB bombs on the Kharkiv area, which would not have been attempted just six months ago. This spares the missiles they would have otherwise used for other purposes, such as the near-complete destruction of the electrical generation plants in the northeast of Ukraine. Russian verified losses of multirole aircraft in the last 15 months are roughly equal to the 2023 deliveries of new SU-34 and -34’s alone, and the Russians continue to produce SU-57’s as well. The air war has gone from an equilibrium in which the airspace over the battle area was virtually denied to both sides, to a situation where the Russians have air superiority over much of the combat front.
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  69. There is no serious analyst who sees a scenario in which Ukraine can recover its lost territory using only their own forces. This doesn’t change that assessment. In that context, this attack can be seen as an effort to gain leverage in eventual peace negotiations. With reference to your guest, I now take ISW with a shaker of salt; they long ago transitioned from analysis to cheerleading.
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  70. The Russians switched to saturation attacks some time ago, they appear to be getting larger and at more frequent intervals. Improved Russian SEAD/DEAD has meant the Ukrainians are having to choose between having SAM coverage of their cities or at the front.
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  71. Ukraine appears to be firming up a lodgement on the left bank of the Dniepro, a tactical achievement. This can grow to operational significance if Ukraine can support this logistically. The indirect fire strikes Dom noted early in the news section is probably an attempt to interdict support for the troops on the left bank, or to break up any assembly of reinforcements.
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  72. UALosses has Ukrainian killed listed by name at 42,100. Missing are estimated at 15,000, most probably POW. This is the lowest estimate by any independent and serious analysis.
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  73. I’m so glad I’m not an interviewer, my eyes would have crossed permanently from thirty circuits around the same points.
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  74. The US issue spoken of refers to ~$300M in aid that has been broken out of a US aid package for a separate vote after failing to pass in the House as part of a larger bill.
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  75. Helicopters in the most dense AAW environment on earth? Even attack helos are being taken down at a decent pace despite playing peek-a-boo popup on their side of the FEBA.
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  76. From the last few days, this should be renamed Ukraine: The Whining. All the content amounts to “more, please”, except on the occasions when the “please” is omitted.
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  77. I guess Russia wasn’t out of missiles. Also, did I hear strategic bombers mentioned? Were those Tu-160 or Tu-22M? I couldn’t find out from ISW today.
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  78. A prolonged divergence in outlook between the political and military leadership won’t lead to anything good.
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  79. Their initial classes of nuke boats were noisy as washing machines. They have made great strides since, no doubt aided by some well-known espionage cases.
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  80. Ukraine has inserted a reserve brigade, perhaps their only fresh reserve, to break the encirclement of Avdiivka and extract what they can of the defenders who must choose between surrender or flight across ground swept by Russian artillery and air-delivered ordnance. An appalling military decision presumably made for the sake of the information space. This debacle had been predictable, and predicted by many, for weeks. And with the Europeans disarmed by decades of fecklessness, Ukraine’s main hope is staked on the US House in recess, whose Speaker has no inclination to bring the passed Senate bill to the floor. Unless cutoff positions have been prepared, the Ukrainians have just left their most heavily fortified positions on the whole front to face the Russians in unimproved terrain with battered units, albeit on a shorter line when the Russians have cleared Donetsk as a logistical hub for further operations.
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  81. I hope to see comments Monday on the post-strike satellite imagery. ISW has said: “ISW has not yet observed any visual confirmation that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed aircraft or infrastructure at any of the airbases.” Awaiting further reports.
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  82. ISW (professional analysts): Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 27 and made gains in some areas, although Ukrainian forces appear not to have continued significant mechanized assaults south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
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  83. Parades. Anything to avoid talking about whats happening at the front.
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  84. It seems counterintuitive that Russia would blow the dam when “their” side (the left bank) is mostly lower than the other and therefore they would be flooding their most forward defenses. Presumably, they have been preparing in depth as elsewhere, and view their net defensive position as enhanced. In any case, Ukraine continues to suffer from the problem of escalation disparity. Regardless of who this benefits the most, it pushes the possible Russian acts of escalation front and center. Some of the displaced Ukrainians of the left bank who were deprived of homes and living, may begin or reinforce partisan activity against the Russians. It seems like a mixed bag operationally.
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  85. The current balance of forces and logistics would suggest an even worse outcome for a Ukranian spring offensive than last year’s effort.
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  86. By the rationale Francis mentioned, the UK and France should lose their permanent Security Council seats and veto before Russia loses theirs. Otherwise the move is purely motivated by the actions of Russia, rather than the reasons cited.
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  87. One company of tanks, requiring its own logistics and services tail, is better than nothing, but not much. Basically a diplomatic and PR statement. These drips and drops of stuff from a dozen sources are producing a heterogenous collection of logistical headaches, but are useful enough to put up with the problems. I’d really think that what are much more useful are MANPADS and one-use antitank systems.
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  88. Because we’re the only ones the Russians fear.
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  89. It really has become a hopium dispenser.
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  90. Re Dom’s description of Russian Armies: I was unaware that the combat units of numbered Russian combined-arms Armies (eg, 20th Guards Combined Arms Army) were regularly part of corps organizations between them and their Army headquarters. Since early in WWII, Russian Armies have directly commanded a considerably smaller number of divisions or brigades than their western counterparts without intervening corps headquarters. Russian corps do exist, but tend to be separate organizations within military districts not subordinate to Armies, and although they may be attached to Armies like any other formation, I’m not sure this has taken place with any frequency.
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  91. Talks and concession seem inevitable. There is no serious analyst who sees a scenario in which Ukraine can recover its lost territory using only their own forces.
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  92. “Russia is doing it [missiles] because it’s all they CAN do”. This is small comfort to the Ukrainians, since they can do nothing of the same kind in response; what Russia can do of this type of assault is 100% more than they. That’s a silly and insensitive dismissal.
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  93. Look for Russia to explore ways to interdict aid whether by sea, air, or land. There are interesting possibilities, but some have escalatory risk.
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  94. Ukraine did indeed have the advantage and initiative for a good part of last year, but the misguided offensive plan, the Russians’ stubborn defense, and the Russians’ leveraging of their manpower tipped the scales. From there, the Ukranians mistakenly turned appearances into military priorities, and the Russians exploited this repeatedly.
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  95. 6:32 I recall ISW has stated that the Russians have already produced these reserves in the form of new formations equipped with new-production and refurbished equipment.
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  96. Linking Putin with Iran and Hamas is wise, lest this war become a backwater of US geopolitical priorities.
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  97. 8:33 Exactly. It’s more IF than when Ukraine aid gets to a vote in the US House. And even if it does, it may be months away, and party discipline in the House is a different animal than in the Senate. Only part of the resistance is US politics. There is also a strong strain in US public opinion and political circles of resentment for the Europeans coasting on defense for decades while sheltering under the US defense umbrella.
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  98. How does Ukraine take back any meaningful amount of their occupied territory? Their demographics preclude the casualties incumbent on the attacker, to say nothing of the other difficulties. They are not merely dependent on Western materiel, they are going to need other nations’ troops.
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  99. Is every comment that isn’t sunshine and unicorns for Ukraine a bot? I would think that a bot would be determined more by technical means than from the content.
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  100. Dom’s use of “gift” was actually the correct word. Ukraine can’t buy what they need, and their military is nonviable without it. The West provides the materiel, and Ukraine provides the casualties.
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  101. Give that guy a ticket back to Ukraine.
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  102. 8:01 ISW has a somewhat different assessment of Russian activity in the north, most recently in their appreciation of June 22: “Russian forces appear to be intensifying the tempo of their offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast while decreasing the rate of attacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast — consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast are primarily intended to fix and distract Ukrainian forces in order to allow Russian forces to intensify elsewhere in theater.” (ISW, June 22 2024) With respect to the restriction on the use of US munitions, the US apparently would like Ukraine to endure, but not to prevail, in line with the frequent observation that the US wants Ukraine to win in a way that means Russia does not lose. Thus the restrictions to which the client state must adhere, and which change with how Ukraine fares.
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  103.  @frankshailes3205 I see so many of these ad hominems in lieu of substantive responses.
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  104.  @sebastianforbes1 Indeed, but a week late, kilometers short, and multiple directions unmentioned. The AFU are getting steamrolled lately.
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  105. With respect to deep strikes, Russian missile and aviation strikes inside Ukraine continue to be more numerous and deliver heavier ordnance than those made by Ukraine against Russia. As opposed to Russia, there are numerous Ukrainian areas without power and others with rolling blackouts. Ukrainian energy officials state that their electricity production has declined from 55Gw to “less than 20Gw” and call the situation a “catastrophic shortage”. Explosions and the sound of diesel generators have become the soundtrack of Ukraine. But the theme of the podcast today is that Ukraine may have damaged a plane. Nice. Today (Wed June 12), there is video that the Russians knocked out an S300 system that enabled them to then attack Myrhorod airbase in Ukraine and strike at least one aircraft. If that’s verified, will it be a large part of your podcast tomorrow considering that one aircraft has ~ 10x the impact on Ukraine due to the relative size of their air forces? This often isn’t reporting, it’s cheerleading.
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  106. This pod is fighting Ukraine’s war in the information space, and it’s good that someone is doing that. Evenhanded analysis can be found at places like ISW; on YT there are several eg Perun, and occasionally Ward Carrol has Ukraine content.
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  107. Time and numbers are what tells. All the rest is commentary.
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  108. Read Glantz. It was a bit of both, an army with thousands of penal battalions as well as the Fifth Guards Tank Army and skilled predecessors of Spetsnaz. But above all, it was an artillery army, an artillery army with lots and lots of tanks.
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  109. It’s not lies, just truth management: hopium, copium, and man-behind-the-curtium.
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  110. As much as we side with Ukraine, what filters through is that misery is greater and greater, the economy is grinding to a halt, and the Russians continue to drive wedges into locations. As much as the Ukrainians want and use the weaponry provided by the West, it produces a Frankenstein logistical situation with need for training, support, repair, and supply of a multitude of specialized munitions, parts & etc. I just don’t see how Ukraine alone can achieve more than a stalemate. And no NATO nation is going to put combat troops on the ground. For the US, it’s an opportunity for us to grind down an enemy in a proxy war by providing military supplies to Ukraine, but we must be careful nonetheless- China is watching ITS potential opponents in a war over Taiwan deplete their equipment and supplies in what is effectively a proxy war for them, in which China expends absolutely nothing.
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  111. I knew quite a few people who went to J school, and there’s a reason they weren’t STEM majors.
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  112. He’s sacked and exiled for being right.
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  113. Several analysts (Perun and others) believe Russia is building up inventories of their more capable missiles (Kalibr and such) for the winter, while currently expending their increasing supply of low - end drones. It is less clear that they may be preferentially sending the new production T90’s as well as refurbished AFV’s from depots to reconstitute depleted formations. What will these be used upon, and when?
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  114. Some friends started a friendly betting pool on the over/under of a brigade-sized meeting engagement in open country in the next year. There were only bets against; most of these guys were US military officers. Most knowledgeable folks expect a positional slog absent some Russian morale collapse, otherwise there seems little chance of movement warfare in the main theaters. Regime collapse in Russia is a better bet for a near-term favorable outcome for Ukraine. Already footage of Leo 2A4 and A6 losses; don’t know if any are recoverable: https://youtu.be/8qSXAaQc7EI There were people who acted like these things are invulnerable “I Win” buttons. They’re good kit, but still can go boom to any ATGM.
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  115. The Russians struck Ukrainian airbases with aircraft on the ground three time in two days, destroying multiple fixed wing fighters and helicopters. The loss could be as much as a quarter of Ukraines remaining Air Force, but mentioned here? Nah. Likewise an increase in the pace of Russian ground gains in the East - crickets.
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  116. US House Speaker Mike Johnson said yesterday that he would not consider President Biden’s request for additional aid to Ukraine. The French government just fell to a no-confidence vote led by parties opposed to Ukraine aid. Ukraine needs to come up with some cash if they want more stuff.
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  117.  @MrLJT1 That was the estimate of an American general (he actually said 72 hours). The RU MOD never claimed any timetable.
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  118. First line of Joe Barnes’ story from yesterday: “Putin ally’s long-term animosity towards Ukraine saw him veto a €50 billion package of support – and walk away with €10 billion”. So he abstained from the years-long EU membership process, probably to get parliamentary cover on an eventual veto. Then he levered €10 billion for Hungary, and blocked €50 billion for Ukraine. Scholz rightly lauded for a canny maneuver to begin a decade/decades long process, but overall, qui bono here?
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  119.  @Ode-to-Odysseus  Russia’s October advances were the largest in a month for the last couple years. The AFU’s Kursk salient has been reduced by half. Russians pushing northward from Robotyne. Advances in multiple areas of Ukraine’s southeast. Russians have broken into Kupyansk. And there are reports (both Russian and Ukrainian) of Russian reconnaissance troops entering the Chernihiv area unopposed. Difficult to call this ‘barely changed’.
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  120. These attacks make more sense as false flags or unauthorized Ukrainian sympathizers, since they could mobilize Russian resolve or - much worse- provoke Russian escalation.
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  121. Finding a way to produce a Corps/Army sized maneuver battle versus a defense 20-40km in depth, versus an enemy who has escalatory recourse as well as air dominance over their own territory is indeed a bit worrying, but possible if the Russians are sufficiently weakened.
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  122. He certainly saw what every thoughtful observer saw: that Avdiivka was going to be encircled if it was not evacuated. Saying so may have got him the sack.
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  123. We keep enough equipment in hand for contingencies that might affect higher US defense priorities, like increased concerns vis-a-vis China, or a war in the Middle East.
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  124. That was quite a slapdown of Dom; the fastest learning environment in the world is among infantry under fire.
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  125. Syrsky’s statement sounds very much like “Zelensky made me do it to draw the Russians away from central Ukraine and Pokrovsk, but I knew it wouldn’t and it hasn’t, so now we have this salient into Russia to defend”.
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  126. Not at the cost of denial, if it’s accurate. It’s also possible that it is one individual’s impression of a limited area; the old tale of three blind men describing an elephant by touching parts of it comes to mind.
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  127. At last, news about change in control of terrain. Trend unchanged for a few months now: Russians advancing in several areas, both sides digging in wherever there is equilibrium.
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  128.  @Grenadier311 Not unusual.
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  129. For irony.
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  130. He’s a copium dispenser.
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  131. Anyone remember the good old days when it was gonna be over for Russia once the AFU got F-16’s?
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  132. Application of the logic razor would suggest that Russian air losses are related to their increased use. SAM traps are a constant effort; the returns scale with enemy air activity. There is a cost in SAM launchers or radars as well, this is much less visible and more difficult to analyze.
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  133. That man droned on and on about social media posts being sufficient to ban someone’s participation in the Olympics. I can’t imagine anything more feckless, or more silly. During the time that the Warsaw Pact was poised to initiate WWIII and proxy wars were in progress on several continents, members of their military participated in the Olympics.
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  134. They are tactical rather than operational breakthroughs. Cracking a trench line or a defensive position centered on a group of buildings is a breakthrough for a company or battalion. It’s just a matter of scale, war isn’t semantics.
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  135. Speaking of drones, is the Sukhoi S-70 already in use?
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  136. Stalingrad, although larger, wasn’t strategically important either. What made it important was the symbolic value placed on it and the forces dedicated to taking/defending it. The same is true of Avdiivka, as it was with Bakhmut.
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  137. Nathanael Greene wasn’t at the Battle of Bunker/Breed’s Hill. He had been serving in the area, but was elsewhere at the time of the battle.
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  138.  @mattsapero1896  That was the last time Ukraine had numerical superiority. Last year, Ukraine was in its best position of the war since 2022 relative to Russia in personnel, equipment and logistics, and their offensive quickly broke down against a deeply entrenched enemy. Now, even with new aid incoming, Ukraine has no prospects for an offensive this summer, and possibly not this year. The Russians apparently have the means and the intention to maintain offensive operations this summer. As great as their dependence for materiel is, what Ukraine needs most of all is something that cannot be bought or sent by the West: more Ukrainians. Look at Ukraine’s 2023 population pyramid; there are virtually no young men. As bad as Russia’s demographic pyramid is, it is better than Ukraine’s, and several times larger. The materiel situation will probably look favorable for Ukraine sometime next year, but when a deeper conscription proves insufficient to recover any meaningful tranche of their territory, Ukraine will be asking for combat troops and aerial support.
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  139. No mention of the pressure on the Ukrainian front from multiple axes? Krynky, Robotyne, northwest from Avdiivka, west from Bakhmut are all being pushed simultaneously, and an attack from the Kupyansk - Liman area looks imminent. Immediate threats seem more important than long term musings.
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  140. Their whole Challenger park is less than 400.
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  141. I’m getting it just fine.
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  142.  @uku4171 I guess we are conscious of being the guarantor of the defense of a lot of allies, including but not not limited to the Europeans.
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  143.  @sebastianforbes1 Yeah, Ukraine occupies much of Russia and has continued to advance relentlessly for the last year. And Russia’s electrical infrastructure is in shambles. Oh, wait, I got that backwards 😄
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  144. Syrsky’s recent statement sounds very much like: “Z made me attack in Kursk to get the Russians to redeploy out of central Ukraine. I told him they wouldn’t, and they didn’t. Now we have this salient to defend in addition to everything else, and it contains our best units”.
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  145. Yes, I mentioned that at length yesterday.
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  146. 5:12 “Expectation of a Russian offensive in the spring”. That’s not good, the current one hasn’t run its course yet. This implies Russian reserves not currently committed in the current attack along the hundred km or so in southeastern Ukraine, or the positional fighting elsewhere. Are the evacuations of population in the Kharkiv area just in areas coming under fire from Russian advances, or is it more general in anticipation that the expected offensive will fall in that area?
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  147. The left (west) ear is being lopped off , while the Russians are also denting in the base of the eastern side. AFU putting in some counterattacks, but otherwise just defending.
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  148. That’s a baffling assertion. Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, all that happened was that the Soviets collapsed, despite having vastly more capable forces than it has now. What’s the geopolitical rationale for an exhausted and vastly weaker Russia being a conventional threat to the West simply from having its border moved back to the frontiers of Poland and Rumania?
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  149. AFU retreating in every area of active combat. What EU nation is going to keep Ukraine stocked with Patriot missiles and real-time satellite intel?
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  150. @ They are retreating in Kursk as well. The result of their Kursk 2.0 offensive was that within a week or so, they held less Russian territory than when it began due to the Russians attacking all around the salient, and it continues to shrink. Refer to any reliable mapper, even the pro-Ukrainian ISW or Deep State, which is basically a part of the AFU. And on every other active part of the front, the Russians are advancing, while the few AFU counterattacks are either deblocking or temporary screens for withdrawals. Despite the losses, Russian force reconstitution outstrips than that of Ukraine. Even the AFU admits this by saying that they are increasingly outnumbered. Ukraine’s demographic pyramid is one of the few that is worse than Russia’s, and on a population base a fourth as large. Ukraine’s critical need is for something no one can give them: more Ukrainian men.
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  151. 12:43 It’s not a handful, it’s the Speaker and the majority party.
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  152. I can imagine the fun that one or more of the USN’s 53 SSN’s had taking turns tracking the French sub on sonar and cataloguing its signature.
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  153. Arms, yes. Infantry, no. The Ukrainians of late are utterly unable to hold wooded/ forested areas due to the inability to man a line with sufficient density to prevent constant Russian infiltration. The only exception is in the Kursk salient, where they have massed enough force to lose slowly.
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  154. Your guest got it wrong. US opinion isn’t indifferent, it is opposed to further aid. The opposition isn’t visceral, but basically a view that it’s time for the Europeans to pay up after they spent decades cutting their defense spending and lolling under the umbrella of US protection.
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  155. It really has become a hopium dispenser. “Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain!”
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  156. @ Just a city formerly of 60-70k, a rail hub, sitting astride a major radial communications roadway, prepared by the Ukrainians as a major defense node and completely ringed by field fortifications. Certainly of no importance. And by the way Kharkiv, while still in Ukrainian hands, doesn’t exactly stand.
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  157. ISW abandoned objectivity more than a year ago, and are now overtly partisan for Ukraine. It looks like US weaponry will now go to Ukraine only on a cash or in-kind basis if at all, and even then this might not apply to Patriot, ATACMS and possibly other materiel and services (satellite recon and Starlink) without submission to negotiations.
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  158. “There are no Russian troops in Chasiv Yar” -Ukrainian MOD 😄
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  159. Ukraine continues to probe with most of the new brigades in reserve but MLR not reached in any location. Russians defending without committing additional units. Attrition now favors the larger Russian army since Ukraine is on the offensive. A larger proportion of missiles are getting through at Kiev. Is this due to improved Russian ECCM, degraded Ukrainian SAM stocks, or is Ukraine prioritizing more AAW assets to the front? ‘The old wars were decided more by their episodes that their tendencies, while modern wars are decided more by their tendencies than their episodes’ (probably not verbatim, but I didn’t look it up).
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  160. DU isn’t radioactive to any appreciable degree, and can’t be used to produce any fissile product.
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  161. A few countries are either actually or considering tapping the brakes. Germany is looking with concern at the potential for AfD (who mostly oppose aid) to be impossible to exclude from the next government because of projected electoral gains. A bill with $300M Ukraine aid was stopped Friday in the US House, the aid will be broken out for a separate up-and-down vote that may fail.
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  162. It has been for some time. Ukraine is in a critical position for both logistics and numbers. It’s not irretrievable, but they are in a very much worse position than six months ago or even last year.
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  163. The side with a demographic advantage doesn’t want to repatriate soldiers to their opponent.
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  164. I see opinion in the US that is beginning to see the stated Ukrainian victory conditions as unattainable by them in the context of their performance this summer (never mind that at least some of the problems resulted from moronic doctrinal suggestions from Western militaries). Further, the Israel war now has higher significance for the US. If one has to choose one or the other, we would probably be inclined to the Levant, especially since the US managed the decline of the USSR tolerably well even when the current Ukraine was a Soviet possession. These events, along with political considerations are causing some hitches in support for Ukraine in the US. If it is necessary to negotiate, now might be better rather than in the context of an event like a first ‘no’ vote on UKR aid in our Congress, or AfD surging into the BRD government after a major election success. As your guest said, time is on Russia’s side, especially since Ukrainian success is dependent upon outside help, and only the Russians have escalatory options.
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  165.  @Jszar  The western allies provide stuff, they aren’t currently fighting and show no proclivity to do so, meaning there are a few things that Russia can do that Ukraine cannot reply in kind. One is using strategic ALCM or other platforms with conventional warheads; admittedly a trade off since it erodes Russia’s deterrent. Another is using its submarines to enforce shipping restrictions, implying a more forceful interdiction of Ukraines ability to ship grain. Interference with satellite comms. Holding a new nuclear test. Mobilizing closer to the percentage of population that Ukraine has. It’s not difficult to come up with stuff. In any case, these things are just a coda to my previous post.
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  166. Besieged cities don’t get supplies, that’s sort of the definition of a siege.
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  167. About a quarter of the Legion is Slavic or Siberian.
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  168. In what hallucination was that huge? The Hail Mary in Iraq was a huge armored attack by several heavy divisions in concert; this was a battalion-sized attack. We get that there’s a hunger for ANY form of success, but please.
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  169. devilishdeed is becoming the most popular commenter.
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  170. Dom is like a feature columnist on the middle school newspaper: inventive insults outrank reality.
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  171. Some will arrive in days. This will probably aid Ukraines air defense and deep strike ability before it does much for their combat capability. Ukraine’s greatest need, more than materiel, is something that cannot be bought or sent- more Ukrainians. Look at Ukraine’s 2023 population pyramid; there are virtually no young men. The material aid from the West will probably keep Ukraine from losing outright. Retaking territory will require the Ukrainians to go onto the short side of the attrition balance attacking an enemy in field fortifications; we have already seen Ukraine do poorly at that when they were in the best personnel, equipment, and supply situation they’ve had thus far. First will come what has already been proposed: deeper conscription. When that is insufficient, the solution will be for Ukraine to ask for combat troops.
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  172. Perun is best. By a lot. A military historian has called it the “best researched, most thoughtful, and best presented” material on the web regarding the war.
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  173. It’s Ukraine that’s in the dark. Russian strikes into Ukraine continue to be more numerous, with larger munitions, and more effective. Ukraine has a cold, dark winter coming.
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  174. IIRC some 350 square Km west of the Avdiivka area since the taking of that city, not counting any territory taken elsewhere.
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  175. I’m sure that haranguing the guy who holds a blackball on your EU membership is the way to go.
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  176. Not inside Ukraine.
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  177. The simplest explanation appears to be everyone taking a cautious, penny wise policy. The only systematic strategy explanation would be a desire for the status quo ante: keep Russia from taking Ukraine while not risking the military defeat of a nuclear power. Neither make a lot of sense.
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  178. There are days with few missiles fired because the Russians have switched to saturation strikes, and only fire a few missiles on the intervening days. The saturation attacks are working quite well, to judge from lower interception rates, blacked-out cities, and stress on the Kyiv defenses. If the FABs were as uselessly inaccurate as Dom snarks, Ukrainian officials wouldn’t specifically mention them, would they? But the Ukranians hit a couple ships, so everything is going swimmingly. Their foreign minister is just nervous without cause.
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  179.  @herona70  When commenting on what a pro-Ukraine mapper says is Putinbottery, things are looking dismal.
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  180. Francis just repeated what I’ve been saying here for months about the direction of US opinion.
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  181. Responses from the US House majority to Biden’s speech were not heartening: many negatively characterized it as a speech using a preamble about Israel to introduce a speech predominantly about aid to Ukraine, and that Ukraine does not outrank Israel in US geostrategic considerations.
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  182.  @chadstevens6605 While the front moves westward? Unlikely.
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  183. There is a Lord Lyon King of Arms 😄
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  184. Tactical use has always been part of their doctrine. That leads to a degree of desensitization, which shouldn’t be discounted.
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  185. OK lol.
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  186. In the US, Israel gets precedence.
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  187. @ “a few meters”. Look at the map changes since the summer. Also, Russian force reconstitution is going well enough that the Ukrainians consistently complain of being increasingly outnumbered.
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  188. Not with the Russians advancing in 9/9 active combat areas.
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  189. There is no scenario where Ukraine recovers its territory using only its own forces. Any victory plan that isn’t merely rhetorical requires Western forces in combat roles.
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  190. Hitchens is profoundly missed.
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  191. Putting in armored assets to help stabilize a new line.
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  192. Reports: understrength and exhausted Ukrainian units have the breakdown that understrength and exhausted units commit. Dom: “jazz hands”
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  193. The worlds oldest commissioned warship is USS Constitution, but it’s not surprising that someone from the UK would want to forget about her. Kommuna is probably second.
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  194.  @marisabenson1222 Not at Avdiivka. Consult ISW and other analysts.
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  195.  @stream2watch 😆
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  196. Next to no movement on the front, but always in the same direction for a couple years = 20% of Ukraine occupied.
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  197. Eventually that goes sideways.
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  198. They are. Ukraine has gone from a large energy exporter to a large importer. Ukrainian authorities have said their output has decided from 55Mw to less than 20. There are also problems with routing because of line outages. Explosions and diesel generators are the soundtrack of Ukraine.
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  199.  @idleishde6124 That is accurate. I think the House has reached the point that it will vote down any Ukraine aid that stands alone. It might possibly pass in conjunction with a meaningful measure to stop border crossings into the US.
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  200. Just look at the map. No one has to lie about what’s happening. AFU are getting steamrolled.
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  201. Reports that Russia is able to rotate troops in essentially all areas indicates that Russian replacement efforts have replenished enough units to do so. As ISW reports, Russia is also recruiting and training at a pace that equals its recent losses, making its recent scope and level of attacks sustainable from an attrition point of view. They aren’t running out of men. This buildup must be the source for the concerns over expected attacks in the northeast area - more formations had to come from somewhere, and all the other MD’s have been tapped. Russian command and control in the northeast area would apparently be better since these units appear to mostly be from the same (Western) Military District. Warnings about planned Ukrainian evacuations in this area are either a reaction to its likelihood, or playing along if they think the attack threats are a maskirovka. With revived troop strength, the Russians face a choice: whether or not to do another partial mobilization after their elections. One solidifies their political situation, the other essentially eliminates the possibility of any effective Ukrainian ground effort in the near term by strengthening Russian reserves, something that didn’t even exist at one point. Ukraine needs a several fold increase in support, quantity and quality, from its European neighbors. The US has demonstrated an attitude that it’s not going to shoulder a large proportion of the effort. If these things don’t happen, it’s possible that Ukraine’s best balance of forces vs Russia has passed. Ukraine needs a strong qualitative and logistical edge because otherwise the one thing they need most is something no one can give them- a lot more Ukranians.
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  202. I sure there’s an all sunshine Ukraine channel somewhere.
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  203. Well, have to talk about something - anything - besides what’s happening at the front. The US continues to be very cagey, especially since European support seems to be fading or endangered after the next elections.
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  204. The European elections will be interesting, especially to see if AfD makes the gains currently projected.
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  205. Pilot transitional training is the easiest and fastest part of this acquisition. Full operational IOC for F-16 has been years in the countries that transitioned to it. The costs of support would amount to virtually all of the US PDA, leaving little for things Ukraine needs more like HIMARS rockets and artillery ammunition. Gripen would be a vastly better choice for Ukraine than F-16, with its austere field capability and the designed-in ability to be serviced by conscripts after relatively brief training. It’s difficulty to see how F-16s can be supported in Ukraine without direct western (probably US) logistical and tech support. One possible conclusion is that Ukraine doesn’t want the most effective aircraft as much as it wants a blood oath from the US.
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  206. 21:00 to 40:30 is frontline first person observation. His observation that Ukraine cannot attack in the same way as the Russians is pointed and accurate: they can’t manage artillery parity, much less superiority, and don’t have the men to mount attritional attacks with infantry. They must somewhere establish operational maneuver for success, and this is problematic . They will at least have suitable equipment; the problem will be assembling sufficient mass.
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  207. Quite a buzzkill - surprisingly rapid development of Congressional resistance to support for Ukraine. McCathy’s ouster is pointed at getting a more isolationist Speaker to reflect the trend in the US House. 32:10 to 33:45 points out that US support for Ukraine was pretty solid until eroded by the unfocused policy of the current administration, attempting to solve the problem with apparently endless tranches of money instead of international leadership.
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  208.  @yuglesstube  I would call it sea denial. It is relevant primarily if the Russians envisaged any amphibious operations, those would now be off the table.
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  209. Writing down the Russians with a proxy is fine, but it’s not the Russian capabilities that concern us most.
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  210. It is because there are extremely dense air defenses on both sides. Air operations over Ukraine are extremely difficult because of this. The Russians have essentially the same systems at greater density over the area they hold.
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  211. Middle school insults are all that are left to the faithful.
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  212. Translation of the US concerns: higher gas prices hurt Biden’s campaign.
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  213. Middle-school insults to reportage ratio is 3:1
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  214. There were outlets that implied that the Russians would run away at the first use of HIMARS or the sight of Leopard 2’s.
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  215. Check the mappers; they continue moving forward.
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  216.  @lord6617  Central Asia is Kazakhstan/ Mongolia -ish. It’s always cold there.
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  217. Regarding the US: of course we would like for Ukraine to win, and funding a proxy against an enemy depletes that potential enemy disproportionately relative to one’s own resources, and would thus be both desirable and sound strategically. The problem is that China is watching the depletion of Western inventories at absolutely no cost to themselves while they prepare to take Taiwan. The US must constantly weigh its ability to meet all of its strategic necessities.
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  218. The US provides intel and reconnaissance that, if withdrawn, either can’t be replaced, or replaced with difficulty and more time lag.
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  219.  @toddlawrence6872  The location of forces matters a lot; the Ukrainians just shut down their only remaining coal coking plant due to the Russian forces’ proximity to Pokrovsk. Also, certain areas of terrain are the actual Russian war aims, which is kinda important. Attrition is favoring the Russians due to their better force regeneration. Ukraines population pyramid in military ages is worse than Russia’s, and their population is 1/4 as large. Ukraine’s critical need is for something no other nation can supply: more Ukrainians.
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  220. A campaign issue in the US as well as Germany. I’m not as surprised at countries tapping the brakes as I am that it is happening this soon.
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  221. Land mines and field fortifications, if dense and expansive, are extremely effective at mobility denial and enhancing attrition.
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  222. Tell that to Bomber Command and the Eighth and Twentieth US Air Forces. I don’t think their efforts were out of desperation.
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  223. A favorable outcome is the #2 priority of the US. #1 is to avoid a wider war. “Favorable outcome” does not coincide with Urkraine’s stated aims.
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  224.  @professorg8383 An alternative view is that the US is intentionally pursuing the geopolitical status quo - enough support to prevent Ukraine from being overrun, but not enough to make the defeat of a nuclear-armed power likely.
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  225. And who was fired to put him in charge? This was a double blunder by Zelensky.
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  226. Could have to do with US opinion polling now running 55-45 against another Ukrainian aid package. In Germany, AfD has gained very substantially into second place ahead of regional elections; AfD is pretty flatly against further aid. Ukraine probably has to show some substantial breach of Russian defenses soon to continue getting current or higher levels of help.
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  227. The cupboard is pretty bare, and there’s been significant attrition of artillery platforms. Also IIRC not every Western 155mm piece can fire every type of 155 ammunition.
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  228. Both sides do this, Spetsnaz have had plenty of practice in the last couple decades to stay sharp for the war with Ukraine.
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  229. Why relieved? Ukraine is (in an operational sense) striking into air in Kursk region with its reserves, suffering the higher losses incumbent on the attacker, while the Russians continue to advance along several avenues of advance into central Ukraine. Russian forces in the Kursk region are assembling and yesterday began counterattacking the eastern face of the new front. Also remember that Russian missile and aviation strikes inside Ukraine continue to be more numerous and with heavier ordnance than those made by Ukraine against Russia. Ukrainian energy officials state that their electricity production has declined from 55Gw to “less than 20Gw” and call the situation a “catastrophic shortage”. Ukraine has gone from being a major energy exporter to a heavy buyer of electricity, and rolling blackouts are widespread. Ukrainian officials are warning their people that the coming winter will be cold and dark. Ukraine’s demographic problems are more and more pressing with respect to obtaining military personnel. Their demographic pyramid is one of the few in the world that is worse than Russia’s, and it is one-third as large. There is no serious analyst who sees a scenario in which Ukraine can recover its lost territory using only their own forces. The greatest need is for something the West cannot provide - more Ukrainians. The Ukrainian attack in Kursk is a bargaining position for eventual negotiations. They have shown themselves unable to make headway against established Russian forces.
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  230. The difficulties in shifting forces from the Kursk salient include the value of the territory as a negotiating chip, determining what force is necessary to hold a salient without prepared defenses, and the losses that will be incurred by withdrawing units along routes well know and probably pre-registered by the Russians. Even then, it would be days before any units moved can get themselves to the desired location and sort themselves out to enter the line. Recently, losses of the Russians and Ukrainians have been at parity because both are attacking. That’s terrible for the side that is already at a strong numerical disadvantage.
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  231.  @gracesprocket7340  This reinforces the point I was making; someone touted as an expert commentator on the military affairs of the war is unaware of the general organization of the forces of one side.
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  232.  @heatrayzvideo3007  But every destroyed Russian tank, and therefore any harmful substance, is in Ukraine. Likewise, belts of land mines cover a large swathe of southern Ukraine.
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  233.  @colonelangus8247 They haven’t been paying their dues. They have been drawing down for decades, lolling under the umbrella of US power.
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  234. We have tread relatively lightly because Russia’s ability to escalate is orders of magnitude greater than Ukraine’s. Russia’s doctrine is a continuation of Soviet doctrine, in which first use of nuclear weapons can be operational and does not require an existential threat.
    2
  235. Telegraph upholding its standards.
    2
  236. So the General from the Ukrainian Intel Directorate essentially told The Economist that the West owes Ukraine more inventory without reference to their own needs, since they still have something left in the larder? OK then. Sounds like the “two red button” meme, hubris vs desperation.
    2
  237. In outlook and style, he sounds a bit like Schörner.
    2
  238. Nothing makes a statement sound serious like the inclusion of terms from fantasy fiction.
    2
  239. Mainly that there is only one side with the ability to escalate.
    2
  240.  @johnashton4086 Um, not quite. The Soviets lost somewhere around four times the German military dead, and won by attrition, being more able to replace their losses. The Russian traded books AND space for time.
    2
  241. A Reuters poll released today states that 41% of US respondents agreed that the US should provide arms to Ukraine. This number was 65% in June. The support for financial aid in the poll was 37%. Another poll by another organization showed 61% and 63% respectively. Both polls noted that support had dropped significantly.
    2
  242. The eight brigade equivalents Ukraine sent to the north have been wrecked counterattacking the Russians around Vovchansk, and their redeployment there has left the eastern part of Ukraine open to an increased tempo of Russian advance. Some areas in the east seem to be transitioning from positional fighting to meeting engagements, which will be very bad for Ukraine. Lanchester’s Laws appear to be beginning to bite hard on the Ukrainians, as Russia continues to successfully reconstitute units and continue their offensive.
    2
  243. @@FlowerPower441US aid is slowing for two reasons: increasing public opinion against it (IIRC its a majority in all swing states), and growing sentiment that the European members of NATO should bear the load of aid, having cut their defense for decades and coasted along under the US defense umbrella. Europe needs to pony up in a large way if they want to see a Ukrainian success.
    2
  244. 42:01 “Quantity has a quality all its own” is a Russian thing. Prior to this, the observation that “all the best stuff” went to equip one brigade. One brigade. A company of Challengers, a battalion of Abrams.
    2
  245. I think that’s wrong, opposition appears to have grown in the House and is starting in the Senate. I don’t think any aid will get passed without a very fundamental change in border policy and actions.
    2
  246. The UK’s total park of Challenger II was less than 350 when they agreed to give a dozen or so. They dont exactly have tanks to spare. In Germany, AfD (who essentially want to end aid)is gaining support, so expect a tap on the brakes from Germany.
    2
  247. Look at Ukraine’s population pyramid. The 18 to 25 cohort is extremely small. Ukraine is reticent to grind their tiny stock of seed corn.
    2
  248. Interesting to minimize recent Russian gains when those of just the last two weeks represent a significant proportion of the area gained by the entire Ukrainian offensive last year. Credit for mentioning the failed special forces operation, the characterization of it as an attempt at a media attention grab/deflection is certainly correct, I can’t imagine what military utility it would have. Most Western outlets haven’t even mentioned it.
    2
  249. Meanwhile, Ukraine loses a few more villages, Pokrovsk is being flanked from the south, and the Russians are cutting into the base of the Suzhda salient.
    2
  250.  @MrRille333 occupation of a quarter of your opponent isn’t exactly a stand-off.
    2
  251. Where will they operate them? They aren’t compatible with austere airfields.
    2
  252.  @marcopalazzo9349 The Russian use of glide bombs hasn’t decreased. Even if Ukrainian claims of aircraft downed are accepted, Russian 2023 production of multirole aircraft is ~double the losses from Jan 2023 to present. Clearly, if the Russians continue what they’ve been doing, they consider the effect worth the attrition.
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  253. I don’t know about capitulation, but a collapse of the current line is possible, which would probably make negotiations immediately necessary. It does have an air of desperation when Zelensky has shifted from begging for aid to berating the donors for not giving more and sooner, as well as warning NATO that they are next, which is pretty fatuous.
    2
  254. “Russia claims”?? Even the semi-official Deep State map has shown Vuledar in Russian control since Oct 1.
    2
  255.  @shannonroberts5080  It also doesn’t show force reconstitution or demographics. Despite their losses, the force disparity in RU favor is growing, even according to the AFU’s statements. And Ukraine’s demographic pyramid is one of the few on earth that is worse than Russia’s with respect to military age men, and that on not quite one-third the population. No serious analyst posits a scenario where Ukraine takes back its territory using only their own forces. Some Ukrainian officials now frankly admit that getting NATO into combat roles is what they want and need. Will is about to undergo a major test as Ukraine is about to have a very cold and dark winter. They have gone from being a major energy exporter to a heavy importer, and can’t get what they have to many locations. Various European nations are also flagging in their support, and some are looking at coming elections where parties which have less (or no) interest in supporting Ukraine are gaining, eg AfD in Germany. Territory held is the currency of negotiations, and that is why both sides are straining for every square meter, even when a more flexible strategy might be more preferable operationally, particularly for Ukraine.
    2
  256. The tradition in the US with respect to disinformation is for the government to protect it like all other speech, leaving its disproof to responses from government organs and the media. More briefly put, lying in the public forum is legal and protected.
    2
  257.  @sebastianforbes1 How about answering the question?
    2
  258.  @robertsteele474  Odessa comes up a lot in discussion of both general and escalatory options.
    2
  259. “A Harris victory contested by Trump” appears to be a fading possibility, to judge by Trump overtaking Harris in electoral polling, especially when it is generally conceded that Trump’s support is undercounted.
    2
  260. The Russians just took delivery of a batch of nine new multirole aircraft of the SU-30/34/35 family this week.
    2
  261. And now they are going to get much worse terms.
    2
  262. Nice story bro. Carthago delenda est.
    2
  263. “All Ukraine needs to perform like we did in Iraq is superior training and equipment, lavish logistics and fire support, extensive engineering capabilities, and absolute sustained air supremacy. I don’t see why we can’t do that.”
    2
  264.  @udsmall7306 ITs geTting On foR holdinG 25% oF UkRaiNe.
    2
  265.  @anthonyhulse1248  Deep analysis.
    2
  266. The US aid slowdown has multiple reasons. One is leverage in an attempt to get enough change in immigration policy to demonstrate the prior policy as worse than failed; ie purely internal US politics. The other is a view that the burden should be on Europe in view of their long term failure to meet their NATO contributions. This also interfaces with US operations in the Gulf region and planning with respect to our commitments vs China’s threats. We’re also having an eyeroll at the hyperbole of Russia attacking Europe; in a fight without special weapons, Poland could probably stop them unaided. Also, Dom should refrain from attempts to explicate Congressional processes 😆
    2
  267. They shot down 354 of 151 missiles fired at them, the vibration from the SAM launches took down the grid. Believing the Ukrainian military’s stats is almost as heavy glue sniffing as believing the Russian MOD.
    2
  268. It’s all they have at present, other than the theatricals in the Belgorod region.
    2
  269. Don’t know, but milbloggers from both sides are saying they have dropped boatloads of FABs and glide bombs on the Ukrainians in the last week.
    2
  270. That’s the best solution possible, probably better than the Leopards, in terms of numbers, capability and uniformity.
    2
  271. It’s unspoken as to which side has more suffering from poor heat - or none.
    2
  272. First part accurate, second part entirely plausible.
    2
  273. ATP Geo is even more fun, I play his mania in the background while I work.
    2
  274. In the most dense AAW environment on Earth? Lol.
    2
  275. This was done in WWII with naval mines. The US has had a family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) for decades; these can be sown by helicopters, artillery, and other methods.
    2
  276.  @SorinAntal  By quite a bit, at least vs Harris.
    2
  277. The statements from the leaks align pretty closely with my own conclusions drawn from various Western analysts. How does Ukraine get across the Perekop, after fighting their way there? The statements about the Russians being limited to T-64/72’s is incorrect. Recent satellite data shows that Russia still has ~900 T-80 and later just in their depots, as well as just short of 2000 T-72 variants. How many better tanks they still have in units, and how quickly these reserve vehicles can be brought to service is the question. Also, with Ukraine on the offensive, the ratio of casualties will shift, and Ukrainian attempts to advance with armor will run into the same problem of dense ATGM defenses that the Russians faced, not to mention the problems associated with attacking into the worlds largest artillery park. Ukraine has a long and costly path to victory. It is possible and desirable, but it is also dependent on continued heavy gifts of materiel from the West. Even with this, what Ukraine will need most is something the west cannot provide - more Ukrainian soldiers. A Russian political collapse or an armistice is more likely than Ukraine recovering all of their territory including Crimea.
    2
  278. Only 10-12km from the main defensive line in the area of Berdyansk.
    2
  279. We will see if that is true in the House, and if so, how long it takes.
    2
  280. AFU just getting steamrolled lately.
    2
  281. No mention whatever of what is taking place at the front, as usual. I wonder why. Keep in mind that virtually every day, if not every single day, that Russian strikes against Ukraine are more numerous and with heavier ordnance that Ukraine’s against Russia. This shows in the contrast of the two countries’ energy industries. While Russia’s fuel industry has been impacted, Ukraine has gone from being a major electricity exporter, to being an importer. Throughout Ukraine, including Kyiv, there are rolling electrical blackouts.
    2
  282. This is one of the things I voted for.
    2
  283. Oh boy, now that the Ukrainians have F-16’s those Russians will turn tail… Wait, they are advancing in multiple directions, and at an increased pace.
    2
  284. Absolutely no good news.
    2
  285. Transitioning most air forces to F-16s took 3-5 years.
    2
  286. Fly them through the most dense air defense zone on Earth? 😆
    2
  287. Russia doesn’t need shills, the map does their talking.
    2
  288. The reality is that other governments and the U.N. have come to view American taxpayer dollars as an entitlement.
    2
  289. Last time the Brits tried to tell us what to do didn’t go well.
    2
  290. No serious analyst envisages a scenario in which Ukraine regains its territory using only its own combat forces.
    2
  291. A failure, when every location that the Ukrainians drew forces to send north has been attacked successfully? Got it. Wait to judge further once the Russians commit the remainder of the forces they intend to use.
    2
  292. At this point, force reconstitution is of great importance, and the numbers aren’t close.
    2
  293. A few million more Ukranians.
    2
  294. No commentator any longer pretends that Ukraine can achieve their aim of recovering all their lost territory on the battlefield.
    2
  295. Implies the massive mobile reserve and numerical superiority similar to that of Eighth Army.
    2
  296. The Russians will probably push west from Avdiivka enough to develop the Ukrainian line and exploit any gap. They are already attacking in the Robotyne area with a force at least as large as that used at Avdiivka, and are also attacking west out of Bakhmut. The meat attacks ceased around Avdiivka several months ago and Ukrainian sources report that Russian troops appear to be better trained than previously. The Russians were for the first time able to successfully use and sustain close air support around Avdiivka, indicating that they believe that important results can be gained by committing their air assets that were previously carefully preserved. A force considerably larger than that used at Avdiivka appears to be forming up in the Kupyiansk region for another attack. Regardless of past attrition, even the Ukrainians say the Russians outnumber them everywhere, showing that the Russians have leveraged their demographic advantage and so far have won the mobilization race. The Ukrainians need everything, but especially one thing no one can give them: more Ukrainians. It’s a critical situation for Ukraine, with the danger of collapse in multiple locations. Regime change in Russia is their best hope, but there is no guarantee that would halt the war. Had the US House passed the aid on then the day the Senate passed it, dropping $60B on Ukraine may not have made any real difference at Avdiivka. Should it be necessary as noted in the podcast, Ukraine’s best negotiating position may have passed.
    2
  297. “The enemy always gets a vote”.
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  298. We are here presented the spectacle of people discussing the prospect of war crimes trials where the losers try the winners in absentia after an armistice.
    2
  299. US aid looks likely to decrease in the near term. European NATO slacked for years, and there is exasperation here that they seem to expect the load to be carried by America even when there is a regional war. The US is becoming more focused on Israel and readiness vs China. Spending for SRP replenishment is being mentioned as a priority. As for this being a Christmas gift to Putin, he is the least likely adversary to be able to do something substantial vs US interests with one. As a worst case, recall that the US successfully managed the decline of the USSR when it was still in possession of Ukraine.
    2
  300. I’d be less dismissive of Orban, since he holds an effective veto of Ukraine aid.
    2
  301. Thats a rhetorical flourish, but it points to something important. The one thing the West can’t give the Ukrainians is critical need considering the Russians’ manpower: more Ukrainians.
    2
  302. And to think that the Democrats’ biggest worry used to be that Biden would die in office and they’d be stuck with Kamala as their candidate.
    2
  303. In addition to multiple advances in the south, the left ear of the Kursk salient is being lopped off.
    2
  304. Seven-ish
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  305.  @DeRuyter62 They just fired one. Do try to keep up.
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  306.  @VorbildRoß  That occurred briefly several months ago. Since then, the Russians have been steadily reducing it down to half its original size while also attacking vigorously in numerous parts of Ukraine. They don’t talk about that here, it requires looking at professional analysts like ISW and mappers like Deep State (sanctioned by Ukraine) or the Russian-friendly but often more up to date Suriyak.
    2
  307. A test would be if Russia intercepts and interns a non-China flagged ship, and the subsequent maritime insurance response.
    2
  308. It’s often the rule rather than the exception for soldiers who do not surrender as part of a group capitulation. Doesn’t make it right, but individual soldiers are quite likely not to survive an effort to surrender in combat. When in settled positions between engagements it’s sometimes different, with each side trying to entice enemy soldiers to come across for morale/ propaganda/ intelligence value.
    2
  309. Becoming irrelevant and a worse choice that Gripen.
    2
  310.  @Kath-nd6pj  Not three, but roughly a dozen towns and villages in the last ten days (some 300 square km just in the Avdiivka area), and biting into at least eight more when I looked at the Ukrainian-run mapping just a while ago. The Ukrainians are withdrawing because there is no alternative. The fortifications ordered behind Avdiivka last year weren’t built, so the Ukrainians are withdrawing into what are currently improvised positions that they are improving. This is all verifiable by geolocation. There are news reports from Western sources that inquiries are under way to determine why the fortified belt behind Avdiivka wasn’t built. The tempo of Russian operations has increased rather than slowed of late. Several of the formations involved in the reduction of Avdiivka have been identified in successful attacks this week, indicating that they weren’t rendered combat ineffective, as was claimed. This is all from Ukrainian or pro-Ukrainian sources.
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  311. It reflects political trends pointing to declining support in parts of the west including the US. This needs to be taken into account since it will affect the course of events in Ukraine. The course of this war will be determined as much by the actions of other nations as by the combatants, assuming neither has a political overturn.
    2
  312.  @gogudelagaze1585 And yet Ukraine says they are outnumbered overall, and the intel services of other countries agree. Either someone is bad at math, the loss estimates are inaccurate, or Russia has leveraged their demographic advantage.
    2
  313.  @richiecooke69 Maybe, but he is correct.
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  314. AFU are just getting steamrolled of late. Russia’s biggest month of gain to date, and even the rasputitsa may not stop them.
    2
  315.  @foraminutethere23  The usefulness of Bakhmut to the Russians is not taking it, but the attritional grind that the opponent is unwilling to end by withdrawal.
    2
  316. Pipe dreams.
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  317. I think he’s been thoughtful and balanced. And my disclaimer is that I’m a skeptic of Ukraine winning.
    2
  318. People are reacting as if these events are taking away Ukraines ability to win. Ukraine was never going to recover its territory without help in ground combat. I also noticed that Dom is simultaneously asserting that the Russian Army is helpless against Ukraine, but a threat to Europe.
    2
  319. Dom’s first segment: more “nothing to see here folks, Steiner’s aid package will set everything right”. Ukraine would give their eyes for the stalemate they plaintively decried months ago, to say nothing of gains like the Russians have made since last fall. It’s odd that the Ukrainians suddenly can’t do a unit rotation. One might think that this might just be a cover for a company here or there just breaking and legging it, and the units nearby having to retreat due to an observant Russian response. The implication that all Russian advances result from mindless bludgeoning and the weight of numbers is belied by the events at and around Ocheretyne. The thrust forward there was a rapid response to developments, and a subsequent move to the south from that town outflanked the Ukrainians in Novobakhmutivka and Soloviove, causing the Ukrainians to withdraw hastily with little fighting. That’s planning and maneuver, not knuckle dragging.
    2
  320. He’s blowing sunshine. Otherwise, the aid would not have slowed.
    2
  321. I was taken aback at the statement that it was hard to think of Russian non-nuclear escalatory options, I can think of several offhand: Depressed-trajectory Kalibr strikes from the Black Sea Kilo-class subs. Blockade of Odessa sea traffic with said submarines. Risking some strategic assets (TU-22 and -160) using ALCM of whatever necessary range on missions such as interdiction of Western supplies, a large strike on a major city assessed to be less protected than Kyiv, or port/ canal facilities. “Escalate to de-escalate” is part of their doctrine, I would presume that applies to non-nuclear options even more than to nuclear weapons.
    2
  322. For more about aerial attacks on civilians, see UK Bomber Command and US Eighth and Twentieth Air Forces.
    2
  323. I’ve noticed that Dom has quit saying that Russian missile production is faltering since each such mention was shortly followed by a big night of Russian strikes.
    2
  324. More and more, to find out what’s happening on land, I have to check analysis sites like ISW. Wonder why.
    2
  325. There is no serious analyst who sees any scenario where Ukraine recovers its territory without active combat participation of air and ground forces from other nations, and in multi divisional strength. Who will that be?
    2
  326. Not exactly, check ISW. The Russians are advancing on at least three axes in the Avdiika and Bakhmut areas.
    2
  327. Parts of the Ukrainian front are crumbling, their strength is at its nadir, and youre focused on one Russian SU-25. Way to prioritize.
    2
  328. A hundred men may be the combat strength of many Ukrainian battalions at present.
    2
  329.  @grisall  “no casualties”. Withdrawing on foot via a route observed by air and covered by enemy fire.
    2
  330.  @anthonyhulse1248 I’ll keep it simple then. Ukraine has gone from being a major exporter of electricity to a major importer, and it’s getting worse each week.
    2
  331. I suppose that the movement of the front for the last six months can’t be mentioned either. It’s certainly being avoided.
    2
  332. “That’s a bingo”.
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  333. Not referring to the comments here, but I would ask if any earnest analyst trying to be objective who isn’t cheerleading for Ukraine a “Russian troll”? I’m thinking of Perun on YT, Justin Bronk, etc.
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  334. I’ve heard him say it so many times that it doesn’t interrupt my attention anymore.
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  335.  @jaxonl7810 ISW is a Western organization that is pretty openly pro-Ukraine. If they could find any evidence of destroyed planes, they would have it up on the double quick.
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  336. The Russians are taking very heavy casualties, but replacing them apace. The severity of the problem for AFU is demonstrated by their recent tendency to rapidly relinquish any wooded area; they cannot maintain enough troop density to prevent repeated Russian infiltration and advance in these areas. The commentators constantly fling about the term “unsustainable” with respect to Russian losses, but it is the AFU that is critically short of personnel.
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  337. Constant reference to far right parties, while there apparently aren’t any far left parties.
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  338. Ukraine shoots down 147 of 120 Russian missiles fired and large swathes of Ukraine go dark: entirely fact. Russians claim to shoot down a few ATACMS: impossible.
    2
  339. Some of the starch has been removed by recent developments.
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  340. Re weapons systems, their provision, restriction, and denial: the West, and the US in particular, wants Ukraine to survive but not prevail. Russia may be an enemy, but destabilization is undesirable. The restrictions etc can change based on how Ukraine fares.
    1
  341. I don’t think anyone’s actions would have much effect on the Russians’ ability to interdict grain shipments from the Black Sea ports.
    1
  342.  @tubthump  Exactly.
    1
  343.  @frankguz55  Russian production and resurrection is clearly not sufficient to replace losses at current attrition, but the loss analysis is more conclusive with respect to T80 than T90 becoming more prevalent. Whether this is a preference for T80’s automotive performance or some other factor isn’t conclusive. In any case, establishment of an operational reserve is plausible even at the cost of slighting front units whose tasks are manageable with primarily infantry and artillery.
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  344. That assumes that either there would not be ground combat on Taiwan, or that the US would neither commit ground troops to that combat nor preposition units or material configured to unit sets. Also, Abrams is a distinctly different kettle of fish with respect to fuel, learning curve and other logistical tails. And we’re not likely to be sanguine about the Russians having an opportunity to pull one apart at leisure.
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  345. The wreckage from all the missiles they shot down strangely fell onto their power plants, and the warheads were still operational. Astonishingly unfortunate.
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  346. For those who prefer editorials and gratuitous snark to analytical reporting like ISW, Perun, et al.
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  347. Unamused by the avocations of the idle.
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  348.  @FlorianaLions platinum response.
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  349. It’s fairly small, but just the four subs with ICBM’s isn’t exactly negligible.
    1
  350.  @halporter9  Correct, moving 20 or so votes in the House is all it takes to allow more to waver. Also, several European countries are at least tapping the brakes, and others have negative signs politically, eg surging AfD in Germany.
    1
  351.  @The_ZeroLine  Clearly resistance has expanded. Previously, aid passed virtually by acclamation, but now it has trouble getting to the floor.
    1
  352.  @Carlos12160  That’s not different, it’s the norm for sieges throughout history. Refusal of safe passage of civilians and destruction of any possible food sources were standard siege practice. All of which now fall under condemnation by international law, of course, but remain the most effective siegecraft. About all the progress that has been made is that belligerents now refrain from propelling the dead bodies of infected people (or animals, in the case of zoonoses) into the area of the enemy, as once was the practice.
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  353. The breakthrough spoken of is through the outer defensive zone. The Ukrainians are about 10-12km from the main defense zone in the area near Berdyansk.
    1
  354. If Kursk was done to hold some Russian territory for negotiating purposes, that succeeded. If it was to get the Russians to ease pressure in the Pokrovsk direction, that was a predictable failure. Russian doctrine is to reinforce the units having success.
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  355. The “stalemate” Dr Snyder describes is a straw man. He is correct that calling the situation permanently static is wrong, but the positional warfare that has developed has many characteristics of an actual stalemate in that it has properties that make it very hard to break, and the most important one is something the West can’t give Ukraine- a lot more Ukranian soldiers.
    1
  356.  @anthonyhulse1248 No, apparently the claims that the AFU are sharp as a tack were a deception.
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  357. The title says “Podcast”.
    1
  358. 180 tanks would be six battalion equivalents a month, although not much can go into reserve because of need for replacements in front line units. Probably indicates a slow replenishment of Russian operable tank holdings.
    1
  359. Eventually everything comes down to who pays. No cash, no carry.
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  360. Sunday: the Ukrainian advance in the Kursk region is being counterattacked from north and east. Ukrainian reconnaissance/ diversionary groups continue to probe outward into Russian territory. The Ukrainians have been digging in from the first day, they clearly hope to hold some Russian territory as a bargaining point in peace negotiations. Russian attacks in the area of Vovchansk have been retaking some of the remaining ground gained by Ukraine’s last major attack, although this will almost certainly be wound down or suspended to divert forces to attack the Ukrainian incursion. The Russians continue to advance on several axes in central Ukraine,have cut the main Ukrainian radial supply road at several points, and stand near the outskirts of Pokrovsk. The last ground gained by the 2023 Ukrainian offensive is being cleaned up by the Russians in the Robotyne area. More attacks by the Ukrainians on the sand spits of western Crimea have been repelled. The Ukrainian units attacking in the bubble held in the Kursk region are unavailable to defend against the steady loss of ground, towns, and villages in the center of Ukraine. Would the Russian commanders welcome the diversion of Ukrainian effort as well as the opportunity to extract from the AFU the increased losses incumbent upon the attacker? All in all, this attack by the Ukrainians appears to be governed by PR or thoughts of future negotiations, rather than operational reasons. Upsetting the equanimity of the Russian populace in the region may favor either side.
    1
  361. A straw to grasp at. Ukraine’s best hopes for 2024 are regime change in Russia (which isnt absolutely certain to be a good thing), and direct Western intervention. In that context, Putin’s age is a consideration.
    1
  362. Given the prevailing narrative, listeners may be surprised that Russia holds about ten times the number of prisoners as Ukraine. I wasn’t, I figured just the envelopment of Avdiivka produced a couple thousand captured Ukrainians.
    1
  363. He’s very popular in his district.
    1
  364.  @Horseracingtip  He ran unopposed in 2022, and won 60.4% to 25% (there were 2 other candidates) in 2020. It’s a strongly Republican district.
    1
  365. The first year of every Russian war starts as an absolute crap show, with Russia throwing bodies at the problem as a solution. Then they mobilize, organize, and produce,winning about half the time. The past year has been completely consistent with Russia’s history of warfare, and Russia fights long wars.
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  366. It seems that the folks most in favor of globalization are now the ones most mystified as to why NATO troops are not fighting in Ukraine.
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  367.  @divpolitics9520  That would be more accurately directed at the hyperbole of the podcast title.
    1
  368.  @anthonyhulse1248 Yes, the US Army Air Corps and Bomber Command used good old dumb bombs or incendiaries for that.
    1
  369. What does the rise of AfD mean for Germany’s position?
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  370. Ukraine desperately wants a wider war. Romania doesn’t. Nor does the US, who has given Romania some $500 million in recent years.
    1
  371. Especially when it holds less prospects for success than last time.
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  372.  @marisabenson1222 You misspelled acuity.
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  373. It is part of known Russian doctrine referred to as “escalate to de-escalate”: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf
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  374. It’s not just the US where doubts are arising, Germany’s AfD party is polling second at present in advance of upcoming German elections.
    1
  375. Fall out and draw a rifle from the quartermaster.
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  376.  @robmc3338 In addition to whatever else they might have, the entirety of the Wagner forces have been pulled into reserve.
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  377.  @timeames2509 Has everyone forgotten that the Russians have many attack submarines, while the Ukrainians have no ASW capability, since they no longer have a navy? Interdiction/strike of the Ukrainian ports has always been the lowest risk and highest yield escalation for Russia. It’s possible they held it back as a quid pro quo for attacks on the Kerch bridge.
    1
  378. I think many in the US want a status quo ante. They don’t want Ukrainian successes sufficient to test the borders of Russian escalation, but would like for Ukraine to preserve its sovereignty. Even Lindsay Graham is now saying no more aid to Ukraine until we handle our own problems. European NATO members’ assets should be sufficient to achieve this, if they finally raised their spending to the levels expected of NATO members.
    1
  379. As a member of the majority in this election, I am proud of the result, and have no apologies.
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  380.  @badwolftx2139  Yes. Allows a larger flow of logistics to support a larger force grouping.
    1
  381. The Russian advances are because they are beating the Ukrainians on the battlefield. Nearly complete dependence on bought or gifted materiel is a tenuous military strategy, and liable to produce the results seen.
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  382.  @stephenoneill245  Try reading more. US located, pro-Ukraine military analysis organization ISW said: “ISW has not yet observed any visual confirmation that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed aircraft or infrastructure at any of the airbases.”
    1
  383. If Dom is looking at Deep State’s map, he isn’t seeing what I’m seeing. It shows the Russians bashing in the western side of the Kursk salient, with no movement by the Ukrainians there in the last couple days. It is approximately 50% of its previous maximum area. In addition to this, the Russians are steadily advancing on the Pokrovsk axis, and threatening to pocket a sizeable area east of Hirnyk. There are smaller advances on other axes as well.
    1
  384.  @darinmeritt3790  Nothing wrong with my vision. Today shows a further diminution of the Kursk salient and Russian advances around Pokrovsk, with the Ukrainians continuing to abandon the salient west of Hirnyk. Deep State btw is a pro-Ukrainian mapper.
    1
  385. A number of Democrats are opposed to the Senate bill because it contains aid for Israel. If the bill had majority support, the discharge petition would have enough signatures to force it to the floor for a vote.
    1
  386. It’s middle school insults.
    1
  387. Shortly afterward, Orban blocked €50 billion in aid to Ukraine. Talks on the package will resume early next year.
    1
  388.  @mrwpg  I quoted a Telegraph story. What here is untrue? Calling folks bots is a thoroughly vapid response.
    1
  389.  @samsungtap4183  It happened.
    1
  390. A tank’s lifespan on the battlefield is days, a couple weeks at best. If it’s not destroyed, what puts it back in action? Trained recovery/maintenance personnel and spare parts. A highly heterogeneous equipment array (eg artillery pieces of eight or nine different types, some requiring specific ammunition not usable in another system) is an enormous logistical headache to keep operational.
    1
  391.  @MJGMJGMJG Precisely.
    1
  392. True, but if they continue, there might not be any more Patriot missiles or HIMARS rockets in the future. Beggars can’t be choosers.
    1
  393.  @jaxonl7810  Pro Ukraine, US based ISW, frequently quoted as authoritative analysts, said: “ ISW has not yet observed any visual confirmation that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed aircraft or infrastructure at any of the airbases.”
    1
  394.  @brittadueandersen2519  Its constantly in the US news, if only in the form of the increasing resistance to the next few hundred million dollars of aid, and the associated Congressional wrangling.
    1
  395. Probably more like an unfavorable negotiated settlement, much like Finland’s after the Winter War.
    1
  396. A condition Russia has said it will not agree with.
    1
  397. The best opportunity for negotiation has passed.
    1
  398. The were given proportionately more tanks and IFV than artillery. So they did tank things with them since that was the (not so) tacit implication.
    1
  399.  @Ode-to-Odysseus  all accurate, check mappers and ISW. Although Ukraine-friendly, ISW are professional analysts and hew to factual findings.
    1
  400. @ That’s painfully ignorant. Go to ISW or some other analyst site, read a little text, and look at some maps. And they are pro-Ukraine.
    1
  401. Leading with the one direction of about six with a Ukrainian success.
    1
  402. It will be a clash, I imagine the Russians may draw from the 800 or so T-80 and 200 T-90 not yet committed, call up and train conscripts and reservists, and refurbish as many as possible of the of the 8-10k older tanks they have in storage depots. I imagine they also have hundreds each of GRAD-P and towed artillery they may pull out of mothballs if they can man them.
    1
  403.  @WayneTheSeine  A couple/three dozen F-16’s will bring Ukraine’s Air Force back up to about the number of fighters they had in 2022. That will still leave Ukraine at about a 1 to 20 disadvantage in multirole fighter aircraft, using a plane with a dedicated logistical train and a requirement for long and fairly pristine runways. It was a bad choice compared with the Saab Gripen. Air analyst Dr Justin Bronk and other analysts have covered this at length in the professional literature as well as popular press and YT.
    1
  404. Well, if it escalates to a global nuclear exchange, global warming will be stopped.
    1
  405. It’s not one man, it’s a majority in the House, and also that Ukraine places well behind several other issues in US opinion polling this election year. Working as designed.
    1
  406.  @tonysargent3852 The Ukrainians don’t want the most effective/ useful/ sustainable tanks or planes as much as they want more US involvement.
    1
  407. Let’s talk about a war without discussing the front. As for indiscriminate bombing, see also: RAF Bomber Command.
    1
  408. I’m sure the Russians are unaware of this and aren’t producing any artillery barrels at all, and have never stored any 😃
    1
  409. She had every position she’s held handed to her. The presidency comes by secret ballot, which is not conducive to a DEI aspirant.
    1
  410. Some don’t automatically assume that it’s the job of the US to do the job of the Europeans when they squawk for help after cynically neglecting regional security for decades.
    1
  411. Actually, transition training will be the easiest element of the acquisition. Protection and keeping them operational will be the biggest challenge.
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  412.  @tonyledsham2810  LOOL
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  413. China rebukes Russia over missile attack. Also China: sells Russia dual-use goods.
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  414. The war is decided by this. Putin will be in Kyiv tomorrow to surrender. This is talking about minutiae to avoid considering the whole.
    1
  415.  @davidbrancaleone3039 I’m retired early lol.
    1
  416. 53:09 Is Macron the Jerry Lundegaard of world leaders?
    1
  417. @ The assets in Syria will be deployed to Ukraine. ~6k troops, SAMs, aircraft. How’s it going there?
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  418. What Ukraine needs most of all is something the West can’t send them: more Ukrainians.
    1
  419. This is the Blackout Friday episode.
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  420. A number of Democrats oppose aid to Israel, and therefore have not signed the House discharge petition that would bring the Senate aid bill to the floor. That bill with aid for Ukraine also includes aid to Israel and Taiwan. Not so simple, is it?
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  421.  @itsteoroman That there has been no decrease in Russian bombing gives the lie to this. And the Patriots that are being used close to the line of contact are being hunted and attrited as well.
    1
  422. If things actually do get hairy, Russian doctrine is “escalate to de-escalate”. I doubt it will reach serious significance, though.
    1
  423.  @David_Lloyd-Jones  Who said use surface ships? The Russians have several types of long range maritime strike aircraft with multiple series of dedicated air-to-ship missiles as well as LGB’s, etc. These have various ranges, speeds, and strike profiles. They also have submarines and Ukraine doesn’t do ASW.
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  424.  @Arizonaman30  That’s a good plan, that’s why the Russians have prepared defensive positions and mining tens of km deep along this area. Entirely possible, but it will be costly; the Russians have lots of ATGM’s, and have an edge in airspace control over and especially behind the territory they control. The loss profile of the last year could easily be reversed. The Ukrainians will have an edge in everything they need for early phases of the operation except aircraft and more Ukrainians.
    1
  425.  @Arizonaman30  And reaching the Azov would indeed produce a Russian logistical nightmare.
    1
  426. Because he can.
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  427. They can keep striking the refineries, but that might put a stop to replenishment of Patriot missiles and HIMARS rockets, except maybe for cash.
    1
  428. Acting in accordance with what he said he’d do.
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  429. They do when it’s value is primarily to encourage foreign support for the future than to achieve success in the near term.
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  430. Russia’s amphibious possibilities are indeed neutered. They do have sea denial in the Black Sea with their submarines if they choose that as an escalation, since Ukraine has no ASW assets.
    1
  431. That’s the most insanely funny thing I’ve heard in some time.
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  432. S 400 is deployed.
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  433. Has devilishdeed gone from madlad to astute?
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  434. Why would the Russians use surface ships or aircraft when they have submarines?
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  435. At some point Russia might want to negotiate if the balance tilts against them, but I can’t imagine that would be now. They are preparing for an offensive at the same time that their current efforts seem to threaten a breakthrough into the operational depths.
    1
  436. Is this somehow implying that Ukrainian strikes against Russia are more numerous than vice versa? Russia is hitting Ukraine with more strikes and larger warheads.
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  437. It’s the most dense surface to air defense zone on earth, excepting possibly the Korean border. Fly planes over it?
    1
  438. Wagner is there to refit, eyeball the Poles, and present a threat to northern Ukraine.
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  439.  @RyanBrown-nx8dw  Research.
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  440. Wagner is there to eyeball the Poles and to create concerns for northern Ukraine.
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  441. DW has an occasional analyst on and she’s superb, unfortunately can’t recall her name.
    1
  442. I remember a Churchill quote, probably not verbatim: “the old wars were decided more by their episodes than their tendencies, while modern wars are decided more by their tendencies than their episodes”.
    1
  443.  @sebastianforbes1  Here’s a starting point, the use of nuclear weapons in regional conflict is first mentioned on page 2. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf There is much published on this topic, usually referred to as “escalate to de-escalate”. Not an esoteric subject.
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  444.  @DebbieGlenn-f9u  answered above.
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  445. If averaged out daily, just Soviet WWII military deaths were at least sixfold greater than the current total casualties: I.e. dead, wounded, missing and captured. Truly staggering.
    1
  446. Tedious.
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  447. And, as usual, calling the enemy advances unimportant while dwelling on any Ukrainian pinprick.
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  448.  @kenofken9458 The “three days” was an on-air estimate by a Western general.
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  449.  @xx7101  Is any of my statement untrue or misleading? Just pointing out problems; I would gladly stand corrected. I suppose neutral analysis sites like ISW are also ‘reporting from Moscow’.
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  450.  @jimgraham6722  One assumes that SA-8 and its upgraded forms are being used in this role, but as with Buk and S-300, inventories are shrinking or depleted. Unless the Ukrainians are able to manufacture these missiles, a replacement is indeed needed.
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  451. The problem is that nuclear weapons use is part of their doctrine, usually referred to as “escalate to de-escalate” as noted in this assessment from the organization tasked to brief the US Congress: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf
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  452. If Höcke benefited from his conviction for naughty words, then prosecuting him was an error. The AfD continually gets an assist from the Wiebkes.
    1
  453. It’s not faltering today.
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  454. Hilarity.
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  455. A western civilian analyst recently paid to task a commercial satellite to image Russian tank storage and rehab depots, and assessed how many usable tanks are still in storage. Between 1500-2000 have been removed from storage, presumably to active service. Some 3900 “good” tanks remain visible (there are also many garages); of these, approximately 990 are of T-80/ T-90 type, and roughly 2800 of all other types, around 1000 of which are T-54 through T-64.
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  456. Ninja’d.
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  457. Let’s see a politician hauled to The Hague and charged with not intervening in someone else’s war. What comedy.
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  458. Kinzinger is an observer, not a participant of Congress; his statements reflect CNN’s positions more than those of Congressional Republicans. Otherwise, there would not have been a slowdown in US aid, and numerous polls would not show that “we have sent more than enough aid” is a majority position in the US.
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  459. The western media fights for Ukraine in the information space. This is both appropriate and to be expected. This isn’t the place to go for impartial analysis.
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  460. This war isn’t good and started yet.
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  461.  @burritosls Eye of the beholder. Ukraine not losing is a strategic defeat for Russia. Ukraine winning (by their stated objectives) would of course be a decisive defeat, but could be destabilizing. In any case, a growing view in the US is that Europe should bear the great majority of the load.
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  462.  @stream2watch  Russia is unlikely to completely take over Ukraine, but Ukraine is at least as unlikely to recover its lost territory. About ten months ago, Ukraine was in its best position of the war relative to Russia in personnel, equipment and logistics, and their offensive quickly broke down against a deeply disadvantaged but well entrenched enemy. Now, even with new aid incoming, Ukraine has no prospects for an offensive this summer, and probably not this year. The Russians apparently have the means and the intention to step up offensive operations this summer. As great as their dependence for materiel is, what Ukraine needs most of all is something that cannot be bought or sent by the West: more Ukrainians. Look at Ukraine’s 2023 population pyramid; there are virtually no young men. As bad as Russia’s demographic pyramid is, it is better than Ukraine’s, and several times larger. Whence come the troops to retake their territory? There is only one answer: they will eventually be asking the west for combat troops.
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  463.  @stream2watch  Oh, so they just keep the 25-30% of Ukraine they now hold.
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  464. It’s become difficult to ignore that Russia is getting on for occupying 20% of Ukraine, and putting in new attacks the Ukrainians aren’t able to meaningfully oppose.
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  465. If they get emotional about holding all of it, it may get nipped off at the base by the Russians.
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  466. Hodges defines a Pollyanna. He’d be perfect.
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  467.  @anthonyhulse1248 Center for Global Energy Policy at Columbia U, among others.
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  468. A military photo op. I suppose that’s to be expected.
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  469.  @APW554  lol, that’s pretty porous, in addition to the implication that Crimea gets reoccupied because the Russians just leave, or surrender to this cunning siege.
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  470.  @spxram4793  By all means, don’t try to disprove an assertion, just go ad hominem.
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  471.  @spxram4793  There, that wasn’t hard, why not make this response first? Look for the footage, and look for disproof or verification.
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  472. For practical and combat purposes, the entire Ukrainian navy has been sunk or scuttled, but one doesn’t hear about that. They do have two capable corvettes under construction in Turkey.
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  473. Shoigu shopping for millions of rounds of 122, 152, and MRL ammo as well as artillery pieces and spare barrels, while the Russians also ramp up drone supplies from China. Looks like interim procurement in multi-year war planning.
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  474. Well, go arrest him, Deputy Dog.
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  475. Their goal has always been NATO ground troops. In an attritional war, the one thing that the west cannot give Ukraine is more Ukrainians.
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  476. There is no appetite in Congress for any new aid package for Ukraine. I doubt we would sell Patriot missiles to Ukraine for cash, based on recent information.
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  477.  @nowthenzen  It’s not, but it is a higher geopolitical priority.
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  478.  @stephenhill545  I’m sure that fine distinction was OK with everyone in Central Asia.
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  479.  @marisabenson1222 Sounds more like a voter.
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  480. Remains the wild card and IMO Ukraine’s primary hope.
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  481. They are, within their means. Imagine what that statement would mean to the Russians.
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  482.  @terryross2388 When winning involves recovery of their lost territory by military action, that’s absolutely true.
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  483. Remember “No pasaran”? That went well. They need men and munitions.
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  484. Looking to buy a few million rounds of artillery ammunition as well as Russian-compatible artillery pieces and spare barrels.
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  485. That would be AfD.
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  486. And they will take Greenland in the spring when it’s warmer. Please spare me these domino fantasies.
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  487. And the discharge petition on the Senate bill has 177 signatures (218 needed if all seats are filled), all Democrats, and no new signatures in four days.
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  488. Truly, this is legislative air guitar.
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  489. Go ahead.
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  490. The number of Russian aircraft with air-to-air capability against peer or near-peer fighters is about 600, plus about 100 MiG-31 interceptors. The rest are bombers, attack, helicopters, reconnaissance, support, transports, utility and trainers.
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  491. 20:53 Don’t forget strategic reconnaissance, and other satellite usage.
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  492. OK, it’s the same as the Ukraine podcast. It’s all just filler around the “US pls gib” plea. I’d point out that at the point when the Ukrainians were at their best with respect to personnel, equipment, and supply, the Russians stopped the Ukrainian offensive and went over to the attack themselves. Once again: the Russians seized the initiative when Ukraine was at its strongest.
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  493. Western media, including this podcast, has been fighting the information war for Ukraine. It’s reasonable and expected. Reference to multiple sources is necessary to get an accurate picture, and this has been a good source for some things.
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  494. SOME of Russia’s army may (or may not) be learning slowly, but infantry under fire, regardless of nation, are the fastest-learning people on earth.
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  495. Brilliant PWAD analysts, no doubt reading only primary sources 😆
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  496. Red Effect, a Croatian analyst, has an interesting YT on T-90M production and probable current holdings.
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  497.  @anthonyhulse1248  The Ukrainians could only dream to assemble for a parade a brigade level number of troops, some top line SAM systems, a few mobile nukes, and a flyover that equals a quarter of their multirole fighters.
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  498. I saw who was entering J-school years ago at a US “public Ivy” university, and I’m utterly unsurprised at the state of US media. They were lower quarter students and nine of ten were already wearing political blinkers. Granted, the lower quarter at that university was substantially higher IQ than average, but these folks were almost universally lacking in critical thinking. I rely on think tanks (both sides), news services and European media.
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  499. But the US will commit its forces in support of Taiwan when China attacks it.
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  500.  @ilovezzz2012  That will continue regardless of what nation possesses the land. It may be very important for that reason, but with regard to that, the sovereign entity that holds it is moot.
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  501. At least it’s a mea culpa, but is meeting the previous goal sufficient for both their needs and aiding Ukraine after taking a few decades off ?
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  502.  @johnanderson3731  The same as last year, defense in depth with reserves to counter attempted incursions. Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory are fewer in number and weight than the Russians inside Ukraine. I’d worry more about Ukrainian productive capacity in the context of serious deprivation of electricity. It’s less serious since they are a supplicant of the West, but some self-sufficiency would be desirable. Russia continues to build its own aircraft, missiles and armored vehicles and other big things painted green, as well as having willing sellers. The arrival of sixty F-16’s will bring the Ukrainians all the way up to a 11-to-1 disadvantage in multirole fighter aircraft, so the Ukrainians won’t be attacking with air superiority, or even parity.
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  503. The target is international support.
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  504. Sounds like Xi scared the bloomers off Macron.
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  505.  @tord008 That’s not actually possible. Ukraine has been prostrate and begging for weeks, even to the point of possibly giving the Russians intel on the state of their inventory of certain munitions.
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  506. Would the Russian bloggers be silent during a success?
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  507. That’s why they are advancing on multiple directions at an increasing pace.
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  508.  @HistoryonYouTube  It is in commission, afloat, and with a commander and crew.
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  509. Taurus missiles might be problematic for Germany since AfD has passed every party but one in recent polling before the upcoming elections with a policy of rolling back support. The ruling coalition may need to tap the brakes on aid to stay ahead.
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  510. On LAND? Crickets.
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  511. What matters are the Kilos. They can do sea denial if Russia wants maritime escalation, and can also launch land-attack missiles. Ukraine has not shown that they have any ASW capability despite use of the Kilos near Kherson and Odesa, and they are no longer frequenting Sevastopol, being based at Novorossiysk.
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  512. Thirty F-16’s will bring the Ukraine Air Force halfway back to the strength it had in 2022. They will then be outnumbered in multirole fighters by a little more than 10:1, and the F-16 requires long and relatively pristine runways. Most air analysts agree that F-16 was an inferior choice to the Gripen, which may eventually be available as well.
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  513. Keeping their fuel options open. Germany is making it without Russian gas, but just barely. They would like to stay warm and continue to run their economy this winter.
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  514. Both my current and former Representatives have not signed the discharge petition, I have written both to encourage them to stand firm until after there is meaningful border control.
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  515. Remember that what is being talked about is giving a couple dozen F-16s to a country that will be hard pressed to support them, while their opponent has several hundred same or later-gen fighters.
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  516. Looks like those protesters ran into some boys adept at violence.
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  517. Deal. We could stand some spending restraint.
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  518.  @Aaron-rw3lv There are several impediments to this. The equipment that could easily be sent is already in Ukrainian hands or expended; the US has to some degree developed other priorities, domestic pressure is building against further spending in several nations, and there has always been (true or not) some geopolitical concern that too great a Ukrainian success could be destabilizing. In addition, the enemy always has a vote. Russia’s has been to stay the course, lean on attrition, and ramp up its military industrial base. The Russian experience is that losing 4 men for 1 was entirely successful in their last major war.
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  519. More and more Americans and their representatives are about ready to end the conditions that allow Europe to spend a pittance on defense while relying on the US strategic forces, Air Force, and Navy, and stop paying into a war that can and should be won with European assets.
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  520.  @sebastianforbes1  ISW has gradually transitioned from analysis, to pro-Ukraine, to Ukraine’s cheerleading squad.
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  521. The biggest concern now is that the rasputitsa will bog international resolve even more than military operations.
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  522. Remember that majority of the Ukrainian tank holdings are Russian-made vehicles, including many T-62’s, so the same thing happens to them.
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  523. Israel ranks higher on US geopolitical priorities, so it’s unavoidable.
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  524. Their interest lies in the only thing that can retrieve Ukraine’s territory- the commitment of Western troops to ground and air combat.
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  525. The UK’s total tank park of Challengers is less than 400. The numbers that they can spare amount to a symbolic gesture and a significant logistics and maintenance burden, not to mention the retraining. A meaningful solution would be getting the 300-odd Challenger I that Jordan is retiring. The company-sized tranches of disparate foreign vehicles Ukraine is getting are of course welcome, but major logistical headaches.
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  526. The retaliation appears to be Russia attacking the Ukrainian grain storage facilities at the ports, and possibly denying transit to and from Odessa et al. An escalation responded to with a more painful and internationally significant escalation.
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  527. Opposition to further aid at previous levels is growing. We couldn’t get the Europeans to pay their way in NATO, let them handle this.
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  528. Not only is “literally” being overused and misused, but misspelled as well.
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  529. 16:21 Expats living in Russia report that there are a few items whose price has been inflated, but everything remains available, including Western brand names. Food costs are low and wages rising. Many businesses are reporting doing well, as Russians now vacation internally, and their spending remains in Russia.
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  530. Scholz looking over his shoulder at AfD and others. Softening of German support in 3…2…1…
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  531. The attacks of last spring seemed weaker and more sporadic. Either the Russians capabilities/ determination have increased, or the attacks last year were diversionary.
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  532. I learned them in Russian when studying the WWII campaigns, often default to those names and pronunciation.
    1
  533. Look at the demographic pyramid of Ukraine. There’s virtually no one in the 18-20 age group. The Ukrainians appear to see this group as too few to matter and too valuable to expend. Ukraine is probably the only country on earth with a demographic pyramid worse than Russia.
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  534. But the US is tapping the brakes already.
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  535. The police apparently support the anti-Israel folks. And they only take action against the folks who don’t oppose them with numbers and force.
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  536. I think that ~40 F-16s will be about as useful to Ukraine as a similar number of 4th gen fighters are to Russia: not very. This is because both sides operate in an extremely dense air defense environment.
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  537. The Ukranians are probably warming up pitches for this now. More troops are their greatest need at present - more than fighter jets.
    1
  538. Ukraine isn’t a major item in US opinion polling. Immigration is #1. He has consistently said that meaningful and lasting action on the border will be followed by action on foreign military aid. The discharge petition on the Senate bill isn’t getting enough signatures to bring it to the floor because there are a sizeable number of Democrats who object to the bill containing aid for Israel. I used to think that the bill would pass easily if brought for a House vote; now it looks doubtful. Ukraine aid in any form will probably come in a stand-alone bill.
    1
  539. Maybe a shift in operations since Ukraine has no ASW capability.
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  540. So, the resumption of middle school name-calling is the only good news?
    1
  541. Countering the surface fleet has successfully limited or ended Russian amphibious options. The Russians still have submarines, to which the Ukrainians have no counter. Of course, their use would be escalatory.
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  542.  @marisabenson1222  get a sonar, MAD, and ASW weapon on a drone and get back to me. In other countries, that’s called a corvette or an ASW helicopter, depending on whether it’s surface or aerial.
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  543. The Senate bill isn’t moving in the US House partially because there are a number of Democrats who oppose it because it contains aid to Israel, and they therefore have not signed the discharge petition. Although the Speaker initially refused to bring it to the floor to leverage a bill on border security, I don’t think it would now pass if it were brought to the floor because of this bipartisan opposition. Ukraine aid is going to have to be a standalone bill. The invocation of the Trump/MAGA trope isn’t necessary to explain what is taking place, especially since it was stalled even before any statements by Trump. If anything, it’s more plausible that Trump has simply jumped out in front of the parade in order to look like he’s leading it.
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  544. The UK’s entire Challenger 2 park is less than 400 tanks, and is no longer in production.
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  545.  @falloutking2819  One would think that an unacceptable ratio; the Russians appear to disagree.
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  546. Khan is indifferent to defeat as long as it’s a Green defeat.
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  547. It might have to with not wanting it to be likely that an example of their MBT will fall into in Russian hands.
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  548. It does gloss over some of the difficulties, but it’s otherwise a pretty evenhanded middlebrow intro.
    1
  549. The level of snark is directly proportional to the degree of Russian success.
    1
  550. Eugene V Debs was on the ballot in the presidential election of 1920 despite being in US federal prison at the time. I can’t imagine that won’t weigh into the SCOTUS decision.
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  551. Corruption, Internal politics, underperformance, lack of confidence from the upper military echelon, difference of opinion on means and methods are all possible. Corruption is a known issue and viewed extremely dimly by the nations donating war matériel to Ukraine .
    1
  552. Accidents are a thing. A 3 megaton fusion bomb is still underground a few miles from where a family member lived near Goldsboro NC. It buried itself deeply in the ground after a B-52 broke up in midair in 1961 and unlike the other bomb carried, it could not be recovered.
    1
  553. It would have been in the title of the podcast had it been in any way successful.
    1
  554. It already looks like Macron is headed for a scalding by Le Pen’s party.
    1
  555. And the Russians advance steadily on multiple axes.
    1
  556. Why then is Ukraine continuing to lose territory?
    1
  557. The massive superiority of force, absolute air supremacy, and deep interdiction are missing in this instance.
    1
  558.  @rmdomainer9042 Lviv would disagree.
    1
  559. Scholtz’s “reticence” is due to the fact that his support for Ukraine, among other things, is looking like the cause of an imminent drubbing in the upcoming elections. I dont understand discussions about a possible shift in US support when it has already occurred.
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  560. Ukraine’s best hope is a political upheaval in Russia rather than military success. That said, it’s not clear that a successor Russian government would cease to prosecute the war.
    1
  561. A week or two to see if rested and reconstituted western military district forces attack as expected, and what lessons both sides have learned.
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  562. Isnt Kupyansk in the southeast of Ukraine?
    1
  563. Except that the US is prepared to defend Taiwan if it is implemented by force.
    1
  564. US support for Ukraine is waning, we have more pressing interests. We’re not worried about Russia, we managed the decline of the Soviet Union back when it possessed Ukraine and the other peripheral republics.
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  565.  @rmdomainer9042  Holding 30% of Ukraine, and advancing more in the last couple days than the 2023 Great Ukrainian Offensive.
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  566. Now all NATO is obliged to immediate ground combat assistance to Finland if Russia were to attack them, among other things. Yet another country dives under the US defense umbrella.
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  567. Did he say it enough?
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  568. The first or second most common place of origin of the troops in the FFL is Russia.
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  569. No serious analyst proposes a scenario in which Ukraine recovers its territory using only its own forces.
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  570.  @anthonyhulse1248  The point was that UTL should refrain from clutching the pearls.
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  571. Precisely.
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  572. At least it’s not “pay us for our stuff”. Yet.
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  573. Probably not, he is too empirical.
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  574. Germany’s next election will probably be unable to keep anti-Ukraine aid AfD out of the government. France is a bit more than uncertain, since the no-confidence vote was mostly organized by parties that are both opposed to Ukraine aid.
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  575.  @efghggdxlmfn33  “woo, enough unemployed for a whole brigade” - Z
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  576.  @richardmarsden5610  They are indeed, now that anything seaborne isn’t feasible. 3000-4000 the n landing ships aren’t for riverine ops.
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  577. Does the language of the MOD’s appreciation imply that it believes neither side has uncommitted forces of sufficient size to qualify as an operational reserve?
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  578.  @tracboy80 Kind of like how the T-62 was the simpler version of the T-64, used in the motor-rifle divisions and for export?
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  579.  @WhizzingFish12  “Version” wasn’t meant to imply they were the same vehicle; of course T-62 was first, hence the name, although these names are somewhat inaccurate if meant to indicate the year of introduction. The very first T-64s appeared in 1963, using the same 115 gun as the 62. The brief time between the two and the initial similarities suggest an evolutionary path often seen in Soviet militaria, eg the versions of LaGG-3 -> La-5 -> La-5FN -> La-7.
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  580. Quote from US based, pro-Ukraine ISW: “ISW has not yet observed any visual confirmation that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed aircraft or infrastructure at any of the airbases.”
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  581. Probably a recognition of reality. If Crimea is integral to Ukrainian victory, that’s a harder task that retaking the entire Donetsk region. It means attacking across the Perekop isthmus, and even if that very narrow and exceptionally defensible choke point is breached, it then means supplying via that same tiny isthmus. The alternative would be overt outside amphibious assistance, which would be a very great escalation.
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  582.  @marcosiebert4548  That devalues Crimea, it doesn’t change possession. Attacking across a couple tiny isthmus connections into an opponent dug in with the worlds largest artillery park isn’t inviting.
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  583. How about a review of ISW control of terrain summaries in each area?
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  584.  @lucschoesetters4307  ATGMs work both ways, and the Ukrainians will find that mines are as effective against their attacks as they have been against those of the Russians. In à counteroffensive Ukraine will attack into the worlds largest artillery park without indirect fire parity or the luxury of using bodies to weight the attack. There’s a terrible hard road ahead. Regime overthrow in Russia is more likely than the prospect of forcibly ejecting Russia from the occupied Donbas and Crimea. Also, those who survive learn. Much of the early carnage was Russia expecting little resistance and attempting to carry out combat tasks with tanks and insufficient infantry. Armies don’t make the same mistakes endlessly; the Russians have corrected their infantry shortage, while Ukraine has much more limited manpower. The war will depend upon Ukraine establishing maneuver warfare since Russia will win a grinding match.
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  585. Squirrel!
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  586. It does appear that several of these raid groups were roughly handled by Russian troops and the VVS to a degree that suggests their incursions were expected and their routes known. A lengthening of the main line of contact into this area doesn’t favor Ukraine.
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  587. Just wait awhile. That’s how it’s going in the east and south.
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  588. Months from delivery and probably as many months until operational status. Most countries that adopted F-16 took 2-3 years before they were in squadron service. Pilot training was the quickest part, taking only a few months.
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  589.  @RimaFair How? It’s developed into an attritional war, and the territory Ukraine seeks to regain has field fortifications of great depth with extremely dense and extensive minefields. Would that it were not so, but there’s virtually no chance for maneuver warfare in that battlespace. Ukraine is handicapped in a war of attrition because the West cannot give them more Ukranians. Ukraines best hope for achieving their stated war aims lies not on the battlefield, but upon favorable events following a Russian regime change.
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  590. Their primary reason for playing up the capture of a low value objective is to cap the statements from the other side that it would never be taken. It’s part of the 24-hour propaganda cycle.
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  591. They haven’t talked about the front in any detail since the time Avdiika was under attack and they were explaining how the Russians couldn’t take the town because they would run out of men.
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  592. Two of mine disappeared, a lot of the time it’s just YT algo; I’m adding this to check. I’ve been completely shadowbanned on ATP Geo for a month or so 😆
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  593.  @anthonyhulse1248  Ask UK Bomber Command and the Eighth and Twentieth US Air Forces. They responded to this. Oh, and Harry Truman.
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  594. Wow, “reinforcing success”; someone finally referred to Russian doctrine.
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  595. I don’t get how it’s the responsibility of the US to come to the rescue in every European war, bear the majority of the cost (in prior R&D and inventory if not in direct aid cost) and risk an existential confrontation. Europe knew what it was doing when they cut defense to a pittance and relied on the US both for deterrence and safe sea lanes.
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  596. That’s true, but the F-16’s have operating burdens as well. If the logistical/ support tail of F-16’s eats up most of the US PDA, who benefits on balance?
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  597. He also pointed out that Ukraine is at the disadvantage demographically, in defense industrial base, and by perpetually lacking escalatory parity. Ukraine’s hope to meet its stated war aims is not on the battlefield, but for regime change in Russia.
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  598. Precisely.
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  599. The Ukrainian draft dodging is fueled by Ostfront Syndrome: no matter what they do, the Russians just keep coming, and the front grinds steadily westward.
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  600. Looky, we’re relevant.
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  601. LOOL
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  602.  @GB-mu9ue  Categorical dismissal without arguments.
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  603. A quote from US-based, pro-Ukrainian analysis organization ISW: “ISW has not yet observed any visual confirmation that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed aircraft or infrastructure at any of the airbases.”
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  604. AfD may well wind up first in the coming elections if German policy continues of its current course re: Ukraine and immigration.
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  605.  @roverboat2503  Has there been any indication that the ROK would be comfortable parting with significant amounts of 155? That, rather than the fact that they have both large stocks and significant production would be the important question IMO.
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  606. He certainly let the cat out of the bag. I wonder what the next Question Time will be like in the UK Parliament.
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  607. That’s quite an overstatement from channels I have seen, but it is fair to say this channel has consistently been fighting Ukraine’s information war. I think there has been an increase of minimizing unfavorable events or glossing them with insults or strained rationalizations, but from the comments, it seems that is the most popular thing on the podcast, and more middle-school juvenilia would be welcome.
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  608.  @stream2watch  Which is why Ukraine’s offensive broke swiftly last year, and why they wont be be able to sustain one going forward without someone else’s troops.
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  609.  @mindbomb9341  There are idiot Tubers on both sides making clickbait- Mercouris, Davydov, Rehi, etc.
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  610. “Severely damaged”. Not everything at an industrial facility is critical to production, and most drone warheads are not large. Analysis is needed to determine what has been accomplished; hitting 15 or 20 percent of a certain type of site doesn’t mean the enemy is reduced to 80-85% of their production. It’s also not known how long each facility would take to repair.
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  611. Western media is fighting for Ukraine in the information space. That shouldn’t be a surprise. Interpret what is said in that context.
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  612.  @TheMagicLemur Static. How’s it going along 150 km of the southeast?
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  613. In the segment on refinery strikes, the point is made that the Ukrainians have limited strikes to certain types of infrastructure. It is suggested that this is a hint or warning to the West of what Ukraine will do if desperate. This takes for granted that the West, particularly the US, will continue to provide the means for such strikes as well as other equipment. A warning to the contrary has already been given. Biden is fighting to win in Michigan, not Ukraine.
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