Comments by "" (@walterkronkitesleftshoe6684) on "Drachinifel" channel.

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  6. I see you're COMPLETELY unfamiliar with the facts of the matter. The original "plunging fire" theory doesn't stand up to informed scrutiny. Using the German's own AVKS (Artillerie Versuchs Kommando für schiff - Naval Artillery Testing Command) data tables gives an "angle of fall" for shells from Bismarck's 38 cm SK C/34 cannons of approximately 12° from the horizontal at the range where Bismarck's killing shot was fired from (approx 8½ nautical miles). Prebuild Admiralty testing of Hood's armour had demonstrated that her 3in deck armour was proof against 15" shellfire anywhere below 20° angle of fall. V/Adm Holland was well aware of Hood's vulnerability to "plunging fire" it was specifically why he had raced to close the engagement distance from the start of the battle, to cross & escape the "danger zone" from plunging fire. Having succesfully done so he was in the process of a turn to port to open his aft gunnery arcs when the fateful shots landed. The current favoured (and very plausible) theory suggests that Hood's bow wave at speed exposed a section of her lower hull abaft her mainmast (indeed many plan view photos of Hood clearly show this "wave trough"), and a shell from Bismarck hit the exposed area and penetrated BELOW her 12" side armour belt. There were also eyewitness reports from a number of HMS PoW crew members of unusual behaviour of Hood's "X" turret shortly before Hood's deflagration, which give some grounds to the theory that there MAY have been a "misfire" or malfunction within that turret which resulted in a "magazine event".
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  16.  @TTTT-oc4eb  1. A full salvo of main gun fire from a battleship is analogous to a scatter of lead shot from a shotgun. During the battle of Denmark Strait, the Bismarck aimed at Hood from 8-9 nautical miles away. At that range the 38 cm SK C/34 (Bismarck's main armament) had a CEP (circular error probability - effectively the radius of a circle within which 50% of its shots would fall) of 100m. That means that if 8 of Bismarck's 15in guns fired at a single point 8-9 nm away, 4 of her shells would be expected to land (with completely random distribution) within an ellipse (think of it as a stretched circle, due to the angle of fall of the shells) measuring approximately 200m (660ft) wide, (or to put it another way 76% of HMS Hood's 860ft length), by more than three thousand feet long. The other 4 shots would land even FURTHER away from the aiming point. That being the case, how can an individual shell be aimed specifically at a tiny part of HMS Hood's structure, namely the 4in HA magazine, that its believed triggered off Hood's detonation? I'll give you a hint, there's a little clue in my paragraph above....where it says "completely random distribution". A simplified analogy is that if you prop a dartboard up 50 yards away and can consistently knock it over with a shotgun at that range then that is pretty good shooting, just as Bismarck / PE achieved during the Denmark Strait encounter. Now you can "knock the dartboard over" all day long with the shotgun and STILL NOT hit the bullseye (magazine) with an individual pellet. As opposed to being a skillful shot by knocking over the dartboard, whether you hit the bullseye with an individual pellet is complete luck. 2. Where did you get the "Rodney didn't straddle until her 18th salvo" nonsense from? If you're just going to make complete nonsense up there's no point continuing the discussion. As was recorded in HMS Norfolk's war diary HMS Rodney obtained hits with both her 3rd and 4th ranging salvoes at 08:48. Please refer to "Battleship BIsmarck - A Design and Operational History" (Produced by the US Naval Institute) Appendix "B" Pg 518. 3. A heavy cruiser is neither a capital ship or a "heavy unit" in a firefight against a battleship. Trying to portray an 8" cruiser as a "RN heavy unit" is simply trying to make Bismarck's final drubbing look even more one sided. Even James Cameron's description of Bismarck's battle damage illustrated the point thus "On her main belt was counted HUNDREDS of shell gouges and splashmarks, almost all of which were from secondary and cruiser hits".
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  43.  @hajoos.8360  Do I think Opeartion Berlin was a success? Dislocation of the convoy system, the capturing and sinking of 22 merchant ships and running the Home Fleet ragged for 2 months, for no loss to the Kriegsmarine fleet? It certainly was a success!!! You're confusing poor german strategical resource planning with a small but successful commerce raiding operation. Of course the men and materiel of the KM surface fleet would have been better used elsewhere, but that wasn't Lütjens fault. He was given a task in difficult conditions and carried it out relatively successfully. The Strategic overview was not of his making. All very well calling them cowards, but when all you've got is the post "weserübung" remains of a piddling little fleet, you have to nip at the much stronger enemy when he is weak and run away when he isn't. Face it, ANY KM surface ship losses were NOT going to be made good, the RN easily replaced its losses and MORE. It's true that Britain was on the sea what Germany was on land. The British army could NEVER have landed on the continent again, never mind liberate Europe, but on the other hand she was NEVER going to be cut off by the German Navy. A premier land power against a premier sea power... the classic stand off. As for your assertion that the "scuttle order" was given between 09:15 and 09:21, Yes, I DO have a question. Where did you get your (incorrect) information from? Lets look at some survivor testimonies (people who actually witnessed the events of Bismarck's sinking first hand), and not some poorly researched, modern day revisionist TV nonsense made for the "hard of thinking" shall we? From "Battleship Bismarck: A survivor's story" Written by Baron Burkhard von Mullenheim-Rechberg, Bismarck's senior ranking survivor. Page 211 "Our list to port had increased a bit while firing was going on" followed by "Around 9:30am gas and smoke began to drift through our station" This means that prior to 9:30am Bismarck was already flooding, not something that happens to a healthy seaworthy ship, in other words she was already starting to sink. Then from an interview conducted for the highly regarded weekly history journal "Purnell's history of the second world war" in the late 1960's with Kpt Lt Gerhard Junack (who was Bismarck's only surviving engineering officer and the survivor who supposedly enacted the "scuttle order"). He stated that... "Somewhere about 1015 hours, I received an order over the telephone from the Chief Engineer (Korvettenkapitän (Ing.) Walter Lehmann) to 'Prepare the ship for sinking.' That was the last order I received on the Bismarck. Soon after that, all transmission of orders collapsed." Heading back to the account of Mullenheim-Rechberg, on Page 212 he states that (before 10:00am) "I was using all the telephone circuits and calling all over the place in an effort to find out as much as possible about the condition of the ship. I got only one answer. I reached the messenger in the damage control centre and asked "who has and where is the command of the ship? Are there new orders in effect?".... The man said he was in a great hurry. He told me that everyone had abandoned the damage control centre, adding that he was the last one in the room and had to get out... then he hung up". If taken at face value these survivor testimonies show that there was at least a 45 minute gap between Bismarck starting to sink and the first mention of a "scuttle order" being given. Even if Bismarck's crew had done nothing, Bismarck was going to sink, and if the beaten crew want to help the RN, then all the better... But face it, Bismarck's crew weren't going to scuttle a perfectly seaworthy ship in the middle of the storm tossed North Atlantic of their own free will, it was only for the fact that the RN had already dismantled Bismarck and initiated the sinking process. In other words in every sense the sinking of Bismarck was the result of actions dictated by the Royal Navy. Anything else is just hurt German pride, bolstered by modern day delusional wehraboos. Germany was well known for trying to hide its national humiliations, such as when they scuttled their "grand fleet" at the end of WW1, like illogically saying "We lost.. but you didn't win", or a pathetic "You didn't beat us because we killed ourselves before you killed us" sort of idiocy.
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  44.  @hajoos.8360  Rechberg was in the after range finding station not buried in the bowels of the ship he would have had VERY clear indications of Bismarck's pitch and roll trim as part of his rangefinding apparatus, so trying to "poo poo" his account of events is wishful ignorance of cold hard facts. Part of your misinformation comes from relying on wikipedia.... the page regarding Bismarck as well as the other covering her final battle are littered with errors, as well as the omission of various facts that are supported by primary documentation which are repeatedly deleted by "wikipedia preferred editors" who have their own, biased opinions on the matter. You need to read more widely than that. First hand survivor accounts are valuable, as well as some of the better researched works produced since. To pit an unsourced wikipedia statement against that of Rechberg & Bismarck's senior surviving engineering officer is unwise. You talk of "supporting" strategic decisions, Lütjens wasn't part of naval planning, but a commander who would have had little to no input regarding the orders he'd been given. His, as the old saying goes, was to "do or die". All that BS about being "shot on the quarterdeck" after Denmark Strait, you seem to be oblivious to the fact that Lütjens' orders forbade his seeking engagement with enemy capital ships, and the impetuous Lindemann wanting to chase PoW eastwards was EXPRESSLY against the SKL orders that Lütjens was forced to abide by, as well as ill-advised in as far as the Germans were aware that further major units of the RN would be heading westwards from the direction of Scapa Flow. (Also not forgetting the fact that Bismarck was unable to chase PoW who was still steaming at full speed while Bismarck was forced to lower speed due to the damage to her bows causing trim problems and her loss of two boilers due to flooding, as well as ignoring the concerns of the now critical fuel situation Lütjens faced as a result of PoW's hit on her fuel tanks). The "oh she sould have sunk PoW as well" is just fanciful, uninformed wehraboo fantasy.
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  45.  @hajoos.8360  You admit that Bismarck was solely intended to "occupy" any capital ships carrying out direct convoy escort. Did Hood/PoW have an "O.N" convoy accompanying them? His orders expressly forbade him to engage in the situation he was confronted with, which is why you correctly state Lütjens hesitated to open fire at Denmark Strait, as he was judging to see if he could outrun the ships approaching him off the port beam. The reasoning for SKL's orders were confirmed, because as the result of the Denmark Strait engagement "Exercise Rhine" was cancelled due to the damage that Bismarck suffered due to combat with RN capital ships. So what that Hitler asked why PoW was not finished off? LOTS of uninformed people still do ask the same question, the answers being those I gave above. 1. It was in contravention of the Fleet Commander's orders. 2. It was VERY likely that PoW would have been drawing Bismarck towards further RN heavy units closing from Scapa Flow. 3. Bismarck was unable to match PoW's speed due to damage sustained during the prior engagement. I'm actually surprised to find myself speaking up for the Germans as I almost always find myself shooting down the excessive claims, mythology & BS of juvenile wehraboos in these threads, but for the reason of "being fair" I do feel that Lütjens was given a "tall order" and apart from a small number of errors (not refuelling in Norway / Excessive use of RT especially) carried out those orders in a not unskillful manner. It is ALWAYS easier to criticise with the benefit of hindsight, especially as those doing the criticising in YT threads have utterly NO idea of the burden of the weight of command & the "fog of war" when alone in a hostile ocean. Neither do I, but I have the wisdom to acknowledge it, and try to take it into account when assessing the decisions made.
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  46.  @hajoos.8360  Dear oh dear "Lütjens had a blackout"... such utter emotive nonsense. Do you have any evidence that he issued no orders? Apart from Lindemann issuing the order to open fire that is? Bismarck / PE altered course a number of times during the engagement, not least for the imaginary torpedoes that PE had supposedly detected on her hydrophones. There is no record at all of what tactical orders were given on Bismarck's bridge apart from those relayed to PE. It's laughable that you seriously beleive that you have a better grasp of what was occuring that did the actual people involved. You do realise that prior to PE picking up the first hydrophone contact aft of her port beam at 0500 that Lütjens had been advised that the RN Home Fleet was still at anchor in Scapa Flow, as the last available luftwaffe reconnaisance of Scapa Flow on May 21st had indicated that the Home Fleet had not sortied, and neither landbased or Lütjens own shipboard "B-dienst" teams had detected any reason to believe that major units of the RN had since deployed and were now at sea, such had been the radio silence exercised by Tovey & Holland. So the shock of being apprehended by 2 previously undetected major units of the RN Home Fleet only hammered home to Lütjens how poor the German's knowledge of RN dispositions was. Try and imagine being in command of 2 lone ships at sea, knowing you've been located by the enemy, and then realising that for your own part you have no idea of where the world's most powerful navy has its major units in relation to your position. THAT is what should be kept in mind when assessing Lütjens decisions.
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