Comments by "MarcosElMalo2" (@MarcosElMalo2) on "Anders Puck Nielsen" channel.

  1. Inspections could slow down shipping enough to be a “semi-blockade” of St. Petersburg and it wouldn’t be an act of war. It would strangle a lot of trade to Russia. What would be the Russian response at that point? For example, would they use military escorts of ships and ignore inspections? I think Finland, Estonia, and other Baltic nations should impose a heavy inspection regime (including surveillance of Russia’s and China’s “alternative commercial fleet”, aka the Dark Fleet). But there must be coordinated plans to address the response, and so on. With regard to the territorial waters aspect, there are no “international waters” in the area in question. It’s all territorial waters, either Estonia’s or Finland’s waters. International law dictates that peaceful commercial shipping has the right of free passage through these territorial waters of Finland and Estonia. At the same time, both nations have the right to inspect ships passing through their waters. Russia and China have certainly given Finland and Estonia cause to impose a strict inspection regime on all ships entering St. Petersburg.
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  2. Probably not. Carlson knew which questions were acceptable without being told. He’s a natural bootlicker.
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  3.  @mickser101  Why did you cancel your windectomy?
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  4. I avoided forming an opinion until the first 72 hours passed. After that, it was clear that Russia would fail to achieve a quick victory. And it seemed to me that even if Russia could eventually achieve a military victory over Ukraine’s standing army, it couldn’t successfully occupy Ukraine. Ukraine would be a constant drain on Russia’s limited resources. This wouldn’t be a repeat of the mighty Red Army rolling across Eastern Europe in 1945, subverting each country it occupied. If I take a cynical view, I think a slow Ukrainian victory suits the West. Russia might be able to make a recovery if it were to negotiate a withdrawal today and leave tomorrow, but the longer this conflict continues, the worse it will be for Russia long term in all respects. Perhaps greatest of all will be the psychic shock Russia will suffer. There is a saying, “You reach the bottom when you stop digging.” Russia is determined to keep digging.
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  5. That’s very low probability, but not impossible. I assume you mean retired pilots, not pilots currently flying for their respective air forces. There is zero chance of a pilot actively flying for his country’s armed forces to be detached to the Ukrainian Air Force to participate in hostilities. That would be escalatory and the same as a declaration of war. Even retired F-16 pilots would be an excuse for the Russians to escalate if it was discovered. This is why I think it is low probability we will see it happen. Using non-Ukrainian pilots is unnecessary. The Ukrainian AF does not have a pilot shortage. It has an aircraft shortage. Furthermore, if reports are to be believed, experienced Ukrainian pilots have been training on the F-16 over the past year. So there is very little benefit to taking the risk of escalation. However, there is a factor that raises the probability. These missions are being flown well behind the frontlines, so there would be very little chance of a foreign retired pilot being shot down over Russian held territory. If the Russians managed to shoot down an aircraft with such a pilot, the Russians wouldn’t be able to capture the pilot or recover their body. They wouldn’t have proof of this sort of foreign intervention. I think we can rule it out your suggestion, but we can’t completely rule it out. And we can’t rule it out going forward if the situation changes.
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  6. Did you run out of coping juice, comrade?
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  7. We really don’t know if the fighting east of Kharkiv was completely opportunistic or planned. We do know a bit more about the Kherson counteroffensive because it was announced and we saw the various missile attacks on Russian assets to shape the battlefield (depots, air defense, air bases, supply routes). When the attack kicked off, the strategy was a little unusual and perhaps confusing. UA seemed to be attacking on across the entire Kherson front line before settling on the three main lines. The approach east of Kharkiv seems too well organized to be improvised. I think this was planned as an option all along. Ukraine has been conducting reconnaissance and surveillance to get an idea of which strategically important area was most vulnerable. (And I suspect that in addition to drones, they were sending in Long Range Reconn Patrols behind enemy lines when they discovered that the front lines were thinly defended.) Ukraine probably monitored Russia pulling out troops and equipment to send to Kherson. Kherson is not a feint or diversion, but it is being used to fix Russian soldiers in place nevertheless. Russia has concentrated a lot of artillery on both banks of the Dnipro, making it deadly for Ukraine to concentrate its forces for a big breakthrough, but it is possible to surgically isolate smaller Russian units and either push them back or defeat them in detail. The mobile reserves of Russia’s defense-in-depth are having trouble staying organized and concentrated themselves. So I think Anders is right about the strategy for Kherson. Unless the Russians collapse entirely, it’s going to be a campaign of nibbling, avoiding concentration of large masses of soldiers. You’ll notice that although it is slow going, Ukraine seems to be maintaining the initiative, forcing Russia to react to the crisis of the moment. If Russia were to rush forces from Zaporizhe to reinforce Izyum’s lines of communication, we might well see a third counterstroke in the less defended area.
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  8.  @eliasross4576  The main purpose of political science isn’t to make predictions. I know, it’s got “science” in the name, so one might come to this misunderstanding quite easily. Political science isn’t science and is not great at making successful predictions consistently. Mearsheimer’s biggest weakness is his inability to accord agency to non-superpower or great power countries. Mearsheimer likes to see geopolitics as grand manichean struggles, and everyone else are chess pieces. That’s how Mearsheimer can blame the U.S. for Russia’s invasion. In his mind, the U.S provoked the attack.
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  9. One form of defense-in-depth is to stage mobile defense reserves well behind the perimeter that can respond to attempts to break through. The pickets on the perimeter are not expected to hold out indefinitely, just long enough for the reaction force to arrive. You’re probably well aware of this, but it bears mentioning as ground work for the next part. Imagine that you (a generic Ukrainian general) discover that every other quick reaction battalion was sent to reinforce Kherson. Furthermore, you had a pretty good idea of where they are positioned and the routes they would take to reinforce whatever part of the front line was threatened. You could interdict those lines of communication and wreak havoc on the defense. You’d have more leeway to concentrate your forces, because a large portion of the Russian artillery had been shifted to defend Kherson. I don’t think this just fell into some commander’s lap. I think this was carefully planned as an option and was launched when the UA determined the least defended part of front that had strategic importance. So put me down for opportunistic but planned. A lot of prep went into determining Russian disposition of forces.
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  10.  @davidb7422  That’s not the main reason. Russia should have quick reaction reserves staged behind the front. When the frontline gets hit and the line troops are severely threatened, these mobile reserves spring into action. You also have your artillery to rain down concentrations of attacking troops. The breakdown here is that a good number of these units were sent to reinforce Kherson, including arty. Assuming Ukraine did its prep work, they knew where the remaining Russian units were and which roads the Russians would use to send reinforcements. There is a technical term for this in the military. It’s called catching the other guy with his pants down.
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  11.  @pansepot1490  I don’t say this disparagingly, but I’ll say it: Zelensky is a performer, and a performer is exactly what Ukraine has needed to rally against the despotic invader and to garner world support. His inner circle includes people he worked with in his previous career, and they know how to communicate ideas, combat disinformation, and present the right narrative at the right time. He has the charisma and communication skills of a Reagan or a Churchill (while also being very different from them).
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  12. The grain loading is made more difficult, but not impossible. I wonder how quickly the facilities could be repaired or new ones constructed. The purpose of insurance is to protect investments. In shipping, it’s a promise to ship owners that if their ship is lost or damaged, they will be compensated to replace or repair it. A wealthy nation or a cooperative group of nations could act as insurers. They could also charter cargo ships. It would be funny if China or India were pressured into insuring Black Sea shipping.
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  13. There was increased activity in the Baltic around Kaliningrad prior to the invasion, including some aggressive maneuvers (approaching NATO ships closer than is “polite”. This was mentioned in the news, but by that time most of the world’s attention was on the Russian-Belarusian military exercises just outside of Ukraine. His timing was off because he didn’t take into account the 2022 Olympics in China. The Kremlin delayed out of deference to China. This lost them about a month of better terrain conditions before the March thaw that made the countryside too muddy for tanks. This is why you saw the Russians sticking to roads—it was like XXX Corps trying to race up the highway to Arnhem in WWII.
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  14.  @GolemRising  I’ll third the Perun suggestion. When I recommend his channel to people, I advise them not to be put off by the length of Perun’s videos. He has a unique approach in presenting topics that are generally to be found in specialized academia (military policy, economics, geopolitics).
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  15. All of those😅 guys, plus: Vlad Vexler for perspectives on Russian politics (and more general discussions of political philosophy and opinion), and for deep history I go to Timothy Snyder. Snyder is CURRENTLY teaching a class on Ukrainian History at Yale and releasing videos of the course. We’re up to the year 1699 after 11 lectures. I highly recommend Snyder for his historical perspective. He’s also given talks on the Nazi and Soviet genocides in Ukraine, the not-quite-fascism of contemporary autocracies, and other topics. Another good guy for Russian history during the Soviet Period is Steven Kotkin, author of a three volume biography of Stalin. He has an opinion or two about Putin. 😊
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  16. It sort of reminds me of the Doolittle Raid, the first U.S. bombing of Japan in the Spring of 1942. The raid was more symbolic and psychologically effective than militarily effective, demonstrating that the Japanese homeland was vulnerable. The drone raid on Sebastopol similarly demonstrated that Ukraine could reach out and touch Russia where Russia thought it was safe. Even before the attack, there were parts of the Black Sea that the Russian fleet was avoiding. The attack put a fine point on this fact.
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  17. There are several other things that must be negotiated. The most important thing is the return of Ukrainians that Russia has kidnapped. The second is Russia handing over war criminals. It’s worth mentioning that once Russia is forcibly ejected from all of Ukraine, that Ukraine doesn’t have a lot of leverage to negotiate reparations, return of Ukrainian hostages, or turning over war criminals. The parties with leverage are those countries that have been waging the economic war against Russia. Russia wants sanctions and embargoes lifted. It will want to resume trade and normal economic relations. What is Putin willing to trade for such concessions? Will he allow extradition of field commanders and lower level generals? Many would think never, but they forget that Putin is a greedy villain. He wants his yacht back.
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  18. Agreed. But Russia’s ability to set any terms is being reduced every single day. And the goals they have set are either unattainable or meaningless. I think it’s clear that the Ukrainian will to fight will outlast Russia’s will to fight. Once Russia is ejected from Ukrainian territory, it will have decide if it wants to continue. At that point it will have gained nothing and lost much. Will Russia want to stop bleeding? We can only hope so. I am assuming that Ukraine won’t try to march on Moscow once the Russians are pushed out of their company. Once hostilities have ceased, it won’t just be Ukraine and Russia in the negotiations. Russia will want sanctions lifted, it will want to resume trade, etc. This means that EU and NATO countries will participate in negotiating an agreement. They control something Russia wants (normal economic relations). They also control something that Ukraine wants, namely continued support. Now, if Russia would just leave, we could get to the negotiations sooner.
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  19. I agree, but you might be better to discuss this in terms of probabilities and think in terms of individual nations in Europe. And we should also understand the conflict as a two-front war, one front being the economic battle being waged with sanctions. The two are enmeshed, of course. So if some nations falter because of the winter and low energy supplies, how will this effect the shooting war in Ukraine? If Germany weakens in her resolve (the economic damage goes much farther than hearing costs for Germany) and begins to bow to Russian pressure, what then? I happen to think that such an effect will not be decisive, but it will make Ukraine’s situation more difficult. I also think that if we are realistic about such possibilities, actions can be taken to shore up nations struggling with the economic side of the war. But nothing is certain, not ever, not in war and not in peace.
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  20.  @mariaf.6601  He’s going to say that the USSR retreated from the Nazis and won the war, completely ignoring that in the current war, the Russians are playing the role the Nazis and Ukraine, in defending its own soil, plays the role of the Soviets. In short, he’s delusional and ignorant. He really believes that Zelensky is a Nazi. He used to claim it anyway. When someone is that ridiculous, it’s hard to tell what they actually believe.
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  21. These are intriguing alternative possibilities that Anders has outlined. I don’t think he devoted enough time to the possibility of Ukraine creating its own “homegrown” air defense missiles. Ukraine certainly has its own weapons engineering capacity. Ukraine has capable weapon designers and engineers. There could also be technology transfer. Lastly, such weapons needn’t be produced in Ukraine. Ukraine could set up companies with manufacturing facilities in Europe or the U.S. (or anywhere in the world, really). Ukraine could lease such facilities from established manufacturers or buy surplus capacity. Nothing prevents this in friendly countries that support Ukraine. I’ll go so far as to speculate it’s already going on for some of the material used in Ukraine.
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  22.  @a.brekkan4965  The facts are unfair to Russia. 😢
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  23. Bakhmut isn’t strategically significant for Russia, but it could be the base of an attack towards Rostov-on-Don, and I suspect the line is relatively undefended.
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  24.  @krakhedd  Princip and Germany Solos are the same person.
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  25.  @ikke12345  You’ve never been to the Australian Alps?
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  26.  @richardtheweaver4891  I don’t think realists thought Ukraine would completely fold. The assumption was that Ukraine’s standing army couldn’t withstand the onslaught and that Ukrainians would have to fight an insurgency against the Russians. Much of this assumption was based on the idea that the Russian military was in a much better condition than it really was.
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  27. With regard to your point 3., Russia seems to be operating on the ancient principal of looting the occupied. They’re foraging in grocery stores, they’re robbing ATMs, they’re stealing cars. Early in the war I remembered seeing Russian position that had been retaken by the Ukrainians territorial defense force. The Russian soldiers had been staying in a building basement, and the basement was littered with refrigerators. My initial thought was that they were using the refrigerators as improvised defensive bulwarks (in case the building got shelled). Then I realized, THEY WERE STEALING REFRIGERATORS!! The ones scattered about in the basement were the ones that didn’t get loaded onto trucks before the Russians withdrew. For the Russian military, stealing and looting (and of course, much worse, as we have learned) isn’t an unfortunate breakdown in discipline. It would seem to be official policy. I think when Russia is eventually forced to withdraw, we will discover that they’ve stolen everything that wasn’t nailed down. I would also bet that they will try to destroy anything they can’t steal.
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  28. 👍 100%.
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  29.  @SquillagusNiggle  Regarding pinging of random things adding to operator inattention, I think we should return to the matter of the drones and/or drones. What if drones had been dogging the ship over the course of the previous seven weeks. Not necessarily weapon carrying drones, but surveillance drones, etc. If you were the on the Ukrainian side, you could also probe the Moskva to determine at what distance she would consider a drone a threat and fire on it. As time went on, you’d dial back the drone activity, but always make sure there were a few drones moving in and out of the Moskva’s radar. The operators would become accustomed to a few bogies on the screen, to far away to be a threat, and you wouldn’t want to waste valuable AA missiles on them unless they come too close.
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  30. It’s 2 May today. I do not see how Russia can achieve any political goals at this point. The original goals are unreachable. What intermediate goals are achievable? A land grab? The Ukrainians get a vote on that and Kyiv has made it clear that it will not trade land for peace. As of the last week and a half the west is arming Ukraine with offensive weapons at the same time that Russia is trying to reorganize its forces and grab up as much territory it can in Eastern Ukraine. Expect the Ukrainian counter offensive to occur when Russia has exhausted its own offensive capabilities. If the Ukrainians are successful, they will expel Russia sooner rather than later. Everyday, Ukraine’s hand at the negotiating table gets stronger and Russia’s hand gets weaker. The Russians might even lose Crimea, although some would say that is going too far. Anyway, this summer will see whether Ukraine can fight an offensive war and how well the Russian’s can defend their territorial gains. Russia cannot win. if the Ukrainians are successful, we will see Russia lose sooner rather than later. An attritional war against civilians is not going to work against Ukraine. I agree with Andes that the war is pointless for Russia. Putin has lost his gamble. The war is continuing based on its own moment and according to Russian domestic politics; Putin promised the Russians a victory, and the longer he prolongs the war, the longer he prolongs his own domestic power. It’s hard to imagine Putin clinging to power after Russia loses.
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  31. The specifics of the “new looser restrictions” were reported in the press, and interestingly don’t all match perfectly. “Unnamed Pentagon sources” are involved no doubt. And since then, a pentagon spokesman made a clarification that the lifting of restrictions were NOT limited to Kharkiv area of operations, and were not limited in the sorts of military targets allowed. Or rather he suggested that they weren’t disclosing the new limitations because makes more strategic sense to not clarify your tactical intentions. It’s kind of funny. They were issuing a clarification that was actually a de-clarification.
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  32.  @seanp9277  lol, you’re still trotting out “the West doesn’t understand Russian military thinking”? 😂 Where is the thinking? We are aware of Soviet offensive doctrines such as Deep Battle. It’s just that we are puzzled to see the doctrine applied so badly.
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  33.  @stevemaxwell5559  There should be a new Perun video today or tomorrow! See y’all there! 😀
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  34. I appreciate it. I want your analysis but sometimes I have an hour or more and sometimes I don’t. And no offense, but there are only two to whom I guarantee an hour: Perun and Tim Snyder’s Ukrainian history course at Yale. I promise you that if your presentations are 30 minutes or less, I will 100% watch ASAP. Longer than that, I might watch or I might keep putting it off. All that might sound like a back-handed compliment, so let me be clear: I value your thinking, your work, and your knowledge. I respect and appreciate you.
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  35.  @roqsteady5290  I agree. That doesn’t mean a push isn’t worthwhile if it gets them within easy artillery range of the coastal lines of communication. Yes, Russia still has other supply lines, but choking the coast constrains resupply. The Russians maintained supply lines in Kherson,right? But reducing supply by cutting the main ones while constantly harassing and interdicting the others were a major factor in the liberation of Kherson. If your artillery can fire 100 rounds a day, but you’re only getting 50 rounds, your artillery’s effectiveness has been reduced by 50% (more or less, other factors apply). The bottom line is that there is an argument to be made for a southern offensive, even if taking those big cities is out of reach.
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  36.  @tomasescalante2987 That bodes well for NATO if it’s supported by such high calibre academic institutions.
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  37.  @borgazvoda7590  That the 8 million ethnic Russians in Ukraine hate Ukraine is another one of those faulty assumptions that you cling to despite evidence to the contrary. This minority 5th column didn’t rise up as promised. Even now, those most committed to separating from Ukraine in the Donbas are rethinking their positions.
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  38.  @alexandruraresdatcu  Especially if you read and post comments or make videos responding to other videos. I don’t know if it’s true social media for those that purely watch videos without any further interaction with the YouTube site. I don’t think YouTube should get a clean bill of health or a pass, even if it scores better than a dung heap like Xitter.
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  39.  @vancouverbarista I’m not so sure Ukraine wants to block the exit door completely. It is probably sufficient to keep damaging it and limiting cargo transportation across it, but it would be smart to allow panicked Russian soldiers a way to retreat on foot.
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  40.  @mihai2526  you use propaganda and tell them that the wooden shoes are skis.
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  41. That’s how it seems, but it’s hard to say. The question is who will break first.
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  42.  @blackcatdungeonmastersfami5311  Are you consciously lying to spread disinformation, or are you giving us an example of clinging to faulty assumptions?
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  43.  @horrido666  I agree with your assessment of how many Neptunes were fired. The vehicle used for launch has four tubes. Now consider this: what if the Neptune differs from its predecessors by having a much lower skim height. It would run the risk of hitting a larger swell, but in this case, two got through.
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  44.  @u2beuser714  It would be much appreciated if you would watch the video before posting comments. You might be able to comment intelligently rather than appearing to be a simpleton.
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  45. Russian generals have said as much, indicating that Moldova could be their next target. But is this a realistic goal? Their thrusts toward Odessa has failed. Two ships crucial to an amphibious assault on the Odessa coast have been sunk or severely damaged. The big supply push trying to get conventional offensive weaponry to Ukraine indicates that Ukraine is preparing a counter-offensive. I think in the meantime they will allow a costly Russian advance to further deplete Russian forces before the counterstroke.
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  46.  @Dennis0824  That’s why he mentioned insurgency wars. The coalition won the Iraq War the Afghan War. It just failed to secure the peace. Counterinsurgency is a very different type of war than a war of attrition.
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  47.  @kasperwittrup1288  You’re correct in all but one thing. These are territorial waters. International law still provides for free passage for “innocent” commercial shipping. But international law also permits nations to conduct law enforcement activities in their territorial waters, such as inspections. Finland and Estonia each have the right to inspect each and every ship passing through its waters. I think the pilot requirement some are suggesting is a non-starter. But inspections, especially of “suspicious” ships, could put a real kink in Russian economic activity in St. Petersburg. It’s not a blockade, since Finland and Estonia would allow inspected ships to continue their voyages. With regards as to the type of inspections, the Finish (and Estonian, Swedish, Danish, Latvian, and Lithuanian) coastguard wouldn’t only be looking for criminal activity. They should also be equipment inspections to insure that the the inspected ships are seaworthy, mechanically sound, and safe for crew members. Such inspections can take quite a long time . . .
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  48. Fascinating. I can’t help but wonder if a new agreement will demilitarize the Black Sea, given that Russia is losing the war in Ukraine, and it’s no longer a matter of what concessions it will squeeze out of Ukraine.
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  49. And Perun’s previous Sunday’s video on the Russian economy.
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  50. Kherson is a pretty obvious target for a counteroffensive (Ukraine announced it was!), but it could be a feint to draw and pin Russian forces while the thrust comes elsewhere. Izum, southeast of Kharkiv seems like a possibility. The two rules of thumb is 1) strategic target (like a city with major road, rail, and water crossings), and 2) attack weakness not strength. Think of it as a chess game, although chess is vastly simpler.
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