Comments by "MarcosElMalo2" (@MarcosElMalo2) on "How is the war going? — Early September 2022" video.

We really don’t know if the fighting east of Kharkiv was completely opportunistic or planned. We do know a bit more about the Kherson counteroffensive because it was announced and we saw the various missile attacks on Russian assets to shape the battlefield (depots, air defense, air bases, supply routes). When the attack kicked off, the strategy was a little unusual and perhaps confusing. UA seemed to be attacking on across the entire Kherson front line before settling on the three main lines. The approach east of Kharkiv seems too well organized to be improvised. I think this was planned as an option all along. Ukraine has been conducting reconnaissance and surveillance to get an idea of which strategically important area was most vulnerable. (And I suspect that in addition to drones, they were sending in Long Range Reconn Patrols behind enemy lines when they discovered that the front lines were thinly defended.) Ukraine probably monitored Russia pulling out troops and equipment to send to Kherson. Kherson is not a feint or diversion, but it is being used to fix Russian soldiers in place nevertheless. Russia has concentrated a lot of artillery on both banks of the Dnipro, making it deadly for Ukraine to concentrate its forces for a big breakthrough, but it is possible to surgically isolate smaller Russian units and either push them back or defeat them in detail. The mobile reserves of Russia’s defense-in-depth are having trouble staying organized and concentrated themselves. So I think Anders is right about the strategy for Kherson. Unless the Russians collapse entirely, it’s going to be a campaign of nibbling, avoiding concentration of large masses of soldiers. You’ll notice that although it is slow going, Ukraine seems to be maintaining the initiative, forcing Russia to react to the crisis of the moment. If Russia were to rush forces from Zaporizhe to reinforce Izyum’s lines of communication, we might well see a third counterstroke in the less defended area.
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One form of defense-in-depth is to stage mobile defense reserves well behind the perimeter that can respond to attempts to break through. The pickets on the perimeter are not expected to hold out indefinitely, just long enough for the reaction force to arrive. You’re probably well aware of this, but it bears mentioning as ground work for the next part. Imagine that you (a generic Ukrainian general) discover that every other quick reaction battalion was sent to reinforce Kherson. Furthermore, you had a pretty good idea of where they are positioned and the routes they would take to reinforce whatever part of the front line was threatened. You could interdict those lines of communication and wreak havoc on the defense. You’d have more leeway to concentrate your forces, because a large portion of the Russian artillery had been shifted to defend Kherson. I don’t think this just fell into some commander’s lap. I think this was carefully planned as an option and was launched when the UA determined the least defended part of front that had strategic importance. So put me down for opportunistic but planned. A lot of prep went into determining Russian disposition of forces.
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@davidb7422 That’s not the main reason. Russia should have quick reaction reserves staged behind the front. When the frontline gets hit and the line troops are severely threatened, these mobile reserves spring into action. You also have your artillery to rain down concentrations of attacking troops. The breakdown here is that a good number of these units were sent to reinforce Kherson, including arty. Assuming Ukraine did its prep work, they knew where the remaining Russian units were and which roads the Russians would use to send reinforcements. There is a technical term for this in the military. It’s called catching the other guy with his pants down.
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Neither side has full control of the skies, although Ukraine has done a pretty good job of suppressing air defense. Both sides are able to fly sorties, apparently. This is an improvement for Ukraine. Previously, the Russians had a bit more elbow room to operate. With regard to autumn rains and winter snow, mud sucks. Literally. As someone else said, cold frozen conditions favor whomever has better logistics (and shorter supply lines). Knowledge of local terrain is also helpful.
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Autumn has rains and mud, winter has snow and frozen ground. It might not be as bad as the spring thaw, but it will make vehicles road bound.
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