Comments by "MarcosElMalo2" (@MarcosElMalo2) on "Russia's Kharkiv offensive – what is the plan?" video.

  1. 10
  2. 6
  3. 2
  4. 1
  5.  @FabiusPolis  What has been the cost in men and materiel in each case? is an important question. In the case of Ukraine’s offensive, it was unarguable that a relatively light and highly mobile Ukrainian force not only took significant territory but did so at a greater cost to Russia forces. The Ukrainians killed and captured many soldiers and destroyed or captured a great deal of Russian equipment and supplies. The current Russian offensive also seems to be very expensive for Russia. They are paying a high price for territory that now will be expensive to hold, let alone force a breakthrough. I doubt they will be able to move artillery into what is a hard to defend killing zone. Looking at previous battles in history, Operation Market-Garden was a costly strategic failure but a “tactical success”. Allied forces advance all the way to the Rhine River but failed to take the final bridge at Arnhem. And it was a very costly strategic failure, almost destroying British Airborne at Arnhem, and costing a lot of allied lives along the road to Arnhem. Market-Garden also had an opportunity cost, as the resources spent might have been put to better use elsewhere. That said, I’m pretty sure that the Dutch on the allied side of the Rhine were happy to be liberated from the Germans, even though they also suffered casualties. However,I don’t want to make a direct comparison. Market-Garden was a much greater blunder than the current Kharkiv offensive. Another difference is that the allies had a much greater industrial capacity to recover from the blunder. The one possible success for the Russians is if the shift in the front lines threatens Kupiansk. I don’t know enough about the geography or force disposition to say one way or the other. I’d say the most grievous blow that Ukraine has suffered recently was the replacement of Shoigu. That might have far reaching strategic consequences.
    1
  6. 1