Comments by "MarcosElMalo2" (@MarcosElMalo2) on "RFU News — Reporting from Ukraine"
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@NotUnymous Sure, they might have stockpiled supplies. But that is the point of the artillery attacks on warehouses, depots, and supply lines. Russian logistics weren’t very good to begin with, although they have improved. Dispersing the stockpiles might help protect them from artillery and careless smokers, but it also slows their distribution. Slow distribution helps prevent the Russians regaining the initiative.
One of the biggest factors for successful assaults is keeping the initiative. If the Ukrainians can slow the Russian resupply, paralyze the command, and keep the field commanders guessing about which attacks are feints and which are real, they can maintain the initiative.
If you study military history, attackers that lose initiative generally don’t succeed, even with superior numbers. The Normandy landings are a good example of this. The attack was extremely costly in terms of casualties and equipment, but the allied forces maintained the initiative, broke through the beach defenses, and disrupted lines of communication that prevented the German reserve force from reacting quickly. The Germans were unable to block the momentum of the attack, nor could they cut the supply lines to the beachhead.
Operation Market Garden is a good example of losing momentum and losing initiative. The main body of attackers were slowed at several points. The light forces that took the bridges were not reinforced in time and the Germans were able to counterattack with surprising quickness. The main force had to divert forces to protect its flanks and supply lines. The attackers became the defenders, and were ultimately halted not far from their final objective.
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