Comments by "MarcosElMalo2" (@MarcosElMalo2) on "The Weakness of Russian VDV Airborne Force Structure" video.

Too be clear, the battle for Hostemel airport was a helicopter air assault to secure an air bridge. I think the worst factor for the first and second waves of VDV units was that they were unprepared for the mission and there was insufficient planning. Remember, the invasion was top secret until 24 hours (or less for some officers), and the intelligence was really bad: they were not expecting heavy resistance. This intelligence factor applies to the invasion forces as a whole. They didn’t plan for a worst case scenario because they 1) were told it was unnecessary, and 2) they didn’t have time to plan for it. So the first wave suffered heavy casualties and failed to secure the airport. The second wave was either shot out of the sky or turned back. The third wave, which would have included heavier equipment never left the ground. Rather than highlighting force structure weakness (which is also a factor, no doubt), the mission failure and the larger failure point to deficiencies in authoritarian government, namely distrust (the upper echelon keeping the invasion top secret from lower echelons, and probably not discussing it among themselves) and buying into their own propaganda. The intelligence supported the propaganda, and couldn’t be questioned. Raising doubts would be tantamount to disloyalty. A VDV battalion commander couldn’t just say “I’m going to prepare for the worst, just in case” without incurring the wrath of his superiors.
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And the battalion level commanders didn’t get briefed until 24 hours before the invasion. Not just the VDV, but across the entire invasion force. Even with so little time, they were also given faulty intelligence about the resistance they faced. It would be exceedingly difficult to plan and prepare on such short notice AND with faulty intelligence. These are symptoms of the structural problems that undermine authoritarian regimes.
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@MatoVuc Why would they air assault the airport in the first place if not as a forward supply base to quickly strike into Kyiv and decapitate the government? The target makes no sense, otherwise. The truth is, they failed to take the airport. Thus they failed to quickly get together an overwhelming force. By the time the airport was secured, the Ukrainian military had time to prepare the defense of Kyiv. The Hostemel operation was an utter failure and Putin threw away one of his most elite assets.
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Crete was actually a success, albeit a costly one. But it was mostly a success because of the incompetence of the British commander. The VDV failure at Hostemel airport and Kyiv is more like operation Market-Garden, except worse.
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@512TheWolf512 🤷🏻‍♀️ I don’t know, was it? Operation Market-Garden was extremely costly in terms of men and resources. Success needed total success—securing the bridge at Arnhem. It cost the Allies months in terms of opportunity costs. Intelligence mistakes contributed to its failure. Indeed, the gamble probably wouldn’t have been taken if the British had done proper intelligence. There were also equipment and comms failures. In some ways, Market-Garden was a worse disaster. It was an own goal that delayed the inevitable, Germany’s loss in WWII. The Hostemel failure was an own goal that has hastened the inevitable, Russia’s eventual and utter loss in Ukraine.
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@grandayatollah5655 Support couldn’t reach them because planning was so bad—last minute and based on faulty intelligence about the resistance they would encounter. Battalion and company commanders weren’t even briefed until 24 hours (or less) before the invasion. The second wave never got there, either shot down or turned back. The third wave, which would have included heavier supporting elements, never left. Then the relief column stalled—again, due to poor planning and preparation. The lack of support is only a part of it. The failure of the VDV is the failure of the men that foolishly sent them to be slaughtered, men who believe their own wacky propaganda, who value loyalty over competence, and don’t question their field intelligence too much when it confirms their biases (the propaganda shaping intelligence reports).
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Definitely before the invasion. Now would they be an effective counterforce against a military coup? Perhaps not so much. Politics has had a lot to do with Russia’s failure in Ukraine, both in the Kremlin and in the military. It’s one of the weak points of such a corrupt authoritarian government. The decision to invade was kept secret from brigade level officers until 24 hours before the kickoff. That’s not enough time to plan and prepare. The intelligence was bad and pre-shaped by Russia’s own propaganda, which also hindered planning. This secrecy is a symptom of the distrust and jealousy between individuals at all levels. The swallowing whole of one’s own propaganda (aka buying your own bullshit) is a symptom of valuing loyalty and punishing competence as disloyalty.
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