Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "The Forgotten Hero Who Stood Between Britain And Nazi Germany | Fighting The Blue | War Stories" video.

  1. The myth is that the Germans lost because they attacked London, not the radar sites. Goering moved attacks away from the radar sites because they were ineffective, yet they were losing planes and pilots trying to do so. The me109 bomber escorts could not reach London. The Luftwaffe bombers were protected by the me110. Near London they were attacked by swarms of RAF fighters who easily moved the me110’s out of the way to get at the bombers. Bomber formations were repeatedly broken up or deflected, being forced to turn back for home. The great air battle of 15 September 1940, the Germans sent 400 fighters to escort about 100 bombers part of the way to London. Fighter Command ordered into the air nearly 200 Spitfires and Hurricanes swarming high above London and Kent, attacking the poorly escorted bombers. Nearly 300 RAF fighter sorties were launched that day against German fighter escorts. British fighters would land refuel and rearm then take off again. This massive concentration of fighters, larger than anything ever previously displayed by the RAF, convinced the Luftwaffe that Fighter Command was far from being the beaten force that German intelligence was telling them. Chain Home and the fighter control system, which the Germans did not have at the time, allowed outnumbered British fighters to turn up at the right time to intercept Luftwaffe raids time after time after time. The sight of such a large fighter force, that miraculously intercepted the Luftwaffe everywhere it turned, shattered German hopes. The element of surprise gave the RAF men an advantage. German formations could be seen, and also their in-flight deviations, in real time as it was happening. This was directed to the intercepting flights as they moved towards the deviating German formations, to accurately locate them springing surprise attacks. “From the very beginning the British had an extraordinary advantage which we could never overcome throughout the war - radar and fighter control. For us and for our command this was a surprise, and a very bitter one. The British fighter was guided all the way from take-off to his correct position for an attack on the German formations. We had nothing of the kind.” - Adolf Galland The RAF knew exactly where the Germans were and coming from, while the German knew nothing of the locations of RAF fighters. The RAF used intelligence and technology. The Germans were relying on brute force in numbers. The British were far more advanced in radar than the Germans, having types of radar sets the Germans never knew existed. German pilots gave feedback that they were being intercepted on every flight in surprise attacks, so the British must have advanced radar. German scientist refused to acknowledge this. British radar engineers in early August 1940 replaced several of the huge 350-foot fixed antenna arrays of the Chain Home network with a new, smaller, rotating antenna that was used for transmitting and receiving radar pulses - a technological marvel at the time. They also introduced a new superior type of radar scope, called a Plan Position Indicator (PPI). It gave a bird’s eye view from above, rather than the previous side-view presentation. This is what we now traditionally picture as being the typical radar screen. It was an astounding advance. It gave more close controlling of aircraft. The Ground Controlled Interception (GCI). GCI was brilliant for controlling fighters to intercept enemy aircraft, particularly during night interceptions. GCI surpassed the cumbersome filtering of information from visual sightings, sound, radar, etc, and the time-consuming plotting on situation maps. A GCI controller could actually “see” the aircraft as they flew across the countryside, rather than watching voiced plots being pushed across a map. By studying the PPI, the GCI controller could determine the positions of the German fighters, identified by the newly invented Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) technology. The GCI controller could provide timely radio code word instructions directly to the fighters to successfully conduct the interception. The ingenious GCI transformed the British radar system. It provided: i) a basic early warning capability; ii) an actual means for dependable air interception control. So, even as the battle was progressing the British were introducing new advanced technology in radar, improved air defence systems and improving the fighter planes. The Germans brought nothing new to the battle. Goering in June 1940 said “My Luftwaffe is invincible. So now we turn to England. How long will this one last - two, three weeks?” After the clash over Dunkirk it is incredulous he said this.
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