Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "Imperial War Museums"
channel.
-
14
-
10
-
9
-
8
-
8
-
7
-
This is very poor.
♦ Japan thought Germany would definitely defeat the USSR.
♦ The German defeat at Moscow would ensure Germany would not defeat the USSR.
♦ The Japanese entered WW2 on a presumption they would be linking up with Germany. Transpiring they were alone fighting two massive powers with another pinning their forces down in the north, eventually fighting all three. Not what they wanted or planned.
Japan would not attack the British empire, Dutch empire and the US unless Germany declared war on the USA. If Germany said no to declaring war on the USA, Japan would never have attacked and there would be no Pacific war. The two theatres were linked.
Japan did not want to face alone the USA and the British empire. The worst case scenario. And that is what happened. The Germans attempted to get the Japanese to attack the British in the Far East to divert the British away from Europe. The UK was amassing a large air fleet and also had the world's largest navy. The British would not sit by for long only fighting in the desert. The reason Germany attacked the USSR was to get their resources to fight the coming air war with the British. The Japanese repeatedly refused to declare war. Only when the Japanese thought the USSR was about to fall they joined in. The USSR kept 40 divisions opposite the Japanese Kwantung army all though WW2. With superior armour to the Japanese.
Japan received assurances from Germany in the Spring of 1941. that they would declare war on the USA. Japan, economically could not sustain war of any length of time against any major power by itself, either the UK or the USA. Especially a war strung over a vast front. They imported most raw materials with their industry primarily artisan based, with little mass production. If going it alone, what the hell attacking the USA and British Empire was to achieve with no back up occupation force at Pearl Harbor defies belief. The Pearl Harbor attack was to fend off the US navy while they gain as much resource rich territory as possible in the south while the USSR threat is moved away from their north in China by the Germans. To Japan the key was the defeat of the USSR, which by Oct/Nov 1941 they thought was a foregone conclusion.
All through WW2 the Soviets had approx 40 divisions (most armoured) in Siberia and the Soviet Far East facing the Japanese. Without Germany fighting the USSR anticipating a quick German win, the Japanese would never had attacked the USA and the British Empire. It was madness to do so unilaterally and would entail certain defeat - even the Japanese knew that.
The Japanese were to eliminate the US Pacific fleet. The US Atlantic fleet would be occupied by the German U-Boats. The carriers got away at Pearl Harbor. If the carriers were sunk, they would not have been on the defensive by June 1942, giving them far more breathing space and lots more with the anticipated defeat of the USSR within months by the Germans. If the US carriers were sunk along with the US Pacific fleet, and the USSR defeated by summer 1942 by the Germans, Japan would be in very strong position.
The Japanese gained far more territory than they gambled on. They were one day away in Singapore from surrendering, but the British beat them to the white flag. They were expecting more protracted battles in Malaya/Burma and even maybe in the Philippines.
Using some common sense tells you the Japanese were not banking on being alone fighting the world's two largest economic powers. They were expecting at least the USSR to be neutralised or eliminated. And then some military aid from the Germans would be nice if it came. The link was enacted with 41 U-Boats operating from Penang. The Germans then would engage the British diverting them away from fighting the Japanese in Burma. Getting rid of the British and the Soviets was a major prize for Japan, and Germany could do the latter and both they thought the former. So was the notion.
Wages of Destruction by Prof Adam Tooze in quotes:
♦ The tripartite pact was signed in Sept 1940. If one is attacked the others come to their aid.
♦ "The real nightmare of German strategy was the possibility that Japan might come to terms with the United States, leaving Germany to fight Britain and maybe America alone. To forestall this possibility, Hitler had offered to declare war on the United States in conjunction with Japan already in the Spring of 1941."
♦ Germany had offered to declare war on the US before the June 1941 attack on the USSR.
♦ "But the Japanese had refused to commit themselves and instead entered into a last round of negotiations with the USA."
♦ "It was not until October and the fall of the Konoe government that Berlin could feel sure that the Japanese-USA talks were going nowhere."
♦ "When in November 1941 Tokyo began to signal that Japan was about to commit itself against the West, it was the cause of relief, bordering on euphoria in Berlin. Finally Hitler and Ribbentrop had the chance to complete the global strategic alliance they had been hoping for since 1938. And they did not hesitate."
♦ The Germans immediately started to revise the Tripartite pact, knowing of the Japanese commitment to war, at the German's insistence.
♦ "Without prior knowledge of the Japanese timetable for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Hitler pledged himself to following Japan in a declaration of war on the United States."
♦ 7 Dec 1941, Japanese attack the USA at Pearl Harbor and British territories in Malaya and Hong Kong.
♦ The amended Tripartite pact was signed by all, between the 7 Dec 1941, the attacks on the USA and British Empire, and Germany declaring war on the USA on 11 Dec 1941.
♦ 11 Dec 1941 Germany declares war on the USA.
Wages of Destruction is clear that the Germans were informed by the Japanese in November 1941 that they were to declare war. The attacks on the US and British Empire was no surprise to Hitler.
Wages of Destruction also states that Germany was repeatedly attempting to get Japan to declare war on the British empire. The Japanese knew exactly what the Germans wanted and what they would do. It all fits.
As it turned out:
♦ The USSR was not defeated and maintained a large army opposite the Japanese - the Japanese had already been mauled by the Soviets in Manchuria in 1939.
♦ Japan was facing the worst case scenario, the scenario it feared - fighting alone against the British empire and USA, the world's two largest economic superpowers.
♦ This was not in the forecasting. The German army defeated militarily superior France within weeks and since June 1941 were mauling the USSR so badly it was obvious to the Japanese in late 1941 the USSR would be defeated.
♦ The week in which the Japanese attacked the USA and British Empire, the Soviets counter attacked at Moscow with a battering ram of superior T-34 tanks pushing the Germans back taking 30,000 prisoners, ending any chance of Germany defeating the USSR in one swoop. A protracted war against the USSR would ensue. Not what Japan wanted.
♦ In Spring 1941, the Germans feared fighting the USA and the British alone - a worst case scenario for them. They were desperately worse off, fighting the British, USA and the USSR alone.
♦ If the Soviet counter attack had been one month earlier the Japanese would not have attacked the British and the USA - and almost a probability certainty signed a pact with the USA which was in ongoing talks virtually to the attack on the British, Dutch and Americans.
7
-
Pre WW2 Britain was on two paths:
1) The axial-flow air compressor by Griffiths;
2) The centrifugal air compressor by Whittle.
Griffiths' 1926 seminal paper laid down axial-flow. His paper actually outlined a turbo prop. He did not believe at the time the engines could produce enough thrust, but could turn a propeller. He got Metrovick to develop an axial-flow turbojet in 1938, who started the groundwork of the F.2 axial-flow in 1940, having an engine first spin in 1940, with a successful test bed spin in 1941. Whittle's patent was in 1930, which laid down the turbojet. All this info was available to the Germans.
Whittle went for centrifugal, as it was a simpler way of compressing air. Whittle wanted a simple air compressor to establish his turbo jet design quickly. In short, he was interested more in establishing the back end of the engine, the thrust, rather than the front. Once the back end was perfected then he could improve the front, the air compression. This was the sensible approach. The centrifugal compressor was perfectly adequate to prove the rear thrust side of the engine.
As post war engines proved the centrifugal was taken to higher limits. Axial-flow compression was a series of turbine fans on one shaft, with successive fans passing air to the next fan to increase air compression. This added complexity in many ways.
Griffiths went for the more complex axial-flow. He also laid down a contra-rotating compressor, but Metrovick did not go down that road. The more powerful F.2 was used to fly the Meteor plane but considered unreliable at that stage, so Whittle's centrifugal engine was used. The F.2 was more reliable, and powerful, than the German Jumo, but the British would never put a plane in the air with such an unreliable under-developed engine. Wiggin in Birmingham were commissioned to develop high temperature resistant alloys as the jet engines were being developed. The Germans had no such programme. The F.2 ended up as the post war Sapphire being built under licence in the USA as the J65, powering the: Douglas A-4 Skyhawk, Grumman F-11 Tiger, Martin B-57 and the Republic F-84F Thunderstreak.
It took the French a wasted eight years to get the German design reliable, which by that time they had discarded many of the German engine concepts. The French airliner the Sud Aviation Caravelle, used Rolls Royce Avon engines the French engines based on the German designs were so good.
7
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
Pre WW2 Britain was on two paths:
1) The axial-flow air compressor by Griffiths;
2) The centrifugal air compressor by Whittle.
Griffiths' 1926 seminal paper laid down axial-flow. His paper actually outlined a turbo prop. He did not believe at the time the engines could produce enough thrust, but could turn a propeller. He got Metrovick to develop an axial-flow turbojet in 1938, who started the groundwork of the F.2 axial-flow in 1940, having an engine first spin in 1940, with a successful test bed spin in 1941. Whittle's patent was in 1930, which laid down the turbojet. All this info was available to the Germans.
Whittle went for centrifugal, as it was a simpler way of compressing air. Whittle wanted a simple air compressor to establish his turbo jet design quickly. In short, he was interested more in establishing the back end of the engine, the thrust, rather than the front. Once the back end was perfected then he could improve the front, the air compression. This was the sensible approach. The centrifugal compressor was perfectly adequate to prove the rear thrust side of the engine.
As post war engines proved, the centrifugal was taken to higher limits. Axial-flow compression was a series of turbine fans on one shaft, with successive fans passing air to the next fan to increase air compression as air went along the compressor. This added complexity in many ways.
Griffiths went for the more complex axial-flow. He also laid down a contra-rotating compressor, but Metrovick did not go down that path. The more powerful F.2 was used to fly the Meteor plane but considered unreliable at that stage, so Whittle's centrifugal engine was used. The F.2 was more reliable than the German Jumo, but the British would never put a plane in the air with such an unreliable under-developed engine. Wiggin in Birmingham were commissioned to develop high temperature resistant alloys as the jet engines were being developed. The Germans had no such programme. The F.2 ended up as the post war Sapphire being built under licence in the USA as the J65, powering the: Douglas A-4 Skyhawk, Grumman F-11 Tiger, Martin B-57 and the Republic F-84F Thunderstreak.
It took the French a wasted eight years to get the German design reliable, which by that time they had discarded many of the German engine concepts. The French airliner, the Sud Aviation Caravelle, used Rolls Royce Avon engines the French engines, based on German designs, were so good.
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
Caen, the full Order No 1 transcript:
(I Corps Operations Order No. 1, WO 171/258)
3 British Division
a) The task of 3 British Division is to capture CAEN and secure a bridgehead over the R ORNE at that place.
b) The enemy may develop his counter-attack--
i) Through CAEN
ii) Across R ORNE at RANVILLE - BENOUVILLE having established himself in the area East of R ORNE from which he can dominate the beaches West of OUISTREHAM and the Northern approaches to CAEN.
iii) West of Caen, between R MUE and the CAEN Canal
iv) Any combination of the above
In cases (ii) and (iii) using CAEN as a pivot, if he succeeds in forestalling us there.
c) To counter these enemy measure 3 British Division should, before dark on D-Day, have captured or effectively masked CAEN and be disposed in depth with brigade localities firmly established.
i) North-West of BENOUVILLE, in support of 6 Airborne Division operating East of R ORNE (having relieved the airborne troops West of the canal and taken over the defence of the BENOUVILLE-RANVILLE crossings.
ii) North-West of CAEN, tied up with the LEFT forward brigade locality of 3 Canadian Division.
Should the enemy forestall us at CAEN and the defences prove to be strongly organised thus causing us the fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct frontal assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event 3 British Division will contain the enemy in CAEN and retain the bulk of its forces disposed for mobile operations inside the covering position. CAEN will be subjected to heavy air bombardment to limit its usefulness and to make its retention a costly business."
- Richard Anderson - "Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day"
So the intention in the Order is quite clear. Take Caen if possible, but if German resistance ensure that the enemy doesn't use it as a means of counter-attacking. Mask it off then let the RAF deal with Caen. Caen was not the prime aim. It was to draw the German Armour reserves onto the Second Army then grind them down, with also an aim to prevent them from interfering in Bradley's breakout into Brittany and the seizing Cherbourg. The Germans kept approximately 90% of their armour on Monty's left flank against the British and Canadians including ALL the elite Panzer Divisions, and kept all the heavy armour away from the US armies.
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
In an interview with Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission in Washington, in 1955, General Browning said the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges must be seized "as soon as possible", although the wooded Groesbeek Heights on the route to the bridge must be held.
Field Order 11 of 13 Sept is clear in section 2 a), putting the bridges first in the writing, that they were to be seized, then the high ground secured and then the roads. Order 1, of 13 September, written by Lindquist of the 508th, states he will wait at the high ground for a Division Order to move from the Heights to the bridge. In short, wait for an Order from Gavin to move.
The heights near De Ploeg, which are really pretty flat being a wooded area but high for Holland, are pretty well between the Drop Zone (DZ) and bridge. The 508th would go through the Heights to reach the bridge. Browning and Gavin naturally did not want German troops between the LZ and the bridge, so the Heights had to be occupied and secure. The 508th CP would be established at the Heights.
Gavin understood the priorities in sending the 508th to the bridge and Groesbeek heights immediately, with Coln Warren's battalion of the 508th assigned the bridge. To get to the bridge from the DZ you have to pass the Groesbeek Heights, so any enemy at the Heights naturally had to be subdued, then secure the area, which could take time, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge.
It took the 665 men of 508th a painfully slow 3.5 hours to march a few miles from the DZ to the heights, reaching the Groesbeek heights at 1730. They encountered only a few Labour troops in opposition. There were no Germans at the Groesbeek Heights as forward scouts relayed back the situation. So, on route Coln Lindquist the head of the 508th could have sent Warren's A and B companies directly to the bridge, bypassing the Groesbeek Heights, immediately via the riverbank as instructed by Gavin. The rest of the battalion could move to the empty Groesbeek Heights setting up defences at De Ploeg on the heights. Dutch resistance men informed the 508th that the Germans had largely cleared out of Nijmegen with only 19 guards on the bridge. So all was easy and fine, so the two companies assigned the bridge could move immediately to their objective without a diversion via the Groesbeek Heights.
Despite hearing the good news from the Dutch Underground, Lindquist in command of the 508th was not moving at all, keeping all his men static at De Ploeg. Lindquist was waiting for a Divisional Order from Gavin informing him that the DZ was secure, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge. When Gavin found out Lindquist was static via a liaison officer he was livid, running over to De Ploeg in a Jeep telling Lindquist to get moving to the bridge. Even then, took Lindquist another two hours to send men in force to the bridge.
Three stray men from a forty man patrol sent to the bridge immediately by Warren to confirm what the Dutch Underground told them on reaching DePloeg, took the guards on the south end of the bridge prisoner. They left when no one turned up. When leaving they saw hundreds of Germans pour from the north onto the previously lightly guarded bridge. Later, a company of Warren's main force became lost when they eventually moved towards the bridge. By the time Warren's two companies did reach the bridge in force, the Germans had reinforcing the bridge with hundreds of men. Too late. The first attack on the bridge was just before midnight, 10.5 hours after landing.
* The 82nd were expecting German resistance from the east, however it came from the north via the Nijmegen bridge.
* Gavin was expecting Lindquist to secure the Groesbeek heights, which were devoid of enemy forces, then immediately move to the bridge, which meant sending Warren's battalion immediately.
* Lindquist was expecting Gavin to notify him that the DZ was clear.
Gavin was expecting Lindquist to go to the bridge when it was obvious the Groesbeek heights, on the way to the bridge, were secure. As no Germans were about, the heights were naturally secure. Regarding Lindquist's expected clearing of the LZ before moving from DePloeg. Lindquist did write a Field Order for the 508th on 13 September copied to Gavin, stating that once the heights were secure he would wait for a Divisional Order [from Gavin] to move. Two days later at the jump briefing Gavin verbally overruled Lindquist's Field Order, using a map he told him that he should move to the bridge "without delay". Poor command communications by Gavin.
Poulussen, in Lost at Nijmegen discovered that the 508th jumped without any written offensive orders from Gavin. All was verbal from Gavin to Lindquist of the 508. Chester Graham, the 82nd liaison officer, was at the pre jump meeting in England. He said there was no ambiguity amongst anyone there that the bridge was the prime target.
In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, was wanting confirmation that if the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the objectives. In response, dated 25 July 1945, General Gavin was clear: "About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay _after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city.
"_General Browning never knew men were static at De Ploeg. Like Gavin he was expecting men to be seizing the bridge. Being corps commander, he was busy attempting to communicate with all three parachute divisions. The 82nd did launch a few failed attacks on the bridge. In the afternoon of the next day, 18th, Gavin asked permission to launch another attack. Browning, seeing the bridge was well defended, and the failed attacks, refused, opting to wait for XXX Corps to arrive to seize the bridge. Inexplicably Gavin moved all his men out of Nijmegen town completely to the heights and DZ, giving the town back to the Germans. This made matters worse when XXX Corps arrived who had expended vital time, and ammunition, in flushing them out.
On page 162 of the U.S. Official History: "many documents regarding the extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files."
Read:
1) Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment In World War II by Phil Nordyke.
2) Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergström.
3) Market Garden, Then and Now by Karl Magry.
4) Lost at Nijmegen by R Poulusson
4
-
The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up.
The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
According to the official AMERICAN Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
The American post war version of events is one that attempts to whitewash their failure at Nijmegen to capture the bridge on the first day. The film A bridge Too Far, made when Browning had already died, only cemented the false narrative in the minds of the public. Since then many researchers have uncovered the real facts.
The 508th did launch some patrols into Nijmegen. A patrol from the 3rd Battalion almost reached the bridge - but only after being delayed by the enemy with the bridge being reinforced in company strength by the time they reached it.
Warren's 1st Bn had launched a patrol or two patrols, yes, just patrols. Nordyke notes two versions from Warren and his exec' officer. It, or they, were led by the Bn S-2 Intelligence Section, then joined by Lt. Weaver's 3rd Platoon of the Bn reserve C Company, plus two squads from the HQ Company LMG Platoon and C Company's SCR-300 radio set and operator, for communication back to the Battalion. Weaver's patrol met German resistance, withdrawing when they heard the Bn were sending A and B companies to take the bridge. They only went to the bridge because Gavin ran to Lindquist's CP at De Ploeg in a Jeep, screaming at him to get moving when he found, after many hours, he was not moving to the bridge.
"I knew all of the division staff and the other regimental commanders, and was included in the planning of operations and briefings. I was ‘bigoted.’ [This is a WWII military term for being read into/briefed on missions.]
Prior to the Holland jump, I sat in a high-level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important.
After we were dropped in Holland, I went to the 508th Regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, “As soon as the DZ (drop zone) is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.” So I went cross-country through Indian country [slang military term for enemy territory] to the Division CP and relayed Lindquist’s message to Gavin.
I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his jeep, he told me to, “Come with me — let’s get him moving.” "On arriving at the 508th Regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, “I told you to move with speed.”
- by Chester E Graham, liaison officer between the 508th and the 82nd Division Headquarters.
Three stray men of an 82nd patrol, were separated reaching the Nijmegen bridge. They captured about the German bridge guards and their small artillery weapon on the south end of the bridge. They waited an hour until dark at around 7:30 pm, withdrawing as no one turned up. They could hear heavy equipment approaching from Arnhem, being the SS-Panzer Recon Battalion 9, who crossed the bridge at Arnhem just missing Frost's men at 7pm.
- Demolition Platoon, 508th by Zig Burroughs.
Look at Frost's progress in Arnhem, where his whole battalion following A Company moved away from the Germans, through people's houses, over walls and back yards, carrying all their equipment, by-passing German positions, reaching the Arnhem bridge. The British First Airborne landed half an hours after the 508. They had an extra 4 or 5 miles march, met more resistance, yet reached the Arnhem bridge before the US 82nd reached the Nijmegen bridge.
General Gavin gained promotion, 505th PIR command to Assistant Divisional commander for Normandy. He was promoted again to Divisional commander for Holland. Gavin inherited Lindquist as commander of the 508th, who were the least experienced regiment in the Division. Yet Gavin gave the least experienced regiment the prime task. Gavin says that in England he told Lindquist to go for the bridge "without delay." Lindquist denied Gavin said this.
Gavin chose the most experienced regiment, the 504th, who had just returned from Anzio, to secure the Grave bridge, because it was on the Division's supply line. Without the Grave bridge secured, the 82nd would be in trouble. The next most experienced regiment was Gavin's old unit the 505th, giving them the defensive task of securing the landing zones from counter-attack from the Reichswald.
The intelligence picture by SHAEF, on 16 September, suspected II.SS-Panzerkorps was drawing new tanks from a depot in the Kleve area of Germany. Gavin had this mythical 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald, so he gave the least experienced 508th the task of securing Nijmegen and its bridges. This was a unit, better suited to a defensive role. The 508th, and Lindquist, were well dug-in on the Groesbeek ridge at De Ploeg when Gavin was informed they were not moving on the bridges in Nijmegen. They were not following Gavin's divisional plan, Lindquist was waiting for a division order from HQ before moving into Nijmegen. This was a clear communications failure between Gavin and Lindquist.
Ridgway had no role to play in Market Garden as his two divisions of XVIII Corps were attached to the British First Airborne Corps for the operation, under Browning. Ridgway got into a Jeep riding up from Belgium, when XXX Corps made contact with the the 82nd, paying a visit to Gavin's CP to see why they had not secured the bridge. Gavin entered to find Ridgway in the CP studying a map. Gavin ignored him and immediately left without even acknowledging Ridgway's presence.
The fact is there were no German combat troops in Nijmegen on the jump day. None. The low grade aged troops were scared stiff of meeting well armed aggressive paras. The German HQs moved out immediately. Dutch Resistance men informed Linquists at De Ploeg that the bridge had 19 guards with most Germans evacuating Nijmegen.
Regarding Harmel, the German commander who was in command of the 'island' between Nijmegen and Arnhem, when interviewed by Kershaw in the 1970s, he said there was no German armour between the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridge when XXX Corps secured the Nijmegen bridge. This was incorrect as German records show German tanks, inc' Tigers, were already crossing south on the Arnhem bridge to form a line at Elst - the British First had capitulated on the Arnhem bridge running out of ammunition, at the same time XXX Corps crossed the Nijmegen bridge. Harmel never knew this, as communications was skant in a fluid situation. After, the last thing they were thinking of was where and what time, as they saw the allied in a few days had punched a 60 mile salient right into their lines on the German border, taking the largest road bridge in Europe at the time.
▪ Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment In World War II by Phil Nordyke.
▪ Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergström
▪ Market Garden, Then and Now by Karl Magry.
▪ Lost at Nijmegen by R Poulusson
4
-
3
-
The gains from MARKET GARDEN have been noted by: Eisenhower:
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
Major-General Sir Francis De Guingand:
‘It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland.
MONTY The Field-Marshal, NIGEL HAMILTON:
‘General Student, in a statement after the war, considered the ‘Market Garden’ operation to have ‘proved a great success. At one stroke it brought the British 2nd Army into the possession of vital bridges and valuable territory. The conquest of the Nijmegen area meant that the creation of a good jumping board for the offensive which contributed to the end of war.’ Student was expressing the professional admiration of an airborne commander - ‘those who had planned and inaugurated with complete the first airborne operations of military history, had not now even thought of such a possible action by the enemy…the Allied Airborne action completely surprised us. The operation hit my army nearly in the centre and split it into two parts…In spite of all precautions, all bridges fell intact into the hands of the Allied airborne forces—another proof of the paralysing effect of surprise by airborne forces!’ As for hindsight, the only part of that would interest me would be to judge the actions of those people at that time in the situation that they found themselves in. As far as MARKET GARDEN was concerned, the German V-2 rockets on London alone justified the attempt, even without the other, good reasons for making the attempt.
3
-
3
-
3
-
@ThePalaeontologist
Inland Caen was not prime target. ports were. Pre Orders were that if Ceen had stiff resistance the RAF would deal with it. In the early days it was vital to secure the beachhead not get bogged down in fighting for a non-port small city.
"The Battle of the Generals" by General Blumenson makes it clear that Bradley, not Montgomery, ordered Patton to stop at Falaise;
▪ Bradley, on his own initiative, ordered Patton to stop on August 12 (page. 206-207);
▪ Bradley's post-war effort to blame this on Montgomery was "dishonest and anti-British" (page. 211);
▪ Despite Bradley stating he ordered it. Patton was running off to Paris, but Bradley failed to stop him from making a long hook encirclement of the Germans towards Dreux at the Sein (page. 223);
▪ This was in clear contradiction to Montgomery's suggestion that he do so (page. 218).
The U.S. Army Official History - Martin Blumenson's Breakout and Pursuit - attributes the decision not to close the gap to Bradley. Thus the title of the section is BRADLEY'S DECISION (pages 506-509). He states directly: "Montgomery did not prohibit American advance beyond the boundary." And on page 509: "Bradley himself made the decision to halt."
The British Official History - L. F. Ellis, Victory in the West, Vol. 1 - attributes the decision to Bradley on page 429.
In Bradley's memoir A Soldier's Story he says on page 377, "Monty had never prohibited and I never proposed that U.S. forces close the gap from Argentan to Falaise." He gives a number of reasons for not pushing north from Argentan, but Monty forbidding it is not one of them.
Nigel Hamilton, Monty's official biographer, states in The War Years that the decision was Bradley's. "Dempsey's diary record of his meeting with Monty and Bradley proves there was certainly no plot to deny Patton glory, since Dempsey specifically recorded: `So long as the Northward move of Third Army meets little opposition, the two leading Corps will disregard inter-Army boundaries'" (page. 788).
There are plenty of secondary sources that pin the blame on Bradley.
▪ Russell Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants" page. 216: "Bradley, having set the stage by urging Eisenhower and Montgomery to grasp the opportunity of a short envelopment at Falaise-Argentan, failed to persist in completing his own design. He abandoned the short envelopment before its potential was achieved, and meanwhile he had delayed the long envelopment at the Seine.";
▪ Peter Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe page. 171: "Bradley was slow to concentrate sufficient force to close the Falaise Gap from the south when he had the opportunity to do so.";
▪ Robin Neillands, The Battle of Normandy 1944 page. 358: "Bradley's memoirs and the British Official History make it abundantly clear this decision was Bradley's."
There are many more sources where these came from.
Carlo D'Este states on page 444, "When Dempsey met Bradley and Montgomery there was apparently no restraint placed on further northward movement by XV Corps... the fact that the Third Army did not move north of Argentan appears to have been Bradley's choice rather than a prohibition by Montgomery." On page 448 he writes, "The assertion that Montgomery made no effort to close the gap is without foundation." D'Este also dismisses the view of Strafford on page 451. No reasonable reading of D'Este on Falaise could possibly support blaming Montgomery. The US Official History, the British Official History, BRADLEY HIMSELF (twice!) and a multitude of secondary sources say Monty did not order Patton to halt. Neither Bradley himself, nor Montgomery, nor the senior British Army commander, nor the British or American official historians think Montgomery ordered Bradley to stop. THERE WAS NO HALT ORDER by Monty.
Chester Hanson and Ralph Ingersoll promoted that Monty halted Patton at Falaise were Anglophobes. Ingersoll had Communist leanings who wrote in order to convince people to trust the Russians and hate the British "imperialists".
Bradley himself said it was his decision. In A General's Life Bradley writes:
"Montgomery had no part in the decision; it was mine and mine alone. Some writers have suggested that I appealed to Monty to move the boundary north to Falaise and he refused, but, of course, that is not true... I was determined to hold Patton at Argentan and had no cause to ask Monty to shift the boundary."
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
What US historian Harry Yeide wrote of what the Germans thought of Patton:
▪ for most of the war the Germans barely took notice [of Patton].
▪ on March 23 at the Battle of El Guettar—the first American victory against the experienced Germans. Patton’s momentum, however, was short-lived: Axis troops held him to virtually no gain until April 7, when they withdrew under threat from British Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army.
▪ There is no indication in the surviving German military records—which include intelligence reports at the theater, army, and division levels—that Patton’s enemies had any idea who he was at the time. Likewise, the immediate postwar accounts of the German commanders in Tunisia, written for the U.S. Army’s History Division, ignore Patton. Those reports show that ground commanders considered II Corps’s attacks under Patton to have been hesitant, and to have missed great opportunities.
▪ In mid-June [1943], another detachment report described Patton as “an energetic and responsibility-loving command personality”—a passing comment on one of the numerous Allied commanders. Patton simply had not yet done anything particularly noteworthy in their eyes.
▪ But his race to Palermo through country they had already abandoned left the commanders unimpressed. Major General Eberhard Rodt, who led the 15th Panzergrenadier Division against Patton’s troops during the Allied push toward Messina, thought the American Seventh Army fought hesitantly and predictably. He wrote in an immediate postwar report on Sicily, “The enemy very often conducted his movements systematically, and only attacked after a heavy artillery preparation when he believed he had broken our resistance. This kept him regularly from exploiting the weakness of our situation and gave me the opportunity to consolidate dangerous situations.” Once again, Patton finished a campaign without impressing his opponents.
▪ General Hermann Balck, who took command of Army Group G in September, thus did not think highly of Patton—or any other opposing commanders—during this time. Balck wrote to his commander, Runstedt, on October 10, “I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again…can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans” Looking back on his battles against Patton throughout the autumn, in 1979 Balck recalled, “Within my zone, the Americans never once exploited a success. Often [General Friedrich Wilhelm von] Mellenthin, my chief of staff, and I would stand in front of the map and say, ‘Patton is helping us; he failed to exploit another success.’”
▪ The commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, Hasso von Manteuffel, aimed a dismissive, indirect critique at Patton’s efforts at Bastogne, writing in his memoirs that the Americans did not “strike with full élan.” The commanders who fought against Patton in his last two mobile campaigns in the Saar-Palatinate and east of the Rhine already knew they could not win; their losses from this point forward were inevitable, regardless of the commanding Allied opponent.
▪ the Germans offered Patton faint praise during and immediately after the war.
▪ posterity deserves fact and not myth. The Germans did not track Patton’s movements as the key to Allied intentions. Hitler does not appear to have thought often of Patton, if at all. The Germans considered Patton a hesitant commanding general in the scrum of position warfare. They never raised his name in the context of worthy strategists.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
Many are so eager to assert that German technological advances were superior to the British, that they forget to read what the Germans actually made, and how useful it actually was.
The first jet engine to fly in a plane was von Ohain's project at Heinkel. He had substantial funding from a major industrialist. Von Ohain himself admitted that he studied very closely Whittle's jet engine patents before starting work on his own jet engine. His engine had a centrifugal compressor and turbine. It was not the axial-flow turbojet. It was unreliable, inefficient, low power and low life, despite having massive funding from Heinkel - a failure that was not continued. The German jet programme was dropped until they knew the British had prototype jet planes in the air, then it was revived.
Whittle concentrated his very limited funding on the centrifugal compressor because it was well-understood and less problematic than axial-flow designs. He was focused on making a war-usable, reliable and powerful engine - quickly - which would outperform the best piston engine planes of the day. All of these qualities the Jumo and BMW axial jet engines lacked. With limited funding, Whittle developed a reliable engine which was combat-ready near the end of the war. Within months of the first operational flight, production engines were also more powerful than any of the poor engines turned out by the rushed German programs to the enormous detriment of actual combat - Gloster Meteor's top speed of 600 mph in late 1945, 650mph in mid 1946.
No one can claim that an engine is combat ready with a service life of 10-12 hours, which cannot be rapidly throttled up or down otherwise it stalls, is prone to flame-out and terrifies its pilots. They were underdeveloped and unproven axial-flow jet engines, being near garbage. The British installed axial-flow engines in a Meteor, however dropping them as they were too problematic at the time, requiring years to put right. A war was on, with years in development they could not afford.
The problems with German jet engines were not caused by the scarcity of metals in Germany during WW2, as they had access to enough rare metals. To produce a high performing jet engine high-strength alloys are required resisting high temperature. No iron-based alloy is suitable. Germany had no programme to develop such alloys. The British did, developing the nimonic series of alloys, making use of them in the WW2 jet engine programme. That is one, just one, of the reasons why the British jet program had combat potential, with the German program doomed to failure.
The Me262 airframe had many serious faults:
▪ high landing speed:
▪ difficult to maneuver;
▪ no air brakes;
▪ centre of gravity too far back;
▪ Poor downwards pilot visibility;
Those faults made attacking other aircraft far more difficult - at a time when they were desperately short of pilots, particularly pilots with sufficient skill and experience to fly what was a very difficult plane to fly and fight in.
The sweep-back of the wing of the Me262 was minimal, only in the leading edge, with a part of the trailing edge of the wing being straight. The swept wing was an insufficient correction for the plane's centre of gravity problem, not aerodynamics, that prompted the slight wing sweep. It was not until years later that properly designed swept-back wings were introduced in combat planes. By contrast the Gloster Meteor was:
▪ handleable;
▪ maneuverable;
▪ a balanced combat plane.
The Meteor was deliberately designed to an airframe of known traditional qualities, as it had a new type of engine. If there was problems in handling they knew it would be the engine, not the airframe. Having an advanced airframe and new type of engine may give confusion and delays in R&D, delaying the final plane.
While the Meteor was being developed, the British were also working on the supersonic Miles 52 plane - the project was dropped with the plans given over to the USA, which resulted in Bell X-1. No one copied the Me262 in the post war rush to get fast jet planes into service. The British also produced new planes - the world's most advanced, in engine and airframe.
After WW2 the leading German plane designer Kurt Tank, and 62 other German engineers, went to Argentina to design and build the FMA IAe 33 Pulqui II jet plane. They used a RR Nene engine. The plane was a flop.
3
-
3
-
3
-
@Dysfunctional_Reprint
The finest army in the world from mid 1942 onwards was the British under Montgomery. From Alem el Halfa it moved right up into Denmark, through nine countries, and not once suffered a reverse taking all in its path. Over 90% of German armour in the west was destroyed by the British. Montgomery, in command of all ground forces, had to give the US armies an infantry role in Normandy as they were not equipped to engage massed German SS armour.
Montgomery stopped the Germans in every event they attacked him:
◾ August 1942 - Alem el Halfa; October 1942 - El Alamein;
◾ March 1943 - Medenine;
◾ June 1944 - Normandy;
◾ Sept/Oct 1944 - The Netherlands;
◾ December 1944 - Battle of the Bulge;
A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2:
◾ Battle of Alam Halfa;
◾ Second Battle of El Alamein;
◾ Battle of El Agheila;
◾ Battle of Medenine;
◾ Battle of the Mareth Line;
◾ Battle of Wadi Akarit;
◾ Allied invasion of Sicily;
◾ Operation Overlord - the largest amphibious invasion in history;
◾ Market Garden - a 60 mile salient created into German territory;
◾ Battle of the Bulge - while taking control of two shambolic US armies;
◾ Operation Veritable;
◾ Operation Plunder.
Montgomery not once had a reverse.
Not on one occasion were ground armies, British, US or others, under Monty's command pushed back into a retreat by the Germans. Monty's 8th Army advanced the fastest of any army in WW2. From El Alamein to El Agheila from the 4th to 23rd November 1942, 1,300 km in just 17 days. After fighting a major exhausting battle at El Alemein through half a million mines. This was an Incredible feat, unparalleled in WW2. With El Alamein costing just 13,500 casualties.
The US Army were a shambles in 1944/45 retreating in the Ardennes. The Americans didn't perform well at all east of Aachen, then the Hurtgen Forest defeat with 33,000 casualties and Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months at Metz with over 50,000 casualties, with his Lorraine campaign being a failure. Then Montgomery had to be put in command of the shambolic US First and Ninth armies saving them from annihilation, aided by the British 21st Army Group, just to get back to the start line in the Ardennes, with nearly 100,000 US casualties.
Hodges, commander of the US First army, fled from Spa to near Liege on the 18th, despite the Germans never getting anywhere near to Spa. Hodges did not even wait for the Germans to approach Spa. He had already fled long before the Germans were stopped. The Germans took 20,000 US POWs in the Battle of the Bulge in Dec 1944. No other allied country had that many prisoners taken in the 1944-45 timeframe.
The USA retreat at the Bulge, again, was the only allied army to be pushed back into a retreat in the 1944-45 timeframe. Montgomery was effectively in charge of the Bulge having to take control of the US First and Ninth armies. Coningham of the RAF was put in command of USAAF elements. The US Third Army constantly stalled after coming up from the south. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war just about. The US armies were losing men at unsustainable rates due to poor generalship.
Normandy was planned and commanded by the British, with Montgomery involved in planning, with also Montgomery leading all ground forces, which was a great success coming in ahead of schedule and with less casualties than predicted. The Royal Navy was in command of all naval forces and the RAF all air forces. The German armour in the west was wiped out by primarily the British - the US forces were impotent against massed panzers. Monty assessed the US armies (he was in charge of them) giving them a supporting infantry role, as they were just not equipped, or experienced, to fight concentrated tank v tank battles. On 3 Sept 1944 when Eisenhower took over overall allied command of ground forces everything went at a snail's pace. The fastest advance of any western army in Autumn/early 1945 was the 60 mile thrust by the British XXX Corps to the Rhine at Arnhem.
You need to give respect where it is due.
3
-
3
-
A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp and keeping it from German counter-attack - the logistics problem to supply all allied armies. It was:
1) Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or;
2) Take the Schedlt.
Eisenhower had a Northern Thrust strategy, a push to the north on his stretched broad front lines. Taking Noord Babant fell in line with the desires for both SHEAF and Eisenhower. Noord Brabant had to be taken before the Scheldt, as it was essential. It was taken with limited forces, with forces also sent to take the Schedlt.
Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat or Northern Thrust strategy, and was actually a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen needed to be under allied control. The low-lying lands, boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen with land strewn with rivers and canals, is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces and supply directly back to Germany in perfect position for a counter-attack.
Market Garden was the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans were in disarray, so should be easy enough to gain. Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine to fall in line with Eisenhower's priority Northern Thrust strategy at the time. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation.
You needed Arnhem for an easier jump into Germany. Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all - that is, protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital, and was successfully seized. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans a few miles away and still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all. SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@lordrexus
Wrong! For you.......
The state of play on the 17th, D-day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) 18 musicians of a German 'band' were guarding the Waal bridge;
5) a few Germans scattered about along the road;
6) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition, spending over 2 hours in the village instead of moving to the bridge. The Germans blew the bridge when they finally reached it. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would most likely have secured it.
Evidently expecting that Major La Prade's flanking battalion would have captured the highway bridge, these two battalions made no apparent haste in moving through Zon. They methodically cleared stray Germans from the houses, so that a full two hours had passed before they emerged from the village. Having at last overcome the enemy 88mm south of the Zonsche Forest, Major LaPrade's battalion caught sight of the bridge at about the same time. Both forces were within fifty yards of the bridge when their objective went up with a roar.
- US Official History.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In a time critical operation, in this gift of a time window for the Germans they were running armour towards Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon, being right on time. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the Waal bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British 1st AB at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
The Waal bridge as the critical bridge The failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Waal bridge at Nijmegen immediately upon jumping precluded a bridgehead across the Rhine. A bridge they could have walked on whistling Dixie. The bridge was so undefended, a lost British Jeep with four men in it rode over the Waal bridge unopposed.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@ErikExeu
U.S. 82nd Division records state that the first troop of four Guards tanks crossed the Waal road bridge at 1830 hours. Two tanks were hit with the crews taken POW bar one, Sgt Knight. The tanks charged across at full speed approaching 30 mph firing against German guns all the way, with a few hundred Germans high in the girders. Gunner Leslie Johnson in the lead tank said: “They were falling like nine-pins. The incoming fire was so heavy that I swear to this day that Jesus Christ rode on the front of our tank. The Germans were so close that I didn’t bother to look through my sights. We could feel the tracks going over them as we shot them down, and there was blood and gore all over the tank.”
Once the two leading tanks of Pacey and Robinson got past the bridge obstacles at the northern end, Pacey stopped. The War Office report:
“At this point, Pacey stopped, he was not sure where to go as no Americans were seen, so Sergeant Robinson passed him and led on. Much to their surprise, they could not see any Americans so having passed through the concrete chicane they pushed on. Having crossed the road bridge, the four tanks moved down the northern embankment, where they destroyed another anti tank gun. Robinson and Pacey found themselves in a running battle against more guns, and against German infantry who poured out of the church in Lent, and then 1,500 yards further down the road from the bridge, where the main road goes under the railway line, contact was at last made with some Americans, both were very happy to see each other."
The 82nd men at Lent reached Lent following the railway embankment from the riverbank using it for cover. The first American troops that arrived at the bridge approaches/waterside after moving along the riverbank from their river landing point with Burriss’ company of about sixteen men, was at 1915 hours. 45 minutes. after the first tanks had already crossed. This was not the main bridge span, just the raised approach road over land. Official U.S. records confirm that 82nd troops from the 504th arrived at the northern road bridge approaches at 1938 hours. This would be the time they arrived in any real strength to consolidate, one hour 8 mins after the first tank crossed. The records state at 1938 hours:
Not one 82nd man was on the bridge when the first troop of four tanks crossed at 1830, or at 1915 when the second troop of four went over. Official XXX Corps records from the War Office highlight that the successful tank attack on the road bridge was at 1830 hours.
3
-
3
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, wanting confirmed if the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the prime objectives. In response – dated 25 July 1945 – Gen Gavin was clear:
"About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, Commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city."
A straight verbal order to immediately capture the bridge with one battalion. The rest of the regiment were to defend against a possible attack from the Reichswald and clear the LZ. They were to approach the bridge via the flat ground east of the city. Two companies went into Nijmegen with one disobeying orders getting completely lost. Two hours later when they finally rendezvoused, the attack was called off and the battalion called back into defence. In 1947 in his book ‘Airborne Warfare’ Gavin was vague regarding the failure:
"Just before take-off, I discussed the situation with Col Lindquist and directed him to commit not more than one battalion to the seizure of the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as possible after landing, so as to take advantage of surprise and darkness"
Gavin created the illusion that it had been the responsibility of the cautious Col Lindquist to decide when to send troops to the Nijmegen bridge, by writing as ‘soon as possible’. Gavin successfully created the myth that the failure to immediately attack the bridge was a misunderstanding. Gavin failed to issue written offensive orders to Lindquist.
In the official US History written by Charles MacDonald in 1963 he also noticed the conflicting statements. Capt. Westover had access to all the 82nd Divisional records could find no record of these orders. Official US history determined that Col Lindquist of 508 PIR, Lt Col Stanley of 508 PIR, Lt Col Warren of 1/508 PIR and Capt. Bestebreurtje, a Dutch Liaison officer were not aware of any pre jump orders. It noted the only guidance for the men of 508 PIR was Field Order No 1 which was defensive. This was written by Col Lindquist.
Regarding the shift in priorities from the bridge to Groebeeke Heights, Capt. Westover while preparing the official US history of the US divisions taking part in Market Garden, and who was in possession of after action reports, unit diaries and official reports, still found inexplicable discrepancies. Capt. Westover asked Gen Gavin: "What person, staff or headquarters made the decision to apportion the weight of the 82nd AD to the high ground rather than the bridge at Nijmegen?" Gavin’s reply: "This decision was made by myself and approved by my Corps Commander.". There is no record of the conversation on this matter. Gavin then wrote to Westover saying: "Even if we were driven off the low ground, around the bridges, if the high ground could be held, ultimately the Second Army could accomplish the mission."
Gavin assumed the Germans would not reinforce their troops around Arnhem and Nijmegen, and the British paras in Arnhem could hold on indefinitely, it seems that Gavin had chosen this course of action. No real concerted attempt to capture Nijmegen bridge was made until XXX Corps arrived in Nijmegen. XXX Corps successfully seized the bridge, delayed 36 hours, too late to save the British paras holding out on the Arnhem bridge.
Note: From US Official History:
"Although extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files. The story has been reconstructed from unit records; Gavin's letters to Westover and OCMH; letters to OCMH from Colonel Warren, 3 July 1955, Colonel Lindquist, 9 September 1955, Col. Thomas J. B. Shanley formerly Executive Officer, 508th Parachute Infantry, 2 Sep 55, and Rev. Bestebreurtje, 25 Oct 56; a postwar interview with Colonel Lindquist by Westover, 14 Sep 45, copy in 82d Airborne Division Combat Interview file; and Westover, The American Divisions in Operation MARKET, a preliminary narrative written in the European theater shortly after the war, copy in OCMH. Captain Westover had access to all the combat interviews when writing his narrative."
2
-
2
-
In 1941 the British were concurrently fighting in all theatres of war, in all corners of the globe and against better prepared forces of greater numbers. Germany’s war was regional, extending from their borders - all logistics went directly over land back to Germany, apart from North Africa where the Italians provided the sea transport back to nearby Italy. Italy and Vichy France too. Japan’s war was confined to a radius around Japan. Taking on all these countries and securing wins for the free World was pure brilliance. As well as achieving the first three victories against the ‘unstoppable’ German military war machine, Britain achieved that which no other nation in the world could even possibly dream of accomplishing in the early 1940s.
Britain fought a global war in the:
▪ Middle East;
▪ Far East;
▪ Indian subcontinent;
▪ Pacific;
▪ North Africa;
▪ West Africa;
▪ East Africa;
▪ North Atlantic;
▪ South Atlantic;
▪ North Sea;
▪ Barents Sea;
▪ Arctic Sea;
▪ Mediterranean;
▪ Adriatic;
▪ Mainland Western Europe;
▪ Eastern Europe;
▪ Scandinavia.
The British were the only military power in human history to fight in such globally spread theatres of conflict. For the third year running, Britain was propping up an ally - France, USSR, then the USA. The incompetence of US Navy to provide convoy protection on its east coast almost lost the allies the Battle of the Atlantic. Six hundred ships off the US eastern seaboard were lost in the first six months of 1942. Shipping losses climbed to a level that undermined British ability to supply themselves, keep the Soviets in the war, and keep reinforcements flowing to the Middle East and Asia. The British quickly deployed 60 escort vessels to cover the US coast. In 1942 the USA was a liability. For most of 1942 the British Commonwealth held the line, kept back the combined efforts of Germany, Italy and Japan, with minimal input from the USA compared to her potential power, keeping the Atlantic and Indian oceans open with supplies flowing to the vital armies in the Middle East and Asia, and to the USSR. No other empire in the history of the world has been capable of such a sustained multi-continent and multi-ocean operation.
In 1942 the British Commonwealth was fighting a three continent, four ocean campaign, against three major powers and keeping the USSR supplied The thousands of tanks and aircraft sent to the USSR would have saved Singapore.
The total British losses of territory and people in the early war were:
▪ One third of the territory the Soviets lost;
▪ Half of the people the Americans lost - mainly Philippines;
Yet those nations were fighting only on one front and only against one of the three powers. The British Commonwealth had far more ground troops in action against the Japanese than the Americans. Also the British were maintaining sea control over the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. And then provided aircraft carriers and cruisers to help in the Pacific - while the USA concentrated on just one of those theatres.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
Eisenhower's “in the east we had been unable to break out towards the Seine“
- Hamilton Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944
The above showed he had not much of a clue.
Brooke, however, was worried that he had not completely stopped the rot, and the next morning penned a long letter to Monty warning him of Eisenhower’s ‘mischief-making’: “I drew attention to what your basic strategy had been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw the Germans onto the flank while you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the Armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch major offensives on each Army front simultaneously.
I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy is 2½ times that on the Russian front, whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% on the Russian superiority on the Eastern front, I did not consider that we were in a position to launch an all out offensive along the whole front.’ The strategy of the Normandy landing is quite straight-forward. The British (on the left) must hold and draw Germans on to themselves off the western flank whilst Americans swing up to open Brest peninsular,’ Brooke noted in his diary.
- Hamilton Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944
2
-
2
-
@johnlucas8479
Monty didn’t plan Market Garden, coming up with the idea and broad outline only. Montgomery was largely excluded from the planning process.
It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF and Hollinghurst of the RAF.
It was Bereton and Williams who:
▪decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset.
▪rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet.
▪chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges.
▪Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity.
▪ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“
Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Margry....
These kind of decisions ended up being crucial flaws and it was Brereton who enforced them, not Montgomery. The air commanders made the wrong choices throughout the planning.
They took and kept 100km of ground up that road i.e. 90% of it. They NEARLY did it. They were not stopped where they set off, or even halfway up it. They got 90% of the way, within touching distance. Had the operation been planned a bit better by the air commanders and with more resources it would have worked.
Monty’s idea was actually a good one, as nearly all the relevant personnel involved agreed. Including the Americans. They (Eisenhower and Brereton) were the ones who had to agree with it and give it the go ahead. They very much liked the idea.
Eisenhower....
“I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.”
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
Ohain's first designs were centrifugal - failing. The Germans went for the problematic, at the time, axial flow design. The British flew a Meteor with an axial-flow Metro-Vick engine in 1943 dropping it in favour of the reliable centrifugal design. There were five turbojet engines in the UK under R&D in WW2:
▪ Centrifugal, by Whittle (Rover);
▪ Centrifugal, by Frank Halford (DeHaviland);
▪ Axial-flow, by Metro-Vick;
▪ Axial-flow by Griffiths (Rolls Royce);
▪ Axial flow compressor, with reverse flow combustion chambers. The ASX by Armstrong Siddeley;
Metro-Vick sold their jet engine division to Armstrong Siddeley. The Metro-Vick engine transpired into the post war Sapphire. Most American engines in the 1940s/50s were of UK design, many made under licence. The US licensed the J-42 (RR Nene) and J-48 (RR Tay), being virtually identical to the British engines. US aircraft used licensed British engines powering the: P-59, P-80, T-33, F9F Panther, F9F-6 Cougar, FJ Fury 3 and 4, Martin B-57 Canberra, F-94 Starfire, A4 Skyhawk and the A7 Corsair.
The US General Electric J-47 turbojet was developed by General Electric in conjunction with Metropolitan Vickers of the UK, who had already developed a 9-stage axial-flow compressor engine licensing the design to Allison in 1944 for the earlier J-35 engine first flying in May 1948. The centrifugal Rolls Royce Nene is one of the highest production jet engines in history with over 50,000 built.
2
-
@alanmichael5619
In an interview with Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission in Washington, in 1955, General Browning said the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges must be seized "as soon as possible", although the wooded Groesbeek Heights on the route to the bridge must be held.
Field Order 11 of 13 Sept is clear in section 2 a), putting the bridges first in the writing, that they were to be seized, then the high ground secured and then the roads. Order 1, of 13 September, written by Lindquist of the 508th, states he will wait at the high ground for a Division Order to move from the Heights to the bridge. In short, wait for an Order from Gavin to move.
The heights near De Ploeg, which are really pretty flat being a wooded area but high for Holland, are pretty well between the Drop Zone (DZ) and bridge. The 508th would go through the Heights to reach the bridge. Browning and Gavin naturally did not want German troops between the LZ and the bridge, so the Heights had to be occupied and secure. The 508th CP would be established at the Heights.
Gavin understood the priorities in sending the 508th to the bridge and Groesbeek heights immediately, with Coln Warren's battalion of the 508th assigned the bridge. To get to the bridge from the DZ you have to pass the Groesbeek Heights, so any enemy at the Heights naturally had to be subdued, then secure the area, which could take time, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge.
It took the 665 men of 508th a painfully slow 3.5 hours to march a few miles from the DZ to the heights, reaching the Groesbeek heights at 1730. They encountered only a few Labour troops in opposition. There were no Germans at the Groesbeek Heights as forward scouts relayed back the situation. So, on route Coln Lindquist the head of the 508th could have sent Warren's A and B companies directly to the bridge, bypassing the Groesbeek Heights, immediately via the riverbank as instructed by Gavin. The rest of the battalion could move to the empty Groesbeek Heights setting up defences at De Ploeg on the heights.
Dutch resistance men informed the 508th that the Germans had largely cleared out of Nijmegen with only 19 guards on the bridge. So all was easy and fine, so the two companies assigned the bridge could move immediately to their objective without a diversion via the Groesbeek Heights.
Despite hearing the good news from the Dutch Underground, Lindquist in command of the 508th was not moving at all, keeping all his men static at De Ploeg. Lindquist was waiting for a Divisional Order from Gavin informing him that the DZ was secure, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge. When Gavin found out Lindquist was static via a liaison officer he was livid, running over to De Ploeg in a Jeep telling Lindquist to get moving to the bridge. Even then, took Lindquist another two hours to send men in force to the bridge.
Three stray men from a forty man patrol sent to the bridge immediately by Warren to confirm what the Dutch Underground told them on reaching DePloeg, took the guards on the south end of the bridge prisoner. They left when no one turned up. When leaving they saw hundreds of Germans pour from the north onto the previously lightly guarded bridge. Later, a company of Warren's main force became lost when they eventually moved towards the bridge. By the time Warren's two companies did reach the bridge in force, the Germans had reinforcing the bridge with hundreds of men. Too late.
The first attack on the bridge was just before midnight, 10.5 hours after landing. The 82nd were expecting German resistance from the east, however it came from the north via the Nijmegen bridge. Gavin was expecting Lindquist to secure the Groesbeek heights, which were devoid of enemy forces, then immediately move to the bridge, which meant sending Warren's battalion immediately. Lindquist was expecting Gavin to notify him that the DZ was clear.
Gavin was expecting Lindquist to go to the bridge when it was obvious the Groesbeek heights, on the way to the bridge, were secure. As no Germans were about, the heights were naturally secure. Regarding Lindquist's expected clearing of the LZ before moving from DePloeg. Lindquist did write a Field Order for the 508th on 13 September copied to Gavin, stating that once the heights were secure he would wait for a Divisional Order [from Gavin] to move.
Two days later at the jump briefing Gavin verbally overruled Lindquist's Field Order, using a map he told him that he should move to the bridge "without delay". Poor command communications by Gavin. Poulussen, in Lost at Nijmegen discovered that the 508th jumped without any written offensive orders from Gavin. All was verbal from Gavin to Lindquist of the 508. Chester Graham, the 82nd liaison officer, was at the pre jump meeting in England. He said there was no ambiguity amongst anyone there that the bridge was the prime target.
In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, was wanting confirmation that if the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the objectives. In response, dated 25 July 1945, General Gavin was clear: "About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay _after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city."
General Browning never knew men were static at De Ploeg. Like Gavin he was expecting men to be seizing the bridge. Being corps commander, he was busy attempting to communicate with all three parachute divisions. The 82nd did launch a few failed attacks on the bridge. In the afternoon of the next day, 18th, Gavin asked permission to launch another attack. Browning, seeing the bridge was well defended, and the failed attacks, refused, opting to wait for XXX Corps to arrive to seize the bridge. Inexplicably Gavin moved _all his men out of Nijmegen town completely to the heights and DZ, giving the town back to the Germans. This made matters worse when XXX Corps arrived who had expended vital time, and ammunition, in flushing them out.
On page 162 of the U.S. Official History:
"many documents regarding the extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files."
Read:
1) Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment In World War II by Phil Nordyke.
2) Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergström.
3) Market Garden, Then and Now by Karl Magry.
4) Lost at Nijmegen by R Poulusson
2
-
2
-
2
-
@davemac1197
Interesting post. Dave M A C wrote:
"The point on timing is that British resistance at the Arnhem bridge expired at about the same time (1230 hrs) as the Irish Guards re-commenced their advance from Nijmegen (1300 hrs) on 21 September. "
All accounts say the evening before with German armour run over soon after. Some accounts say the initial tanks ran over the dead German bodies, until they could be cleared which was quite quick. The wreckage only needed to be pushed to one side allowing one lane to be free. Karl Magry in Market Garden Then and Now, says German armour was running south over Arnhem bridge at 1500 hrs to create a line at Elst - 3.5 hours prior to the Guards tanks seizing Nijmegen bridge.
For all the concern that must have existed about getting to Arnhem, only a small part of the British armor was freed late on D plus 4, 21 September, to start the northward drive. As the attack began, British commanders saw every apprehension confirmed. The ground off the main roads was low-lying, wet bottomland, denying employment of tanks. A few determined enemy bolstered with antitank guns might delay even a large force. Contrary to the information that had been received, Colonel Frost and his men had been driven away from the north end of the Arnhem bridge the afternoon before, so that since the preceding night the bridge had been open to German traffic. At the village of Ressen, less than three miles north of Nijmegen, the Germans had erected an effective screen composed of an SS battalion reinforced with 11 tanks, another infantry battalion, 2 batteries of 88-mm. guns, 20 20-mm. antiaircraft guns, and survivors of earlier fighting at Nijmegen, all operating under General Bittrich's II SS Panzer Corps. Arnhem lay seven miles north of this screen. The British could not pass.
- US Official History.
Frost controlled the north end of Arnhem bridge for about another two hours after the tanks took Nijmegen bridge. It was dark when the Nijmegen bridge was seized. The bridge had to be secured from German counter-attack with a secure cordon erected on the north bank. Harmel stated: "The four panzers who crossed the [Nijmegen] bridge made a mistake when they stayed in the village of Lent. If they had carried on their advance, it would have been all over for us." According to Saunders, three Tiger tanks and infantry had already been heading south from Arnhem towards Lent about the time the tanks seized Nijmegen bridge. By the time the bridge was fully secured, and tanks ready to roll, then they moved up the road, they would be meeting heavy armour, or/and anti-tank guns.
Saunders and the US Official History match up. Some of Frosts men were still fighting the next day, being scattered not stopping bridge traffic.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@michaelschmid9567
You have been told! XXX Corps were on schedule when reaching Nijmegen. Seven hours to go, with seven miles to travel, up a largely empty road.
Three of an 82nd patrol were separated reaching the Nijmegen bridge. They managed to capture six or seven German troops and a small Flak artillery weapon. They waited an hour until dark at around 7:30 pm, withdrawing. They could hear heavy equipment approaching from Arnhem, being the SS-Panzer Recon Battalion 9, who just just missed Frost's men at Arnhem bridge at 7pm.
Source: Demolition Platoon, 508th by Zig Burroughs.
This contrasts sharply to Frost's progress in Arnhem, where his whole battalion following A Company moved away from the Germans, through people's houses, over walls, and back yards, carrying all their equipment, by-passing German positions, reaching the Arnhem bridge. The British First Airborne landed half an hour after the 508. They have an extra 4 or 5 miles march, met more resistance, yet reached the Arnhem bridge before the US paras reached the Nijmegen bridge.
2
-
@Scaleyback317 wrote:
"How and why did Gavin come out smelling of roses?"
In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, wanting confirmed if the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the prime objectives. In response – dated 25 July 1945 – Gen Gavin was clear:
"About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, Commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city."
A straight order to immediately capture the bridge with one battalion. The rest of the regiment were to defend against a possible attack from the Reichswald and clear the LZ. They were to approach the bridge via the flat ground east of the city. Two companies went into Nijmegen with one disobeying orders getting completely lost. Two hours later when they finally rendezvoused, the attack was called off and the battalion called back into defence. In 1947 in his book ‘Airborne Warfare’ Gavin was vague regarding the failure:
"Just before take-off, I discussed the situation with Col Lindquist and directed him to commit not more than one battalion to the seizure of the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as possible after landing, so as to take advantage of surprise and darkness"
Gavin created the illusion that it had been the responsibility of the cautious Col Lindquist to decide when to send troops to the Nijmegen bridge, by writing as ‘soon as possible’. Gavin successfully created the myth that the failure to immediately attack the bridge was a misunderstanding. There was little misunderstand. Gavin did not give Lindquist any written offensive orders. All was verbal.
In the official US History written by Charles MacDonald in 1963 he also noticed the conflicting statements. Capt. Westover had access to all the 82nd Divisional records could find no record of these orders. Official US history determined that Col Lindquist of 508 PIR, Lt Col Stanley of 508 PIR, Lt Col Warren of 1/508 PIR and Capt. Bestebreurtje, a Dutch Liaison officer were not aware of any pre jump orders. It noted the only guidance for the men of 508 PIR was Field Order No 1 which was defensive.
Regarding the shift in priorities from the bridge to Groebeeke Heights, Capt. Westover while preparing the official US history of the US divisions taking part in Market Garden, and who was in possession of after action reports, unit diaries and official reports, still found inexplicable discrepancies. Capt. Westover asked Gen Gavin: "What person, staff or headquarters made the decision to apportion the weight of the 82nd AD to the high ground rather than the bridge at Nijmegen?" Gavin’s reply: "This decision was made by myself and approved by my Corps Commander.". There is no record of the conversation on this matter. Gavin then wrote to Westover saying: "Even if we were driven off the low ground, around the bridges, if the high ground could be held, ultimately the Second Army could accomplish the mission."
Gavin assumed the Germans would not reinforce their troops around Arnhem and Nijmegen, and the British paras in Arnhem could hold on indefinitely, it seems that Gavin had chosen this course of action. No real concerted attempt to capture Nijmegen bridge was made until XXX Corps arrived in Nijmegen. XXX Corps successfully seized the bridge, delayed 36 hours, too late to save the British paras holding out on the Arnhem bridge.
Note: From US Official History:
"Although extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files. The story has been reconstructed from unit records; Gavin's letters to Westover and OCMH; letters to OCMH from Colonel Warren, 3 July 1955, Colonel Lindquist, 9 September 1955, Col. Thomas J. B. Shanley formerly Executive Officer, 508th Parachute Infantry, 2 Sep 55, and Rev. Bestebreurtje, 25 Oct 56; a postwar interview with Colonel Lindquist by Westover, 14 Sep 45, copy in 82d Airborne Division Combat Interview file; and Westover, The American Divisions in Operation MARKET, a preliminary narrative written in the European theater shortly after the war, copy in OCMH. Captain Westover had access to all the combat interviews when writing his narrative."
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@dmbeaster
In an interview with General Browning in the NY Times he said he gave equal priority to the Nijmegen bridge and the Groesbeek heights. The heights near De Ploeg, which are really pretty flat being a wooded area but high for Holland, are pretty well between the Drop Zone (DZ) and bridge. Browning and Gavin did not want German troops between the DZ and the bridge, so the heights had to be occupied and secure.
Gavin understood the priorities in sending the 508th to the bridge and heights immediately, with Coln Warren's battalion of the 508th assigned the bridge. To get to the bridge from the DZ you have to pass the heights, so any enemy at the heights naturally had to be subdued, then secure the area, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge.
It took the 508th a painfully slow 3.5 hours to march a few miles from the DZ to the heights, reaching the heights at 1730. There were no Germans at the Groesbeek heights as forward scouts relayed back, so Coln Lindquist could send Warren's battalion directly to the bridge immediately, without any delay, while the rest of the 508th stayed back setting up defences at De Ploeg on the Groesbeek heights. Dutch resistance men informed the 508th that the Germans had largely cleared out of the town with only 19 guards on the bridge.
Despite hearing the good news from the Dutch Underground, Lindquist in command of the 508th was not moving at all, staying static at De Ploeg. Lindquist was waiting for a Divisional Order from Gavin that the DZ was secure, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge. When Gavin found out via a liaison officer he was livid, running over to De Ploeg in a Jeep telling Lindquist to get moving to the bridge.
Three stray men from a patrol sent to the bridge by Warren to confirm what the Dutch Underground told them, took the guards on the south end of the bridge prisoner. They left when no one turned up. When leaving they saw hundreds of Germans pour onto the previously lightly guarded bridge. Some of Warren's men became lost when they eventually moved towards the bridge. By the time the 508th did get to the bridge in force, the Germans had come south reinforcing the bridge with hundreds of men. Too late.
The 82nd were expecting German resistance from the east, however it came from the north via the Nijmegen bridge.
▪ Gavin was expecting Lindquist to secure the Groesbeek heights, which were devoid of enemy forces, then immediately move to the bridge, which meant sending Warren's battalion immediately.
▪ Lindquist was expecting Gavin to notify him that the DZ was clear.
Gavin was expecting Lindquist to go to the bridge when it was obvious the Groesbeek heights, on the way to the bridge, were secure. As no Germans were about, the heights were naturally secure.
Regarding Lindquist expecting clearing of the DZ before moving from DePloeg. Lindquist did write a Field Order for the 508th on 13 September copied to Gavin, stating that once the heights were secure he would wait for a Divisional Order [from Gavin] to move. Two days later at the jump briefing Gavin verbally overruled Lindquist's Field Order. Using a map Gavin verbally told Lidquist to move to the bridge "without delay". Poor command communications by Gavin.
Poulussen, in Lost at Nijmegen discovered that the 508th jumped without any written offensive orders from Gavin. All was verbal from Gavin to Lindquist. Chester Graham, the 82nd liaison officer, was at the pre jump meeting in England. He said there was no ambiguity amongst anyone there that the bridge was the prime target.
In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, was wanting confirmation that if the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the objectives. In response, dated 25 July 1945, General Gavin was clear: "About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, Commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city."
General Browning never knew men were static at De Ploeg. Like Gavin he was expecting men to be seizing the bridge. Being corps commander, he was busy attempting to communicate with all three parachute divisions. The 82nd did launch a few failed attacks on the bridge. In the afternoon of the next day, 18th, Gavin asked permission to launch another attack. Browning, seeing the bridge was well defended, and the failed attacks, refused, opting to wait for XXX Corps to arrive to seize the bridge. Inexplicably Gavin moved all his men out of Nijmegen town completely to the heights and DZ, giving the town back to the Germans. This made matters worse when XXX Corps arrived who had expended vital time, and ammunition, in flushing them out.
On page 162 of the U.S. Official History:
"many documents regarding the extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files."
Read:
1) Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment In World War II by Phil Nordyke.
2) Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergström.
3) Market Garden, Then and Now by Karl Magry.
4) Lost at Nijmegen by R Poulusson
2
-
2
-
@Scaleyback317
Chester Graham, who was at the 82nd meeting on 15th in England said it was clear to all what the prime objectives were. It seems Gavin never verbally overrode Lindquist's written Field Order No 1. Well if he did, he never emphasised it to him.
Lost in Nijmegen emphasises that in the unit journal of 508 PIR, that Gavin "desires" that the bridge be taken, not ordered it taken. It also states that A and B companies of the 508th left DePloeg at 2030 hrs to go to the bridge. This is seven hours after landing and 2.5 hours after Gavin told them personally to move to the bridge.
Gavin's divisional plan was for the 508th to "move with speed" on the Nijmegen bridge as soon as possible after landing. The 508th's liaison officer to Division HQ was Captain Chester 'Chet' Graham - "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation.
"Captain Ben Delamater was the 1st Battalion’s executive officer - "The regimental commanding officer [Colonel Roy Lindquist], with his radio operator and two Dutch interpreters from the British army soon followed us onto our first objective. The planned defenses were being set up when several civilians wearing arm bands and carrying Underground credentials of some sort told the colonel that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen, that the town and the highway bridge were lightly held. The regimental CO had been instructed that if the initial mission were accomplished to 'go ahead and take the highway bridge if you can.' This division order was perfectly understood in relation to the primary missions and was not a weak, conditional order as might be supposed offhand.
”When Chet Graham decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge - "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' "
- Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment in World War II by Phil Nordyke
Lost in Nijmegen emphasises that Gavin gave no written offensive orders to Lindquist of the 508th.
2
-
2
-
2
-
The finest army in the world from mid 1942 onwards was the British under Montgomery. From Alem el Halfa it moved right up into Denmark, through nine countries, and not once suffered a reverse taking all in its path. Over 90% of German armour in the west was destroyed by the British. Montgomery, in command of all ground forces, had to give the US armies an infantry role in Normandy as they were not equipped to engage massed German SS armour.
Montgomery stopped the Germans in every event they attacked him:
▪ August 1942 - Alem el Halfa; October 1942 - El Alamein;
▪ March 1943 - Medenine;
▪ June 1944 - Normandy;
▪ Sept/Oct 1944 - The Netherlands;
▪ December 1944 - Battle of the Bulge;
A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2:
▪ Battle of Alam Halfa;
▪ Second Battle of El Alamein;
▪ Battle of El Agheila;
▪ Battle of Medenine;
▪ Battle of the Mareth Line;
▪ Battle of Wadi Akarit;
▪ Allied invasion of Sicily;
▪ Operation Overlord - the largest amphibious invasion in history;
▪ Market Garden - a 60 mile salient created into German territory;
▪ Battle of the Bulge - while taking control of two shambolic US armies;
▪ Operation Veritable;
▪ Operation Plunder.
Montgomery not once had a reverse.
Not on one occasion were ground armies, British, US or others, under Monty's command pushed back into a retreat by the Germans. Monty's 8th Army advanced the fastest of any army in WW2. From El Alamein to El Agheila from the 4th to 23rd November 1942, 1,300 km in just 17 days. After fighting a major exhausting battle at El Alemein through half a million mines. This was an Incredible feat, unparalleled in WW2. With El Alamein costing just 13,500 casualties.
The US Army were a shambles in 1944/45 retreating in the Ardennes. The Americans didn't perform well at all east of Aachen, then the Hurtgen Forest defeat with 33,000 casualties and Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months at Metz with over 50,000 casualties, with the Lorraine campaign being a failure. Then Montgomery had to be put in command of the shambolic US First and Ninth armies, aided by the British 21st Army Group, just to get back to the start line in the Ardennes, with nearly 100,000 US casualties. Hodges, head of the US First army, fled from Spa to near Liege on the 18th, despite the Germans never getting anywhere near to Spa. Hodges did not even wait for the Germans to approach Spa. He had already fled long before the Germans were stopped. The Germans took 20,000 US POWs in the Battle of The Bulge in Dec 1944. No other allied country had that many prisoners taken in the 1944-45 timeframe.
The USA retreat at the Bulge, again, was the only allied army to be pushed back into a retreat in the 1944-45 timeframe. Montgomery was effectively in charge of the Bulge having to take control of the US First and Ninth armies. Coningham of the RAF was put in command of USAAF elements. The US Third Army constantly stalled after coming up from the south. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war just about. The US armies were losing men at unsustainable rates due to poor generalship.
Normandy was planned and commanded by the British, with Montgomery involved in planning, with also Montgomery leading all ground forces, which was a great success coming in ahead of schedule and with less casualties than predicted. The Royal Navy was in command of all naval forces and the RAF all air forces. The German armour in the west was wiped out by primarily the British - the US forces were impotent against massed panzers. Monty assessed the US armies (he was in charge of them) giving them a supporting infantry role, as they were just not equipped, or experienced, to fight concentrated tank v tank battles. On 3 Sept 1944 when Eisenhower took over overall allied command of ground forces everything went at a snail's pace. The fastest advance of any western army in Autumn/early 1945 was the 60 mile thrust by the British XXX Corps to the Rhine at Arnhem.
You need to give respect where it is due.
1
-
aRealHoot76
Britain was key in WW2. Britain fought on every front, being in the war on the first day up to the last - Britain’s war actually ended in 1946 staying on in Viet Nam using Japanese troops alongside British troops to defeat the Viet Minh, but that is another story. Britain was not attacked or attacked anyone, going into WW2 on principle. The Turkish ambassador to the UK stated that the UK can raise 40 million troops from its empire so will win the war. This was noted by Franco who indirectly said to Hitler he would not win, fearing British occupation of Spanish islands and territory if Spain joined the war. Spain and Turkey stayed out of the war.
The Turkish ambassador’s point was given credence when an army of 2.6 million was assembled in India that moved into Burma to wipe out the Japanese. From day one the Royal Navy formed a ring around the Axis positioning ships from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Arctic off Norway, blockading the international trade of the Axis. This deprived the Axis of vital human and animal food, oil, rubber, metals, and other vital resources. By 1941 the successful Royal Navy blockade had confined the Italian navy to port due to lack of oil. By the autumn of 1941 Germany's surface fleet was confined to harbour, by the British fleet and the chronic lack of fuel. A potential German invasion from the the USSR in the north into the oil rich Middle East entailed expanded British troop deployment to keep the Germans away from the oil fields, until they were defeated at Stalingrad.
Throughout 1942 British Commonwealth troops were fighting, or seriously expecting to be attacked, in:
♦ French North Africa;
♦ Libya;
♦ Egypt;
♦ Cyprus;
♦ Syria: where an airborne assault was expected, with preparations to reinforce Turkey if they were attacked;
♦ Madagascar: fighting the Vichy French to prevent them from inviting the Japanese in as they had done in Indochina;
♦ Iraq;
♦ Iran: the British & Soviets invaded Iran in August 1941.
Those spread-out covering troops were more in combined numbers than were facing Japan and Rommel in North Africa. The British Commonwealth fielded over 100 divisions in 1942 alone, compared to the US total of 88 by the end of the war. The Americans and Soviets were Johnny-come-late in WW2, moreso the Americans.
Before the USSR entered the conflict the Royal Navy’s blockade had reduced the Italian and German surface navies to the occasional sorties because of a lack of oil, with the British attacking the Germans and Italians in North Africa, also securing Syria, Iraq, the Levant and ridding the Italians from East Africa. The Germans were on the run by the time the USA had boots on the ground against the Axis.
The Germans had been stopped:
♦ in the west at the Battle of Britain in 1940;
♦ in the east at the Battle of Moscow in 1941. In which Britain provided 40% of the Soviet tanks.
Before the US had boots on the ground, the Germans were on the run after the simultaneous battles in late 1942 of:
♦ El Alemein;
♦ Stalingrad;
The Battle of El Alemein culminated in a quarter of a million Axis prisoners taken in Tunisia - more than taken at Stalingrad. Apart from the US Filipino forces that surrendered in early 1942, the US had a couple of divisions in Gaudalcanal after August 1942, and one in New Guinea by November 1942. In 1943 the US managed to get up to six divisions in the Pacific, but still not matching the British or British Indian armies respectively. Until late 1943 the Australian Army alone deployed more ground fighting troops against the Japanese than the USA.
The Americans never put more ground troops into combat against the Japanese at any point than just the British Indian Army alone, which was 2.6 million strong. The US had nowhere near 2.6 million men on the ground against the Japanese. The Soviets fielded about a million against the Japanese. Most Japanese troops were put out of action by the British and Soviets, not the USA. At the battles of Khohima and Imphal the Japanese suffered their worst defeat in their history up to that point.
Then the British set their Eastern and Pacific fleets against the Japanese, not far off in numbers to the US fleet. The British Pacific Fleet assisted US troops protecting the western coast of Okinawa with its armoured carriers - they could operate way nearer to the coast than wooden decked US carriers, as kamikaze's bounced off them. The fleet also bombarded Japan, Sumatra and Taiwan, sinking one Japanese aircraft carrier and disabling another. The massive British merchant fleet greatly assisted the supply of US forces.
The Australian navy assisted the US navy all through the Japanese war. The USA was in the war for four years, yet it was less than 10 months before the Japanese surrender they actually fielded an entire army against the Japanese. That was in the Philippines. Before that it was just divisions fighting on scattered islands for a month or so at a time.
In Europe the British planned and ran the D-Day Normandy campaign which came in ahead of schedule with 22% less casualties than predicted, with the British in command of all the air, sea and land forces of all nationalities. Then also destroying 90% of German armour in the west in the process, with constant air raids on German cities and industry culminating with 1,000 bomber raids. The Canadian navy was heavily involved in anti U-Boat operations in the Atlantic. The biggest agents in the defeat of the Nazis and Japanese were the British.
1
-
1
-
@tomatoisnotafruit5670
You failed to read my post. Market Garden was a success. A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp and keeping it from German counter-attack - the logistics problem to supply all allied armies. It was:
1) Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or;
2) Take the Schedlt.
Eisenhower had a Northern Thrust strategy, a push to the north on his stretched broad front lines. Taking Noord Babant fell in line with the desires for both SHEAF and Eisenhower. Noord Brabant had to be taken before the Scheldt, as it was essential. It was taken with limited forces. Forces were also sent to take the Schedlt.
Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat or Northern Thrust strategy, and was actually a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen needed to be under allied control. The low-lying lands, boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen with land strewn with rivers and canals, is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces and supply directly back to Germany in perfect position for a counter-attack.
Market Garden was the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans were in disarray, so should be easy enough to gain. Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine to fall in line with Eisenhower's priority Northern Thrust strategy at the time. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation.
You needed Arnhem for an easier jump into Germany. Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all - that is, protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital, and was successfully seized. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans a few miles away and still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all.SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@gerhardris
The First Allied Airborne Army under American Brereton was given Operation Comet by Eisenhower, a cancelled operation conceived and cancelled by Montgomery. FAAA were to flesh out the operation morphing it into Market Garden.
The FAAA were only answerable to SHAEF, not Monty. The FAAA, a floating army available to slot into any army group as needed, was 'notionally' in the 21st Army Group on a temporary basis. The FAAA were responsible for the planning of the operation executing the air part, Market. The FAAA used ground units of Dempsey's Second Army to link seized bridges powering 60 miles into enemy territory.
The ground elements, mainly XXX Corps of Dempsey's Second Army, were superb being on time and having to get around the failures of the 101st and 82nd of the air element, erecting a Bailey bridge overnight at Zon and seizing the Waal bridge for the 82nd. These delays set XXX Corps back two days.
Two of the FAAA's three main air elements failed with one a partial success but did seize a part of the Arnhem bridge, preventing German traffic using the bridge.
All failures were by Americans. Yet Americans blame Monty who never planned the operation or was in command of the execution, which was by the FAAA, XXX Corps or the Second Army.
1
-
@gerhardris
Ike could not sack Monty. If anyone should have been sacked it was Ike...
Montgomery to AlanBrooke..
"If we want the war to end within any reasonable period you have to get Eisenhower’s hand taken off the land battle. I regret to say that in my opinion he just doesn’t know what he is doing.
Montgomery wrote of Eisenhower and his ridiculous broad-front strategy on 22 January 1945:
“I fear that the old snags of indecision and vacillation and refusal to consider the military problem fairly and squarely are coming to the front again . . . The real trouble is that there is no control and the three army groups are each intent on their own affairs. Patton today issued a stirring order to Third Army, saying the next step would be Cologne . . . One has to preserve a sense of humour these days, otherwise one would go mad.”
Alanbrooke wrote in his diary about Eisenhower:
“At the end of this morning's C.O.S. [Chief of Staff] meeting I put before the committee my views on the very unsatisfactory state of affairs in France, with no one running the land battle. Eisenhower, though supposed to be doing so, is on the golf links at Rheims — entirely detached and taking practically no part in running of the war. Matters got so bad lately that a deputation of Whiteley, Bedell Smith and a few others went up to tell him that he must get down to it and RUN the war, which he said he would."
"We discussed the advisability of getting Marshall to come out to discuss the matter, but we are doubtful if he would appreciate the situation. Finally decided that I am to see the P.M. to discuss the situation with him.”
"November 28th I went to see the P.M. I told him I was very worried."
Alan Brooke described in his daily diary that American generals Eisenhower and Marshall as poor strategists, when they were in jobs were strategy mattered. Brooke wrote to Montgomery about his talks with Eisenhower, “it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war!”
You are very confused. Read what I wrote again and understand it.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@
BZZZZZT! Wrong answer.
doktorbimmer, the man who wrote:
"The first patent of a turbojet engine, which was later developed and produced, was that of Frank Whittle, now Sir Frank. His patent was applied for in January 1930. This patent shows a multistage, axial-flow compressor followed by a radial compressor stage, a combustor, an axial-flow turbine driving the compressor, and an exhaust nozzle. Such configurations are still used today..." and "From the beginning of his jet propulsion activities, Frank Whittle had been seeking means for improving the propulsive efficiency of turbojet engines. He conceived novel ideas for which he filed a patent application in 1936, which can be called a bypass engine or turbofan. To avoid a complete new design, Whittle sought an interim solution that could be merely "tacked on" to a jet engine. This configuration was later known as the aft fan. Whittle's work on fan jets or bypass engines and aft fans was way ahead of his time. It was of greatest importance for the future or turbopropulsion." and "In April 1937, Whittle had his bench-test jet engine ready for the first test run. It ran excellently; however, it ran out of control because liquid fuel had collected inside the engine and started to vaporize as the engine became hot, thereby adding uncontrolled fuel quantities to the combustion process. The problem was easily overcome. This first test run was the world's first run of a bench-test jet engine operating with liquid fuel.".
was ....
🍾🎉🎊 German engineer, Ohain 🍾🎉🎊
Zero points bimmer. Zero. Better luck next time.
1
-
1
-
1
-
@freddieclark
In an interview with Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission in Washington, in 1955, General Browning said the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges must be seized "as soon as possible", although the wooded Groesbeek Heights on the route to the bridge must be held.
Field Order 11 of 13 Sept is clear in section 2 a), putting the bridges first in the writing, that they were to be seized, then the high ground secured and then the roads. Order 1, of 13 September, written by Lindquist of the 508th, states he will wait at the high ground for a Division Order to move from the Heights to the bridge. In short, wait for an Order from Gavin to move. The Heights near De Ploeg, which are really pretty flat being a wooded area but high for Holland, are pretty well between the Drop Zone (DZ) and bridge. The 508th would go through the Heights to reach the bridge. Gavin overrode any written Order, and fully emphasized verbally to Lindquist in England that the bridge was to be priority. Chester Graham, witnessed this.
Browning and Gavin naturally did not want German troops between the LZ and the bridge, so the Heights had to be occupied and secure. The 508th CP would be established at the Heights. Gavin understood the priorities in sending the 508th to the bridge and Groesbeek heights immediately, with Coln Warren's battalion of the 508th assigned the bridge. To get to the bridge from the DZ you have to pass the Groesbeek Heights, so any enemy at the Heights naturally had to be subdued, then secure the area, which could take time, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge. It took the 665 men of 508th a painfully slow 3.5 hours to march a few miles from the DZ to the Heights, reaching the Groesbeek heights at 1730. They encountered only a few Labour troops in opposition.
There were no Germans at the Groesbeek Heights as forward scouts relayed back the situation. So, on route Coln Lindquist the head of the 508th could have sent Warren's A and B companies directly to the bridge, bypassing the Groesbeek Heights, immediately via the riverbank as instructed by Gavin. The rest of the battalion could move to the empty Groesbeek Heights setting up defences at De Ploeg on the Heights. Dutch resistance men informed the 508th that the Germans had largely cleared out of Nijmegen with only 19 guards on the bridge. So all was easy and fine, so the two companies assigned the bridge could move immediately to their objective without a diversion via the Groesbeek Heights. Despite hearing the good news from the Dutch Underground, Lindquist in command of the 508th was not moving at all, keeping all his men static at De Ploeg.
Lindquist was waiting for a Divisional Order from Gavin informing him that the DZ was secure, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge. When Gavin found out Lindquist was static via a liaison officer he was livid, running over to De Ploeg in a Jeep telling Lindquist to get moving to the bridge. Even then, took Lindquist another two hours to send men in force to the bridge. Three stray men from a forty man patrol led by Trooper Atkins sent to the bridge immediately by Warren to confirm what the Dutch Underground told them on reaching DePloeg, took the guards on the south end of the bridge prisoner. They left when no one turned up. When leaving they saw hundreds of Germans pour from the north onto the previously lightly guarded bridge. Later, a company of Warren's main force became lost when they eventually moved towards the bridge. By the time Warren's two companies did reach the bridge in force, the Germans had reinforcing the bridge with hundreds of men. Too late. The first attack on the bridge was just before midnight, 10.5 hours after landing.
The 82nd were expecting German resistance from the east, however it came from the north via the Nijmegen bridge.
Gavin was expecting Lindquist to secure the Groesbeek Heights, which were devoid of enemy forces, then immediately move to the bridge, which meant sending Warren's battalion immediately. Lindquist was expecting Gavin to notify him that the DZ was clear. Gavin was expecting Lindquist to go to the bridge when it was obvious the Groesbeek heights, on the way to the bridge, were secure. As no Germans were about, the heights were naturally secure. Regarding Lindquist's expected clearing of the LZ before moving from DePloeg. Lindquist did write a Field Order for the 508th on 13 September copied to Gavin, stating that once the heights were secure he would wait for a Divisional Order [from Gavin] to move. Two days later at the jump briefing Gavin verbally overruled Lindquist's Field Order, using a map he told him that he should move to the bridge "without delay". Poor command communications by Gavin.
Poulussen, in Lost at Nijmegen discovered that the 508th jumped without any written offensive orders from Gavin. All was verbal from Gavin to Lindquist of the 508. Chester Graham, the 82nd liaison officer, was at the pre jump meeting in England. He said there was no ambiguity amongst anyone there that the bridge was the prime target.
In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, was wanting confirmation that the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the objectives. In response, dated 25 July 1945, General Gavin was clear: "About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city." General Browning never knew men were static at De Ploeg. Like Gavin he was expecting men to be seizing the bridge. Being corps commander, he was busy attempting to communicate with all three parachute divisions.
The 82nd did launch a few failed attacks on the bridge. In the afternoon of the next day, 18th, Gavin asked permission to launch another attack. Browning, seeing the bridge was well defended, and the failed attacks, refused, opting to wait for XXX Corps to arrive to seize the bridge. Inexplicably Gavin moved all his men out of Nijmegen town completely to the heights and DZ, giving the town back to the Germans. This made matters worse when XXX Corps arrived who had expended vital time, and ammunition, in flushing them out. On page 162 of the U.S. Official History: "many documents regarding the extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files."
Read:
1) Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment In World War II by Phil Nordyke.
2) Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergström.
3) Market Garden, Then and Now by Karl Magry.
4) Lost at Nijmegen by R Poulussen
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@chainz8573
XXX Corps never had red berets. The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up.
The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
According to the official AMERICAN Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
1
-
The Mustang was basically a British plane they had made in an American factory as UK factories were working 24/7. The British Air Ministry directed a six year old inexperienced company, North American Aviation, to the design points they wanted for their plane. British engineers assisted North American engineers who formulated the design in the British office in New York City over three months. Its prime aim was range so large fuel tank were designed as a part of the plane's structure. The Mustang was a British plane made by an American company for them. There was no US forces involvement in the concept, specifications or design. Many Americans lose sight of these fundamental points.
The Rolls Royce Merlin engine made the Mustang perform superbly. The plane initially used an Allison engine, which was only good at low level. The US were behind the British in engine supercharging with the Tizard Mission giving the USA details of advanced super charging. Also the cylinder head design of the Alison was not good enough for full supercharging. Stanley Hooker of RR developed the auto controlled twin-speed twin-charger supercharging technology which was given free to the USA. The first use of the Mustang by the US military was for ground attack because of the poor high level performance of the Allison engine.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=by4lH2whhjk
In the early stages of WW2, the U.S. government allowed the British & French to by-pass them, allowing direct approaches to U.S. aircraft makers, as would the British government approach say Hawker. The British needed all types of planes urgently, even the P-40 which was inferior to their own front line planes. But warplanes they were, being useful in certain theatres and for training.
In early February 1940 the British asked North American Aviation's President Dutch Kindelberger to supply P-40s made under licence from Curtiss, as Curtiss could not supply demand. Unlike Curtiss, North American's factory was far from operating at full capacity. Kindelberger told the British, without any detailed design drawing, "I can build you a better airplane, and I can get it built fast". Contrary to popular belief in the USA, North American did not have a prototype ready design which the Brits just happened to have snapped up under the noses of the US military. The design was developed over three months with British engineers at the British Air Ministry's offices in New York City.
North American were first approached in Jan 1940, who had no "detailed drawings or plans". The British gave this young inexperienced company, who had never designed and built a complete combat plane a chance, but they would have to hold their hands. In Feb 1940 North American still never presented any detailed plans, mailing a design concept drawings to the British delegation in New York. This never had the famed laminar flow wings. The Air Ministry accepted the concept starting the Mustang project. The British Air Ministry accepted the inferior Allison engine as Rolls Royce were working flat out 24/7 unable to meet demand for Merlins. New Merlin shadow factories were being set up, and one in the USA, but not yet fully on-line.
In the interim from Feb to May, three months, the British Air Ministry were forming the fundamentals of the design concepts directing North American to Curtiss and NACA the developer of the laminar flow wings, to ensure a fighter with some leading edge design points, not produce another P-40 fly-alike wasting valuable time. The Air Ministry directed NAA to the Curtiss XP-46 experimental plane with all the leading edge design points of top European designs, with a few of their own, rolled into one.
NAA were ordered by the British Air Ministry to buy the plans and test results of the XP-46 plane from Curtiss and study them as they had never built a fighter, if they wanted the job, at a whopping $56,000, a lot of money at the time. Curtiss engineers always said the Mustang was their design. Not quite as the British Air Ministry had a lot to say in the leading design points - they were paying and calling the shots as it was their plane. There was a danger the Mustang may end up the same way as the XP-46 - a plane with leading edge points that never performed as expected. The plane needed to have long range built into the design. The British Air Ministry took a major gamble with NAA so were active in approving the emerging design points.
The Ministry wanted something better than the poor P-40, being prepared to wait, but realistically never expected Spitfire performance. Initially that was the case with the first deliveries using the Allison engine - better than a P-40 but no Spitfire. The initial Allison engined Mustangs filled an RAF niche, so no problems for the British at that point. A niche the plane filled was that the RAF needed a long range reconnaissance plane that could also perform ground attack being able as a low level fighter if the need was there. The Spitfire was a short range fast interceptor. With the fall of France the RAF needed a plane with range to penetrate over the German border from English air bases, they would now have one.
Reading many US books on the Mustang you would think the concept of the plane was to escort US bombers. That is way off from the truth. The last thing the British Air Ministry were thinking of when laying down the points of the plane was US bomber doctrine. The US were not even in the war. Initially the US military overall didn't want to know the plane. The British gave a handful to the Soviets before the USA was in the war who turned their noses up at it. The Mustang was not even in U.S. service when it was shooting down FW-190s by the RAF over France. The Air Ministry gave the U.S. military two planes which were left in the corner of a hangar for a long period, initially not assessed it. Quite amazing, as the USA never had a decent front line fighter at the time.
The excuse not to take up the plane by U.S. forces was that it was liquid cooled and vulnerable in frontal attack. This was a poor excuse to reject the plane because it wasn't theirs. What went over their heads was that the world's two best fighters locked horns in the Battle of Britain, both with liquid cooled engines. With British support, the Mustang finally was noticed by the U.S. Army Air Force. The US military had to go to England to fully assess the plane as it was finished off in Liverpool being flow by the RAF. They did eventually adopt the plane calling it the Apache and P-51 when in U.S. service.
UK and U.S. Mustangs for the European war theatre were finished off in Liverpool. They were test flown then delivered to the units by young English girls, many of them teenagers. The Mustang was built to British specification and design guidance without a doubt. They specified and paid for it. It never performed at all like the short range interceptor the Spitfire, not having the maneuverability of the Spitfire and was about useless above 15,000 feet. It was 'fine' and reasonably fast at low altitude with the Allison engine. It could operate over France and even Germany at a push, escorting bombers because of the longer range that the British Air Ministry specified. The Mustang filled an initial niche role for the British. continued......
1
-
...Continued...
Rolls Royce. Rolls engineers under Ron Harker went to North American to advise on how to install a Merlin engine in the Mustang. They also gave advice from their work with the RR Mustang X. Rolls-Royce made the first proposal to North American regarding a Merlin 45 engine Mustang in 1940, after Stanley Hooker improved the power by 30%. This was before the plane was operational an still in the R&D stage. The RR Merlin was superior to the Alison engine, also to what it was in February 1940 when North American were first approached by the Air Ministry. The later Merlin 61 had the two-stage auto controlled supercharging developed by again by Stanley Hooker. This gave an extra 70 mph and 15,000 feet of operation to the Merlin. A quantum leap. The pilot just went where he liked without degradation in performance.
RR sent three engineers led by James Ellor to supervise the adaption and manufacture of a Merlin 61, built under licence in Detroit, the same type that was already being considered for the Rolls Royce Mustang X experimental series.
On 9 June 1942, the first memos from W/C I.R. Campell-Orde of the RAF Air Fighting Development Unit at Duxford, revealed that an effort was being made to convince North American to adopt a Merlin-powered Mustang. Work in the US was setback due to an initial lack of interest and also to mechanical failures of the first Merlin engines built under licence in the USA. Both projects commenced at nearly the same time with the first Mustang X in the air about a month earlier than the North American XP-51B.
The RR Mustang-X programme was 5 or 6 airframes each with different experimentation. RR attempted to have North American accept British Merlin 61s (the two-stage superchargers) in American airframes, it is clear that the prime contractor (NAA) wanted to control the project as control was looking like it was to move over to the UK. NAA was essentially building production-standard aircraft rather than the experimental series that saw each of the RR Mustang Xs trying out new variations of design. An offshoot was the mid-engine RR Griffon engined Mustang that actually made it to the mock-up stage, albeit with a Merlin installed amidships. On the success of the RR Mustang-X built in Nottingham, the Air Ministry ordered hundreds from RR, who declined wanting to remain specialising in engines. NAA remained the prime contractor.
Rolls Royce mass produced Merlins in Crewe, Manchester and Glasgow, also licensing Packard in the USA, using idle US industry. The US made Merlins were to supply the Canadian aircraft factories - to avoid a two-way trans-Atlantic trip and give extra manufacturing when the engine proved very popular with many airframe makers. An agreement was reached in September 1940, with the first Packard built Merlin engine running in August 1941.
Early in 1944 the P-38, P-51B Mustang and P-47C, were dived by the British for compressibility testing at the RAE Farnborough, England at the request of the USAAF. They had trouble when these planes dived onto attacking German fighters when providing top cover for the bombers. The results were that the Mach numbers, the maneuvering limits, were Mach 0.68 for the P-38, Mach 0.71 for the P-47, and Mach 0.78 for the Mustang. The corresponding figures for the FW-190 and Me109 was Mach 0.75. The tests resulted in the Mustang being chosen for all escort duties. - Page 70, Wings On My Sleeve by Eric Brown, who did the test.
1
-
1
-
1
-
@johnho7422
◾Market Garden was planned badly by mainly Americans, Brereton and Williams.
◾US 82nd failed to seize vital the Waal bridge
◾US 101st failed to seize the vital Zon bridge
◾British 1st Airborne moved onto the Arnhem bridge denying its use to the Germans.
◾XXX Corps powered up the road from Belgium reaching the Waal bridge at Nijmegen on schedule.
The British hardly put a for wrong having to take the Waal bridge for the 82nd. Ever since the operation the Americans have tried to whitewash their incompetency. In the US Official history they noted documents were inexplicably MISSING on Market Garden. They obviously smelled something and mentioned it in the history. ......
"Although extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files. The story has been reconstructed from unit records; Gavin's letters to Westover and OCMH; letters to OCMH from Colonel Warren, 5 July 1955, Colonel Lindquist, 9 September 1955, Col. Thomas J. B. Shanley formerly Executive Officer, 508th Parachute Infantry, 2 Sep 55, and Rev. Bestebreurtje, 25 Oct 56; a postwar interview with Colonel Lindquist by Westover, 14 Sep 45, copy in 82d Airborne Division Combat Interview file; and Westover, The American Divisions in Operation MARKET, a preliminary narrative written in the European theater shortly after the war, copy in OCMH. Captain Westover had access to all the combat interviews when writing his narrative."
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1