Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "How the Allies trapped the Germans" video.
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Caen, the full Order No 1 transcript:
(I Corps Operations Order No. 1, WO 171/258)
3 British Division
a) The task of 3 British Division is to capture CAEN and secure a bridgehead over the R ORNE at that place.
b) The enemy may develop his counter-attack--
i) Through CAEN
ii) Across R ORNE at RANVILLE - BENOUVILLE having established himself in the area East of R ORNE from which he can dominate the beaches West of OUISTREHAM and the Northern approaches to CAEN.
iii) West of Caen, between R MUE and the CAEN Canal
iv) Any combination of the above
In cases (ii) and (iii) using CAEN as a pivot, if he succeeds in forestalling us there.
c) To counter these enemy measure 3 British Division should, before dark on D-Day, have captured or effectively masked CAEN and be disposed in depth with brigade localities firmly established.
i) North-West of BENOUVILLE, in support of 6 Airborne Division operating East of R ORNE (having relieved the airborne troops West of the canal and taken over the defence of the BENOUVILLE-RANVILLE crossings.
ii) North-West of CAEN, tied up with the LEFT forward brigade locality of 3 Canadian Division.
Should the enemy forestall us at CAEN and the defences prove to be strongly organised thus causing us the fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct frontal assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event 3 British Division will contain the enemy in CAEN and retain the bulk of its forces disposed for mobile operations inside the covering position. CAEN will be subjected to heavy air bombardment to limit its usefulness and to make its retention a costly business."
- Richard Anderson - "Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day"
So the intention in the Order is quite clear. Take Caen if possible, but if German resistance ensure that the enemy doesn't use it as a means of counter-attacking. Mask it off then let the RAF deal with Caen. Caen was not the prime aim. It was to draw the German Armour reserves onto the Second Army then grind them down, with also an aim to prevent them from interfering in Bradley's breakout into Brittany and the seizing Cherbourg. The Germans kept approximately 90% of their armour on Monty's left flank against the British and Canadians including ALL the elite Panzer Divisions, and kept all the heavy armour away from the US armies.
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Eisenhower's “in the east we had been unable to break out towards the Seine“
- Hamilton Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944
The above showed he had not much of a clue.
Brooke, however, was worried that he had not completely stopped the rot, and the next morning penned a long letter to Monty warning him of Eisenhower’s ‘mischief-making’: “I drew attention to what your basic strategy had been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw the Germans onto the flank while you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the Armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch major offensives on each Army front simultaneously.
I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy is 2½ times that on the Russian front, whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% on the Russian superiority on the Eastern front, I did not consider that we were in a position to launch an all out offensive along the whole front.’ The strategy of the Normandy landing is quite straight-forward. The British (on the left) must hold and draw Germans on to themselves off the western flank whilst Americans swing up to open Brest peninsular,’ Brooke noted in his diary.
- Hamilton Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944
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