Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "Operation Market Garden | What went wrong?" video.
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In an interview with Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission in Washington, in 1955, General Browning said the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges must be seized "as soon as possible", although the wooded Groesbeek Heights on the route to the bridge must be held.
Field Order 11 of 13 Sept is clear in section 2 a), putting the bridges first in the writing, that they were to be seized, then the high ground secured and then the roads. Order 1, of 13 September, written by Lindquist of the 508th, states he will wait at the high ground for a Division Order to move from the Heights to the bridge. In short, wait for an Order from Gavin to move.
The heights near De Ploeg, which are really pretty flat being a wooded area but high for Holland, are pretty well between the Drop Zone (DZ) and bridge. The 508th would go through the Heights to reach the bridge. Browning and Gavin naturally did not want German troops between the LZ and the bridge, so the Heights had to be occupied and secure. The 508th CP would be established at the Heights.
Gavin understood the priorities in sending the 508th to the bridge and Groesbeek heights immediately, with Coln Warren's battalion of the 508th assigned the bridge. To get to the bridge from the DZ you have to pass the Groesbeek Heights, so any enemy at the Heights naturally had to be subdued, then secure the area, which could take time, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge.
It took the 665 men of 508th a painfully slow 3.5 hours to march a few miles from the DZ to the heights, reaching the Groesbeek heights at 1730. They encountered only a few Labour troops in opposition. There were no Germans at the Groesbeek Heights as forward scouts relayed back the situation. So, on route Coln Lindquist the head of the 508th could have sent Warren's A and B companies directly to the bridge, bypassing the Groesbeek Heights, immediately via the riverbank as instructed by Gavin. The rest of the battalion could move to the empty Groesbeek Heights setting up defences at De Ploeg on the heights. Dutch resistance men informed the 508th that the Germans had largely cleared out of Nijmegen with only 19 guards on the bridge. So all was easy and fine, so the two companies assigned the bridge could move immediately to their objective without a diversion via the Groesbeek Heights.
Despite hearing the good news from the Dutch Underground, Lindquist in command of the 508th was not moving at all, keeping all his men static at De Ploeg. Lindquist was waiting for a Divisional Order from Gavin informing him that the DZ was secure, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge. When Gavin found out Lindquist was static via a liaison officer he was livid, running over to De Ploeg in a Jeep telling Lindquist to get moving to the bridge. Even then, took Lindquist another two hours to send men in force to the bridge.
Three stray men from a forty man patrol sent to the bridge immediately by Warren to confirm what the Dutch Underground told them on reaching DePloeg, took the guards on the south end of the bridge prisoner. They left when no one turned up. When leaving they saw hundreds of Germans pour from the north onto the previously lightly guarded bridge. Later, a company of Warren's main force became lost when they eventually moved towards the bridge. By the time Warren's two companies did reach the bridge in force, the Germans had reinforcing the bridge with hundreds of men. Too late. The first attack on the bridge was just before midnight, 10.5 hours after landing.
* The 82nd were expecting German resistance from the east, however it came from the north via the Nijmegen bridge.
* Gavin was expecting Lindquist to secure the Groesbeek heights, which were devoid of enemy forces, then immediately move to the bridge, which meant sending Warren's battalion immediately.
* Lindquist was expecting Gavin to notify him that the DZ was clear.
Gavin was expecting Lindquist to go to the bridge when it was obvious the Groesbeek heights, on the way to the bridge, were secure. As no Germans were about, the heights were naturally secure. Regarding Lindquist's expected clearing of the LZ before moving from DePloeg. Lindquist did write a Field Order for the 508th on 13 September copied to Gavin, stating that once the heights were secure he would wait for a Divisional Order [from Gavin] to move. Two days later at the jump briefing Gavin verbally overruled Lindquist's Field Order, using a map he told him that he should move to the bridge "without delay". Poor command communications by Gavin.
Poulussen, in Lost at Nijmegen discovered that the 508th jumped without any written offensive orders from Gavin. All was verbal from Gavin to Lindquist of the 508. Chester Graham, the 82nd liaison officer, was at the pre jump meeting in England. He said there was no ambiguity amongst anyone there that the bridge was the prime target.
In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, was wanting confirmation that if the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the objectives. In response, dated 25 July 1945, General Gavin was clear: "About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay _after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city.
"_General Browning never knew men were static at De Ploeg. Like Gavin he was expecting men to be seizing the bridge. Being corps commander, he was busy attempting to communicate with all three parachute divisions. The 82nd did launch a few failed attacks on the bridge. In the afternoon of the next day, 18th, Gavin asked permission to launch another attack. Browning, seeing the bridge was well defended, and the failed attacks, refused, opting to wait for XXX Corps to arrive to seize the bridge. Inexplicably Gavin moved all his men out of Nijmegen town completely to the heights and DZ, giving the town back to the Germans. This made matters worse when XXX Corps arrived who had expended vital time, and ammunition, in flushing them out.
On page 162 of the U.S. Official History: "many documents regarding the extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files."
Read:
1) Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment In World War II by Phil Nordyke.
2) Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergström.
3) Market Garden, Then and Now by Karl Magry.
4) Lost at Nijmegen by R Poulusson
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The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up.
The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
According to the official AMERICAN Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
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The American post war version of events is one that attempts to whitewash their failure at Nijmegen to capture the bridge on the first day. The film A bridge Too Far, made when Browning had already died, only cemented the false narrative in the minds of the public. Since then many researchers have uncovered the real facts.
The 508th did launch some patrols into Nijmegen. A patrol from the 3rd Battalion almost reached the bridge - but only after being delayed by the enemy with the bridge being reinforced in company strength by the time they reached it.
Warren's 1st Bn had launched a patrol or two patrols, yes, just patrols. Nordyke notes two versions from Warren and his exec' officer. It, or they, were led by the Bn S-2 Intelligence Section, then joined by Lt. Weaver's 3rd Platoon of the Bn reserve C Company, plus two squads from the HQ Company LMG Platoon and C Company's SCR-300 radio set and operator, for communication back to the Battalion. Weaver's patrol met German resistance, withdrawing when they heard the Bn were sending A and B companies to take the bridge. They only went to the bridge because Gavin ran to Lindquist's CP at De Ploeg in a Jeep, screaming at him to get moving when he found, after many hours, he was not moving to the bridge.
"I knew all of the division staff and the other regimental commanders, and was included in the planning of operations and briefings. I was ‘bigoted.’ [This is a WWII military term for being read into/briefed on missions.]
Prior to the Holland jump, I sat in a high-level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important.
After we were dropped in Holland, I went to the 508th Regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, “As soon as the DZ (drop zone) is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.” So I went cross-country through Indian country [slang military term for enemy territory] to the Division CP and relayed Lindquist’s message to Gavin.
I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his jeep, he told me to, “Come with me — let’s get him moving.” "On arriving at the 508th Regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, “I told you to move with speed.”
- by Chester E Graham, liaison officer between the 508th and the 82nd Division Headquarters.
Three stray men of an 82nd patrol, were separated reaching the Nijmegen bridge. They captured about the German bridge guards and their small artillery weapon on the south end of the bridge. They waited an hour until dark at around 7:30 pm, withdrawing as no one turned up. They could hear heavy equipment approaching from Arnhem, being the SS-Panzer Recon Battalion 9, who crossed the bridge at Arnhem just missing Frost's men at 7pm.
- Demolition Platoon, 508th by Zig Burroughs.
Look at Frost's progress in Arnhem, where his whole battalion following A Company moved away from the Germans, through people's houses, over walls and back yards, carrying all their equipment, by-passing German positions, reaching the Arnhem bridge. The British First Airborne landed half an hours after the 508. They had an extra 4 or 5 miles march, met more resistance, yet reached the Arnhem bridge before the US 82nd reached the Nijmegen bridge.
General Gavin gained promotion, 505th PIR command to Assistant Divisional commander for Normandy. He was promoted again to Divisional commander for Holland. Gavin inherited Lindquist as commander of the 508th, who were the least experienced regiment in the Division. Yet Gavin gave the least experienced regiment the prime task. Gavin says that in England he told Lindquist to go for the bridge "without delay." Lindquist denied Gavin said this.
Gavin chose the most experienced regiment, the 504th, who had just returned from Anzio, to secure the Grave bridge, because it was on the Division's supply line. Without the Grave bridge secured, the 82nd would be in trouble. The next most experienced regiment was Gavin's old unit the 505th, giving them the defensive task of securing the landing zones from counter-attack from the Reichswald.
The intelligence picture by SHAEF, on 16 September, suspected II.SS-Panzerkorps was drawing new tanks from a depot in the Kleve area of Germany. Gavin had this mythical 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald, so he gave the least experienced 508th the task of securing Nijmegen and its bridges. This was a unit, better suited to a defensive role. The 508th, and Lindquist, were well dug-in on the Groesbeek ridge at De Ploeg when Gavin was informed they were not moving on the bridges in Nijmegen. They were not following Gavin's divisional plan, Lindquist was waiting for a division order from HQ before moving into Nijmegen. This was a clear communications failure between Gavin and Lindquist.
Ridgway had no role to play in Market Garden as his two divisions of XVIII Corps were attached to the British First Airborne Corps for the operation, under Browning. Ridgway got into a Jeep riding up from Belgium, when XXX Corps made contact with the the 82nd, paying a visit to Gavin's CP to see why they had not secured the bridge. Gavin entered to find Ridgway in the CP studying a map. Gavin ignored him and immediately left without even acknowledging Ridgway's presence.
The fact is there were no German combat troops in Nijmegen on the jump day. None. The low grade aged troops were scared stiff of meeting well armed aggressive paras. The German HQs moved out immediately. Dutch Resistance men informed Linquists at De Ploeg that the bridge had 19 guards with most Germans evacuating Nijmegen.
Regarding Harmel, the German commander who was in command of the 'island' between Nijmegen and Arnhem, when interviewed by Kershaw in the 1970s, he said there was no German armour between the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridge when XXX Corps secured the Nijmegen bridge. This was incorrect as German records show German tanks, inc' Tigers, were already crossing south on the Arnhem bridge to form a line at Elst - the British First had capitulated on the Arnhem bridge running out of ammunition, at the same time XXX Corps crossed the Nijmegen bridge. Harmel never knew this, as communications was skant in a fluid situation. After, the last thing they were thinking of was where and what time, as they saw the allied in a few days had punched a 60 mile salient right into their lines on the German border, taking the largest road bridge in Europe at the time.
▪ Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment In World War II by Phil Nordyke.
▪ Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergström
▪ Market Garden, Then and Now by Karl Magry.
▪ Lost at Nijmegen by R Poulusson
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The gains from MARKET GARDEN have been noted by: Eisenhower:
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
Major-General Sir Francis De Guingand:
‘It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland.
MONTY The Field-Marshal, NIGEL HAMILTON:
‘General Student, in a statement after the war, considered the ‘Market Garden’ operation to have ‘proved a great success. At one stroke it brought the British 2nd Army into the possession of vital bridges and valuable territory. The conquest of the Nijmegen area meant that the creation of a good jumping board for the offensive which contributed to the end of war.’ Student was expressing the professional admiration of an airborne commander - ‘those who had planned and inaugurated with complete the first airborne operations of military history, had not now even thought of such a possible action by the enemy…the Allied Airborne action completely surprised us. The operation hit my army nearly in the centre and split it into two parts…In spite of all precautions, all bridges fell intact into the hands of the Allied airborne forces—another proof of the paralysing effect of surprise by airborne forces!’ As for hindsight, the only part of that would interest me would be to judge the actions of those people at that time in the situation that they found themselves in. As far as MARKET GARDEN was concerned, the German V-2 rockets on London alone justified the attempt, even without the other, good reasons for making the attempt.
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A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp and keeping it from German counter-attack - the logistics problem to supply all allied armies. It was:
1) Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or;
2) Take the Schedlt.
Eisenhower had a Northern Thrust strategy, a push to the north on his stretched broad front lines. Taking Noord Babant fell in line with the desires for both SHEAF and Eisenhower. Noord Brabant had to be taken before the Scheldt, as it was essential. It was taken with limited forces, with forces also sent to take the Schedlt.
Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat or Northern Thrust strategy, and was actually a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen needed to be under allied control. The low-lying lands, boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen with land strewn with rivers and canals, is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces and supply directly back to Germany in perfect position for a counter-attack.
Market Garden was the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans were in disarray, so should be easy enough to gain. Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine to fall in line with Eisenhower's priority Northern Thrust strategy at the time. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation.
You needed Arnhem for an easier jump into Germany. Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all - that is, protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital, and was successfully seized. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans a few miles away and still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all. SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view.
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In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, wanting confirmed if the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the prime objectives. In response – dated 25 July 1945 – Gen Gavin was clear:
"About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, Commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city."
A straight verbal order to immediately capture the bridge with one battalion. The rest of the regiment were to defend against a possible attack from the Reichswald and clear the LZ. They were to approach the bridge via the flat ground east of the city. Two companies went into Nijmegen with one disobeying orders getting completely lost. Two hours later when they finally rendezvoused, the attack was called off and the battalion called back into defence. In 1947 in his book ‘Airborne Warfare’ Gavin was vague regarding the failure:
"Just before take-off, I discussed the situation with Col Lindquist and directed him to commit not more than one battalion to the seizure of the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as possible after landing, so as to take advantage of surprise and darkness"
Gavin created the illusion that it had been the responsibility of the cautious Col Lindquist to decide when to send troops to the Nijmegen bridge, by writing as ‘soon as possible’. Gavin successfully created the myth that the failure to immediately attack the bridge was a misunderstanding. Gavin failed to issue written offensive orders to Lindquist.
In the official US History written by Charles MacDonald in 1963 he also noticed the conflicting statements. Capt. Westover had access to all the 82nd Divisional records could find no record of these orders. Official US history determined that Col Lindquist of 508 PIR, Lt Col Stanley of 508 PIR, Lt Col Warren of 1/508 PIR and Capt. Bestebreurtje, a Dutch Liaison officer were not aware of any pre jump orders. It noted the only guidance for the men of 508 PIR was Field Order No 1 which was defensive. This was written by Col Lindquist.
Regarding the shift in priorities from the bridge to Groebeeke Heights, Capt. Westover while preparing the official US history of the US divisions taking part in Market Garden, and who was in possession of after action reports, unit diaries and official reports, still found inexplicable discrepancies. Capt. Westover asked Gen Gavin: "What person, staff or headquarters made the decision to apportion the weight of the 82nd AD to the high ground rather than the bridge at Nijmegen?" Gavin’s reply: "This decision was made by myself and approved by my Corps Commander.". There is no record of the conversation on this matter. Gavin then wrote to Westover saying: "Even if we were driven off the low ground, around the bridges, if the high ground could be held, ultimately the Second Army could accomplish the mission."
Gavin assumed the Germans would not reinforce their troops around Arnhem and Nijmegen, and the British paras in Arnhem could hold on indefinitely, it seems that Gavin had chosen this course of action. No real concerted attempt to capture Nijmegen bridge was made until XXX Corps arrived in Nijmegen. XXX Corps successfully seized the bridge, delayed 36 hours, too late to save the British paras holding out on the Arnhem bridge.
Note: From US Official History:
"Although extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files. The story has been reconstructed from unit records; Gavin's letters to Westover and OCMH; letters to OCMH from Colonel Warren, 3 July 1955, Colonel Lindquist, 9 September 1955, Col. Thomas J. B. Shanley formerly Executive Officer, 508th Parachute Infantry, 2 Sep 55, and Rev. Bestebreurtje, 25 Oct 56; a postwar interview with Colonel Lindquist by Westover, 14 Sep 45, copy in 82d Airborne Division Combat Interview file; and Westover, The American Divisions in Operation MARKET, a preliminary narrative written in the European theater shortly after the war, copy in OCMH. Captain Westover had access to all the combat interviews when writing his narrative."
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In 1941 the British were concurrently fighting in all theatres of war, in all corners of the globe and against better prepared forces of greater numbers. Germany’s war was regional, extending from their borders - all logistics went directly over land back to Germany, apart from North Africa where the Italians provided the sea transport back to nearby Italy. Italy and Vichy France too. Japan’s war was confined to a radius around Japan. Taking on all these countries and securing wins for the free World was pure brilliance. As well as achieving the first three victories against the ‘unstoppable’ German military war machine, Britain achieved that which no other nation in the world could even possibly dream of accomplishing in the early 1940s.
Britain fought a global war in the:
▪ Middle East;
▪ Far East;
▪ Indian subcontinent;
▪ Pacific;
▪ North Africa;
▪ West Africa;
▪ East Africa;
▪ North Atlantic;
▪ South Atlantic;
▪ North Sea;
▪ Barents Sea;
▪ Arctic Sea;
▪ Mediterranean;
▪ Adriatic;
▪ Mainland Western Europe;
▪ Eastern Europe;
▪ Scandinavia.
The British were the only military power in human history to fight in such globally spread theatres of conflict. For the third year running, Britain was propping up an ally - France, USSR, then the USA. The incompetence of US Navy to provide convoy protection on its east coast almost lost the allies the Battle of the Atlantic. Six hundred ships off the US eastern seaboard were lost in the first six months of 1942. Shipping losses climbed to a level that undermined British ability to supply themselves, keep the Soviets in the war, and keep reinforcements flowing to the Middle East and Asia. The British quickly deployed 60 escort vessels to cover the US coast. In 1942 the USA was a liability. For most of 1942 the British Commonwealth held the line, kept back the combined efforts of Germany, Italy and Japan, with minimal input from the USA compared to her potential power, keeping the Atlantic and Indian oceans open with supplies flowing to the vital armies in the Middle East and Asia, and to the USSR. No other empire in the history of the world has been capable of such a sustained multi-continent and multi-ocean operation.
In 1942 the British Commonwealth was fighting a three continent, four ocean campaign, against three major powers and keeping the USSR supplied The thousands of tanks and aircraft sent to the USSR would have saved Singapore.
The total British losses of territory and people in the early war were:
▪ One third of the territory the Soviets lost;
▪ Half of the people the Americans lost - mainly Philippines;
Yet those nations were fighting only on one front and only against one of the three powers. The British Commonwealth had far more ground troops in action against the Japanese than the Americans. Also the British were maintaining sea control over the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. And then provided aircraft carriers and cruisers to help in the Pacific - while the USA concentrated on just one of those theatres.
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@johnlucas8479
Monty didn’t plan Market Garden, coming up with the idea and broad outline only. Montgomery was largely excluded from the planning process.
It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF and Hollinghurst of the RAF.
It was Bereton and Williams who:
▪decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset.
▪rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet.
▪chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges.
▪Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity.
▪ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“
Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Margry....
These kind of decisions ended up being crucial flaws and it was Brereton who enforced them, not Montgomery. The air commanders made the wrong choices throughout the planning.
They took and kept 100km of ground up that road i.e. 90% of it. They NEARLY did it. They were not stopped where they set off, or even halfway up it. They got 90% of the way, within touching distance. Had the operation been planned a bit better by the air commanders and with more resources it would have worked.
Monty’s idea was actually a good one, as nearly all the relevant personnel involved agreed. Including the Americans. They (Eisenhower and Brereton) were the ones who had to agree with it and give it the go ahead. They very much liked the idea.
Eisenhower....
“I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.”
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@davemac1197
Interesting post. Dave M A C wrote:
"The point on timing is that British resistance at the Arnhem bridge expired at about the same time (1230 hrs) as the Irish Guards re-commenced their advance from Nijmegen (1300 hrs) on 21 September. "
All accounts say the evening before with German armour run over soon after. Some accounts say the initial tanks ran over the dead German bodies, until they could be cleared which was quite quick. The wreckage only needed to be pushed to one side allowing one lane to be free. Karl Magry in Market Garden Then and Now, says German armour was running south over Arnhem bridge at 1500 hrs to create a line at Elst - 3.5 hours prior to the Guards tanks seizing Nijmegen bridge.
For all the concern that must have existed about getting to Arnhem, only a small part of the British armor was freed late on D plus 4, 21 September, to start the northward drive. As the attack began, British commanders saw every apprehension confirmed. The ground off the main roads was low-lying, wet bottomland, denying employment of tanks. A few determined enemy bolstered with antitank guns might delay even a large force. Contrary to the information that had been received, Colonel Frost and his men had been driven away from the north end of the Arnhem bridge the afternoon before, so that since the preceding night the bridge had been open to German traffic. At the village of Ressen, less than three miles north of Nijmegen, the Germans had erected an effective screen composed of an SS battalion reinforced with 11 tanks, another infantry battalion, 2 batteries of 88-mm. guns, 20 20-mm. antiaircraft guns, and survivors of earlier fighting at Nijmegen, all operating under General Bittrich's II SS Panzer Corps. Arnhem lay seven miles north of this screen. The British could not pass.
- US Official History.
Frost controlled the north end of Arnhem bridge for about another two hours after the tanks took Nijmegen bridge. It was dark when the Nijmegen bridge was seized. The bridge had to be secured from German counter-attack with a secure cordon erected on the north bank. Harmel stated: "The four panzers who crossed the [Nijmegen] bridge made a mistake when they stayed in the village of Lent. If they had carried on their advance, it would have been all over for us." According to Saunders, three Tiger tanks and infantry had already been heading south from Arnhem towards Lent about the time the tanks seized Nijmegen bridge. By the time the bridge was fully secured, and tanks ready to roll, then they moved up the road, they would be meeting heavy armour, or/and anti-tank guns.
Saunders and the US Official History match up. Some of Frosts men were still fighting the next day, being scattered not stopping bridge traffic.
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@michaelschmid9567
You have been told! XXX Corps were on schedule when reaching Nijmegen. Seven hours to go, with seven miles to travel, up a largely empty road.
Three of an 82nd patrol were separated reaching the Nijmegen bridge. They managed to capture six or seven German troops and a small Flak artillery weapon. They waited an hour until dark at around 7:30 pm, withdrawing. They could hear heavy equipment approaching from Arnhem, being the SS-Panzer Recon Battalion 9, who just just missed Frost's men at Arnhem bridge at 7pm.
Source: Demolition Platoon, 508th by Zig Burroughs.
This contrasts sharply to Frost's progress in Arnhem, where his whole battalion following A Company moved away from the Germans, through people's houses, over walls, and back yards, carrying all their equipment, by-passing German positions, reaching the Arnhem bridge. The British First Airborne landed half an hour after the 508. They have an extra 4 or 5 miles march, met more resistance, yet reached the Arnhem bridge before the US paras reached the Nijmegen bridge.
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@Scaleyback317 wrote:
"How and why did Gavin come out smelling of roses?"
In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, wanting confirmed if the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the prime objectives. In response – dated 25 July 1945 – Gen Gavin was clear:
"About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, Commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city."
A straight order to immediately capture the bridge with one battalion. The rest of the regiment were to defend against a possible attack from the Reichswald and clear the LZ. They were to approach the bridge via the flat ground east of the city. Two companies went into Nijmegen with one disobeying orders getting completely lost. Two hours later when they finally rendezvoused, the attack was called off and the battalion called back into defence. In 1947 in his book ‘Airborne Warfare’ Gavin was vague regarding the failure:
"Just before take-off, I discussed the situation with Col Lindquist and directed him to commit not more than one battalion to the seizure of the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as possible after landing, so as to take advantage of surprise and darkness"
Gavin created the illusion that it had been the responsibility of the cautious Col Lindquist to decide when to send troops to the Nijmegen bridge, by writing as ‘soon as possible’. Gavin successfully created the myth that the failure to immediately attack the bridge was a misunderstanding. There was little misunderstand. Gavin did not give Lindquist any written offensive orders. All was verbal.
In the official US History written by Charles MacDonald in 1963 he also noticed the conflicting statements. Capt. Westover had access to all the 82nd Divisional records could find no record of these orders. Official US history determined that Col Lindquist of 508 PIR, Lt Col Stanley of 508 PIR, Lt Col Warren of 1/508 PIR and Capt. Bestebreurtje, a Dutch Liaison officer were not aware of any pre jump orders. It noted the only guidance for the men of 508 PIR was Field Order No 1 which was defensive.
Regarding the shift in priorities from the bridge to Groebeeke Heights, Capt. Westover while preparing the official US history of the US divisions taking part in Market Garden, and who was in possession of after action reports, unit diaries and official reports, still found inexplicable discrepancies. Capt. Westover asked Gen Gavin: "What person, staff or headquarters made the decision to apportion the weight of the 82nd AD to the high ground rather than the bridge at Nijmegen?" Gavin’s reply: "This decision was made by myself and approved by my Corps Commander.". There is no record of the conversation on this matter. Gavin then wrote to Westover saying: "Even if we were driven off the low ground, around the bridges, if the high ground could be held, ultimately the Second Army could accomplish the mission."
Gavin assumed the Germans would not reinforce their troops around Arnhem and Nijmegen, and the British paras in Arnhem could hold on indefinitely, it seems that Gavin had chosen this course of action. No real concerted attempt to capture Nijmegen bridge was made until XXX Corps arrived in Nijmegen. XXX Corps successfully seized the bridge, delayed 36 hours, too late to save the British paras holding out on the Arnhem bridge.
Note: From US Official History:
"Although extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files. The story has been reconstructed from unit records; Gavin's letters to Westover and OCMH; letters to OCMH from Colonel Warren, 3 July 1955, Colonel Lindquist, 9 September 1955, Col. Thomas J. B. Shanley formerly Executive Officer, 508th Parachute Infantry, 2 Sep 55, and Rev. Bestebreurtje, 25 Oct 56; a postwar interview with Colonel Lindquist by Westover, 14 Sep 45, copy in 82d Airborne Division Combat Interview file; and Westover, The American Divisions in Operation MARKET, a preliminary narrative written in the European theater shortly after the war, copy in OCMH. Captain Westover had access to all the combat interviews when writing his narrative."
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@dmbeaster
In an interview with General Browning in the NY Times he said he gave equal priority to the Nijmegen bridge and the Groesbeek heights. The heights near De Ploeg, which are really pretty flat being a wooded area but high for Holland, are pretty well between the Drop Zone (DZ) and bridge. Browning and Gavin did not want German troops between the DZ and the bridge, so the heights had to be occupied and secure.
Gavin understood the priorities in sending the 508th to the bridge and heights immediately, with Coln Warren's battalion of the 508th assigned the bridge. To get to the bridge from the DZ you have to pass the heights, so any enemy at the heights naturally had to be subdued, then secure the area, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge.
It took the 508th a painfully slow 3.5 hours to march a few miles from the DZ to the heights, reaching the heights at 1730. There were no Germans at the Groesbeek heights as forward scouts relayed back, so Coln Lindquist could send Warren's battalion directly to the bridge immediately, without any delay, while the rest of the 508th stayed back setting up defences at De Ploeg on the Groesbeek heights. Dutch resistance men informed the 508th that the Germans had largely cleared out of the town with only 19 guards on the bridge.
Despite hearing the good news from the Dutch Underground, Lindquist in command of the 508th was not moving at all, staying static at De Ploeg. Lindquist was waiting for a Divisional Order from Gavin that the DZ was secure, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge. When Gavin found out via a liaison officer he was livid, running over to De Ploeg in a Jeep telling Lindquist to get moving to the bridge.
Three stray men from a patrol sent to the bridge by Warren to confirm what the Dutch Underground told them, took the guards on the south end of the bridge prisoner. They left when no one turned up. When leaving they saw hundreds of Germans pour onto the previously lightly guarded bridge. Some of Warren's men became lost when they eventually moved towards the bridge. By the time the 508th did get to the bridge in force, the Germans had come south reinforcing the bridge with hundreds of men. Too late.
The 82nd were expecting German resistance from the east, however it came from the north via the Nijmegen bridge.
▪ Gavin was expecting Lindquist to secure the Groesbeek heights, which were devoid of enemy forces, then immediately move to the bridge, which meant sending Warren's battalion immediately.
▪ Lindquist was expecting Gavin to notify him that the DZ was clear.
Gavin was expecting Lindquist to go to the bridge when it was obvious the Groesbeek heights, on the way to the bridge, were secure. As no Germans were about, the heights were naturally secure.
Regarding Lindquist expecting clearing of the DZ before moving from DePloeg. Lindquist did write a Field Order for the 508th on 13 September copied to Gavin, stating that once the heights were secure he would wait for a Divisional Order [from Gavin] to move. Two days later at the jump briefing Gavin verbally overruled Lindquist's Field Order. Using a map Gavin verbally told Lidquist to move to the bridge "without delay". Poor command communications by Gavin.
Poulussen, in Lost at Nijmegen discovered that the 508th jumped without any written offensive orders from Gavin. All was verbal from Gavin to Lindquist. Chester Graham, the 82nd liaison officer, was at the pre jump meeting in England. He said there was no ambiguity amongst anyone there that the bridge was the prime target.
In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, was wanting confirmation that if the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the objectives. In response, dated 25 July 1945, General Gavin was clear: "About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, Commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city."
General Browning never knew men were static at De Ploeg. Like Gavin he was expecting men to be seizing the bridge. Being corps commander, he was busy attempting to communicate with all three parachute divisions. The 82nd did launch a few failed attacks on the bridge. In the afternoon of the next day, 18th, Gavin asked permission to launch another attack. Browning, seeing the bridge was well defended, and the failed attacks, refused, opting to wait for XXX Corps to arrive to seize the bridge. Inexplicably Gavin moved all his men out of Nijmegen town completely to the heights and DZ, giving the town back to the Germans. This made matters worse when XXX Corps arrived who had expended vital time, and ammunition, in flushing them out.
On page 162 of the U.S. Official History:
"many documents regarding the extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files."
Read:
1) Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment In World War II by Phil Nordyke.
2) Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergström.
3) Market Garden, Then and Now by Karl Magry.
4) Lost at Nijmegen by R Poulusson
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@Scaleyback317
Chester Graham, who was at the 82nd meeting on 15th in England said it was clear to all what the prime objectives were. It seems Gavin never verbally overrode Lindquist's written Field Order No 1. Well if he did, he never emphasised it to him.
Lost in Nijmegen emphasises that in the unit journal of 508 PIR, that Gavin "desires" that the bridge be taken, not ordered it taken. It also states that A and B companies of the 508th left DePloeg at 2030 hrs to go to the bridge. This is seven hours after landing and 2.5 hours after Gavin told them personally to move to the bridge.
Gavin's divisional plan was for the 508th to "move with speed" on the Nijmegen bridge as soon as possible after landing. The 508th's liaison officer to Division HQ was Captain Chester 'Chet' Graham - "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation.
"Captain Ben Delamater was the 1st Battalion’s executive officer - "The regimental commanding officer [Colonel Roy Lindquist], with his radio operator and two Dutch interpreters from the British army soon followed us onto our first objective. The planned defenses were being set up when several civilians wearing arm bands and carrying Underground credentials of some sort told the colonel that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen, that the town and the highway bridge were lightly held. The regimental CO had been instructed that if the initial mission were accomplished to 'go ahead and take the highway bridge if you can.' This division order was perfectly understood in relation to the primary missions and was not a weak, conditional order as might be supposed offhand.
”When Chet Graham decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge - "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' "
- Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment in World War II by Phil Nordyke
Lost in Nijmegen emphasises that Gavin gave no written offensive orders to Lindquist of the 508th.
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The finest army in the world from mid 1942 onwards was the British under Montgomery. From Alem el Halfa it moved right up into Denmark, through nine countries, and not once suffered a reverse taking all in its path. Over 90% of German armour in the west was destroyed by the British. Montgomery, in command of all ground forces, had to give the US armies an infantry role in Normandy as they were not equipped to engage massed German SS armour.
Montgomery stopped the Germans in every event they attacked him:
▪ August 1942 - Alem el Halfa; October 1942 - El Alamein;
▪ March 1943 - Medenine;
▪ June 1944 - Normandy;
▪ Sept/Oct 1944 - The Netherlands;
▪ December 1944 - Battle of the Bulge;
A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2:
▪ Battle of Alam Halfa;
▪ Second Battle of El Alamein;
▪ Battle of El Agheila;
▪ Battle of Medenine;
▪ Battle of the Mareth Line;
▪ Battle of Wadi Akarit;
▪ Allied invasion of Sicily;
▪ Operation Overlord - the largest amphibious invasion in history;
▪ Market Garden - a 60 mile salient created into German territory;
▪ Battle of the Bulge - while taking control of two shambolic US armies;
▪ Operation Veritable;
▪ Operation Plunder.
Montgomery not once had a reverse.
Not on one occasion were ground armies, British, US or others, under Monty's command pushed back into a retreat by the Germans. Monty's 8th Army advanced the fastest of any army in WW2. From El Alamein to El Agheila from the 4th to 23rd November 1942, 1,300 km in just 17 days. After fighting a major exhausting battle at El Alemein through half a million mines. This was an Incredible feat, unparalleled in WW2. With El Alamein costing just 13,500 casualties.
The US Army were a shambles in 1944/45 retreating in the Ardennes. The Americans didn't perform well at all east of Aachen, then the Hurtgen Forest defeat with 33,000 casualties and Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months at Metz with over 50,000 casualties, with the Lorraine campaign being a failure. Then Montgomery had to be put in command of the shambolic US First and Ninth armies, aided by the British 21st Army Group, just to get back to the start line in the Ardennes, with nearly 100,000 US casualties. Hodges, head of the US First army, fled from Spa to near Liege on the 18th, despite the Germans never getting anywhere near to Spa. Hodges did not even wait for the Germans to approach Spa. He had already fled long before the Germans were stopped. The Germans took 20,000 US POWs in the Battle of The Bulge in Dec 1944. No other allied country had that many prisoners taken in the 1944-45 timeframe.
The USA retreat at the Bulge, again, was the only allied army to be pushed back into a retreat in the 1944-45 timeframe. Montgomery was effectively in charge of the Bulge having to take control of the US First and Ninth armies. Coningham of the RAF was put in command of USAAF elements. The US Third Army constantly stalled after coming up from the south. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war just about. The US armies were losing men at unsustainable rates due to poor generalship.
Normandy was planned and commanded by the British, with Montgomery involved in planning, with also Montgomery leading all ground forces, which was a great success coming in ahead of schedule and with less casualties than predicted. The Royal Navy was in command of all naval forces and the RAF all air forces. The German armour in the west was wiped out by primarily the British - the US forces were impotent against massed panzers. Monty assessed the US armies (he was in charge of them) giving them a supporting infantry role, as they were just not equipped, or experienced, to fight concentrated tank v tank battles. On 3 Sept 1944 when Eisenhower took over overall allied command of ground forces everything went at a snail's pace. The fastest advance of any western army in Autumn/early 1945 was the 60 mile thrust by the British XXX Corps to the Rhine at Arnhem.
You need to give respect where it is due.
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@tomatoisnotafruit5670
You failed to read my post. Market Garden was a success. A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp and keeping it from German counter-attack - the logistics problem to supply all allied armies. It was:
1) Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or;
2) Take the Schedlt.
Eisenhower had a Northern Thrust strategy, a push to the north on his stretched broad front lines. Taking Noord Babant fell in line with the desires for both SHEAF and Eisenhower. Noord Brabant had to be taken before the Scheldt, as it was essential. It was taken with limited forces. Forces were also sent to take the Schedlt.
Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat or Northern Thrust strategy, and was actually a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen needed to be under allied control. The low-lying lands, boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen with land strewn with rivers and canals, is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces and supply directly back to Germany in perfect position for a counter-attack.
Market Garden was the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans were in disarray, so should be easy enough to gain. Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine to fall in line with Eisenhower's priority Northern Thrust strategy at the time. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation.
You needed Arnhem for an easier jump into Germany. Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all - that is, protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital, and was successfully seized. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans a few miles away and still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all.SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view.
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@chainz8573
XXX Corps never had red berets. The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up.
The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
According to the official AMERICAN Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
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