Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "10,000 men dropped on Arnhem. Only 2,000 returned, here's why" video.
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@Dysfunctional_Reprint
The finest army in the world from mid 1942 onwards was the British under Montgomery. From Alem el Halfa it moved right up into Denmark, through nine countries, and not once suffered a reverse taking all in its path. Over 90% of German armour in the west was destroyed by the British. Montgomery, in command of all ground forces, had to give the US armies an infantry role in Normandy as they were not equipped to engage massed German SS armour.
Montgomery stopped the Germans in every event they attacked him:
◾ August 1942 - Alem el Halfa; October 1942 - El Alamein;
◾ March 1943 - Medenine;
◾ June 1944 - Normandy;
◾ Sept/Oct 1944 - The Netherlands;
◾ December 1944 - Battle of the Bulge;
A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2:
◾ Battle of Alam Halfa;
◾ Second Battle of El Alamein;
◾ Battle of El Agheila;
◾ Battle of Medenine;
◾ Battle of the Mareth Line;
◾ Battle of Wadi Akarit;
◾ Allied invasion of Sicily;
◾ Operation Overlord - the largest amphibious invasion in history;
◾ Market Garden - a 60 mile salient created into German territory;
◾ Battle of the Bulge - while taking control of two shambolic US armies;
◾ Operation Veritable;
◾ Operation Plunder.
Montgomery not once had a reverse.
Not on one occasion were ground armies, British, US or others, under Monty's command pushed back into a retreat by the Germans. Monty's 8th Army advanced the fastest of any army in WW2. From El Alamein to El Agheila from the 4th to 23rd November 1942, 1,300 km in just 17 days. After fighting a major exhausting battle at El Alemein through half a million mines. This was an Incredible feat, unparalleled in WW2. With El Alamein costing just 13,500 casualties.
The US Army were a shambles in 1944/45 retreating in the Ardennes. The Americans didn't perform well at all east of Aachen, then the Hurtgen Forest defeat with 33,000 casualties and Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months at Metz with over 50,000 casualties, with his Lorraine campaign being a failure. Then Montgomery had to be put in command of the shambolic US First and Ninth armies saving them from annihilation, aided by the British 21st Army Group, just to get back to the start line in the Ardennes, with nearly 100,000 US casualties.
Hodges, commander of the US First army, fled from Spa to near Liege on the 18th, despite the Germans never getting anywhere near to Spa. Hodges did not even wait for the Germans to approach Spa. He had already fled long before the Germans were stopped. The Germans took 20,000 US POWs in the Battle of the Bulge in Dec 1944. No other allied country had that many prisoners taken in the 1944-45 timeframe.
The USA retreat at the Bulge, again, was the only allied army to be pushed back into a retreat in the 1944-45 timeframe. Montgomery was effectively in charge of the Bulge having to take control of the US First and Ninth armies. Coningham of the RAF was put in command of USAAF elements. The US Third Army constantly stalled after coming up from the south. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war just about. The US armies were losing men at unsustainable rates due to poor generalship.
Normandy was planned and commanded by the British, with Montgomery involved in planning, with also Montgomery leading all ground forces, which was a great success coming in ahead of schedule and with less casualties than predicted. The Royal Navy was in command of all naval forces and the RAF all air forces. The German armour in the west was wiped out by primarily the British - the US forces were impotent against massed panzers. Monty assessed the US armies (he was in charge of them) giving them a supporting infantry role, as they were just not equipped, or experienced, to fight concentrated tank v tank battles. On 3 Sept 1944 when Eisenhower took over overall allied command of ground forces everything went at a snail's pace. The fastest advance of any western army in Autumn/early 1945 was the 60 mile thrust by the British XXX Corps to the Rhine at Arnhem.
You need to give respect where it is due.
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@lordrexus
Wrong! For you.......
The state of play on the 17th, D-day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) 18 musicians of a German 'band' were guarding the Waal bridge;
5) a few Germans scattered about along the road;
6) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition, spending over 2 hours in the village instead of moving to the bridge. The Germans blew the bridge when they finally reached it. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would most likely have secured it.
Evidently expecting that Major La Prade's flanking battalion would have captured the highway bridge, these two battalions made no apparent haste in moving through Zon. They methodically cleared stray Germans from the houses, so that a full two hours had passed before they emerged from the village. Having at last overcome the enemy 88mm south of the Zonsche Forest, Major LaPrade's battalion caught sight of the bridge at about the same time. Both forces were within fifty yards of the bridge when their objective went up with a roar.
- US Official History.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In a time critical operation, in this gift of a time window for the Germans they were running armour towards Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon, being right on time. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the Waal bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British 1st AB at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
The Waal bridge as the critical bridge The failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Waal bridge at Nijmegen immediately upon jumping precluded a bridgehead across the Rhine. A bridge they could have walked on whistling Dixie. The bridge was so undefended, a lost British Jeep with four men in it rode over the Waal bridge unopposed.
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@ErikExeu
U.S. 82nd Division records state that the first troop of four Guards tanks crossed the Waal road bridge at 1830 hours. Two tanks were hit with the crews taken POW bar one, Sgt Knight. The tanks charged across at full speed approaching 30 mph firing against German guns all the way, with a few hundred Germans high in the girders. Gunner Leslie Johnson in the lead tank said: “They were falling like nine-pins. The incoming fire was so heavy that I swear to this day that Jesus Christ rode on the front of our tank. The Germans were so close that I didn’t bother to look through my sights. We could feel the tracks going over them as we shot them down, and there was blood and gore all over the tank.”
Once the two leading tanks of Pacey and Robinson got past the bridge obstacles at the northern end, Pacey stopped. The War Office report:
“At this point, Pacey stopped, he was not sure where to go as no Americans were seen, so Sergeant Robinson passed him and led on. Much to their surprise, they could not see any Americans so having passed through the concrete chicane they pushed on. Having crossed the road bridge, the four tanks moved down the northern embankment, where they destroyed another anti tank gun. Robinson and Pacey found themselves in a running battle against more guns, and against German infantry who poured out of the church in Lent, and then 1,500 yards further down the road from the bridge, where the main road goes under the railway line, contact was at last made with some Americans, both were very happy to see each other."
The 82nd men at Lent reached Lent following the railway embankment from the riverbank using it for cover. The first American troops that arrived at the bridge approaches/waterside after moving along the riverbank from their river landing point with Burriss’ company of about sixteen men, was at 1915 hours. 45 minutes. after the first tanks had already crossed. This was not the main bridge span, just the raised approach road over land. Official U.S. records confirm that 82nd troops from the 504th arrived at the northern road bridge approaches at 1938 hours. This would be the time they arrived in any real strength to consolidate, one hour 8 mins after the first tank crossed. The records state at 1938 hours:
Not one 82nd man was on the bridge when the first troop of four tanks crossed at 1830, or at 1915 when the second troop of four went over. Official XXX Corps records from the War Office highlight that the successful tank attack on the road bridge was at 1830 hours.
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@gerhardris
The First Allied Airborne Army under American Brereton was given Operation Comet by Eisenhower, a cancelled operation conceived and cancelled by Montgomery. FAAA were to flesh out the operation morphing it into Market Garden.
The FAAA were only answerable to SHAEF, not Monty. The FAAA, a floating army available to slot into any army group as needed, was 'notionally' in the 21st Army Group on a temporary basis. The FAAA were responsible for the planning of the operation executing the air part, Market. The FAAA used ground units of Dempsey's Second Army to link seized bridges powering 60 miles into enemy territory.
The ground elements, mainly XXX Corps of Dempsey's Second Army, were superb being on time and having to get around the failures of the 101st and 82nd of the air element, erecting a Bailey bridge overnight at Zon and seizing the Waal bridge for the 82nd. These delays set XXX Corps back two days.
Two of the FAAA's three main air elements failed with one a partial success but did seize a part of the Arnhem bridge, preventing German traffic using the bridge.
All failures were by Americans. Yet Americans blame Monty who never planned the operation or was in command of the execution, which was by the FAAA, XXX Corps or the Second Army.
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@gerhardris
Ike could not sack Monty. If anyone should have been sacked it was Ike...
Montgomery to AlanBrooke..
"If we want the war to end within any reasonable period you have to get Eisenhower’s hand taken off the land battle. I regret to say that in my opinion he just doesn’t know what he is doing.
Montgomery wrote of Eisenhower and his ridiculous broad-front strategy on 22 January 1945:
“I fear that the old snags of indecision and vacillation and refusal to consider the military problem fairly and squarely are coming to the front again . . . The real trouble is that there is no control and the three army groups are each intent on their own affairs. Patton today issued a stirring order to Third Army, saying the next step would be Cologne . . . One has to preserve a sense of humour these days, otherwise one would go mad.”
Alanbrooke wrote in his diary about Eisenhower:
“At the end of this morning's C.O.S. [Chief of Staff] meeting I put before the committee my views on the very unsatisfactory state of affairs in France, with no one running the land battle. Eisenhower, though supposed to be doing so, is on the golf links at Rheims — entirely detached and taking practically no part in running of the war. Matters got so bad lately that a deputation of Whiteley, Bedell Smith and a few others went up to tell him that he must get down to it and RUN the war, which he said he would."
"We discussed the advisability of getting Marshall to come out to discuss the matter, but we are doubtful if he would appreciate the situation. Finally decided that I am to see the P.M. to discuss the situation with him.”
"November 28th I went to see the P.M. I told him I was very worried."
Alan Brooke described in his daily diary that American generals Eisenhower and Marshall as poor strategists, when they were in jobs were strategy mattered. Brooke wrote to Montgomery about his talks with Eisenhower, “it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war!”
You are very confused. Read what I wrote again and understand it.
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@freddieclark
In an interview with Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission in Washington, in 1955, General Browning said the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges must be seized "as soon as possible", although the wooded Groesbeek Heights on the route to the bridge must be held.
Field Order 11 of 13 Sept is clear in section 2 a), putting the bridges first in the writing, that they were to be seized, then the high ground secured and then the roads. Order 1, of 13 September, written by Lindquist of the 508th, states he will wait at the high ground for a Division Order to move from the Heights to the bridge. In short, wait for an Order from Gavin to move. The Heights near De Ploeg, which are really pretty flat being a wooded area but high for Holland, are pretty well between the Drop Zone (DZ) and bridge. The 508th would go through the Heights to reach the bridge. Gavin overrode any written Order, and fully emphasized verbally to Lindquist in England that the bridge was to be priority. Chester Graham, witnessed this.
Browning and Gavin naturally did not want German troops between the LZ and the bridge, so the Heights had to be occupied and secure. The 508th CP would be established at the Heights. Gavin understood the priorities in sending the 508th to the bridge and Groesbeek heights immediately, with Coln Warren's battalion of the 508th assigned the bridge. To get to the bridge from the DZ you have to pass the Groesbeek Heights, so any enemy at the Heights naturally had to be subdued, then secure the area, which could take time, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge. It took the 665 men of 508th a painfully slow 3.5 hours to march a few miles from the DZ to the Heights, reaching the Groesbeek heights at 1730. They encountered only a few Labour troops in opposition.
There were no Germans at the Groesbeek Heights as forward scouts relayed back the situation. So, on route Coln Lindquist the head of the 508th could have sent Warren's A and B companies directly to the bridge, bypassing the Groesbeek Heights, immediately via the riverbank as instructed by Gavin. The rest of the battalion could move to the empty Groesbeek Heights setting up defences at De Ploeg on the Heights. Dutch resistance men informed the 508th that the Germans had largely cleared out of Nijmegen with only 19 guards on the bridge. So all was easy and fine, so the two companies assigned the bridge could move immediately to their objective without a diversion via the Groesbeek Heights. Despite hearing the good news from the Dutch Underground, Lindquist in command of the 508th was not moving at all, keeping all his men static at De Ploeg.
Lindquist was waiting for a Divisional Order from Gavin informing him that the DZ was secure, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge. When Gavin found out Lindquist was static via a liaison officer he was livid, running over to De Ploeg in a Jeep telling Lindquist to get moving to the bridge. Even then, took Lindquist another two hours to send men in force to the bridge. Three stray men from a forty man patrol led by Trooper Atkins sent to the bridge immediately by Warren to confirm what the Dutch Underground told them on reaching DePloeg, took the guards on the south end of the bridge prisoner. They left when no one turned up. When leaving they saw hundreds of Germans pour from the north onto the previously lightly guarded bridge. Later, a company of Warren's main force became lost when they eventually moved towards the bridge. By the time Warren's two companies did reach the bridge in force, the Germans had reinforcing the bridge with hundreds of men. Too late. The first attack on the bridge was just before midnight, 10.5 hours after landing.
The 82nd were expecting German resistance from the east, however it came from the north via the Nijmegen bridge.
Gavin was expecting Lindquist to secure the Groesbeek Heights, which were devoid of enemy forces, then immediately move to the bridge, which meant sending Warren's battalion immediately. Lindquist was expecting Gavin to notify him that the DZ was clear. Gavin was expecting Lindquist to go to the bridge when it was obvious the Groesbeek heights, on the way to the bridge, were secure. As no Germans were about, the heights were naturally secure. Regarding Lindquist's expected clearing of the LZ before moving from DePloeg. Lindquist did write a Field Order for the 508th on 13 September copied to Gavin, stating that once the heights were secure he would wait for a Divisional Order [from Gavin] to move. Two days later at the jump briefing Gavin verbally overruled Lindquist's Field Order, using a map he told him that he should move to the bridge "without delay". Poor command communications by Gavin.
Poulussen, in Lost at Nijmegen discovered that the 508th jumped without any written offensive orders from Gavin. All was verbal from Gavin to Lindquist of the 508. Chester Graham, the 82nd liaison officer, was at the pre jump meeting in England. He said there was no ambiguity amongst anyone there that the bridge was the prime target.
In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, was wanting confirmation that the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the objectives. In response, dated 25 July 1945, General Gavin was clear: "About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city." General Browning never knew men were static at De Ploeg. Like Gavin he was expecting men to be seizing the bridge. Being corps commander, he was busy attempting to communicate with all three parachute divisions.
The 82nd did launch a few failed attacks on the bridge. In the afternoon of the next day, 18th, Gavin asked permission to launch another attack. Browning, seeing the bridge was well defended, and the failed attacks, refused, opting to wait for XXX Corps to arrive to seize the bridge. Inexplicably Gavin moved all his men out of Nijmegen town completely to the heights and DZ, giving the town back to the Germans. This made matters worse when XXX Corps arrived who had expended vital time, and ammunition, in flushing them out. On page 162 of the U.S. Official History: "many documents regarding the extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files."
Read:
1) Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment In World War II by Phil Nordyke.
2) Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergström.
3) Market Garden, Then and Now by Karl Magry.
4) Lost at Nijmegen by R Poulussen
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@johnho7422
◾Market Garden was planned badly by mainly Americans, Brereton and Williams.
◾US 82nd failed to seize vital the Waal bridge
◾US 101st failed to seize the vital Zon bridge
◾British 1st Airborne moved onto the Arnhem bridge denying its use to the Germans.
◾XXX Corps powered up the road from Belgium reaching the Waal bridge at Nijmegen on schedule.
The British hardly put a for wrong having to take the Waal bridge for the 82nd. Ever since the operation the Americans have tried to whitewash their incompetency. In the US Official history they noted documents were inexplicably MISSING on Market Garden. They obviously smelled something and mentioned it in the history. ......
"Although extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files. The story has been reconstructed from unit records; Gavin's letters to Westover and OCMH; letters to OCMH from Colonel Warren, 5 July 1955, Colonel Lindquist, 9 September 1955, Col. Thomas J. B. Shanley formerly Executive Officer, 508th Parachute Infantry, 2 Sep 55, and Rev. Bestebreurtje, 25 Oct 56; a postwar interview with Colonel Lindquist by Westover, 14 Sep 45, copy in 82d Airborne Division Combat Interview file; and Westover, The American Divisions in Operation MARKET, a preliminary narrative written in the European theater shortly after the war, copy in OCMH. Captain Westover had access to all the combat interviews when writing his narrative."
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