Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "Elon Musket"
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@sean640307
Brian Urquart was wrong on just about everything. He had a chip as he was sacked. His great nephew David Rendall occasionally is on Youtube giving some excellent info he got from his gt uncle. One was that SHAEF pushed for Market Garden to protect Antwerp from German counter-attack and artillery fire wanting Noord Brabant, which is the territory up to Nijmegen. Arnhem was added on as it was just a jump over the Rhine. SHAEF got what they wanted. A buffer up to Nijmegen. Brian Urquart died at 101 earlier this year.
He wrote:
It’s also worth pointing out the inaccuracies in his portrayal in many of the books and films. He didn’t get into an argument with Lt General Browning about tanks at Arnhem - Majors don't argue with Lt Generals he told me - he informed the chief of staff- a brigadier - and a few of the brigade majors, that he believed German panzer units had been positioned nearby.
Brian got this information from Enigma code breaking, he was the only ULTRA* cleared officer on the Airborne staff - the main reason he didn’t fly in with Corps headquarters. That information probably included how few tanks there were - but also how many veteran troops and battle-hardened commanders were stationed nearby.
In 1944 he couldn't tell the brigadier, his colleagues or Browning even, where he got his information or its provenance. It’s possible he exaggerated resistance reports and tertiary aerial photos to make his case. Photos like we see in the films have never been found. So it wasn’t quite as clear cut.
When he was interviewed by historians after the war, he had to continue the cover story for ULTRA. When Corneilius Ryan interviewed him for a Bridge too Far in the late 50s, ULTRA was still top secret. Ryan printed Brian’s cover story of aerial photos and Attenborough conflated them with the Tiger II’s - that turned up days later from the Czech border.
The final assessment, that these panzer divisions weren’t fully operational, and the tanks, if any, were junk, was actually the correct one. 1st Airborne would only meet one SP Gun on Day 1, a few partially armed training tanks, armoured cars and half tracks before day 3. They destroyed most of them.
There was no armour in the Arnhem area. The first tanks came from Germany on d-day + 1 in the evening - knocked out by the paras. Records back that up. The RAF state they saw no armour in the area:
Google:
ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY
It states:
"hardly any tanks were actually present in the Arnhem area on 17 September. The vast majority deployed from Germany or other battle fronts after the airborne landings."
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@sean640307
In hindsight, in my view, Browning should not have gone. Brereton should have told him to stay in England. But Browning was a man who led from the front. Those generals inspired men. Browning was well respected by the US and British paras.
If you wanted to speak to Monty, you went through his troops to his caravan. If you wanted to see a US general you went to the nearest 5 star châteaux. Who got the most respect from their men!
But Browning was not at fault at all. With him being there, he ordered Gavin to take the bridge once he saw the failure, when Gavin's mind was all over the place. Gavin pulled his men completely out of Nijmegen, when they were actually at the southern approaches to the bridge - with Browning not knowing the level of his instability. Then Gavin's men had to fight to get back into the town, not reaching the bridge until XXX Corps came along, who then decided they would take the bridge themselves.
I knew four men who were at Market Garden. Two in the 1st Airborne, and two in XXX Corps, one being my uncle.
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@sean640307
Gen Gavin:
"Just before take-off, I discussed the situation with Col Lindquist and directed him to commit not more than one battalion to the seizure of the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as possible after landing, so as to take advantage of surprise and darkness"
By writing as ‘soon as possible’, Gavin created the illusion that it had been the responsibility of Col Lindquist to decide when to send troops to the Nijmegen Bridge. Gavin successfully created the myth that the failure to immediately attack the bridge was a misunderstanding. That had fallen into history absolving Gavin of the defeat of the British 1st at Arnhem.
The Official US History written by Charles MacDonald in 1963 noticed conflicting statements. Capt. Westover, a US Army Historical officer, who had access to all the 82nd Divisional records could not find any record of these orders. Official US history determined that Col Lindquist (Com 508 PIR), Lt Col Stanley (Exec officer 508 PIR), Lt Col Warren (Com 1/508 PIR) and Capt. Bestebreurtje (Dutch Liaison Off) were not aware of any pre jump orders and in fact the only guidance for the men of 508 PIR was Field Order No 1 which was entirely defensive.
When assessing the shift in priorities from the bridge to Groebeeken Heights, Capt. Westover whilst preparing the Official US history of the US divisions partaking in Market Garden, and in possession of after action reports, unit diaries and official reports etc., still found discrepancies, that could not be explained. Capt. Westover asked Gen Gavin:
"What person, staff or headquarters made the decision to apportion the weight of the 82nd AD to the high ground rather than the bridge at Nijmegen?" Gavin replied: "This decision was made by myself and approved by my Corps Commander."
There is no record of Gavin and Browning's conversation on this matter. An unproven conversation was sufficient for Anglo phobe US historians to suggest that the decision could have been made by Browning. In the US Gavin was absolved of any responsibility.
Gavin wrote to Westover saying:
"Even if we were driven off the low ground, around the bridges, if the high ground could be held, ultimately the Second Army could accomplish the mission"
The Second Army did accomplish the mission - a mission they were not tasked to do. A mission that delayed the time critical operation to preclude a foothold over the Rhine.
Charles Whiting a friend of Gavin’s states in his book ‘’Bloody Bremen’ that Gavin told him in conversation that there was a Soviet spy in Ike’s headquarters, who was passing information to the USSR, who in turn passed it onto Germany in an attempt to slow down the Allied advance. Gavin also said to have admitted in his diary that his actions caused the failure of gaining of a foothold over the Rhine. The Soviets passing on info to Germany is highly fanciful.
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A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp and keeping it from German counter-attack - the logistics problem to supply all allied armies. It was:
1) Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or;
2) Take the Schedlt.
Noord Branant had to be taken first, as it was essential. It was taken with limited forces also sent to take the Schedlt. Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat, actually being a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen needed to be under allied control.
The low-lying lands, boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen with land strewn with rivers and canals, is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces and supply directly back to Germany in perfect position for a counter-attack. Market Garden was the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans were in disarray, so should be easy enough to gain.
Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation. You needed Arnhem for a jump into Germany. Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all - that is protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital, and was successfully seized. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans are still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all.
SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view.
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The British 1st Airborne made it to Arnhem bridge, taking the north end of the bridge, denying its use to the Germans. The other two airborne units, both US, failed to seize their assigned bridges immediately. If they had XXX Corps would have been in Arnhem on d-day+1, before any armour came in from Germany. Game set and match. The Germans would not have known what had hit them.
The 12 hour delay caused by the 101st not seizing the Zon bridge, meant the Germans for 12 hours had a critical time window to pour in troops and get armour moving towards Arnhem. The longer the time delay the more Germans poured in, hence more resistance, hence a slower XXX Corps. Obvious.
On top of the 12 hour delay, the 82nd not seizing their bridge at Nijmegen (XXX Corps had to take it for them), caused an additional 36 hour delay. This meant another longer time window for the Germans to keep up the reinforcing. The extra 36 hour delay created by the 82nd, meant a bridgehead over the Rhine was precluded, as the two day time window in total given to the Germans was far too long.
The British paras did their part in securing a crossing over its assigned waterway, the Rhine. The two US para units failed in theirs. XXX Corps hardley put a foot wrong.
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@davemac1197
The time stamps state 82nd 504 got to the north end of the bridge, not on it under it, a few minutes before the tanks crossed the bridge. The US official history state that what must have been three lost stragglers, detached from their unit got to it. They were of no use at all in seizing the bridge, if they put their heads up they would have been gunned down from Germans in the bridge girders.
US Official History:
In Nijmegen, as the British tankers approached the south end of the highway bridge, they spotted an American flag floating atop what they took to be the north end of the bridge. This the British assumed to be an American signal that the tanks could cross. In reality, the paratroopers still were a few steps from the highway bridge; [they were in Lent nearly a mile from the prime target, the road bridge] the flag was flying from the north end of the railroad span. Spraying shells and machine gun bullets into the girders, the British tankers nevertheless raced onto the bridge. Three tanks reached the far end. Three privates from Companies H and I, 504th Parachute Infantry, got on the north end of the bridge at almost the same moment. The time was 19I0.
The times on the map and official history do not correlate. The map say the tanks crossed at 1830, 45 minutes before the three lost stragglers reached the bridge.
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@davemac1197
From US Official history....
As night came the British stopped in Valkenswaard, their "formal" objective. The objective of Eindhoven, which General Horrocks had indicated he hoped to reach on D-Day, lay six miles to the north.
So, XXX Corps was on schedule meeting their objective. XXX Corps reached Eindhoven at 1230 hrs, [d-day+1] running through without stopping through the night, only to stop at the Zon bridge which the US 101st failed to seize.
US Official history...
at 0645 (D plus 2, 19 September) the armor rumbled across [the Zon bridge].
That is about a 19 hours delay - OK knock off an hour for getting through Eindhoven, say 18 hours. An 18 hours delay because the US 101st failed to seize their objective. They never used a coup de main using gliders. If they did they it would have been highly likely they would have secured the Zon bridge.
US Official history....
Spearheading the 30 Corps ground column, reconnaissance troops of the Guards Armoured Division linked with Colonel Tucker's 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 the morning of D plus 2, 19 September. Major formations of the British armor were not far behind.
XXX Corps covered over 26 miles in 2 hr 45 mins, averaging about 7 mph. They got to Zon at about 1330 hrs d-day+1, So they would have reached the 82nd at at Nijmegen at 1615 hrs d-day+1, at the latest. More like an hour earlier, or as fast as the vehicles could go. If the 82nd had secured the Nijmegen bridge XXX Corps would have linked up with the British paras early evening d-day+1.
The situation on the 17th at H hour, d-day, was:
♦ Heavy German forces on the Dutch-Belgian border - naturally as it was their front line
♦ A few German infantry north of Eindhoven.
♦ About 600 older men of a training unit at Nijmegen, who were moving north to safety on hearing of the para drops.
♦ Some scattered German infantry at Arnhem.
♦ The road from north of Eindhoven to Arnhem was pretty well totally free.
XXX Corps brushed aside the heavy German resistance on the Dutch-Belgian border, with "remarkable" progress as the US Official history states.
From 21st Army Group Orders:
Final point of PHASE I:
(f) The Div may conc SOUTH of EINDHOVEN in areas of the CL preparatory to further adv.
conc = concentration area:
Which is an area, usually in the theatre of operations, where troops are assembled before beginning, or continuing, active operations. It says: preparatory to further adv. adv = advance. So, on phase 1 they were to concentrate South of Eindhoven before (preparatory) to advancing. That is clear. When concentrating that is gathering all vehicles in one location. Vehicles will still be moving into this concentration location at 35 vehicles to every mile of the train at a hoped 10 mph. If the vehicles move at 10mph from the starting point the lead vehicles should be south of Eindhoven in 1 hour. But the lead have to stop to concentrate. And 35 vehicles in each mile at a hoped 10 mph are pouring into the concentration location. It does not say how many vehicles have to be in the concentration area before moving off again.
Now onto phase 2. Phase 2 clearly states that it will start at 1st light on D+1. It says:
PHASE II: (a) The Div will continue the adv
That is advance after phase 1 is concluded of course. To continue the advance you have to be stopped. Phase 1 concludes south of Eindhoven as the force concentrated. Clear. The document says a hoped 10 mih (10mph), but not for phase 1 as the forces are concentrated south of Eindhoven at end of phase 1. South of Eindhoven is approx 11 miles from the start point. It only expects 11 miles of advance in the first 5 hours, which is understandable as German forces formed a line in front of British forces at the northern British front on the Belgian/Dutch border.
So, on D-day XXX Corps have to get to Eindhoven which is 11 miles and depending on tactic conditions it is hoped they will move at 10 mph when moving north from Eindhoven. There are two different points here:
1. Target time -
XXX Corps do not have 100% control of the time to reach targets, except south of Eindhoven.
2. Rate of Movement, when "moving" -
XXX Corps have near 100% control of this.
XXX Corps when moving were moving not quite as hoped, but rather than expected, irrespective of the tactical situation. Reaching hoped for vague target times (which are not specific only roughly deducted) are different. Indeed as XXX Corps were dependent on the MARKET side of the operation, the airborne units, to keep up their rate of movement.
XXX Corps were not slow. They maintained the less than a hoped speed of movement, but clearly what was realistically expected. The only times they did not move were due to the US 101st and 82nd, when both failed to seize bridges, which was out of XXX Corp's control. XXX Corps had to seize the bridges themselves or create the bridge (Bailey bridge). When XXX Corps turned up at Nijmegen at 0820 at D+2, given the approx 12 hour delay at Zon when the 101st failed to seize the bridge, they were near enough at an expected rate of movement - when they were actually moving. Less than hoped, but clearly adequate to complete the operation.
The longer the delay, the more time for the Germans to pour in troops and armour. Time was vital to a successful operation. All it needed was the three para units to secure their assigned bridges immediately, then XXX would have run up the empty road to Arnhem, crossing the Rhine on d-day plus 1 with a successful operation.
The British First Airborne secured their crossing in denying it to the Germans, the other two US units failed.
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@sg0310
The finest army in the world from mid 1942 onwards was the British under Montgomery. From Alem el Halfa it moved right up into Denmark, through nine countries, and not once suffered a reverse taking all in its path. Over 90% of German armour in the west was destroyed by the British. Montgomery, in command of all ground forces, had to give the US armies an infantry role in Normandy as they were not equipped to engage massed German SS armour.
Montgomery stopped the Germans in every event they attacked him:
♦ August 1942 - Alem el Halfa;
♦ October 1942 - El Alamein;
♦ March 1943 - Medenine;
♦ June 1944 - Normandy;
♦ Sept/Oct 1944 - The Netherlands;
♦ December 1944 - Battle of the Bulge;
A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2:
♦ Battle of Alam Halfa;
♦ Second Battle of El Alamein;
♦ Battle of El Agheila;
♦ Battle of Medenine;
♦ Battle of the Mareth Line;
♦ Battle of Wadi Akarit;
♦ Allied invasion of Sicily;
♦ Operation Overlord - the largest amphibious invasion in history;
♦ Market Garden - a 60 mile salient created into German territory;
♦ Battle of the Bulge - while taking control of two shambolic US armies;
♦ Operation Veritable;
♦ Operation Plunder.
Montgomery not once had a reverse.
Not on one occasion were ground armies, British, US or others, under Monty's command pushed back into a retreat by the Germans. Monty's 8th Army advanced the fastest of any army in WW2. From El Alamein to El Agheila from the 4th to 23rd November 1942, 1,300 km in just 17 days. After fighting a major exhausting battle at El Alemein through half a million mines. This was an Incredible feat, unparalleled in WW2. With El Alamein costing just 13,500 casualties. Monty took a quarter of a million POWs in Tunisia. More than taken at Stalingrad.
The US Army were a shambles in 1944/45 retreating in the Ardennes. The Americans didn't perform well at all east of Aachen, then the Hurtgen Forest defeat with 33,000 casualties and Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months at Metz with over 50,000 casualties, with the Lorraine campaign being a failure.
Then Montgomery had to be put in command of the shambolic US First and Ninth armies, aided by the British 21st Army Group, just to get back to the start line in the Ardennes, with nearly 100,000 US casualties. Hodges, head of the US First army, fled from Spa to near Liege on the 18th, despite the Germans never getting anywhere near to Spa. Hodges did not even wait for the Germans to approach Spa. He had already fled long before the Germans were stopped. The Germans took 20,000 US POWs in the Battle of The Bulge in Dec 1944. No other allied country had that many prisoners taken in the 1944-45 timeframe.
The USA retreat at the Bulge, again, was the only allied army to be pushed back into a retreat in the 1944-45 timeframe. Montgomery was effectively in charge of the Bulge having to take control of the US First and Ninth armies. Coningham of the RAF was put in command of USAAF elements. The US Third Army constantly stalled after coming up from the south. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war just about. The US armies were losing men at unsustainable rates due to poor generalship.
Normandy was planned and commanded by the British, with Montgomery involved in planning, with also Montgomery leading all ground forces, which was a great success coming in ahead of schedule and with less casualties than predicted. The Royal Navy was in command of all naval forces and the RAF all air forces. The German armour in the west was wiped out by primarily the British - the US forces were impotent against massed panzers. Monty assessed the US armies (he was in charge of them) giving them a supporting infantry role, as they were just not equipped, or experienced, to fight concentrated tank v tank battles. On 3 Sept 1944 when Eisenhower took over overall allied command of ground forces everything went at a snail's pace. The fastest advance of any western army in Autumn/early 1945 was the 60 mile thrust by the British XXX Corps to the Rhine at Arnhem.
You need to give respect where it is due.
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@sg0310
Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Eisenhower approved, under resourcing the operation. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed. The Market part was planned by mainly Americans while Garden mainly the British. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who:
♦ Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practised and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
♦ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
♦ Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused;
♦ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
♦ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here by agreeing;
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, yet rarely seen at Market Garden;
♦ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak". The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.
General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgement or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives.
Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges. They arrived at 2200, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, five hours after the jump. The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800. An easy taking of the bridge had now passed. XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 7 miles to go to Arnhem.
Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men at the edge of the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself. XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges themselves and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men in clearing the town, seizing the bridge themselves.
What you see in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge. If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corp's Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge.
The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin. Even the US Official War record confirms this. Charles B. MacDonald wrote the US Official history on Market Garden: https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_19.htm The Market part of Market Garden failed. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
"it was not until 9 October, more than a month after the fall of Antwerp, that General Eisenhower told Montgomery to devote his entire attention to the clearance of the Scheldt. By that time Monty had the Canadians cleared it, or were investing in many of the Channel ports"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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The British 1st Airborne made it to Arnhem bridge, taking the north end of the bridge, denying its use to the Germans.
The other two airborne units, both US, failed to seize their assigned bridges immediately. If they had XXX Corps would have been in Arnhem on d-day+1, before any armour came in from Germany. Game set and match. The Germans would not have known what had hit them.
The 12 hour delay caused by the 101st not seizing the Zon bridge, meant the Germans for 12 hours had a critical time window to pour in troops and get armour moving towards Arnhem. The longer the time delay the more Germans poured in, hence more resistance, hence a slower XXX Corps. Obvious.
On top of the 12 hour delay, the 82nd not seizing their bridge at Nijmegen (XXX Corps had to take it for them), caused an additional 36 hour delay. This meant another longer time window for the Germans to keep up the reinforcing. The extra 36 hour delay created by the 82nd, meant a bridgehead over the Rhine was precluded, as the two day time window in total given to the Germans was far too long.
The British paras did their part in securing a crossing over its assigned waterway, the Rhine. The two US para units failed in theirs.
XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
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@fishingthelist4017
Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Eisenhower approved, under resourcing the operation. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed. The Market part was planned by mainly Americans, that failed, while Garden mainly the British, which succeed. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who:
♦ Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practised and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
♦ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
♦ Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused;
♦ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
♦ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here by agreeing;
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, yet rarely seen at Market Garden;
♦ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak". The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.
General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgement or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives.
Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges. They arrived at 2200, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, five hours after the jump. The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800. An easy taking of the bridge had now passed. XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 7 miles to go to Arnhem.
Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men at the edge of the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself. XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges themselves and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men in clearing the town, seizing the bridge themselves. What you see in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge. If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corp's Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge.
The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin. Even the US Official War record confirms this. Charles B. MacDonald wrote the US Official history on Market Garden: https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_19.htm The Market part of Market Garden failed. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
"it was not until 9 October, more than a month after the fall of Antwerp, that General Eisenhower told Montgomery to devote his entire attention to the clearance of the Scheldt. By that time Monty had the Canadians cleared it, or were investing in many of the Channel ports"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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@fishingthelist4017
A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp and keeping it from German counter-attack - the logistics problem to supply all allied armies. It was:
1) Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or;
2) Take the Schedlt.
Noord Branant had to be taken first, as it was essential. It was taken with limited forces also sent to take the Schedlt. Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat, actually being a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen needed to be under allied control.
The low-lying lands, boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen with land strewn with rivers and canals, is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces and supply directly back to Germany in perfect position for a counter-attack. Market Garden was the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans were in disarray, so should be easy enough to gain.
Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation. You needed Arnhem for a jump into Germany. Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all - that is protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital, and was successfully seized. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans are still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all.
SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view.
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@fishingthelist4017
The British 1st Airborne made it to Arnhem bridge, taking the north end of the bridge, denying its use to the Germans. The other two airborne units, both US, failed to seize their assigned bridges immediately. If they had XXX Corps would have been in Arnhem on d-day+1, before any armour came in from Germany. Game set and match. The Germans would not have known what had hit them.
The 12 hour delay caused by the 101st not seizing the Zon bridge, meant the Germans for 12 hours had a critical time window to pour in troops and get armour moving towards Arnhem. The longer the time delay the more Germans poured in, hence more resistance, hence a slower XXX Corps. Obvious.
On top of the 12 hour delay, the 82nd not seizing their bridge at Nijmegen (XXX Corps had to take it for them), caused an additional 36 hour delay. This meant another longer time window for the Germans to keep up the reinforcing. The extra 36 hour delay created by the 82nd, meant a bridgehead over the Rhine was precluded, as the two day time window in total given to the Germans was far too long.
The British paras did their part in securing a crossing over its assigned waterway, the Rhine. The two US para units failed in theirs. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
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@fishingthelist4017
Once again, the British army had adbvanced into Belgium super quick with supply being from Normandy. The Germans had consolidated on their own borders. Simple to understand.
Monty had to be put in command of two shambolic US armies, the First and the Ninth, when the Germans attacked them at the Bulge.
Monty's reputation is all he did. He never had a reverse, going through nine countries.
The broad front was an initial disaster. Eisenhower was out of his depth.
Montgomery to Alan Brooke..
"If we want the war to end within any reasonable period you have to get Eisenhower’s hand taken off the land battle. I regret to say that in my opinion he just doesn’t know what he is doing.
Montgomery wrote of Eisenhower and his ridiculous broad-front strategy
on 22 January 1945:
“I fear that the old snags of indecision and vacillation and refusal to consider the military problem fairly and squarely are coming to the front again . . . The real trouble is that there is no control and the three army groups are each intent on their own affairs. Patton today issued a stirring order to Third Army, saying the next step would be Cologne . . . One has to preserve a sense of humour these days, otherwise one would go mad.”
Alanbrooke wrote in his diary about buffoon Einsenhower:
“At the end of this morning's C.O.S. [Chief of Staff] meeting I put before the committee my views on the very unsatisfactory state of affairs in France, with no one running the land battle. Eisenhower, though supposed to be doing so, is on the golf links at Rheims — entirely detached and taking practically no part in running of the war. Matters got so bad lately that a deputation of Whiteley, Bedell Smith and a few others went up to tell him that he must get down to it and RUN the war, which he said he would."
"We discussed the advisability of getting Marshall to come out to discuss the matter, but we are doubtful if he would appreciate the situation. Finally decided that I am to see the P.M. to discuss the situation with him.”
"November 28th I went to see the P.M. I told him I was very worried."
Alan Brooke described in his daily diary that American generals Eisenhower and Marshall as poor strategists, when they were in jobs were strategy mattered. Brooke wrote to Montgomery about his talks with Eisenhower, “it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war!”
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@fishingthelist4017
It has been explained to you. Stretched logistics was a problem. Also the retreating Germans re-grouped with forces in Germany. Simple to understand.
Monty tried to get a para jump into the Scheldt but was refused. It was take the Scheldt or Noodd Brandant. A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp and keeping it from German counter-attack - the logistics problem to supply all allied armies. It was:
1) Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or;
2) Take the Schedlt.
Noord Branant had to be taken first, as it was essential. It was taken with limited forces also sent to take the Schedlt. Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat, actually being a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen needed to be under allied control.
The low-lying lands, boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen with land strewn with rivers and canals, is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces and supply directly back to Germany in perfect position for a counter-attack. Market Garden was the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans were in disarray, so should be easy enough to gain.
Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation. You needed Arnhem for a jump into Germany. Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all - that is protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital, and was successfully seized. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans are still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all.
SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view.
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@fishingthelist4017
Read again. Monty created Operation Comet, a pursuit operation.
Monty had taken a large port intact, the only one taken intact. The German 15th army was to the north west of him, with Germans to the north and west.
Monty's prime concern was ensuring Antwerp stayed in allied hands, not being taken back, or destroyed, by the Germans. It was essential Antwerp was not taken back by the Germans. Monty was not going on speculative chases that may run out of steam, like what happened in North Africa to the British and Germans, then being driven back losing a major port. He was not going to do what happened with Patton in the east, getting nowhere, sustaining heavy casualties for no progress.
The logistics had not fully kept up. It is not difficult to understand.
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