Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "U.S. Army War College"
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I will let the Germans have a say on the Bulge:
Genral Hasso von Manteuffel:
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
By November 1944, British SHEAF officer, Strong, noted that there was a possibility of a German counteroffensive in the Ardennes or the Vosges. Strong went to personally warn Bradley, who said, let 'em come.
Montgomery on hearing of the attack immediately took British forces to the Meuse to prevent any German forces from making a bridgehead, and moving west of the river, securing the rear. He was prepared to halt their advance and attack them. This was while Eisenhower and Bradley were doing nothing.
even by 19 December, three days into the offensive, no overall plan had emerged from 12th Army Group or SHAEF, other than the decision to send Patton’s forces north to Bastogne. Overall, the Ardennes battle was in urgent need of grip.
General Hodges had yet to see Bradley or receive more than the sketchiest orders from his Army Group commander.
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
On 20 December, Montgomery had sent a signal to Alanbrooke regarding the US forces:
Not good... definite lack of grip and control. I have heard -nothing_ from Ike or Bradley and had no orders or requests of any sort. My own opinion is that the American forces have been cut in half and the Germans can reach the Meuse at Namur without opposition.
Omar Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group, did very little:
16 Dec, the first day, for 12 hours did nothing.
16 Dec, after 12 hours, he sent two armoured divisions from
the flanking Ninth and Third Armies.
17 Dec, after 24 Hours, he then called in two US airborne
divisions from Champagne.
18 Dec, he ordered Patton to halt his pending offensive in
the Saar.
18 Dec, he had still not established contact with the First Army,
while Monty had.
19 Dec, he withdrew divisions from the Aachen front to shore
up the Ardennes.
19 Dec, he had still not produced an overall defensive plan.
19 Dec, the Supreme Commander intervened directly late in the day.
20 Dec, Eisenhower telephoned Montgomery telling him to take
command of the US First and Ninth Armies
While all this dillying by Bradley was going on, German armies were pounding forward into his lines.
British SHEAF officer Whiteley and American officer Betts visited the U.S. First Army HQ seeing the shambles. Strong, Whiteley, and Betts recommended that command of the armies north of the Ardennes be transferred from Bradley to Montgomery. Unfortunately only the British officers approached Beddel Smith of their recommendations, who immediately fired the pair, claiming it was a nationalistic thing. The next morning, Beddel Smith apologized seeing the three were right, recommending to Eisenhower to bring in Monty. It was because of the shambles of the US command of the First and Ninth armies that highly professional Montgomery had to be in command.
During the Battle of the Bulge Eisenhower was stuck self imprisoned in his HQ in des-res Versailles near Paris in fear of German paratroopers wearing US uniforms with the objective to kill allied generals. He had remained locked up more than 30 days without sending a single message or order to Montgomery, and that is when he thought he was doing ground control of the campaign, when in effect Montgomery was in control as two US armies had to be put under his control after the German attack, the US First and Ninth armies. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war, just about. Coningham of the RAF had to take control of US air force units.
The only thing Eisenhower did was tell Monty to get control of two out of control US armies, tell the US 101st to go to Bastogne (who were in northern France after the buffer Market Garden was created) and men under Bradley to counter-attack. That is it.
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Midland Redux
Over 90,000 US casualties at the Bulge. Two US armies, the Ninth and the First had to be put under British command. Parts of the USAAF had to be put under Coningham of the RAF. The Anglo-American alliance was shaky, mainly because of green egotistical US generals, who were only colonels only a few years previously. Eisenhower lacked firm strategy and grip on his wayward generals. His broad-front strategy was a disaster. Only because the Germans lost a lot of men and equipment in the Bulge, allied armies would not have gotten over the Rhine until summer 1945. That is how bad Eisenhower was.
Monty, was a proven army group leader being a great success in North Africa and Normandy, which came in with 22% less than predicated casualties and ahead in territory taken at D-Day plus 90. Common sense dictates to keep Monty in charge of all ground operations, not give it to a political man like Eisenhower, who was only a colonel a few years previously and had never been in charge of any army directly, never mind three army groups. The longest advance in 1944/early 1945 was the 60 mile lightening four day advance by the British XXX Corps to the Rhine at Arnhem. Under Monty the allies moved 500 km in only three months from D-Day to September 1944. Under Eisenhower they barely moved 100 km in seven months from September 1944 March 1945.
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nfd1960 US industry DID expand greatly. Many new shipyards opened up to make the Liberty ships. Brand new aircraft factories were built. Similar in the UK. Companies that made furniture were now assembling planes. A standard set airfield design was laid down and teams of men and vehicles were laying hundreds out complete with standard hangars and pre-fabbed buildings. Teams would go from site to site laying them out zipping them up in super-fast time. The same with the USSR who also had to take their factories from the west to the Urals, which was a greater achievement.
In the last year of the war the US produced 98,000 aircraft, displaying the rapid expanse of US industry. British aircraft production was relaxed in some areas, like aircraft, as the USA was pouring them out, so no need to overproduce. The British during WW2 produced more aircraft, and better aircraft, than the Germans. In hindsight, the British put too much resources into shipbuilding, maybe the US put too much into planes. Army logistics support: oil, supplies and transport could have been much better. Also better armour, especially from the US side.
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peter feltham Only one third of the British Army was in France - 9% of the allied forces - French, Dutch, British and Belgian forces. The French complained of the luke-warm British response on the ground. The British concentrated on the sea and air as the French had a massive armoured army. The BEF was small and the first army that was fully motorised - no one marched. Nevertheless they stopped the German advance at Arras using the new Matilda 2 tank, with German troops running away in panic. The German anti-tank guns could not knock out the tank. They had to level 88mm guns in panic to knock it out.
The British started a retreat across water well before the Germans arrived as the French lines had broken down. Dunkirk was not a fiasco. It was retreat across water in which 350,000 men got to England. A success. They lived to fight another day. The RAF's CAP was a huge success in largely keeping the Luftwaffe away killing more German aircraft than what they lost.
Back in the UK British industry was turning over 24/7 producing the latest equipment, not the old stuff used in France. Matlida 2s were being tuned out, of which the Germans had met and feared.
The Germans first had to get a beachhead on a coast full of cliffs, there are few suitable landing beaches. They would be crossing in concrete barges towed by tugs and Rhine barges. The barges were being bombed by the RAF in port. It would take them about 24 hours to cross, and through the night, being straffed by the RAF, shore batteries and even the wash from an RN frigate would turn them over. The beaches were oiled up setting the water on fire as invasion barges came in. The Germans never even had a torpedo plane. The Ju97 Stuka was easy to knock out - they withdrew it from the Battle of Britain the losses were so high.
If they managed to get ashore it would not have lasted. They had no surface navy worth talking of as most had been destroyed in Norway. Supply would have been near impossible. How you think this army with hand weapons on a beach was to be resupplied facing the world's largest navy? Well I suggest you read some history and absorb some figures.
Then the British army afters Dunkirk is re-equipped with heavy tanks moving in on these men. The German paras might take a small town for a few days until the tanks come in. Annihilation of Germans are the words that come to mind. General Jodle said it would be like sending his men through a British mincing machine.
BTW, the British took Sealion so seriously they sent 55 Matilda 2 tanks to North Africa during the Battle of Britain.
Look at the preparation for Normandy and with 100% air and sea superiority. And you think the German had a chance in concrete barges? My oh my!
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