Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "Real Engineering" channel.

  1. 7
  2. 7
  3. 5
  4. 4
  5. 2
  6. 2
  7. 2
  8. 2
  9. 2
  10. 2
  11. 2
  12. 2
  13. 2
  14. 2
  15. 2
  16. 2
  17. 2
  18. 2
  19. 2
  20. 2
  21. 2
  22. 2
  23. 1
  24. 1
  25. 1
  26. 1
  27. 1
  28. 1
  29. 1
  30. 1
  31. 1
  32. 1
  33. 1
  34. 1
  35. 1
  36. 1
  37. 1
  38. 1
  39. 1
  40. 1
  41. 1
  42. 1
  43. 1
  44. 1
  45. 1
  46. 1
  47. 1
  48. 1
  49. 1
  50. 1
  51. 1
  52. 1
  53. 1
  54. 1
  55. 1
  56. 1
  57. 1
  58. 1
  59. 1
  60. 1
  61. 1
  62. 1
  63. 1
  64. 1
  65. 1
  66. 1
  67. 1
  68. 1
  69. 1
  70. 1
  71. 1
  72. 1
  73. 1
  74. 1
  75. 1
  76. 1
  77. 1
  78. 1
  79. 1
  80. 1
  81. 1
  82. 1
  83. 1
  84. 1
  85. 1
  86. 1
  87. 1
  88. 1
  89. 1
  90. 1
  91. 1
  92. 1
  93. 1
  94. 1
  95. 1
  96. 1
  97. 1
  98. 1
  99. 1
  100. 1
  101. 1
  102. 1
  103. 1
  104. 1
  105. 1
  106. 1
  107. 1
  108. 1
  109. 1
  110. 1
  111.  @Avalanche041  The Americans wanted a full landing in 1942. Very odd as they first had boots on the ground against the Germans after 13 months. The British had to tell them about seaborne invasions and that it would be suicide. Churchill wanted to move up Italy though the gap into Austria to get into the heart of Germany. The US view won over with a cross Channel invasion. The British then planned the D-Day operation, and as I wrote, ran it. Of course some US men were involved in the planning where it concerned their forces, however the prime planners and those who decided what and where, were the British. D-Day was a British operation for sure. British landing craft were superior to the wooden US Higgin's boats. The helmsman was behind an armoured shield. As the advance inland progressed at a snail's pace due to Eisenhower's broad-front strategy (taken from the US civil war - no kidding) US forces were sustaining exceptionally high casualties, mainly due to poor generalship. US generals cared little about the lives of their men, unlike the British and Canadians who developed armoured personnel carriers in WW2 - the US rejected them when offered. 100,000 casualties at the Bulge (Montgomery had to take control of two shambolic US armies), 52,000 at Lorraine, 12,000 Operation Queen, 33,000 at the Hurtgen Forest defeat, etc. US chiefs of staff in Washing fearing embarrassing US defeats being pushed right back, poured more troops into the ETO. Most of the US forces sent over were poorly trained, green and luckily never saw any action whatsoever. They were immediately taken back to prepare for the invasion of Japan. At the end of WW2 in Europe the forces were half American because of this panic by their Chiefs of staff, with British, Commonwealth, French (they had over one million), and other contributors making up the rest. BTW, the British and its empire fielded 100 divisions in 1942 alone while US overall in WW2 fielded 88. An army of 2.6 million moved into Burma, dwarfing the US boots on the ground against the Japanese. Churchill gave the green Americans initially too much rope. He suggested an American be supreme commander, flattering them to get them to adopt Germany First. The US assumed the British would be in full control as it was ther backyard. Churchill had an obsession about Hitler over estimating the Germans. The Americans should not have have been in control of any part of the ETO. When were in control of planning (Market Garden comes to mind) it nearly always went pear shaped.
    1
  112. 1
  113. 1
  114. 1
  115. 1
  116. 1
  117.  @peterson7082  wrote: "Because the outstanding majority of German armor was encountered by British and Commonwealth forces until late June." That was the way Montgomery planned it. His left flank (the British) takes on the bulk of the German forces drawing it away from his right flank (the Americans), in order they break out forming an encirclement. That was the plan which happened. US forces were not capable of taking on massed German armour. They lacked experience and not with a 75mm infantry tank. US forces hardly met German armour in Normandy. The Americans had only faced one battalion of 40 assault guns in June (17th SS) and only one panzer divisions (2nd SS) in July. The only time the Americans faced a large number of tanks in Normandy was when the Germans counter attacked them in August during Mortain. Even then, the panzer divisions had been whittled down in strength after engaging Monty's forces around Caen and were nowhere near at the strength they were when they were fighting around Caen. In Normandy throughout the whole of June there was just one battalion of 40 assault guns in the ENTIRE American sector. These were the Stugs of 17th SS. There was no other armour in the whole of the American sector (apart from some few insignificant early war obsolete French tanks) until 2nd SS Das Reich turned up in front of St Lo in early July. At this time the British and Canadians had EIGHT panzer divisions (4 Waffen SS) in their sector. Two more Tiger battalions were sent to the British sector in early July 1944.
    1
  118. 1
  119. 1
  120. 1
  121. 1
  122. 1
  123. 1
  124. 1
  125. 1