Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "History Hustle"
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@sean640307
Stopping at Valkernswaard south of Eindhoven was in the plan. The thousands of vehicles had to muster before moving off up the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem.
From 21st Army Group Orders:
Final point of PHASE I:
(f) The Div may conc SOUTH of EINDHOVEN in areas of the CL preparatory to further adv.
conc = concentration area:
Which is an area, usually in the theatre of operations, where troops are assembled before beginning, or continuing, active operations.
It says: preparatory to further adv. adv = advance.
So, on phase 1 they were to concentrate South of Eindhoven before (preparatory) to advancing. That is clear.
When concentrating that is gathering all vehicles in one location. Vehicles will still be moving into this concentration location at 35 vehicles to every mile of the train at a hoped 10 mph. If the vehicles move at 10mph from the starting point the lead vehicles should be south of Eindhoven in 1 hour. But the lead have to stop to concentrate. And 35 vehicles in each mile at a hoped 10 mph are pouring into the concentration location. It does not say how many vehicles have to be in the concentration area before moving off again.
Now onto phase 2. Phase 2 clearly states that it will start at 1st light on D+1. It says:
PHASE II: (a) The Div will continue the adv
That is advance after phase 1 is concluded of course. To continue the advance you have to be stopped. Phase 1 concludes south of Eindhoven as the force concentrated. Clear.
The document says a hoped 10 mih (10mph), but not for phase 1 as the forces are concentrated south of Eindhoven at end of phase 1. South of Eindhoven is approx 11 miles from the start point. It only expects 11 miles of advance in the first 5 hours, which is understandable as German forces formed a line in front of British forces at the northern British front on the Belgian/Dutch border.
So, on D-day XXX Corps have to get to Eindhoven which is 11 miles and depending on tactic conditions it is hoped they will move at 10 mph when moving north from Eindhoven.
XXX Corps were not slow. They maintained the less than a hoped speed of movement, but clearly what was realistically expected. The only times they did not move were due to the US 101st and 82nd, when both failed to seize bridges, which was out of XXX Corp's control. XXX Corps had to seize the bridges themselves or create the bridge (Bailey bridge).
When XXX Corps turned up at Nijmegen at 0820 at D+2, given the approx 11 hour delay at Zon when the 101st failed to seize the bridge, they were near enough at an expected rate of movement. Less than hoped, but clearly adequate to complete the operation.
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A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp and keeping it from German counter-attack - the logistics problem to supply all allied armies. It was:
1) Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or;
2) Take the Schedlt.
Eisenhower had a Northern Thrust strategy, a push to the north on his stretched broad front lines. Taking Noord Babant fell in line with the desires for both SHEAF and Eisenhower.
Noord Brabant had to be taken before the Scheldt, as it was essential. It was taken with limited forces, with forces also sent to take the Schedlt. Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat or Northern Thrust strategy, and was actually a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen needed to be under allied control. The low-lying lands, boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen with land strewn with rivers and canals, is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces and supply directly back to Germany in perfect position for a counter-attack.
Market Garden was the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans were in disarray, so should be easy enough to gain. Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine to fall in line with Eisenhower's priority Northern Thrust strategy at the time. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation. You needed Arnhem for an easier jump into Germany. Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all - that is, protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital, and was successfully seized. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans a few miles away and still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all.
SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view.
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