Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "Operation Market Garden | Animated History" video.
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@garymartin1040
As in the campaign from Alamein to Tripoli, Monty’s intention was to resist opportunism and to defeat the enemy by retaining the initiative- building up his forces, and then ‘driving’ so hard that he could maintain sufficient momentum to reach his considered objective in one operation. Tripoli had fallen in this way.
Monty was in his element. It was a repetition of Alam Halfa- and just as he had then astonished his staff by planning the offensive battle of Alamein while Eighth Army prepared itself for a defensive battle at Alam Halfa, so now he gave Simpson details of his forthcoming offensive at Mareth.....The secret, as he had learned in the aftermath of Alamein and demonstrated in the battle for Tripoli, was not simply to follow up the enemy, but to prepare men, material and supplies so that, having once broken though the crust of opposition, Eight Army had sufficient momentum to smash its way through to its further objectives. In a letter of 2 January 1943 Monty had explained his tactical strategy to the CIGS, Sir Alan Brooke:
My present situation is that the further I get from Benghazi, the more difficult my administration becomes. I have now got to the point where I cannot let the enemy go on drawing me forward slowly. My solution is to stand where I am, to spend up to 14th Jan in building resources of petrol, supplies, ammunition, etc. and then to smash my way through to TRIPOLI in one big bound.This tactical strategy, so mocked later by romantic historians enamored of the pragmatic cut-and-thrust type of military manoeuvre, was Monty’s greatest contribution to the war in North Africa.
The Allies under Eisenhower had attempted to exploit the success and surprise of their ‘Torch’ landing by piecemeal advance into Tunisia. Within a month of Anderson was confessing to Eisenhower he had reached a ‘point of “diminishing power” being at the end of a long and tortuous line of supply.
-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield.
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@sean640307
The reality is that Hodges, Bradley and even Eisenhower should have been sacked over the Bulge. Only the British could sack Monty. Monty saved the US's rear ends at the Bulge, then jealous and sniping US generals wanted him out because he made them look like they were - amateurs. Monty insisted on all ground forces given back to him, after they were transferred to Eisenhower after Normandy was won by Monty.
If Eisenhower tried to sack Monty he would have found he would be in line to be sacked from high up political pressure.
"The next day, 29th December, I sent Eisenhower the following letter:
“My dear Ike,
1. It was very pleasant to see you again yesterday and to have a talk on the battle situation.
2. I would like to refer to the matter of operational control of all forces engaged in the northern thrust towards the Ruhr, i.e. 12 and 21 Army Groups. I think we want to be careful, because we have had one very definite failure when we tried to produce a formula that would meet this case; that was the formula produced in SHAEF FWD 15510 dated 23-9-44, which formula very definitely did not work.
3. When you and Bradley and myself met at Maastricht on 7 December, it was very clear to me that Bradley opposed any idea that I should have operational control over his Army Group; so I did not then pursue the subject. I therefore consider that it will be necessary for you to be very firm on the subject, and any loosely worded statement will be quite useless.
4. I consider that if you merely use the word ‘co-ordination’ it will not work. The person designated by you must have powers of operational direction and control of the operations that will follow on your directive.
5. I would say that your directive will assign tasks and objectives to the two Army Groups, allot boundaries, and so on. Thereafter preparations are made and battle is joined. It is then that one commander must have powers to direct and control the operations; you cannot possibly do it yourself, and so you would have to nominate someone else.
6. I suggest that your directive should finish with this sentence: ‘12 and 21 Army Groups will develop operations in accordance with the above instructions. From now onwards full operational direction, control, and co-ordination of these operations is vested in the C.-in-C. 21 Army Group, subject to such instructions as may be issued by the Supreme Commander from time to time’
7. I put this matter up to you again only because I am so anxious not to have another failure. I am absolutely convinced that the key to success lies in:
(a) all available offensive power being assigned to the northern line of advance to the Ruhr;
(b) a sound set-up for command, and this implies one man directing and controlling the whole tactical battle on the northern thrust.
I am certain that if we do not comply with these two basic conditions, then we will fail again.
8. I would be grateful if you would not mention to Bradley the point I have referred to in para. 3. I would not like him to think that I remembered that point and had brought it up.
Yours always, and your very devoted friend Monty"
- Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery, Montgomery of Alamein.
The letter infuriated US generals because Monty pointed out they had a big failure, and that he should rightly be given back control of all ground armies as he saved the day at the Bulge, having to take control of two US armies. Monty wanted to be in control of all ground forces dropping the failing broad-front. The letter clearly states that.
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The British 1st Airborne made it to Arnhem bridge, taking the north end of the bridge, denying its use to the Germans.
The other two airborne units, both US, failed to seize their assigned bridges immediately. If they had XXX Corps would have been in Arnhem on d-day+1, before any armour came in from Germany. Game set and match.
The Germans would not have known what had hit them.
The 12 hour delay caused by the 101st not seizing the Zon bridge, meant the Germans for 12 hours had a critical time window to pour in troops and get armour moving towards Arnhem.
The 36 hour delay, on top of the 12 hour delay, caused by the 82nd not seizing their bridge at Nijmegen (XXX Corps had to take it for them), meant another longer time window for the Germans to keep up the reinforcing. The 36 hour delay created by the 82nd, meant a bridgehead over the Rhine was precluded, as the two day time window given to the
Germans was far too long.
The British paras did their part in securing a crossing over its assigned waterway, the Rhine. The two US para units failed in theirs. XXX Corps never put a foot wrong.
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@sirfinleygaming9490
The Americans lost so many men in bodged and poorly planned offensives, like 52,000 casualties in the failed Lorraine offensive, 33,000 at the Hurtgen Forest defeat, 12,000 operation Queen, 100,000 in the Bulge retreat, etc. They panicked sending a huge level of troops to Europe, that by the end they had half the allied troops. Most came in at the very end , being green, never seeing the enemy or fired a shot. Most went straight back home being readied for Japan.
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John Signs
Oh the ignorance of the man! It is bad enough having Rambo about. The US supplied about 10-11% of British supplies, which was mainly raw materials and machine tools, with 5% Soviet. Read British War Production by Postan 1951. Not earth shattering from the USA.
Monty used mostly BRITISH built trucks and vehicles for his 1,000km advance in 17 days in November 1942. The British produced over one million trucks in WW2. Britain was one of the largest industrial producers in the world. The US had three times the population of Britain but only out produced Britain by two.
Britain produced over 150,000 planes, planes which were the most advanced of any nation, like jets, the Mosquito, Spitfire, Tempest, Lancaster, etc. In 1941 the British were building more aircraft than Germany, Japan and Italy combined, 5,000 more than the USSR and 5,000 less than the USA.
The British built 50,000 tanks (about the same as the USA, but better tanks than the Sherman), over one million trucks, over one million machine guns and a quarter of a million artillery pieces. Even the British empire: the Canadians built more wheeled vehicles than the Germans, also building Lancasters, Mosquitos and Valentine tanks. https://www.thehistorypress.co.uk/articles/how-the-motor-industry-helped-win-the-second-world-war/
The USAAF in the UK was getting something like 70% of its supplies locally until 1943 (its in the USAAF history), with around 30% overall. In 1942 the US was a liability, when Britain was waging full war.
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@americanatlas3631
The US never had a top class general, many buffoons though - Patton, Bradley, Clark and MacArthur come to mind. Most were only colonels a few years previously, including Eisenhower. Montgomery had more years experience as a general than all of them combined in the ETO - literally.
♦ Only the Americans criticise Monty, in a veiled attempt
to disguise their inept performance in Europe.
Monty never retreated, not once.
♦ From mid-1942 onwards the British Army was
the finest in the world, taking all in its path.
♦ Bradley felt humiliated having 2 of his 3 armies
taken from him and given to Monty in the Bulge.
♦ The deplete and demoralised US armies should
have been pushed to the rear of the British 21st
Army Group. Monty never humiliated them. He
kept them at the front.
♦ Monty filled the losses of the two US armies
with British troops. British troops under US
command with the US command under British
command. It worked.
♦ The Americans always criticise Monty for not being
aggressive. Which is a way of saying he was
not stupid and overran his supply lines as Rommel
always did along with some British generals in
North Africa and as did US general Patton.
♦ A US report in the 1980s criticised Patton heavily
in the Lorraine.
When the US 1st and 9th armies were given to Monty at the Bulge, Monty chose the right option. Instead of joining a grindmeat where the Americans lost almost 100,000 and the Germans around 75,000, Monty decided to choose his own ground, and not fight in the Ardennes. The result was that more than 100,000 Germans were made casualties in Operation Veritable and Grenade, British (and American) casualties were less than 20.000. In Operation Plunder the British went further to make 30,000 German casualties, for an remarkable number of only 4,000 allied casualties.
Monty's operations were on the offensive, and yet the Germans suffered a gigantic number of casualties compared to the minimum of the British. Of the three main powers, the British managed the most cost effective advances in the war, while still keeping up the pace, and even facing the majority of the Germans in Normandy, while advancing faster than everyone else after the break-out to Belgium.
Patton was stuck in Metz for 3 months and had 50.000 casualties, Bradley had 34.000 in the Hurtgen Forest defeat. The Americans were having manpower troubles after the bulge. - mostly because of their head on tactics and complete lack of interest in keeping their soldiers alive. They counter-attacked in the Bulge not because it was the most sane thing to do, but just to try make Bradley and the Americans at large less humiliated.
Monty in the Bulge had the same thinking as in Operation Luttich. Let the Germans go as far as west as possible while minimizing casualties.
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@tubaman500
A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp and keeping it from German counter-attack - the logistics problem to supply all allied armies. It was:
1) Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or;
2) Take the Schedlt.
Eisenhower had a Northern Thrust strategy. Taking Noord Babant fell in line with the desires for both SHEAF and Eisenhower.
Noord Brabant had to be taken before the Scheldt, as it was essential. It was taken with limited forces, with forces also sent to take the Schedlt. Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat or Northern Thrust strategy, actually being a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen needed to be under allied control. The low-lying lands, boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen with land strewn with rivers and canals, is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces and supply directly back to Germany in perfect position for a counter-attack.
Market Garden was the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans were in disarray, so should be easy enough to gain. Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine to fall in line with Eisenhower's priority Northern Thrust strategy at the time. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation. You needed Arnhem for an easier jump into Germany. Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all - that is, protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital, and was successfully seized. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans a few miles away and still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all.
SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view.
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