Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "TIKhistory"
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After the fall of France, the Germans had access to the industry of Northern Italy, France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, however were not able to use it to match either the Soviets or the British in war production. The success of the Royal Navy blockade was instrumental in starving Germany of vital resources and food both animal and human. French production of planes destined for Germany was minuscule. France was not capable to produce as pre-war the French imported coal from Britain for its power generation. With the successful Royal Navy blockade the main source of coal was from Germany. Germany could not increase its production to overcome the French shortfall.
The amount of food produced in continental Europe fell. The production of meat and dairy products in countries such as Denmark was dependant on imported grain and animal feed from the Americas. This was now not available. The level of food available from the dairy industry collapsed as did food production in general. In the rest of Europe food production had been based on chemical fertilizer. Huge levels of the chemicals used for fertilizer production were diverted to the manufacturing of explosives.
French workers were on subsistence rations. Electricity was widely not available in France. The country had been dependant on motorized transportation. With no fuel with road & rail vehicles seized by the Germans, milk was poured away in farms and other produce put back into the ground unable to reach towns or cities. Most of French oil imports came from abroad. Once France fell oil products came from Romania and synthetic oil made in Germany, and so little it made little difference to the dire situation. The oil output was not enough for the needs of the German forces alone and to keep the Italian navy operational, which threatened to suspend all operations in February 1941 unless Germany provided 250,000 tons of fuel due to the dire shortage. France reverted to a horse and cart economy. The occupied countries were a drain on the German economy.
The USSR had the natural resources that would enable Germany to out-produce Britain and America. Hitler turned to the USSR which was also a key step in his broader strategy. The invasion of the USSR was brought forward. The urgency of Hitler's aggression was also down to his awareness of the threat posed to Germany by the emergence of the USA as a global superpower. The USA has access to vast resources inside the USA, a land stolen by moving west, from indigenous people and the Mexicans. Hitler took this precedence looking east to emulate the USA, and match them economically. None of the German generals thought that the USSR could initially stand up to an invasion of over 3 million men in June 1941, however they knew they had to defeat the USSR by Christmas or they would fail as Germany had few resources and committed all reserves. This was another gamble. The USSR did stand up to the Germans and were able to marshal their industrial and military resources to last.
The British were pushing the Germans back in Operation Crusader in the North African desert in late 1941. British forces had secured Syria from the Vichy French and Iraq was secured from a German inspired revolt keeping the Germans away from the oil fields of the Middle East and ensuring the war was conducted in Europe and the strip on the southern Mediterranean coast. British and Soviet forces invaded Iran with the Soviets committing 1,000 tanks, to secure the British oil refinery at Aberdan and the railway from the Gulf to the Soviet border. The German advance was stopped dead at Moscow in December 1941, with 40% of the tanks used supplied by the British with the Soviets launching their new T-34 tank of which Germany had no answer.
With German industry being bombed by the RAF, being totally outproduced by the British & Soviets, desperately short of all resources because of the Royal Navy blockade, Germany now winning the war was a remote proposition. No more quick win gambles could be played. The gamble in France worked, the gamble in the USSR failed. The defeat at Moscow was in the same month the USA came into the war when Japan attacked the British Empire & the USA and Germany declared war on the USA. In the first year the USA entered WW2, 1942, the USSR outproduced the USA.
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Books I used: It Never Snows in September by Robert Kershaw, The Battle For The Rhine by Robin Neilands, Reflect on Things Past by Peter Carington and the best, Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Magry (a Dutchman).
The British went north to eliminate the V rocket launching sites in Holland which were aimed at London, protect the vital port of Antwerp and ensure the Soviets did not reach the North Sea coast.
One of the objects of Market Garden was to form the northern end of a pincer with British forces at the German border, with the southern end of the pincer the US forces already in Belgium. The pincer was to close on the vital Ruhr. Good plan. Strangle the Ruhr which supplies all the German coal & steel and Germany is finished quickly. The operation was to use the British XXX Corps and the 1st Allied Airborne Army.
Market Garden was deemed a 90% success. A 60 mile salient was created into enemy territory isolating a German army in Holland, eliminating V rocket launching sites and protecting the port of Antwerp, the only port taken intact in the west. XXX Corps never relinquished any territory taken. The northern end of the salient was later used to launch forces into Germany. The 10% of failure was that Allied armies did not gain a foothold over the Rhine at Arnhem.
The operation plan was that the 1st Airborne Army would parachute drop and seize bridges from the Dutch/Belgium border up to Arnhem over the Rhine, with XXX Corps thrusting through to Arnhem over the captured bridges. The most northern large bridge was to be secured by British airborne units at Arnhem, the US 82nd would seize the large Nijmegen bridge and other small bridges and the US 101st Airborne seize smaller bridges to the south.
The reason for not achieving 100% success in the operation was completely down to the failure of the 82nd Airborne in not seizing the Nijmegen bridge on the first day they dropped into Nijmegen. Their prime objective. All bridges were seized on the first day, except the Nijmegen bridge. The man responsible was General Gavin. The 101st Airborne failed to take the bridge at Son in the south of Holland. XXX Corps ran over a Bailey bridge which delayed the advance for 12 hours. XXX Corps made up the time reaching Nijmegen pretty well on schedule only being disappointed at seeing the bridge still in German hands and the 82nd still fighting in and around the town. The 82nd had made no real attempt to seize the bridge.
The 82nd had no part in the eventual seizure of the bridge at all, as it was taken in the dark by the British XXX Corps tanks and Irish Guards infantry. The Irish Guards cleared out 180 Germans from the bridge girders. Only 5 tanks crossed the bridge with two being knocked out and one got operational again. So, only four operational tanks were available on the north side of the bridge. Strangely, Gavin's plan was to take one of Europe's largest road bridges only from one end.
The film A Bridge Too Far has Robert Redford (playing Cook) as one of the 82nd men taking the vital road bridge after rowing the river in canvas boats. This never happened.
The 82nd played no part in seizing the bridge counter to what Moffat Burriss stated. The few tanks were to secure the north end of the bridge after seizing the bridge, not to run off to Arnhem in the dark leaving the bridge vulnerable to Germans counter-attack. The Irish Guards infantry advanced no further than the immediate vicinity of the bridge that night.
Sergeant Peter Robinson, of the of the Guards Armored Division who led the charge over the Nijmegen road bridge in his Firefly tank stated:
"The Nijmegen bridge wasn’t taken [by the 82nd] which was our objective.
We were being engaged all the time. Just as I got round the corner and turned right I saw these helmets duck in a ditch and run, and gave them a burst of machine gun fire. I suddenly realised they were Americans."
"Well, my orders were to collect the American colonel who was in a house a little way back, and the first thing he said to me was "I have to surrender"
"Well I said, 'I'm sorry. My orders are to hold this bridge. I've only got two tanks available but if you'd like to give me ground support for a little while until we get some more orders then we can do it. He said he couldn’t do it, so I said that he had better come back to my wireless and talk to General Horrocks because before I started the job I had freedom of the air. Everybody was off the air except myself because they wanted a running commentary about what was going on - So he came over and had a pow-wow with Horrocks. The colonel said 'Oh very well’ and I told him where I wanted the men, but of course you can't consolidate a Yank and they hadn’t been there ten minutes before they were on their way again."
The 82nd men wanted to surrender! And never gave support which was what they were there to do.
Captain Lord Carington's own autobiography entitled 'Reflect on Things Past':
"My recollection of this meeting is different. Certainly I met an American officer [Moffatt Burriss] but he was perfectly affable and agreeable. As I said the Airborne were all very glad to see us and get some support, no one suggested we press on to Arnhem. This whole allegation is bizarre, just to begin with I was a captain and second-in-command of my squadron so I was in no position either to take orders from another captain or depart from my own orders which were to take my tanks across the bridge, join up with the US Airborne and form a bridgehead. This story is simple lunacy and this exchange did not take place."
"A film representation of this incident has shown American troops as having already secured the far end of the bridge. That is mistaken - probably the error arose from the film-maker's confusion of two bridges, there was a railway bridge with planks placed between the rails and used by the Germans for [light] road traffic, to the west of the main road bridge we crossed"
The meeting of the 82nd men and the tanks was 1 km north of the bridge in the village of Lent under a small railway bridge over a road. The 82nd men did not reach the north end of the actual target, the road bridge, the Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry got there first from the south.
Historians get confused. There are two bridges at Nijmegen. a railway bridge to the west and and road bridge to the east. They are about 1km apart. The 82nd men rowed the river west of the railway bridge made their way north following the railway embankment for cover. They reached the village of Lent where the railway embankment meets the road approach to the main road bridge. There is a small railway bridge over the road at this point. This is the bridge the 82nd men seized. The railway and road bridges over the Waal were seized by British troops.
Heinz Harmel (played by Hardy Kruger in the film A Bridge Too Far), the 10th SS Panzer Division commander who was between Arnhem and Nijmegen, says it was the British tanks that raced across seizing the bridge. Harmel did not know of that three Tiger tanks that had crossed the Arnhem bridge running south, the German communications was disjointed. Harmel stated that there was little German armour between Nijmegen and Arnhem. That was not correct. The three powerful Tiger tanks would have made scrap metal out of the British Shermans. By the time the Guards tanks crossed Nijmegen bridge Johnny Frost's British paratroopers at the Arnhem bridge were being overrun because of the long delay in seizing the Nijmegen bridge.
Tanks running to Arnhem would have been sitting ducks on the raised road. The Guards tanks were split up and spread out over 20 miles, supporting the 82nd all over Nijmegen.
Nor did the 82nd take the southern end of the main road bridge in Nijmegen town. Lt Col Vandervoort of the 82nd was in the southern approaches to the bridge, alongside the Grenadier Guards tanks. Vandervoort and his men never went onto the bridge. He remained at the southern approaches to the bridge with the rest of the 82nd and the Irish Guards infantry.
After 2 days fighting, split up, spread out and disjointed, the Guards Armoured Division had to regroup, re-arm and re-fuel. It was simply not possible for them to have moved onto Arnhem that night being spread out over 20 miles. The task the five tanks were given that crossed the bridge was to defend the bridge and consolidate against enemy attacks.
The prime objective, Nijmegen bridge was not captured on the 17th because there was a foul up in communication between General Gavin and Colonel Lindquist of the 508th PIR of the 82nd Airborne. Gavin allegedly verbally told Lindquist during the pre-drop talk to take a battalion of the 508th and make a quick strike to the bridge on the 17th and to "move without delay" but Lindquist understood it that Gavin had told him that his 508th should only move for the bridge once his regiment had secured the assigned 508th's portion of the defensive perimeter for the 82nd Division. So Lindquist didn't move his battalion towards the Nijmegen bridge until after this had been done, and by that time it was too late as the Germans had reinforced the bridge and were pouring troops into Nijmegen.
Browning, joint head of the 1st Airborne Army, who parachuted into Nijmegen on day two. Seeing the bridge untaken he told General Gavin of the 82nd on the evening of 18th September that the Nijmegen bridge must be taken on the 19th, when XXX Corps were to arrive, or at the latest, very early on the 20th.
Gavin passed the buck, in an attempt to shift blame due to the fact that the 82nd totally failed to take the Nijmegen road bridge whose job it was to defend the bridge and prevent the Germans from taking it back. Gavin, and other Americans since, cast aspersions on the British tankers and XXX Corps.
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"In Nijmegen, the arrival of British armour had raised the intensity and scale of the fighting. Extensive fires had broken out, marking the progress of the XXX Corps advance. Combined Sherman and infantry attacks during the early night hours of 20 September had been halted by accurate artillery fire around the traffic circle south of the Hunner park. SS-Captain Krueger of 21 Battery had personally directed the fire. At 0130 two Shermans remained with sheared tracks after the attack had been repelled. During the course of the morning three more combined arms attacks were concentrated upon the gradually shrinking 10SS perimeter defending the southern bank of the Waal."
- It Never Snows in September, by Kershaw, page 192.
"At 1500, 40 Sherman tanks plus artillery and air support began firing to cover the advance of Cook's 3rd Battalion as they crossed the Waal in boats.
- Kershaw, P196.
But resistance inside Nijmegen continued for quite some time after the famous actions to take the bridges. Bittrich (commander of IISS Corps) reported at 2330 on September 20th that "nothing [had] been heard from the Nijmegen garrison for two hours" and that he could "only assume the German units had been destroyed".
- Kershaw, page 212.
Just because nothing had been heard for two hours at 2330, didn't mean that Nijmegen was cleared of German units. It just meant that they hadn't been in contact. Some units continued to fight on. Kampfgruppe Euling were still holding their positions at 2230, although they then made a break for it in the dark some time afterwards."
- It Never Snows in September, by Kershaw, page 213
"The Guards Armoured Coldstream Guards Group still was needed as a reserve for the Airborne division. This left but two armoured groups to go across the Waal [Nijmegen road bridge]. Even those did not make it until next day, D plus 4, 21 September, primarily because of diehard German defenders who had to be ferreted out from the superstructure and bridge underpinnings."
- The Battle for the Rhine 1944, Neillands
At the village of Ressen, less than three miles north of Nijmegen, the Germans had erected an effective screen composed of an SS battalion reinforced by eleven tanks, another infantry battalion, two batteries of 88mm guns, 20 20mm anti-aircraft guns and survivors of earlier fighting in Nijmegen.
"American readers should note that the above comments come from the US Official History, where the notion that Lord Carrington and his five tanks could have penetrated this screen and got up to Arnhem on the night of D plus 3 — even supposing such a move was ever suggested — is revealed as a delusion."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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“Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4, after a week’s pause. After that date supply was not a problem. Hurtgen Forest and Operation Queen were launched as supply was good.
"Eisenhower. He had now heard from both his Army Group commanders — or Commanders-in-Chief as they were currently called — and reached the conclusion that they were both right; that it was possible to achieve everything, even with lengthening supply lines and without Antwerp."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
“It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September 16th. On the other hand, three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th " for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.' “
- CHESTER WILMOT, THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE. Page 58.
Land supplies were not taken from Patton and given to Monty. It is a complete myth to claim otherwise. Monty didn't even have a full army for his attack at Market Garden, just a Corps and supporting elements, with much flown in from England. Half of the troop transport aircraft were taken by Bradley to take parcels, otherwise far more men would have been dropped on the 1st day of Market Garden.
Market Garden was not a very large ground operation. It was limited in size. The American attack into the Hurtgen Forest started when Market Garden was going on. The US advance on the Hurtgen Forest by First US Army 9th Infantry Division began on 14th September, 3 days before Market Garden began, and was continuing to try and advance into the Hurtgen even when Market Garden began 3 days later, but it was halted by the Germans however.
This was soon followed up by a larger advance by the US First Army towards Aachen at the start of October. Market Garden didn't make a notable dent in allied supplies seeing as the US was able to put on a larger ground attack right afterwards. According to Bradley in his own book there was parity of supplies between the three allied armies, Second British, First and Third US by mid September 1944 and according to the official US Army History as cited in Hugh Cole's book, The Lorraine Campaign page 52. "by 10th September the period of critical (gasoline) shortage had ended". This was a whole week before Market Garden took place. The gasoline drought was the end of August/beginning of September. It was over by the time of Market Garden.
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The British 2nd Tactical Air Force in the Bulge took control of the IX and XXIX Tactical Air Commands from Vandenberg’s Ninth Air Force.
The First Army’s hasty defense had been one of hole-plugging, last stands, and counterattacks to buy time. Although some were successful, these tactics had created organizational havoc within Hodges’ forces as divisional units had been committed piecemeal and badly jumbled.
Ridgway wanted St. Vith’s defenders to stay east of the Salm, but Montgomery ruled otherwise. The 7th Armored Division, its ammunition and fuel in short supply and perhaps two-thirds of its tanks destroyed, and the battered elements of the 9th Armored, 106th, and 28th Divisions could not hold the extended perimeter in the rolling and wooded terrain. Meanwhile, Dietrich’s second wave of tanks entered the fray. The II SS Panzer Corps immediately threatened the Salm River line north and west of St. Vith, as did the LVIII Panzer Corps circling to the south, adding the 2d SS Panzer Division to its drive. Ordering the St. Vith defenders to withdraw through the 82d Airborne Division line to prevent another Schnee Eifel disaster, Montgomery signaled them that “they come back with all honor.”
- Ardennes-Alsace by Roger Cirillo. US Army Center of Military History
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”_
“I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Christmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...[Montgomery] was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- General Hasbrouck of 7th Armor - “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
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Market Garden
1. Monty approached the 1st Airborne Army, Brereton, to do a
drop on the Scheld. He said "no", saying was too risky.
Market Garden came about out of Comet, a multi crossing of the Rhine.
2. Market Garden was to run up to the Zuiderzee and just east of Arnhem.
3. Market Garden was to create a buffer between Antwerp and German forces.
4. Advantages are: the German 15th Army is fully isolated in
Holland, Antwerp is protected from German counter-attack,
V rocket launching sites are overrun, a springboard to the Ruhr.
Ardennes Offensive
1. Antwerp was a vital port in the north (the only port taken intact),
even the Germans knew that. They poured more V rockets on
Antwerp than London.
2. If the Germans were to counter-attack in force it had to be to a
point to stop allied supply - Antwerp. It would also isolate the
British to the north.
3. The German attempt to reach Antwerp needed the element
of surprise and light initial resistance. An arc from Antwerp
to the German border gives, Eindhoven, Aachen and the
Ardennes forest. Not much in distance from Antwerp to any
of them. Going through a forest would achieve surprise, not
through the fortified Market Garden salient in Holland. Forcing
through the Market Garden salient would meet up with the
German 15th army in Holland. But that would not necessarily
stop allied resupply via Antwerp. The German idea of going
straight for Antwerp was sound.
The Germans knew the British had superior armour to the USA, having their armour annihilated by the British in Normandy. US forces had performed poorly overall, as the Kasserine Pass, Hurtgen Forest and the Lorraine Campaign had clearly shown. German armour was largely wiped out in the west by the British in Normandy. The Germans would prefer to attack the Americans rather than the British - obviously. The Ardennes had light US forces in front of it - the Germans did run though the forest in 1940. The US assessed no German army would run through it. It was a perfect launch point for the German gamble.
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What I wrote was fact, with references. Market Garden's failure was due to the US 82nd. Look at this video, do not take my word for it.
US bashing? You were sneering the British. You have to be kidding, look at the film A Bridge Too Far. Full of lies. It made the British out to be buffoons and the Yanks a bunch of hustlers - It was made by the Americans. The British Army was the finest in the world. It took all before it from mid-1942 onwards. The buffoonery of the US in The Kassarine Pass, Lorraine, Hurtgen Forest, The Bulge, Market Garden, around Rome, etc, is well known. The US 1st & 9th armies had to be taken under British control in the Bulge.
The Market Garden salient was to be reinforced directly after - Operation Aintree. The US 7th Armoured Division was sent in to take Overloon in Holland. They failed and had to be pulled out. The British 3rd Infantry Division and 11th Armoured Division had to be sent in to take the town.
Do not go by Hollywood history.
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