Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "TIKhistory"
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Slippery Storm
OH no!
The US 1st and 9th armies were put under Montgomery's command at the Bulge. The 9th Army was under British control until the end of the war. In effect in the early stages of the Bulge Montgomery was commanding, as Ike was AWOL not even communicating with Montgomery for about 30 days. Part of the US air force were put under RAF command.
On Paton's ride up to the Bulge, the road from Luxembourg to Bastogne was largely devoid of German forces, as Bastogne was on the very southern German periphery. Only when Patton got near to Bastogne did he face 'some' German armour. The Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade wasn't one of the best armoured units, while 26th Volks-Grenadier only had a dozen Hetzers, and the tiny element of Panzer Lehr (Kampfgruppe 901) left behind had only a small number of tanks operational. Its not as if Patton had to smash through full panzer divisions or Tiger battalions on his way to Bastogne. Patton's armoured forces outnumbered the Germans by at least 6 to 1.
Patton faced little German armour when he broke through to Bastogne because the vast majority of the German 5th Panzer Army had already left Bastogne in their rear and moved westwards to the River Meuse, where they were engaging forces under Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Leading elements were engaging the Americans and British under Montgomery's command near Dinant by the Meuse.
It was Patton's failure to concentrate his forces on a narrow front and his own decision to commit two green divisions to battle without adequate reconnaissance that were the reasons for his stall. After the German attack in the Ardennes, US air force units were put under the command of Coningham of the RAF. Coningham, gave Patton massive ground attack plane support and he still stalled. Patton rarely took any responsibility for his own failures. It was always somebody else at fault, including his subordinates.
In the Lorraine, Patton only moved 10 miles in 3 months.
Read Monty and Patton:Two Paths to Victory
by Michael Reynolds
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William Smith
Some facts for you. The British were the single biggest agents in the defeat of Nazi Germany. They were there from day one until the end. The so-called "invincible" Germans army tried and failed, with their allies, for two years in WW2 to defeat the British army in North Africa. The finest army in the world from mid 1942 onwards was the British. From El Alemein it moved right up into Denmark, through nine countries, and not once suffered a reverse taking all in its path. Over 90% of German armour in the west was destroyed by the British. Montgomery had to give the US armies an infantry role as they were not equipped to engage massed German SS armour.
Montgomery stopped the Germans in every event they attacked him:
♦ August 1942 - Alem el Halfa
♦ October 1942 - El Alamein
♦ March 1943 - Medenine
♦ June 1944 - Normandy
♦ Sept/Oct 1944 - Holland
♦ December 1944 - Battle of the Bulge
Not on one occasion were Monty's ground armies pushed back into a retreat by the Germans. The US Army were struggling in 1944/45 retreating in the Ardennes. The Americans didn't perform all that great east of Aachen, then the Hurtgen Forest defeat with 33,000 casualties and Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months with over 50,000 casualties. The Battle of the Bulge took all the US effort, and vital help from Montgomery and the British 21st Army Group, just to get back to the start line. The Germans took 20,000 US POWs in the Battle of The Bulge in Dec 1944. No other allied country had that many prisoners taken in the 1944-45 timeframe. The USA retreat at the Bulge, again, the only allied army to be pushed back into a retreat in the 1944-45 timeframe. Montgomery was effectively in charge of the Bulge having to take control of the US 1st and 9th armies. The 9th stayed under his control until the end of the war just about.
Normandy was planned and commanded by the British which was a great success coming in ahead of schedule and with less casualties than predicted. The German armour in the west was wiped out by the primarily British - the US forces were impotent against the panzers. Monty assessed the US armies (he was in charge of them) and had to give them a supporting infantry role, as they were just not equipped to fight tank v tank battles. On 3 Sept 1944 when Eisenhower took over overall allied command of ground forces everything went at a snail's pace. The fastest advance of any western army in Autumn/early 1945 was the 60 mile thrust by the British XXX Corps to the Rhine at Arnhem.
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William Smith
Monty's plan in Normandy was not for British forces to take territory. He specifically wanted to draw in German armour onto British forces to grind them up to keeping them away from the US forces for them to break out (Operation Cobra). That was even stated at St.Paul's school in Fulham in the planning, but low key so as not to lower British soldiers morale. To do that Monty was confident British armour could match German armour - US armour would struggle or most likely be overwhelmed. A 12 mile sector around Caen saw more concentrated German armour in all of WW2. Goodwood was not British forces taking territory, as the plan was for the US forces to do that, Monty specifically states this here in this link in an interview with Edward R Murrow. Transcript....
"The acquisition of territory on the eastern flank of the beachhead in the Caen sector was not really important. What was important there was to draw the maximum number of German divisions, and especially the armour, into that flank. The acquisition of territory was important on the western flank [the US sector]." ...."an accusation drawn at me, that I ought to have taken Caen in the programme on D-Day! And we didn't. I didn't mind about that because....The air force would get very het up because I didn't go further down towards Falaise and get the ground suitable for airfields. I didn't bother about that, it would have meant enormous casualties in doing it and it wasn't necessary."
"I could reply to that criticism that on the American front the line from which the breakout was finally launched was a line the St.Lo-Periers road, should have been captured in the initial plan by the American 1st Army on D-Day plus 5, that was the 11th June. But they didn't actually capture it until the 18th July. But I have never returned the charge with that accusation. ...until now"
"I have never understood why Ike said in his dispatches that, when the British failed to break out towards Paris on the eastern flank. The Americans were able [to break out], because of our flexibility, to take it on, on our western flank. I have always thought that was an unfair criticism of Dempsey and the 2nd British Army."
- Field Marshall Montgomery (1959)
The RAF chief Tedder, wanted Monty fired as he wanted open territory to the south towards Falaise to setup his airfields saying Monty was not pursing territory aggressively enough. Monty would have none of it. Operation Goodwood was engaging the massed armoured German defences drawing them in to British lines, grinding them up moving slowly. Here is a 1970s objective British Army Sandhurst internal video analysing Operation Goodwood, with even German commanders who were there taking part. At the beginning it specifically states Monty told Generals O'Connor and Dempsey not to run south to Falaise, not to take territory. Look at 6 mins:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=udW1UvSHXfY
Monty was not too concerned with Caen as it would consume too many resources to take. He was more concerned with grinding up German armour in the field and acting as a decoy for the American armies to break out. Although by the time of Goodwood only the southern suburbs of Caen were in German hands.
Monty was in charge of all of Operation Overlord. He wanted the German armour away from US forces, to allow them to break out. It worked. That is what he wanted and planned. Monty never saw Caen as important but never criticised US forces..... until 1959 when they were at him about Caen, he criticised them for taking St.Lo a month late - with little German armour around for a month. The Germans did eventually send some armour to St.Lo with the US forces making it worse for themselves to capture the place.
Even Bradley agreed with Monty. Bradley wrote that:
"The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we [the Americans] were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride, this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for while we tramped around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded".
At Goodwood's the Germans had five lines of dug-in anti-tank defence and heavy Tiger and fast Panther tanks for mobility. Goodwood was mostly 'not' bocage but open ground more suitable for tank battles, where the German long range 88mm's would be at an advantage. Caen saw the densest concentration of German armour ever seen in WW2. At Kursk the Germans were attacking over a near 50 mile front. There was not 8 panzer divisions within 12 miles.
There were EIGHT Panzer Divisions in the Caen sector by end of June 1944. Monty had no option but to engage them head on and also draw in their reserves. The Germans kept sending more and more panzer divisions around the Caen area as June progressed and into July. The panzer divisions deployed to the Caen area:
• 21st Panzer Division - 117 Panzer IVs.
• Panzer Lehr Division - 101 Panzer IVs, 89 Panthers.
• 2nd Panzer Division - 89 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers.
• 116th Panzer Division - 73 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers. (In reserve just behind the front).
• 1st SS Panzer Division - 98 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers.
• 9th SS Panzer Division - 40 Stugs, 46 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers.
• 10th SS Panzer Division - 38 Stugs, 39 Panzer IVs.
• 12th SS Panzer Division - 98 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers.
• Tiger Battalion SS101 - 45 Tigers.
• Tiger Battalion SS102 - 45 Tigers.
• Tiger Battalion 503 - 45 Tigers.
Source. Bernages Panzers and the Battle For Normandy and Zetterling's Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness.
Subsequently the US forces hardly met German armour in Normandy, performing mainly an infantry role, with most German armour being eliminated by British forces.
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@danwelch8547
♦ North Africa was vital. If the Germans got to the Middle East and the oil it would have been all over. The Germans wanted to link up with the Japanese in India or Iran. Mesopotamia plan.
♦ Only the Yanks criticise Monty, in a veiled attempt to disguise their inept performance in Europe. Monty never retreated, not once.
♦ From mid-1942 onwards the British Army was the finest in the world, taking all in its path.
♦ Bradley felt humiliated having 2 of his 3 armies taken from him and giving to Monty in the Bulge.
♦ The depleted and demoralised US armies at the Bulge should have been pushed to the rear of the British 21st Army Group. Monty never humiliated them. He kept them at the front.
♦ Monty filled the losses of the two US armies with British troops. British troops under US command with the US command under British command. It worked.
♦ The Yanks always criticise Monty for not being aggressive. Which is a way of saying he was not stupid overrunning his supply lines as Rommel always did along with some British generals in North Africa, and as did US Patton.
♦ A US report in the 1980s criticised Patton heavily in the Lorraine. One point was that he constantly overran supplies.
When the US First and Ninth armies were given to Monty at the Bulge, Monty chose the right option. Instead of joining a grindmeat where the Americans lost almost 100,000 and the Germans around 75,000, Monty decided to choose his own ground, not fighting in the Ardennes. The result was that more than 100,000 Germans were made casualties in Operation Veritable and Grenade, British (and American) casualties were less than 20.000.
In Operation Plunder the British went further to make 30,000 German casualties, for an remarkable number of only 4,000 allied casualties. Monty's operations were on the offensive, and yet the Germans suffered a gigantic number of casualties compared to the minimum of the British. Of the three main powers, the British managed the most cost effective advances in the war, while still keeping up the pace, and even facing the majority of the Germans in Normandy, while advancing faster than everyone else after the break out, to Belgium.
Patton was stuck in Metz for three months suffering 50.000 casualties, Bradley had 42.000 in the Hurtgen Forest defeat. The Americans were having manpower troubles after the Bulge. - mostly because of their head on tactics and lack of interest in keeping their soldiers alive. They counterattacked in the Bulge not because it was the most sane thing to do, but just to try make Bradley and the Americans at large less humiliated.
Monty in the Bulge had the same thinking as in Operation Luttich. Let the Germans go as far as west as possible while minimizing casualties.
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@danwelch8547
I will let the Germans have the first say on the Bulge:
General Hasso von Manteuffel:
‘The operations of the American First Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
By November 1944, British SHEAF officer, Strong, noted that there was a possibility of a German counter-offensive in the Ardennes or the Vosges. Strong went to personally warn Bradley at his HQ, who said, "let 'em come".
Montgomery on hearing of the attack immediately, without consulting Eisenhower, took British forces to the Meuse to prevent any German forces from making a bridgehead, securing the rear. He was prepared to halt their advance and attack them. This was while Eisenhower and Bradley were doing nothing.
even by 19 December, three days into the offensive, no overall plan had emerged from 12th Army Group or SHAEF, other than the decision to send Patton’s forces north to Bastogne. Overall, the Ardennes battle was in urgent need of grip. General Hodges had yet to see Bradley or receive more than the sketchiest orders from his Army Group commander.
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
On 20 December, Montgomery had sent a signal to Alanbrooke regarding the US forces:
"Not good... definite lack of grip and control. I have heard nothing from Ike or Bradley and had no orders or requests of any sort. My own opinion is that the American forces have been cut in half and the Germans can reach the Meuse at Namur without opposition."
Omar Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group, did very little:
16 Dec, the first day, for 12 hours did nothing.
16 Dec, after 12 hours, he sent two armoured divisions from the flanking Ninth and Third Armies.
17 Dec, after 24 Hours, he then called in two US airborne divisions from Champagne.
18 Dec, he ordered Patton to halt his pending offensive in the Saar.
18 Dec, he had still not established contact with the First Army, while Monty had.
19 Dec, he withdrew divisions from the Aachen front to shore up the Ardennes.
19 Dec, he had still not produced an overall defensive plan.
19 Dec, the Supreme Commander intervened directly late in the day.
20 Dec, Eisenhower telephoned Montgomery telling him to take command of the US First and Ninth Armies
While all this dillying by Bradley was going on, German armies were pounding forward into his lines. Bradley should have been fired. Hodges ran away from his command post.
British officer Whiteley & American officer Betts of SHEAF visited the U.S. First Army HQ after the German attack, seeing the shambles. Strong, Whiteley, and Betts recommended that command of the armies north of the Ardennes be transferred from Bradley to Montgomery. Unfortunately only the two British officers approached Beddel Smith of their recommendations, who immediately fired the pair, claiming it was a nationalistic thing. The next morning, Beddel Smith apologized seeing the three were right, recommending to Eisenhower to bring in Monty.
During the Battle of the Bulge Eisenhower was stuck self imprisoned in his HQ in des-res Versailles near Paris in fear of German paratroopers wearing US uniforms with the objective to kill allied generals. He had remained locked up more than 30 days without sending a single message or order to Montgomery, and that is when he thought he was doing ground control of the campaign, when in effect Montgomery was in control as two US armies had to be put under his control after the German attack, the US First and Ninth armies. Coningham of the RAF had to take control of US air force units. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war, just about.
Biased American authors such as Stephen Ambrose wrote that Eisenhower took control of the Bulge and made the battle his veneering it as an all American victory. Ambrose completely falsified history. The only thing Eisenhower did was tell Monty to get control of two out of control US armies, tell the US 101st to go to Bastogne (who were in northern France after the buffer Market Garden was created) and men under Bradley to counterattack. That is it.
At the end of the Bulge would you believe it, Eisenhower gave Bradley an award.
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@danwelch8547
Some facts for you. The British were the single biggest agents in the defeat of Nazi Germany. They were there from day one until the end. They did not enter because they attacked another country or were attacked. The so-called "invincible" Germans army tried and failed, with their allies, for two years in WW2 to defeat the British army in North Africa. The finest army in the world from mid 1942 onwards was the British. From Alem el Halfa it moved right up into Denmark, through nine countries, and not once suffered a reverse taking all in its path. Over 90% of German armour in the west was destroyed by the British. Montgomery had to give the US armies an infantry role as they were not equipped to engage massed German SS armour.
Montgomery stopped the Germans in every event they attacked him:
♦ August 1942 - Alem el Halfa
♦ October 1942 - El Alamein
♦ March 1943 - Medenine
♦ June 1944 - Normandy
♦ Sept/Oct 1944 - The Netherlands
♦ December 1944 - Battle of the Bulge
Not on one occasion were ground armies, British or US, under Monty's command pushed back into a retreat by the Germans. The US Army were struggling in 1944/45 retreating in the Ardennes. The Americans didn't perform well at all east of Aachen, then the Hurtgen Forest defeat with 33,000 casualties and Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months with over 50,000 casualties.
The Battle of the Bulge took all the US effort, with Montgomery in command and the British 21st Army Group, just to get back to the start line, with nearly 100,000 casualties. The Germans took 20,000 US POWs in the Battle of The Bulge in Dec 1944. No other allied country had that many prisoners taken in the 1944-45 timeframe. The USA retreat at the Bulge, again, the only allied army to be pushed back into a retreat in the 1944-45 timeframe. Montgomery was effectively in charge of the Bulge having to take control of the US First and Ninth armies. The US Third Army constantly stalled after coming up from the south. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war just about. The US armies were losing men at unsustainable rates due to poor generalship.
Normandy was planned and commanded by the British with Montgomery leading all ground forces, which was a great success coming in ahead of schedule with less casualties than predicted. The Royal Navy was in command of all naval forces with the RAF all air forces. The German armour in the west was wiped out by primarily the British - the US forces were impotent against the panzers. Monty assessed the US armies (he was in charge of them) and had to give them a supporting infantry role, as they were just not equipped, or experienced, to fight concentrated tank v tank battles. On 3 Sept 1944 when Eisenhower took over overall allied command of ground forces everything went at a snail's pace. The fastest advance of any western army in Autumn/early 1945 was the 60 mile thrust by the British XXX Corps to the Rhine at Arnhem.
Then the ignored British naval blockade on the Axis economy, which was so successful the substantial Italian navy could not put to sea in full strength, or even at all on some occasions, because of a lack of oil. Then the British bomber offensive on the German economy, taking the war right into German cities, wiping out Hamburg in one night.
You need to give respect where it is due.
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*****
"the fact that they had intel saying there were German panzer divisions there and was ignored."
"the composition of the German forces at Arnhem was far more complex than most published histories of Market Garden had tended to suggest. The two SS panzer divisions had been operating far below their full strength on the eve of the operation and, while 1st Airborne was ultimately confronted by armour in considerable strength, hardly any tanks were actually present in the Arnhem area on 17 September. The vast majority deployed from Germany or other battle fronts after the airborne landings".
- ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the RAF
"Urquhart’s account is therefore somewhat perplexing. Further problems arise if we seek to document the events he described. Several extensive searches for the photographs have failed to locate them. Ostensibly, this might not seem surprising, as most tactical reconnaissance material was destroyed after the war, but Urquhart insisted that the Arnhem sortie was flown by a Spitfire squadron based at Benson; this would almost certainly mean 541 Squadron. Far more imagery from the Benson squadrons survived within the UK archives, but no oblique photographs showing tanks at Arnhem. In addition, although the Benson missions were systematically recorded at squadron and group level, not one record matches the sortie Urquhart described."
"The low-level missions targeting the bridges on 6 September were scrupulously noted down, but all other recorded reconnaissance sorties over Arnhem were flown at higher altitudes and captured vertical imagery. Equally, it has proved impossible as yet to locate an interpretation report derived from a low-level mission that photographed German armour near Arnhem before Market Garden."
"As for Brian Urquhart’s famous account of how a low-level Spitfire sortie took photographs of tanks assumed to belong to II SS Panzer Corps, the reality was rather different. In all probability, the low-level mission that Urquhart recalled photographed the bridges and not the tanks"
- ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the RAF
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+oldtanker2
As to your obsession with Caen. Caen was not strategic. Ports were important cities were not. Caen was a second tier objective. Valuable resources would not be engaged on secondary targets, as the priority was to secure the beachhead and set a massive supply dump, and get troops ashore ASAP. If Monty could go around a city and leave it he would. The British destroyed over 90% of German armour in Normandy. The British had superior armour than the US. Montgomery, the overall commander of Normandy, planned to draw in German armour onto the British who would grind it up. This released the Americans to swing around and form a pincer. This did happen.
Caen had more German tanks per mile than Kursk. In just a dozen miles or so 8 Panzer divisions in a very small area of front. Caen had the highest concentration density of German tanks ever seen in WW2. At Kursk the panzer divisions were spread out over a much wider area and were not concentrated as densely as around Caen. At Kursk the Germans were attacking over a near 50 mile front. There were not 8 panzer divisions within 12 miles.
There were eight panzer divisions in the Caen sector by end of June 1944. The Germans kept sending more and more panzer divisions around the Caen area during June and into July.
The panzer divisions deployed to the Caen sector:
▪️ 21st Panzer Division (117 Panzer IVs).
▪️ Panzer Lehr Division ( 101 Panzer IVs, 89 Panthers).
▪️ 2nd Panzer Division (89 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers).
▪️ 116th Panzer Division (73 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers). In reserve just behind the front.
▪️ 1st SS Panzer Division (98 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers).
▪️ 9th SS Panzer Division (40 Stugs, 46 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers).
▪️ 10th SS Panzer Division (38 Stugs, 39 Panzer IVs)
▪️ 12th SS Panzer Division (98 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers).
▪️ Tiger Battalion SS101 (45 Tigers).
▪️ Tiger Battalion SS102 (45 Tigers).
▪️ Tiger Battalion 503 (45 Tigers).
Sources.
Bernages Panzers and the Battle For Normandy
Zetterling's Normandy 1944
German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness.
On 12th June 1944 the British had no room to sidestep any German divisions before Caen because the Germans totally blocked them. This is why a wide right hook on Caen was attempted. To the south of Panzer Lehr's sector in the vicinity of Villers Bocage there was thought to be an area devoid of German forces. So this wide right hook was attempted on the morning of 13th June. If it was any wider and it would have overrun into the American lines. Unknown to the British, Schwere SS Panzer Abteilung 101 turned up into this area on the night of the 12/13th June and blocked this right hook with their Tigers closing the door on Caen.
There was no other room to manoeuvre onto Caen. All attempts had to go right through the German panzer divisions throughout the rest of June and early July. The Germans had excellent defensive country with fields broken up by hedgerows everywhere to utilise to their advantage. They also had superior tanks for the most part.
*The Americans didn't even face any German armour until June 13th, and that was only a battalion of assault guns*. The Americans were behind schedule taking Carentan and St Lo facing little to no German armour. The Americans moved no faster inland to the south than the British did, yet they never met any masses of German armour. The US forces couldn't get anywhere near to St Lo until 18 July, an objective they were planned to capture on the 11 June.
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+TIK
The stupidity of the Americans was that they didn't know it was coming in the Bulge. Like the French in 1940, the US didn't know there was a massive build up of armour on the other side of the line. Well reports did tell them but they ignored many of them - like the French. The US could not hold the German forces as their armies were not equipped to deal with massed German armour, having only one infantry tank and a doctrine that tanks do not engage tanks. They had to bring up a self-propelled gun to deal with a tank. If one was around of course, which they never are when you need one.
If British forces were at that location, they would not have been so lax and they would have stopped the advance quicker having superior armour and greater experience of dealing with German armour. BTW, Monty did warn them of a bulge.
In 1940 the massed German armour ran at the French through the Ardennes not the British. The British were way behind the French with only a small force. When the French collapsed the British had to retreat facing a massive army in front of them. Nevertheless, the British did stop the blitzkrieg advance at Arras. Rommel thought he had been hit by a force that was three times the size. The new Matilda 2 tank scared them.
"John, in fairness, the British never had to face an attack the size that US forces had to face during the Battle of the Bulge."
At Caen the most concentrated German armour in WW2 faced the British. 1,358 German tanks in June alone with 135 of them Tigers and 405 Panthers. That is 40% of the German tanks were Tigers and Panthers. Over 1,500 overall - in June the US faced only 40 assault guns and a handful of obsolete French tanks. At the Bulge there was 1,500 German tanks and not all of them were pitted against US forces, they could not all get through the Ardennes forest at once. As US historian Steven Zaloga wrote, there was only three incidences where US forces met Tigers in the whole of WW2, so few of the tanks at the Bulge were Tigers.
Monty wanted a buffer between Antwerp and German forces, hence Market Garden. One its prime aims, probably its prime aim. It came in useful. I don't think you mentioned that in the video. Or did you?
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