Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "TIKhistory"
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@agentmulder1019
Caen was strategically unimportant.
Caen had more German tanks per mile than Kursk. In just a dozen miles or so right Panzer divisions in a very small area of front. Caen had the highest concentration density of German tanks ever seen in WW2, pitted against British armour. At Kursk the panzer divisions were spread out over a much wider area and were not concentrated as densely as around Caen. Caen saw the densest concentration of German armour ever seen in WW2. At Kursk the Germans were attacking over a near 50 mile front. There were certainly not right panzer divisions within 12 miles.
There were EIGHT Panzer Divisions in the Caen area by end of June 1944 and FIVE lines of anti-tank guns. The Germans kept sending more and more panzer divisions around the Caen area as June went on and into July. These were the panzer divisions deployed to the Caen area.
♦ 21st Panzer Division (117 Panzer IVs).
♦ Panzer Lehr Division ( 101 Panzer IVs, 89 Panthers).
♦ 2nd Panzer Division (89 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers).
♦ 116th Panzer Division (73 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers). In reserve just behind the front.
♦ 1st SS Panzer Division (98 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers).
♦ 9th SS Panzer Division (40 Stugs, 46 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers).
♦ 10th SS Panzer Division (38 Stugs, 39 Panzer IVs)
♦ 12th SS Panzer Division (98 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers).
♦ Tiger Battalion SS101 (45 Tigers).
♦ Tiger Battalion SS102 (45 Tigers).
♦ Tiger Battalion 503 (45 Tigers)
Source. Bernages Panzers and the Battle For Normandy and Zetterling's Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness.
On 12th June 1944 the British had no room to sidestep any German divisions before Caen because the Germans totally blocked them. This is why a wide right hook on Caen was attempted. To the south of Panzer Lehr's sector in the vicinity of Villers Bocage there was thought to be an area devoid of German forces, and so this wide right hook was attempted on the morning of 13th June (any wider and it would have overrun into the American lines). Unfortunately, unknown to the British, Schwere SS Panzer Abteilung 101 turned up into this area on the night of the 12/13th June and blocked this right hook with their Tigers and closed the door on Caen.
There was no other room to manoeuvre onto Caen. All attempts had to go right through the German panzer divisions through the rest of June and early July, with the Germans having excellent defensive country (fields broken up by hedgerows everywhere) with which to utilise to their advantage.
The Germans had over 1,500 tanks and assault guns in the British/Canadian sector, including Tiger and Panthers. Even the King Tiger and Jagdpanther made their WW2 combat débuts around Caen in July.
The Americans, who were not equipped, or experienced to face massed German armour, were given primarily an infantry role by Montgomery - the Americans met very little armour in WW2. The US forces didn't face any German armour until June 13th, and that was only a mere battalion of assault guns. The British destroyed about 90% of German armour in the west.
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+Dave Inportland
"It wasn't Churchills idea to appoint an American Supreme Commander."
It was Churchill's idea to appoint an American, to get them to adopt Germany First. I think it was at Casablanca. In hindsight a dumb thing to do. Eisenhower was clearly not up to the job. He was a colonel only in mid 1942. Most US generals would never make it in the British army. Alan Brooke chief of the British Imperial General Staff wrote: "Ike knows nothing about strategy and is quite unsuited to the post of Supreme Commander. It is no wonder that Monty's real high ability is not always realised"
The US never supplied all the men and materials. The USA supplied 11% of total UK needs, mainly raw materials and food and machine tools, and 5% of the USSR's. 400 tons per day (enough to feed only Bradford). The British had to heavily contribute to feeding and housing the millions of Americans that came over. For Normandy the UK provided the vast majority of the naval forces and air forces and more Brits landed on D-Day than Yanks. Monty in Normandy was in charge of all armies, US and British.
The US was taking heavy losses after Eisenhower took US forces from Monty after Normandy on 2 Sept 1944. 52,000 casualties in the Lorraine when Patton moved 10 miles in three months. 33,000 at the Hurtgen Forest defeat. 100,000 at the Bulge. The USA started to pour men in as their losses were horrendous due to naive and incompetent generals. At this time the British were building up a 2.6 million man army to march into Burma. The US were sending men who were allocated for the Far East to Europe, because of their horrendous losses. The British never suffered such losses, apart from Normandy where the British did most of the heavy fighting.
At May 1945 US manpower in Europe outnumbered British as the US was fearful of further large losses of men. It was envisaged that more British would be in Europe and more US men in the Far East. The the reverse occurred.
After the Germans scythed into the US armies at the Bulge, Monty had to take control of two US armies to stop the advance and turn it back, the 1st and 9th. He had control of the 9th until the end of the war.
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@rcwagon
Market Garden failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. The failure point was not seizing the Nijmegen bridge immediately. At the end of D-Day all crossings were denied to the Germans, except one - the Nijmegen bridge.
General Gavin of the US 82nd was tasked to seize the Nijmegen bridge as soon as landing. Gavin never, he failed with only a few German guards on the bridge. He failed because his 82nd did not seize the Nijmegen bridge immediately. Gavin even de-prioritised the bridge the prime target and focus. The 82nd were ready at 2 pm on the jump day and never moved to the bridge. The gigantic bridge was guarded by only 19 guards. The Germans occupied the bridge at 1900 hrs. Six hours after the 82nd were ready to march.
Events on the 1st day:
♦ "At 1328, the 665 men of US 82nd 1st Battalion began to fall from the sky."
- Poulussen, R. Lost at Nijmegen.
♦ "Forty minutes after the drop, around 1410, _the 1st Battalion marched off towards their objective, De Ploeg, three miles away."
_ Poulussen,
♦ "The 82nd were digging in and performing recon in the area looking for 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald
- Neillands, R. The Battle for the Rhine 1944.
♦ The 82nd were dug in and preparing to defend their newly constructed regimental command post, which they established at 1825. Then Colonel Lindquist "was told by General Gavin, around 1900, to move into Nijmegen."
-Poulussen
Events on the evening of the 1st day:
♦ Having dug in at De Ploeg, Warren's battalion wasn't prepared to move towards Nijmegen at all.
-Poulussen,
♦ Once Lindquist told Lieutenant Colonel Warren that his battalion was to move, Warren decided to visit the HQ of the Nijmegen Underground first - to see what info the underground had on the Germans at the Nijmegen bridge.
- Poulussen,
♦ It was not until 1830hrs that he [Warren] was able to send a force into Nijmegen. This force was somewhat small, just one rifle platoon and an intelligence section with a radio — say forty men.
- Neillands. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
♦ This was not a direct route to the bridge from Warren's original position, and placed him in the middle of the town. It was also around 2100 when "A" Company left to attempt to capture the Nijmegen road bridge.
♦ "B" Company was not with them because they'd split up due to it being dark with "visibility was less than ten yards".
- Poulussen,
♦ The 82nd attacks were resisted by the Germans until the next day.
Events of the 2nd day:
♦ Gavin drove up in a jeep the next morning and was told by Warren that although they didn't have the bridge yet, another attack was about to go in.
♦ Gavin then told Warren to hold because the Germans were attacking in the southeast portion of the 82nd perimeter.
♦ At around 1100, Warren was ordered to withdraw from Nijmegen completely.
- Poulussen
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In 1941 the British were concurrently fighting in all theatres of war, in all corners of the globe and against better prepared forces of greater numbers. Germany’s war was regional, extending from their borders - all logistics went directly over land back to Germany, apart from North Africa where the Italians provided the sea transport back to nearby Italy. The British were fighting Italy and Vichy France too. Japan’s war was confined to a radius around Japan.
Taking on all these countries and securing wins for the free World was pure brilliance.
As well as achieving the first three victories against the ‘unstoppable’ German military war machine, Britain achieved that which no other nation in the world could even possibly dream of accomplishing in the early 1940.
Britain fought a global war in the:
♦ Middle East;
♦ Far East;
♦ Indian subcontinent;
♦ Pacific;
♦ North Africa;
♦ West Africa;
♦ East Africa;
♦ North Atlantic;
♦ South Atlantic;
♦ North Sea;
♦ Barents Sea;
♦ Arctic Sea;
♦ Mediterranean;
♦ Adriatic;
♦ Mainland Western Europe;
♦ Eastern Europe;
♦ Scandinavia.
The British were the only military power in human history to fight in such globally spread theatres of conflict.
For the third year running, Britain was propping up an ally - France, USSR, then the USA. The incompetence of US Navy to provide convoy protection on its east coast almost lost the allies the Battle of the Atlantic. Six hundred ships off the US eastern seaboard were lost in the first six months of 1942. Shipping losses climbed to a level that undermined British ability to supply themselves, keep the Soviets in the war, and keep reinforcements flowing to the Middle East and Asia. The British quickly deployed 60 escort vessels to cover the US coast.
In 1942 the USA was a liability. For most of 1942 the British Commonwealth held the line, kept back the combined efforts of Germany, Italy and Japan, with minimal input from the USA compared to her potential power, keeping the Atlantic and Indian oceans open with supplies flowing to the vital armies in the Middle East and Asia, and to the USSR. No other empire in the history of the world has been capable of such a sustained multi-continent and multi-ocean operation.
In 1942 the British Commonwealth was fighting a three continent, four ocean campaign, against three major powers and keeping the USSR supplied The thousands of tanks and aircraft sent to the USSR would have saved Singapore.
The total British losses of territory and people in the early war were:
♦ One third of the territory the Soviets lost;
♦ Half of the people the Americans lost - mainly Philippines;
Yet those nations were fighting only on one front and only against one of the three powers.
The British Commonwealth had far more ground troops in action against the Japanese than the Americans. Also the British were maintaining sea control over the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. And then provided aircraft carriers and cruisers to help in the Pacific - while the USA concentrated on just one of those theatres.
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David Himmelsbach
Not this nut again...
1985 US Army report on the Lorraine Campaign.
Patton does not come out well.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a211668.pdf
From the document is in italics:
"Soldiers and generals alike assumed that Lorraine would fall quickly, and unless the war ended first, Patton's tanks would take the war into Germany by summer's end. But Lorraine was not to be overrun in a lightning campaign. Instead, the battle for Lorraine would drag on for more than 3 months."
"Despite its proximity to Germany, Lorraine was not the Allies' preferred invasion route in 1944_._ Except for its two principal cities, Metz and Nancy, the province_ contained few significant military objectives." "Moreover, once Third Army penetrated the province and entered Germany, there would still be no first-rate military objectives within its grasp. The Saar industrial region, while significant, was of secondary importance when compared to the great Ruhr industrial complex farther north."
Another Patton chase into un-needed territory, like
he did when running his troops into Brittany.
"With so little going for it, why did Patton bother with Lorraine at all? The reason was that Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, made up his mind to destroy as many German forces as possible west of the Rhine."
In other words a waste of time.
"Communications Zone organized the famous Red Ball Express, a non-stop conveyor belt of trucks connecting the Normandy depots with the field armies."
They were getting fuel via 6,000 trucks.
"The simple truth was that although fuel was plentiful in Normandy, there was no way to transport it in sufficient quantities to the leading elements. On 31 August , Third Army received no fuel at all."
In short, Patton overran his supply lines. What was
important was to secure the Port of Antwerp's
approaches. Montgomery approached the US leaders
of the First Airborne Army and they would not drop into
the Scheldt.
"Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be considered First-rate troops. Third Army encountered whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and others consisting entirety of soldiers with stomach ulcers."
Some army the Americans were going to fight
"Was the Lorraine campaign an American victory' From September through November, Third Army claimed to have inflicted over 180,000 casualties on the enemy. But to capture the province of Lorraine, a problem which involved an advance of only 40 to 60 air miles, Third Army required over 3 months and suffered 50,000 casualties, approximately one-third of the total number of casualties it sustained in the entire European war."
Huge losses for taking unimportant territory,
against a poor German army.
"Ironically, Third Army never used Lorraine as a springboard for an advance into Germany after all. Patton turned most of the sector over to Seventh Army during the Ardennes crisis, and when the eastward advance resumed after the Battle of the Bulge, Third Army based its operations on Luxembourg, not Lorraine. The Lorraine campaign will always remain a controversial episode in American military history."
It's getting worse. One third of all European casualties
in Lorraine and never used the territory to move into Germany.
"Finally the Lorraine Campaign demonstrated that Logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful and aggressive the commanding general may be." "Patton violated tactical principles" "His discovered that violating logistical principles is an unforgiving and cumulative matter."
Not flattering at all. And Americans state Patton
was the best general they had.
Bradley stated later:
“Patton was developing as an unpopular guy. He steamed about with great convoys of cars and great squads of cameramen … To George, tactics was simply a process of bulling ahead. Never seemed to think out a campaign. Seldom made a careful estimate of the situation. I thought him a shallow commander … I disliked the way he worked, upset tactical plans, interfered in my orders. His stubbornness on amphibious operations, parade plans into Messina sickened me and soured me on Patton. We learned how not to behave from Patton’s Seventh Army.”
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Shandwen
Some facts for you. The British were the single biggest agents in the defeat of Nazi Germany. They were there from day one until the end. The so-called "invincible" Germans army tried and failed, with their allies, for two years in WW2 to defeat the British army in North Africa. The finest army in the world from mid 1942 onwards was the British. From El Alemein it moved right up into Denmark, through nine countries, and not once suffered a reverse taking all in its path. Over 90% of German armour in the west was destroyed by the British. Montgomery had to give the US armies an infantry role as they were not equipped to engage massed German SS armour.
Montgomery stopped the Germans in every event they attacked him:
♦ August 1942 - Alem el Halfa
♦ October 1942 - El Alamein
♦ March 1943 - Medenine
♦ June 1944 - Normandy
♦ Sept/Oct 1944 - The Netherlands
♦ December 1944 - Battle of the Bulge
Not on one occasion were Monty's ground armies pushed back into a retreat by the Germans. The US Army were struggling in 1944/45 retreating in the Ardennes. The Americans didn't perform well at all east of Aachen, then the Hurtgen Forest defeat with 33,000 casualties and Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months with over 50,000 casualties. The Battle of the Bulge took all the US effort, and vital help from Montgomery and the British 21st Army Group, just to get back to the start line. The Germans took 20,000 US POWs in the Battle of The Bulge in Dec 1944. No other allied country had that many prisoners taken in the 1944-45 timeframe. The USA retreat at the Bulge, again, the only allied army to be pushed back into a retreat in the 1944-45 timeframe. Montgomery was effectively in charge of the Bulge having to take control of the US 1st and 9th armies. The 9th stayed under his control until the end of the war just about.
Normandy was planned and commanded by the British with Montgomery leading, which was a great success coming in ahead of schedule and with less casualties than predicted. The German armour in the west was wiped out by primarily the British - the US forces were impotent against the panzers. Monty assessed the US armies (he was in charge of them) and had to give them a supporting infantry role, as they were just not equipped to fight tank v tank battles. On 3 Sept 1944 when Eisenhower took over overall allied command of ground forces everything went at a snail's pace. The fastest advance of any western army in Autumn/early 1945 was the 60 mile thrust by the British XXX Corps to the Rhine at Arnhem.
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Montgomery immediately assessed what the Germans were doing and their aims. This would have been passed to US high command. Bradley saying he never knew the Germans ultimate aim until after WW2 is hogwash.
Bastogne was on the German's extreme left flank. They bypassed the town leaving a light containment force at Bastogne, with focus towards the west where bigger fish were to fry, being stopped by Montgomery's 21st Army Group at Dinant.
The 18,000 inside Bastogne said themselves they were not relieved by Patton. They just walked out. The German commander of the containment force was scared stiff of the 18,000 attacking him, as he would have been overwhelmed. The 18,000 made no attempt to break out. The 18,000 in the town did not effect the course of the battle or its outcome, as they just stayed inside in warm buildings, while the smaller German containment force were outside in sub zero temperatures.
Bastogne had 18,000 inside, with artillery and armoured units. Bastogne was a crossroads to where? Bastogne was on the extreme left flank of the German advance. Much further left then you are in US lines. The Germans by-passed the town once they found resistance, as it was not worth holding up troops over. The Germans were going west. West was were their objectives where. The Meuse and Antwerp.
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Narred Darr
whist market Garden? uh?
After the Normandy breakout both British and US armies had little in front of them and sped across France.
A 1985 US Army report on the Lorraine Campaign. The US 2nd Armour were in Patton's army. Patton does not come out well at all.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a211668.pdf
From the document is in italics.
"Soldiers and generals alike assumed that Lorraine would fall quickly, and unless the war ended first, Patton's tanks would take the war into Germany by summer's end. But Lorraine was not to be overrun in a lightning campaign. Instead, the battle for Lorraine would drag on for more than 3 months."
The British never said the war would be over by Xmas.
"Despite its proximity to Germany, Lorraine was not the Allies' preferred invasion route in 1944. Except for its two principal cities, Metz and Nancy, the province *contained few significant military objectives.*"
"Moreover, once Third Army penetrated the province and entered Germany, there would still be no first-rate military objectives within its grasp. The Saar industrial region, while significant, was of secondary importance when compared to the great Ruhr industrial complex farther north."
Another Patton chase into un-needed territory, like he did when running his troops into Brittany.
"With so little going for it, why did Patton bother with Lorraine at all? The reason was that Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, made up his mind to destroy as many German forces as possible west of the Rhine."
In other words a waste of time, not getting at the heart of the German war machine.
"Communications Zone organized the famous Red Ball Express, a non-stop conveyor belt of trucks connecting the Normandy depots with the field armies."
They were getting fuel via 6,000 trucks.
"The simple truth was that although fuel was plentiful in Normandy, there was no way to transport it in sufficient quantities to the leading elements. On 31 August , Third Army received no fuel at all."
In short, Patton overran his supply lines. What was important was to secure the Port of Antwerp's approaches. Monty approached the US leaders of the First Airborne Army and they would not drop into the Scheld.
"Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be considered First-rate troops. Third Army encountered whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and others consisting entirety of soldiers with stomach ulcers."
Some army the Americans were going to fight
"Was the Lorraine campaign an American victory? From September through November, Third Army claimed to have inflicted over 180,000 casualties on the enemy. But to capture the province of Lorraine, a problem which involved an advance of only 40 to 60 air miles, Third Army required over 3 months and suffered 50,000 casualties, approximately one-third of the total number of casualties it sustained in the entire European war."
Huge losses for taking unimportant territory, against a poor German army. How clever.
"Ironically, Third Army never used Lorraine as a springboard for an advance into Germany after all. Patton turned most of the sector over to Seventh Army during the Ardennes crisis, and when the eastward advance resumed after the Battle of the Bulge, Third Army based its operations on Luxembourg, not Lorraine. The Lorraine campaign will always remain a controversial episode in American military history."
It's getting worse. The Americans had one third of all their European casualties in Lorraine and never used the territory to move into Germany.
"Finally the Lorraine Campaign demonstrated that Logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful and aggressive the commanding general may be."
"Patton violated tactical principles"
"His discovered that violating logistical principles is an unforgiving and cumulative matter."
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@Michael Basford
You need to do some reading.
In an interview with General Browning in the NY Times he said he gave equal priority to the bridge and the Groesbeek heights. The heights near De Ploeg, which are really pretty flat being a wooded area but high for Holland, are pretty well between the DZ and bridge. Browning and Gavin did not want German troops between the DZ and the bridge, so the heights had to be occupied and secure. Gavin understood the priorities of sending the 508th to the bridge and heights immediately, with Coln Warren's battalion of the 508th assigned the bridge. To get to the bridge from the DZ you have to go through the heights, so any enemy at the heights naturally had to be subdued, then secure the area, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge.
It took the 508th a painfully slow 3.5 hours to march a few miles from the DZ to the heights, reaching the heights at 1730. There were no Germans at the heights as a forward scouts relayed back, so Coln Lindquist could send Warren's battalion to the bridge immediately, without any delay, while men stayed back setting up defences at De Ploeg on the heights. Dutch resistance men informed the 508th that the Germans had largely cleared out of the town with only 19 guards on the bridge.
Lindquist of the 508th was not moving at all, staying static at De Ploeg. Lindquist was waiting for a Divisional Order from Gavin that the "DZ" was secure then move Warren's battalion to the bridge. When Gavin found out via a liaison officer he was livid, running over to De Ploeg in a Jeep telling Lindquist to get moving to the bridge. Three stray men from a patrol sent to the bridge by Warren to confirm what the Dutch Underground told them, took the guards on the south end of the bridge prisoner. They left when no one turned up. When leaving they saw the Germans pour hundreds of men onto the bridge. Some of Warren's men got lost when they eventually moved to the bridge. By the time the 508th did get to the bridge in force, the Germans had come south reinforcing the bridge with hundreds of men. Too late.
The 82nd were expecting German resistance from the east, however it came from the north via the Nijmegen bridge. Gavin was expecting Lindquist to secure the heights, which were devoid of enemy forces, then move to the bridge, which meant sending Warren's battalion immediately. Lindquist was expecting Gavin to notify him that the DZ was clear, Gavin was expecting Lindquist to go to the bridge when it was obvious the heights, on the way to bridge, were secure. As no Germans were about, the heights were naturally secure.
Regarding Lindquist's expecting clearing of the DZ before moving from DePloeg. Lindquist did write a Field Order for the 508th on 13 September copied to Gavin, stating that once the heights were secure he would wait for a Divisional Order [from Gavin] to move. Two days later at the jump briefing Gavin verbally told Lindquist, using a map, that he should move to the bridge "without delay". Poor command communications by Gavin. Poulussen, in Lost at Nijmegen discovered that the 508th jumped without any written offensive orders from Gavin. All was verbal from Gavin to Lindquist. Chester Graham, the 82nd liaison officer, was at the pre jump meeting in England. He said there was no ambiguity amongst anyone that the bridge was the prime target.
In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, was wanting confirmation if the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the objectives. In response, dated 25 July 1945, General Gavin was clear: "About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, Commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city."
Browning never knew men were static at De Ploeg. Like Gavin he was expecting men to be seizing the bridge. Being corps commander, he was busy trying to communicate with all three para divisions. The 82nd launched a few failed attacks on the bridge. In the afternoon of the next day, 18th, Gavin asked permission to launch another attack. Browning, seeing the bridge was well defended, and the failed attacks, refused, opting to wait for XXX Corps to arrive to seize the bridge. Inexplicably Gavin moved all his men out of Nijmegen town completely to the heights and DZ, giving the town back to the Germans. This made matters worse when XXX Corps arrived who had expend vital time, and ammunition, in flushing them out.
On page 162 of the U.S. Official History:
"many documents regarding the extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files."
Read:
Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment In World War II by Phil Nordyke.
Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergström.
Market Garden, Then and Now by Karl Magry.
Lost at Nijmegen by R Poulusson
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