Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "No, Monty didn't make a "Blunder" during the Battle of the Bulge (with the 82nd Airborne)" video.
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The British 2nd Tactical Air Force in the Bulge took control of the IX and XXIX Tactical Air Commands from Vandenberg’s Ninth Air Force.
The First Army’s hasty defense had been one of hole-plugging, last stands, and counterattacks to buy time. Although some were successful, these tactics had created organizational havoc within Hodges’ forces as divisional units had been committed piecemeal and badly jumbled.
Ridgway wanted St. Vith’s defenders to stay east of the Salm, but Montgomery ruled otherwise. The 7th Armored Division, its ammunition and fuel in short supply and perhaps two-thirds of its tanks destroyed, and the battered elements of the 9th Armored, 106th, and 28th Divisions could not hold the extended perimeter in the rolling and wooded terrain. Meanwhile, Dietrich’s second wave of tanks entered the fray. The II SS Panzer Corps immediately threatened the Salm River line north and west of St. Vith, as did the LVIII Panzer Corps circling to the south, adding the 2d SS Panzer Division to its drive. Ordering the St. Vith defenders to withdraw through the 82d Airborne Division line to prevent another Schnee Eifel disaster, Montgomery signaled them that “they come back with all honor.”
- Ardennes-Alsace by Roger Cirillo. US Army Center of Military History
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”_
“I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Christmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...[Montgomery] was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- General Hasbrouck of 7th Armor - “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
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@winoodlesnoodles1984
What US historian Harry Yeide wrote of what the Germans thought of Patton:
♦ for most of the war the Germans barely took notice [of Patton].
♦ on March 23 at the Battle of El Guettar—the first American victory against the experienced Germans. Patton’s momentum, however, was short-lived: Axis troops held him to virtually no gain until April 7, when they withdrew under threat from British Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army.
♦ There is no indication in the surviving German military records—which include intelligence reports at the theater, army, and division levels—that Patton’s enemies had any idea who he was at the time. Likewise, the immediate postwar accounts of the German commanders in Tunisia, written for the U.S. Army’s History Division, ignore Patton. Those reports show that ground commanders considered II Corps’s attacks under Patton to have been hesitant, and to have missed great opportunities.
♦ In mid-June [1943], another detachment report described Patton as “an energetic and responsibility-loving command personality”—a passing comment on one of the numerous Allied commanders. Patton simply had not yet done anything particularly noteworthy in their eyes.
♦ But his race to Palermo through country they had already abandoned left the commanders unimpressed. Major General Eberhard Rodt, who led the 15th Panzergrenadier Division against Patton’s troops during the Allied push toward Messina, thought the American Seventh Army fought hesitantly and predictably. He wrote in an immediate postwar report on Sicily, “The enemy very often conducted his movements systematically, and only attacked after a heavy artillery preparation when he believed he had broken our resistance. This kept him regularly from exploiting the weakness of our situation and gave me the opportunity to consolidate dangerous situations.” Once again, Patton finished a campaign without impressing his opponents.
♦ General Hermann Balck, who took command of Army Group G in September, thus did not think highly of Patton—or any other opposing commanders—during this time. Balck wrote to his commander, Runstedt, on October 10, “I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again…can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans” Looking back on his battles against Patton throughout the autumn, in 1979 Balck recalled, “Within my zone, the Americans never once exploited a success. Often [General Friedrich Wilhelm von] Mellenthin, my chief of staff, and I would stand in front of the map and say, ‘Patton is helping us; he failed to exploit another success.’”
♦ The commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, Hasso von Manteuffel, aimed a dismissive, indirect critique at Patton’s efforts at Bastogne, writing in his memoirs that the Americans did not “strike with full élan.” The commanders who fought against Patton in his last two mobile campaigns in the Saar-Palatinate and east of the Rhine already knew they could not win; their losses from this point forward were inevitable, regardless of the commanding Allied opponent.
♦ the Germans offered Patton faint praise during and immediately after the war.
♦ posterity deserves fact and not myth. The Germans did not track Patton’s movements as the key to Allied intentions. Hitler does not appear to have thought often of Patton, if at all. The Germans considered Patton a hesitant commanding general in the scrum of position warfare. They never raised his name in the context of worthy strategists.
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@ohgosh5892
A part of the exchange was that Britain would impart technology to the USA. The USA was way behind. Look at the Tizzard Mission: a-bomb, radar, proximity fuses, penicillin, jet engines, sonar, advanced supercharging, etc, etc. All given to the USA.
It was to be two-way. But little the USA developed they gave to the Brits. They would not tell the Brits about the Norden bomb site. Which was a ruse, as it was nothing special, so probably to keep up the ruse.
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@winoodlesnoodles1984
1985 US Army report on the Lorraine Campaign.
Patton does not come out well at all.
Combat Studies Institute.
The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, September-December 1944.
by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel
February, 1985
From the document is in italics:
Soldiers and generals alike assumed that Lorraine would fall quickly, and unless the war ended first, Patton's tanks would take the war into Germany by summer's end. But Lorraine was not to be overrun in a lightning campaign. Instead, the battle for Lorraine would drag on for more than 3 months."
"Despite its proximity to Germany, Lorraine was not the Allies' preferred invasion route in 1944. Except for its two principal cities, Metz and Nancy, the province contained few significant military objectives." "Moreover, once Third Army penetrated the province and entered Germany, there would still be no first-rate military objectives within its grasp.
The Saar industrial region, while significant, was of secondary importance when compared to the great Ruhr industrial complex farther north."
Another Patton chase into un-needed territory, full of vineyards like he did when running his troops into Brittany.
"With so little going for it, why did Patton bother with Lorraine at all?
In other words a waste of time.
"Communications Zone organized the famous Red Ball Express, a non-stop conveyor belt of trucks connecting the Normandy depots with the field armies."
They were getting fuel via 6,000 trucks.
"The simple truth was that although fuel was plentiful in Normandy, there was no way to transport it in sufficient quantities to the leading elements. On 31 August , Third Army received no fuel at all."
In short, Patton overran his supply lines. What was important was to secure the Port of Antwerp's approaches, which Eisenhower deprioritised. Montgomery approached the US leaders of the First Airborne Army who would not drop into the Scheldt.
"Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be considered First-rate troops. Third Army encountered whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and others consisting entirety of soldiers with stomach ulcers."
Some army Patton wasere going to fight
"Was the Lorraine campaign an American victory? From September through November, Third Army claimed to have inflicted over 180,000 casualties on the enemy. But to capture the province of Lorraine, a problem which involved an advance of only 40 to 60 air miles, Third Army required over 3 months and suffered 50,000 casualties, approximately one-third of the total number of casualties it sustained in the entire European war."
The US Army does not think it was a victory. Huge losses for taking unimportant territory, against a poor German army.
"Ironically, Third Army never used Lorraine as a springboard for an advance into Germany after all. Patton turned most of the sector over to Seventh Army during the Ardennes crisis, and when the eastward advance resumed after the Battle of the Bulge, Third Army based its operations on Luxembourg, not Lorraine. The Lorraine campaign will always remain a controversial episode in American military history."
It's getting worse. One third of all European casualties in Lorraine and never used the territory to move into Germany.
Not flattering at all. And many Americans state Patton was the best general they had. Bradley stated later:
“Patton was developing as an unpopular guy. He steamed about with great convoys of cars and great squads of cameramen … To George, tactics was simply a process of bulling ahead. Never seemed to think out a campaign. Seldom made a careful estimate of the situation. I thought him a shallow commander … I disliked the way he worked, upset tactical plans, interfered in my orders. His stubbornness on amphibious operations, parade plans into Messina sickened me and soured me on Patton. We learned how not to behave from Patton’s Seventh Army.”
Patton was not advancing or being heavily engaged at the time he turned north to Bastogne when the Germans pounded through US lines in the Ardennes. Bastogne was on the very southern German flank, their left flank, their focus being west. The strategic significance of the stand at Bastogne is over exaggerated. The 18,000 inside of artillery, armour and infantry, did not change the course of the battle. The German's bypassed Bastogne, placing a containment force around the town. It was not worth them tying up men for the place.
Only when Patton neared Bastogne did he engage some German armour but not a great deal at all. Patton's ride to Bastogne was mainly through US held territory, with the road from Luxembourg to Bastogne having few German forces. The Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade was far from being one of the best German armoured units with about 80 tanks, 26th Volks-Grenadier having about 12 Hetzers, and the small element of Panzer Lehr (Kampfgruppe 901) left behind with a small number of operational tanks. Patton did not have to smash through full panzer divisions or Tiger battalions on his way to Bastogne. Patton's armoured forces outnumbered the Germans by at least 6 to 1. Patton faced very little German armour when he broke through to Bastogne because the vast majority of the German 5th Panzer Army had already left Bastogne in their rear moving westwards to the River Meuse. They were engaging forces under Montgomery's 21st Army Group near Dinant by the Meuse. Monty's armies halted the German advance pushing them back.
On the night of the 22 December 1944, Patton ordered Combat Command B of 4th Armored Division to advance through the village of Chaumont in the night. A small number of German troops with anti tank weapons stopped the American attack who pulled back. The next day, fighter bombers strafed the village of Chaumont weakening the defenders enabling the attack to resume the next afternoon. However, a German counter attack north of Chaumont knocked out 12 Shermans with Combat Command B again retreating. It took Patton almost THREE DAYS just to get through the village of Chaumont. They didn't get through Chaumont village until Christmas Day. Hardly racing at breakneck speed.
Patton had less than 20 km of German held ground to cover during his actual 'attack' towards Bastogne, with the vast majority of his move towards Bastogne through American held lines devoid of the enemy. His start line for the attack was at Vaux-les-Rosieres, 15km southwest of Bastogne and yet he still took him five days to get through to Bastogne. After the German attack in the Ardennes, US air force units were put under Coningham of the RAF, who gave Patton massive ground attack support and he still stalled. Patton's failure to concentrate his forces on a narrow front and his decision to commit two green divisions to battle without adequate reconnaissance resulted in his stall. US historian Roger Cirillo said, "Patton launched attack, after attack, after attack, after attack, that failed. Because he never waited to concentrate".
The 18,000 men in Bastogne pretty well walked out, even the commander of the US 101st stated that. The Germans had vacated the area heading west.
Decades later, Eisenhower recalled how Patton would telephone with frustrating progress reports, saying: “General, I apologize for my slowness. This snow is God-awful. I’m sorry.”
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Montgomery immediately assessed what the Germans were doing and their aims. This would have been passed to US high command. Bradley saying he never knew the Germans ultimate aim until after WW2 is hogwash.
Bastogne was on the German's extreme left flank. They bypassed the town leaving a light containment force at Bastogne, with focus towards the west where bigger fish were to fry, being stopped by Montgomery's 21st Army Group at Dinant.
The 18,000 inside Bastogne said themselves they were not relieved by Patton. They just walked out. The German commander of the containment force was scared stiff of the 18,000 attacking him, as he would have been overwhelmed. The 18,000 made no attempt to break out. The 18,000 in the town did not effect the course of the battle or its outcome, as they just stayed inside in warm buildings, while the smaller German containment force were outside in sub zero temperatures.
Bastogne had 18,000 inside, with artillery and armoured units. Bastogne was a crossroads to where? Bastogne was on the extreme left flank of the German advance. Much further left then you are in US lines. The Germans by-passed the town once they found resistance, as it was not worth holding up troops over. The Germans were going west. West was were their objectives where. The Meuse and Antwerp.
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I will let the Germans have the first say on the Bulge:
General Hasso von Manteuffel:
‘The operations of the American First Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
By November 1944, British SHEAF officer, Strong, noted that there was a possibility of a German counter-offensive in the Ardennes or the Vosges. Strong went to personally warn Bradley at his HQ, who said, "let 'em come".
Montgomery on hearing of the attack immediately, without consulting Eisenhower, took British forces to the Meuse to prevent any German forces from making a bridgehead, securing the rear. He was prepared to halt their advance and attack them. This was while Eisenhower and Bradley were doing nothing.
even by 19 December, three days into the offensive, no overall plan had emerged from 12th Army Group or SHAEF, other than the decision to send Patton’s forces north to Bastogne. Overall, the Ardennes battle was in urgent need of grip. General Hodges had yet to see Bradley or receive more than the sketchiest orders from his Army Group commander.
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
On 20 December, Montgomery had sent a signal to Alanbrooke regarding the US forces:
"Not good... definite lack of grip and control. I have heard nothing from Ike or Bradley and had no orders or requests of any sort. My own opinion is that the American forces have been cut in half and the Germans can reach the Meuse at Namur without opposition."
Omar Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group, did very little:
16 Dec, the first day, for 12 hours did nothing.
16 Dec, after 12 hours, he sent two armoured divisions from the flanking Ninth and Third Armies.
17 Dec, after 24 Hours, he then called in two US airborne divisions from Champagne.
18 Dec, he ordered Patton to halt his pending offensive in the Saar.
18 Dec, he had still not established contact with the First Army, while Monty had.
19 Dec, he withdrew divisions from the Aachen front to shore up the Ardennes.
19 Dec, he had still not produced an overall defensive plan.
19 Dec, the Supreme Commander intervened directly late in the day.
20 Dec, Eisenhower telephoned Montgomery telling him to take command of the US First and Ninth Armies
While all this dillying by Bradley was going on, German armies were pounding forward into his lines. Bradley should have been fired. Hodges ran away from his command post.
British officer Whiteley & American officer Betts of SHEAF visited the U.S. First Army HQ after the German attack, seeing the shambles. Strong, Whiteley, and Betts recommended that command of the armies north of the Ardennes be transferred from Bradley to Montgomery. Unfortunately only the two British officers approached Bedell Smith of their recommendations, who immediately fired the pair, claiming it was a nationalistic thing. The next morning, Beddel Smith apologized seeing the three were right, recommending to Eisenhower to bring in Monty.
During the Battle of the Bulge Eisenhower was stuck self imprisoned in his HQ in des-res Versailles near Paris in fear of German paratroopers wearing US uniforms with the objective to kill allied generals. He had remained locked up more than 30 days communicating little with Montgomery, and that is when he thought he was doing ground control of the campaign, when in effect Montgomery was in control as two shambolic US armies had to be put under his control after the German attack, the US First and Ninth armies. Coningham of the RAF had to take control of US air force units. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war, just about.
And yet biased American authors such as Stephen Ambrose said that Eisenhower took control of the Bulge and made the battle his veneering it as an all American victory. Ambrose completely falsified history. The only thing Eisenhower did was tell Monty to get control of two out of control US armies, tell the US 101st to go to Bastogne (who were in northern France after the buffer Market Garden was created) and men under Bradley to counterattack. That is it.
At the end of the Bulge would you believe it, Eisenhower gave Bradley an award.
Read:
Battle of the Bulge by Charles Whiting
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111,000 British troops were involved. Two shambolic US armies had to be given to a proven competent commander - there was only one, Montgomery. British officer Whiteley & American officer Betts of SHEAF visited the U.S. First Army HQ after the German attack, seeing the shambles. Strong, Whiteley, and Betts recommended that command of the armies north of the Ardennes be transferred from Bradley to Montgomery. Unfortunately only the two British officers approached Beddel Smith of their recommendations, who immediately fired the pair, claiming it was a nationalistic thing called the two "sons of b****s". The next morning, Beddel Smith apologized after seeing the gravity of the situation, saw the three officers were right, recommending to Eisenhower to bring in Monty.
After the Bulge debacle, the British were told to shut up about their involvement, allowing the Americans to claim it was all their victory. An official hush order was given. The idea was to keep the Americans quiet and happy and get on with the war. Dr Mark Felton covers this well enough.
The reality was that Eisenhower, Hodges and Bradley should have been fired from their positions. After the battle Eisenhower gave Bradley an award. No kidding.
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@TheImperatorKnight
Hodges, fled his HQ from Spa to near Liege on the 18th, despite the Germans never getting anywhere near to Spa. Hodges did not even wait for the Germans to approach Spa. He had already fled long before the Germans were stopped. Monty's liaison officers went to Spa but found the HQ empty. They had to ask civilians in the village where they had gone. They pointed up a road to Liege. So they raced up trying to find them. You couldn't make this up.
The USA retreat at the Bulge was the only allied army to be pushed back into a retreat in the 1944-45 timeframe. Montgomery was effectively in charge of the Bulge having to take control of the US First and Ninth armies. Coningham of the RAF was put in command of USAAF elements.
The US Third Army constantly stalled after coming up from the south, who never relieved Bastogne - even the US commanders of the 18,000 inside emphatically say so. They pretty well walked out. Patton, this so-called master of lightning armoured warfare, was so slow. Decades later, Eisenhower recalled how Patton would telephone with frustrating progress reports, saying: “General, I apologize for my slowness. This snow is God-awful. I’m sorry.” It took Patton three days to get thru one village and totally outnumbering the enemy.
The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war just about, and under Monty performed very well. The commander of the Ninth, General Simpson, has near been written out of US military history, as he went hand in hand with Monty for the common good. The US armies were losing men at unsustainable rates due to poor generalship. The Ninth never suffered such attrition rates.
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@TheImperatorKnight
Eisenhower should have been given just the political role, dealing with Chiefs of Staff, presidents, PMs, other forces leaders, etc. The ground control should have stayed with Monty.
Hodges and Bradley should have been fired for sure.
I will let the Germans have the first say on the Bulge:
General Hasso von Manteuffel:
‘The operations of the American First Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Montgomery on hearing of the attack immediately, without consulting Eisenhower, took British forces to the Meuse to prevent any German forces from making a bridgehead, securing the rear. He was prepared to halt their advance and attack them. This was while Eisenhower and Bradley were doing nothing.
On 20 December, Montgomery had sent a signal to Alanbrooke regarding the US forces:
"Not good... definite lack of grip and control. I have heard nothing from Ike or Bradley and had no orders or requests of any sort. My own opinion is that the American forces have been cut in half and the Germans can reach the Meuse at Namur without opposition."
Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group, did very little:
16 Dec, the first day, for 12 hours did nothing.
16 Dec, after 12 hours, he sent two armoured divisions from the flanking Ninth and Third Armies.
17 Dec, after 24 Hours, he then called in two US airborne divisions from Champagne.
18 Dec, he ordered Patton to halt his pending offensive in the Saar.
18 Dec, he had still not established contact with the First Army, while Monty had.
19 Dec, he withdrew divisions from the Aachen front to shore up the Ardennes.
19 Dec, he had still not produced an overall defensive plan.
19 Dec, the Supreme Commander intervened directly late in the day.
20 Dec, Eisenhower telephoned Montgomery telling him to take command of the US First and Ninth Armies
While all this dillying by Bradley was going on, German armies were pounding forward into his lines. Bradley should have been fired immediately. Hodges ran away from his command post.
During the Battle of the Bulge Eisenhower was stuck self imprisoned in his HQ in des-res Versailles near Paris in fear of German paratroopers wearing US uniforms with the objective to kill allied generals. He had remained locked up more than 30 days communicating little with Montgomery, and that is when he thought he was doing ground control of the campaign, when in effect Montgomery was in control as two US shambolic US armies had to be put under his control after the German attack, the US First and Ninth armies.
And yet biased American authors said that Eisenhower took control of the Bulge and made the battle his veneering it as an all American victory. Ambrose completely falsified history. The only thing Eisenhower did was tell Monty to get control of two out of control US armies, tell the US 101st to go to Bastogne (who were in northern France after the buffer Market Garden was created) and men under Bradley to counterattack. That is it.
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Bastogne was not critical at all. It was so critical for the Germans they bypassed it rather than expend men on it. It was on their extreme left flank. The Germans slowed Patton down. He was very slow. Patton had less than 20 km of German held ground to cover during his actual 'attack' towards Bastogne, with the vast majority of his move towards Bastogne through American held lines devoid of the enemy. His start line for the attack was at Vaux-les-Rosieres, 15km southwest of Bastogne and yet he still took him five days to get through to Bastogne.
After the German attack in the Ardennes, US air force units were put under Coningham of the RAF, who gave Patton massive ground attack support and he still stalled. Patton's failure to concentrate his forces on a narrow front and his decision to commit two green divisions to battle without adequate reconnaissance resulted in his stall. US historian Roger Cirillo said, "Patton launched attack, after attack, after attack, after attack, that failed. Because he never waited to concentrate".
The 18,000 men in Bastogne pretty well walked out, even the commander of the US 101st stated that. The Germans had vacated the area heading west.
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@jdsaldivar5606
In fact the 82nd had no part in the eventual seizure of the bridge at all, as it was taken in the dark by the British XXX Corps tanks and Guards infantry. The Irish Guards cleared out 180 Germans from the bridge girders the day after capture. Only 5 tanks crossed the bridge with two being knocked out, and one got operational again by a lone sergeant who met up with the rest of the tanks in the village of Lent 1 km north of the bridge.
So, only four operational tanks were available on the north side of the bridge. Strangely, Gavin's plan was to take one of Europe's largest road bridges only from one end, taking no boats with him. The film A Bridge Too Far has Robert Redford (playing Capt Cook) as one of the 82nd men taking the vital road bridge after rowing the river in canvas boats. This never happened.
Sergeant Peter Robinson, of the of the Guards Armored Division who led the charge over the Nijmegen road bridge in his Firefly tank stated:
"The Nijmegen bridge wasn’t taken [by the 82nd] which was our objective. We reached the far end of the bridge and immediately there was a roadblock. So the troop sergeant covered me through and then I got to the other side and covered the rest of the troop through. We were still being engaged; there was a gun in front of the church three or four hundred yards in front of us. We knocked him out. We got down the road to the railway bridge; we cruised round there very steady. We were being engaged all the time. Just as I got round the corner and turned right I saw these helmets duck in a ditch and run, and gave them a burst of machine gun fire. I suddenly realised they were Americans. They had already thrown a gammon grenade at me so dust and dirt and smoke were flying everywhere. They jumped out of the ditch; they kissed the tank; they kissed the guns because they’d lost a lot of men. They had had a very bad crossing.
Sgt Robinson again....
"Well, my orders were to collect the American colonel who was in a house a little way back, and the first thing he said to me was "I have to surrender""Well I said, 'I'm sorry. My orders are to hold this bridge. I've only got two tanks available but if you'd like to give me ground support for a little while until we get some more orders then we can do it. He said he couldn’t do it, so I said that he had better come back to my wireless and talk to General Horrocks because before I started the job I had freedom of the air. Everybody was off the air except myself because they wanted a running commentary about what was going on - So he came over and had a pow-wow with Horrocks. The colonel said 'Oh very well’ and I told him where I wanted the men, but of course you can't consolidate a Yank and they hadn’t been there ten minutes before they were on their way again."
The 82nd men wanted to surrender! And never gave support which was what they were there to do.
Captain Lord Carington's (in the 5th tank over the bridge) own autobiography entitled 'Reflect on Things Past':
Two of our tanks were hit not lethally - by anti-tank fire, and we found a number of Germans perched in the girders who tried to drop things on us but without great effect."
"A film representation of this incident has shown American troops as having already secured the far end of the bridge. That is mistaken - probably the error arose from the film-maker's confusion of two bridges, there was a railway bridge with planks placed between the rails and used by the Germans for [light] road traffic, to the west of the main road bridge we crossed; and the gallant American Airborne men: reached it."
When Sergeant Robinson and his little command crossed our main road bridge, however, only Germans were there to welcome him; and they didn't stay.
The first meeting of the 82nd men and the tanks was 1 km north of the bridge at the village of Lent where the railway embankment from the railway bridge met the north running road running off the main road bridge. The 82nd men did not reach the north end of the actual road bridge, the Guards tanks and the Guards infantry got there first from the south. Historians get confused. There are two bridges at Nijmegen. a railway bridge to the west and and road bridge to the east. They are about 1km apart. The 82nd men rowed the river west of the railway bridge and seized that bridge. The railway bridge was not suitable for running tanks over of course.
The 82nd men moved along the railway embankment north to where the embankment meets the road approach to the road bridge at Lent.
Only five British tanks were able to cross the bridge that night, and two of them were damaged. 4 tanks initially went across then Carrington's lone tank followed, guarding the northern end of the bridge by itself for nearly an hour before he was relieved.
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Montgomery to Alan Brooke..
"If we want the war to end within any reasonable period you have to get Eisenhower’s hand taken off the land battle. I regret to say that in my opinion he just doesn’t know what he is doing.
Montgomery wrote of Eisenhower and his ridiculous broad-front strategy on 22 January 1945:
“I fear that the old snags of indecision and vacillation and refusal to consider the military problem fairly and squarely are coming to the front again . . . The real trouble is that there is no control and the three army groups are each intent on their own affairs. Patton today issued a stirring order to Third Army, saying the next step would be Cologne . . . One has to preserve a sense of humour these days, otherwise one would go mad.”
Alanbrooke wrote in his diary about Eisenhower:
“At the end of this morning's C.O.S. [Chief of Staff] meeting I put before the committee my views on the very unsatisfactory state of affairs in France, with no one running the land battle. Eisenhower, though supposed to be doing so, is on the golf links at Rheims — entirely detached and taking practically no part in running of the war. Matters got so bad lately that a deputation of Whiteley, Bedell Smith and a few others went up to tell him that he must get down to it and RUN the war, which he said he would."
"We discussed the advisability of getting Marshall to come out to discuss the matter, but we are doubtful if he would appreciate the situation. Finally decided that I am to see the P.M. to discuss the situation with him.”
"November 28th I went to see the P.M. I told him I was very worried."
Alan Brooke described in his daily diary that American generals Eisenhower and Marshall as poor strategists, when they were in jobs were strategy mattered. Brooke wrote to Montgomery about his talks with Eisenhower, “it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war!”
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@jdsaldivar5606
Timeline
Events on the 1st day - D day:
▪ "At 1328, the 665 men of US 82nd 1st Battalion began to fall from the sky."
- R Poulussen, Lost at Nijmegen.
▪ "Forty minutes after the drop, around 1410, the 1st Battalion marched off towards their objective, De Ploeg, three miles away."
- R Poulussen.
"The 82nd were digging in and performing reconn in the area looking for 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald
- Neillands, R. The Battle for the Rhine 1944.
▪ "Colonel Warren about 1830 sent into Nijmegen a patrol consisting of a rifle platoon and the battalion intelligence section. This patrol was to make an aggressive reconnaissance, investigate reports from Dutch civilians that only eighteen Germans guarded the big bridge"
- US Official history, page 163.
▪ It was not until 1830hrs that he [col Warren] was able to send a force into Nijmegen. This force was somewhat small, just one rifle platoon and an intelligence section with a radio — say forty men.
- Neillands. The Battle for the Rhine 1944.
▪ The 82nd were dug in and preparing to defend their newly constructed regimental command post, which they established at 1825. Having dug in at De Ploeg, Warren's battalion wasn't prepared to move towards Nijmegen at all.
- R Poulussen.
▪ Then Colonel Lindquist "was told by General Gavin, around 1900, to move into Nijmegen."
- R Poulussen.
▪ Warren sent a patrol of about 40 men to reconnoiter the bridge at 1830. Three strays from the patrol captured seven of the 18 guards and their 20mm cannon who were guarding the south end of the bridge, having to let them go as no reinforcements arrived. The 508th had actually captured the south end of the largely undefended bridge. The three scouts that reached the southern end of the Nijmegen bridge about an hour before the 9th SS arrived. Joe Atkins of the patrol said: "at the bridge, only a few German soldiers were standing around a small artillery weapon... The Germans were so surprised; the six or seven defenders of the bridge gave up without resisting. We held the prisoners at the entrance to the bridge for about an hour. It began to get dark and none of our other troops showed up. We decided to pull away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack. The German prisoners asked to come with us, but we refused, having no way to guard them. As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge." - The 508th Connection by Zig Boroughs.That was the 9th SS arriving at 1930.
▪ Unfortunately, the patrol's radio failed to function so that Colonel Warren was to get no word from the patrol until the next morning
- US Official History, page 163.
▪ Once Lindquist told Lieutenant Colonel Warren [at 1900] that his Battalion was to move, Warren decided to visit the HQ of the Nijmegen Underground first - to see what info the underground had on the Germans at the Nijmegen bridge.
- R Poulussen,
▪ "Although Company A reached the rendezvous point on time, Company B "got lost en route." After waiting until about 2000, Colonel Warren left a guide for Company B and moved through the darkness with Company A toward the edge of the city. Some seven hours after H-Hour, [2030] the first real move against the Nijmegen bridge began."
- US Official History, page 163.
▪ As the scouts neared a traffic circle surrounding a landscaped circular park near the center of Nijmegen, the Keizer Karel Plein, from which a mall-like park led northeast toward the Nijmegen bridge, a burst of automatic weapons fire came from the circle. The time was about two hours before midnight. [2200 hrs]
- US Official History, page 163.
D Day plus 1
▪ In the meantime Colonel Warren had tried to get a new attack moving toward the highway bridge; but this the Germans thwarted just before dawn with another sharp counterattack.
- US Official History, page 165.
▪ "While the counterattack was in progress, General Gavin arrived at the battalion command post." "General Gavin directed that the battalion "withdraw from close proximity to the bridge and reorganize"." This was to mark the end of this particular attempt to take the Nijmegen bridge"
- US Official History, page 165.
▪ "A new attack to gain the bridge grew out of an early morning conference between General Gavin and Colonel Lindquist." "At 0745 on 18 September, D plus 1, Company G under Capt. Frank J. Novak started toward the bridge."
▪ At around 1100, Warren was ordered to withdraw from Nijmegen completely.
- R Poulussen.
▪ At 1400 on 18 September Colonel Mendez ordered Company G to withdraw from Nijmegen_
- US Official History, page 166._
"the chance for an easy, speedy capture of the Nijmegen bridge had passed. This was all the more lamentable because in Nijmegen during the afternoon the Germans had had nothing more than the same kind of_ "mostly low quality" troops encountered at most other places on D Day."
- US Official History, page 164.
The 82nd completely withdrew from Nijmegen town, allowing the Germans to pour the 10th SS infantry, who went over on the ferry, then south over the Nijmegen bridge to reinforce the bridge and occupy the town. This made matters worse when the 82nd and XXX Corps went into the town to clear them out.
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