Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "Eisenhower’s Broad Front vs Monty’s Narrow Front in 1944" video.

  1. “Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4" - Harry Yeide "Eisenhower. He had now heard from both his Army Group commanders — or Commanders-in-Chief as they were currently called — and reached the conclusion that they were both right; that it was possible to achieve everything, even with lengthening supply lines and without Antwerp." - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 “ It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September 16th. On the other hand, three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th " for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.' “ - CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE. Page 589 "Despite objections raised to Montgomery's plan of an assault on a 40 division front, it was more sensible than Eisenhower's insistence on the entire front being in motion at all times, for no better reason than he could not abide the thought that the two American army groups would not participate as entities in the anticipated victory. Not only did Eisenhower fail to heed Montgomery's suggestions, but also he never seemed to understand the possible benefits. He was evidently unable to understand that to supply 40 divisions attacking on one front would have been an easier task than to supply first one army and then the other as each in turn went over to the offensive. It was this concentration of effort which Eisenhower failed to understand and to implement" - Eisenhower at the Art of Warfare by DJ Haycock, page 182. Land supplies were not taken from Patton and given to Monty. It is a complete myth to claim otherwise. Monty didn't even have a full army for his attack at Market Garden, just a Corps and supporting elements, with much flow in from England. Market Garden was not a very large ground operation. It was limited in size. The American attack into the Hurtgen Forest started when Market Garden was going on. The US advance on the Hurtgen Forest by the First US Army's 9th Infantry Division began on 14th September, 3 days before Market Garden began, and was continuing to try and advance into the Hurtgen even when Market Garden began 3 days later, but it was halted by the Germans however. This was soon followed up by a larger advance by US First Army towards Aachen at the start of October. Market Garden didn't make a notable dent in allied supplies seeing as the US was able to put on a LARGER ground attack right afterwards. According to Bradley in his own book there was parity of supplies between the three allied armies, Second British, First and Third US by mid September 1944 and according to the official US Army History as cited in Hugh Cole's book, The Lorraine Campaign page 52..."by 10th September the period of critical (gasoline) shortage had ended". This was a whole week before Market Garden took place. The gasoline drought was the end of August/beginning of September. It was over by the time of Market Garden.
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  2.  @stevej71393  It was insane. It made sense in Washington, but not on the battlefield.
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  3. The US Ninth Army was in the front line on the 26 August. They came online 10 days later on 5 September. They were moved up to the north of the Ardennes. Their first action was when the German attack pounded into them on 16 December. Four days later they were put into the British 21st Army Group under Montgomery, until a few weeks before the end of the war.
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  4. Monty was forwarding the 40 Division Thrust to forward his "own personal ambition and ego"? Pure opinion. Monty's observations. Monty had dealt with Americans in North Africa where they were dire, and in Sicily with a wayward general who would run into empty territory with bands leading. In Normandy Monty gave them the infantry role as in no way could they cope with massed German armour. Monty's right flank (US armies) broke out in Cobra. Eventually... "on the American front the line from which the breakout was finally launched was a line the St.Lo-Periers road, should have been captured in the initial plan by the American First Army on D-Day plus 5, that was the 11th June. But they didn't actually capture it until the 18th July." - Montgomery That is six weeks late. OK a week late, no problem, but six. Monty obviously never thought too much of US forces and their command for good reason. Now look at Eisenhower Montgomery to Alan Brooke.. "If we want the war to end within any reasonable period you have to get Eisenhower’s hand taken off the land battle. I regret to say that in my opinion he just doesn’t know what he is doing. Alanbrooke wrote in his diary about Einsenhower: “At the end of this morning's C.O.S. [Chief of Staff] meeting I put before the committee my views on the very unsatisfactory state of affairs in France, with no one running the land battle. Eisenhower, though supposed to be doing so, is on the golf links at Rheims - entirely detached and taking practically no part in running of the war. Matters got so bad lately that a deputation of Whiteley, Bedell Smith and a few others went up to tell him that he must get down to it and RUN the war, which he said he would." "We discussed the advisability of getting Marshall to come out to discuss the matter, but we are doubtful if he would appreciate the situation. Finally decided that I am to see the P.M. to discuss the situation with him.” "November 28th I went to see the P.M. I told him I was very worried." Alan Brooke described in his daily diary that American generals Eisenhower and Marshall as poor strategists, when they were in jobs were strategy mattered. Brooke wrote to Montgomery about his talks with Eisenhower, “*it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war!”* Monty and Brooke assess So Monty and Brooke never though too much of US armies and their command, basing their assessments on factual observation and results. Monty had come from Egypt and was now in his 5th country defeating the Germans all the way without suffering a reverse. Each time they attacked him he beat them. Monty was totally correct in wanting him to stay in command of all ground forces. That was reinforced when two shambolic US armies had to be put under his command when the Germans pounded into them in the Bulge attack. Then after the Bulge, Montgomery wrote of Eisenhower and his broad-front strategy on 22 January 1945: “I fear that the old snags of indecision and vacillation and refusal to consider the military problem fairly and squarely are coming to the front again . . . The real trouble is that there is no control and the three army groups are each intent on their own affairs. Patton today issued a stirring order to Third Army, saying the next step would be Cologne . . . One has to preserve a sense of humour these days, otherwise one would go mad.” Nothing had changed.
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  5.  @thevillaaston358  Rambo is cloning again. TIK will you do something about Rambo, who goes by Big Woody, Clone Warrior, Nick Danger, etc.
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  6. Market Garden was to get over the Rhine then consolidate, with unis going to the Zuider Zee if possible. It was not to race to the Ruhr. "Operation MARKET-GARDEN had two major objectives: to get Allied troops across the Rhine and to capture the Ruhr. Three major advantages were expected to accrue: ( I) cutting the land exit of those Germans remaining in western Holland; (2) outflanking the West Wall, _and (3) positioning British ground forces for a subsequent drive into Germany along the North German Plain." - US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN. Page 120. "later, on 15 September, General Eisenhower himself reopened the wound, perhaps with a view to healing it once and for all through a process of bloodletting. Looking beyond both Arnhem and Antwerp, he named Berlin as the ultimate Allied goal" - US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN. Page 210. One of the prime aims of Market Garden was to be the northern grip of the the pincer on the Ruhr. Wayward Eisenhower changed yet again his strategy from the Ruhr to Berlin two days before Market Garden.
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  7. A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp and keeping it from German counter-attack - the logistics problem to supply all allied armies. It was: 1) Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or; 2) Take the Schedlt. Eisenhower had a Northern Thrust strategy, a push to the north on his stretched broad front lines. Taking Noord Babant fell in line with the desires for both SHEAF and Eisenhower.Noord Brabant had to be taken before the Scheldt, as it was essential. It was taken with limited forces, with forces also sent to take the Schedlt. Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat or Northern Thrust strategy, and was actually a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen needed to be under allied control. The low-lying lands, boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen with land strewn with rivers and canals, is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces and supply directly back to Germany in perfect position for a counter-attack. Market Garden was the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans were in disarray, so should be easy enough to gain. Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine to fall in line with Eisenhower's priority Northern Thrust strategy at the time. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation. You needed Arnhem for an easier jump into Germany. Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all - that is, protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital, and was successfully seized. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans a few miles away and still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all.SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view.
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  8. The British and Canadians would be at the spearhead running away with it, with the Americans behind? No, the US First Army was to be on the right. Also, the British had destroyed the German armour in the west, while the US armies saw very little. USA armies were not equipped to face massed top class German armour. They could not be in the lead for obvious reasons.
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  9. Eisenhower was useless at ground command. His broad front was the wrong decision. The US armies were not good enough to deal with German armour. Patton failed to breech the Westwall in The Lorraine, with over 50,000 casualties. He was facing a third rate German army filled with eyes and ears units. Eisenhower should have given ground command to Monty and then he deals with the political aspect. Doing both was too much for one man anyhow.
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  10. General Bodo Zimmermann, Chief of Operations, German Army Group D, said that had the strategy of Montgomery succeeded in the autumn of 1944, there would have been no need to fight for the Westwall, not for the central and upper Rhine, all of 24 which would have fallen automatically. Indeed, had Monty's idea for a 40 division concentrated thrust towards the Ruhr been accepted by Eisenhower instead of messing about in the Lorraine, Alsace, Vosges etc, it would have all been over for the Germans in the west. "The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany." - Gunther Blumentritt in, The Other Side Of The Hill by Liddell Hart
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  11. The idea was to win the war ASAP. Politics and US public opinion should have been brushed to one side.
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  12. Many decades ago some American said Monty had a big ego. So they have all repeated it ever since.
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  13.  @thevillaaston358  Rambo, still being lots of other people we see.
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  14.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, a quiz. Name the the two Americans who primarily planned Market Garden? 20 points for the correct answer. 10 for a bonus question.. Name the Supreme Commander who insisted the operation goes ahead?
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