Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "Your Perception of the WW2 Eastern Front is Wrong" video.

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  3. Wages of Destruction by Prof Adam Tooze: Tooze Page 454: "Critical stores would be reserved above all for the main strike force of 33 tank and motorised infantry divisions. If the battle extended much beyond the first months of the attack, the fighting power of the rest of the German army would dwindle rapidly." "Fundamentally the Wehrmacht was a poor army. The fast striking motorised element of the Germans army in 1941 consisted of only 33 divisions of 130. Three-quarters of the German army continued to rely on more traditional means of traction: foot and horse. The German army in 1941 invaded the Soviet Union with somewhere between 600,000 and 740,000 horses. The horses were not for riding. They were for moving guns, ammunition and supplies." "The vast majority of Germany's soldiers marched into Russia, as they had in France, on foot." "But to imagine a fully motorised Wehrmacht, poised for an attack on the Soviet Union is a fantasy of the Cold War, not a realistic vision of the possibilities of 1941. To be more specific, it is an American fantasy. The Anglo-American invasion force of 1944 was the only military force in WW2 to fully conform to the modern model of a motorised army." Page 455: "the chronic shortage of fuel and rubber" "the fuel shortage of 1941 was expected to be so severe that the Wehrmacht was seriously considering demotorisation as a way of reducing its dependency on scarce oil." "Everything therefore depended on the assumption that the Red Army would crack under the impact of the first decisive blow." Page 456: "a new Soviet industrial base to the east of the Urals, which had the capacity to sustain a population of at least 40 million people." "Soviet industrial capacity was clearly very substantial." "Franz Halder recorded Hitler's ruminations about the Soviet's immense stock of tanks and aircraft." Reading further Tooze gives the misgivings of the German generals of the invasion. All were negative. Page 457: "Halder noted in his diary: Barbarossa: purpose not clear, We do not hurt the English. Our economic base is not significantly improved." At the top of page 459 Tooze emphasises that Hitler misinterpreted Backe's comments about the Ukraine grain. A region that had little surplus and had a substantial population increase from WW1. Page 459: "On 22 January 1941 Thomas had informed his boss, Keitel, that he was planning to submit a report urging caution with regard to the military-economic benefits of the invasion. Now he reversed directions. As it became clear that Hitler was justifying Barbarossa first and foremost as a campaign of economic conquest, Thomas began systematically working towards the Fuehrer." Thomas was head of the OKW economic planning staff. He modified his reports from nagative to positive, presenting the Ukraine as an economic breadbasket. Thomas was an insider and it is assumed he had heard of the misinterpreted Backe's comments to Hitler. Page 459: "The OKW now claimed that in the first thrust the Wehrmacht would be able to seize control of at least 70% of the Soviet Union's industrial potential." Page 460: "As late as the Spring of 1941, the Foreign Ministry was still opposing the coming war, preferring to continue the alliance with the Soviet Union against the British Empire." "If the shock of the initial assault does not destroy Stalin's regime, it was evident in February 1941 that the Third Reich would find itself facing a strategic disaster." Page 452: "the Germans had already conscripted virtually all their prime manpower. By contrast, the Red Army could call up millions of reservists." Why did Germany invade the USSR in a rushed ill-conceived plan? Page 431: "the strongest arguments for rushing to conquer the Soviet Union in 1941 were precisely the growing shortage of grain and the need to knock Britain out of the war before it could pose a serious air threat." "Meanwhile, the rest of the German military-industrialised complex began to gird itself for the aerial confrontation with Britain and America." Germany rushed to invade the Soviet Union, with an ill-equipped army with no reserves in anticipation of a massive air war with Britain and the USA, hoping they could win the Soviet war within weeks. The coming air war: Roosevelt promised 50,000 plane per year production in May 1940, of which a substantial amount would be in the RAF. Germany could not compete with the level of aircraft at the UKs disposal. Whether the planes had US and UK pilots or just UK pilots they were coming Germany's way. And the only way they could really get at each other was by air. Germany feared mass bombing, which came - the bomber in the late 1930s was perceived as a war winning weapon. The Germans knew the lead time for aircraft was 18 months from order to delivery. That meant in late 1941/early 1942, these planes would be starting to come in service in great numbers. Germany needed the resources of the east to compete. If the population was too big they would eliminate the population - the precedence was the American move to the west expanding the USA, taking lands from the natives population and Mexican and eliminating the population. War Production: Keegan, World War Two, chapter War Production: - Germany was third behind the USA, then the UK in GDP, in 1939. Germany = UK in capital goods production in 1939. - UK economy grows 60% during WW2. - Hitler says to Guderian, re: USSR, "had I known they had so many tanks as that, I would have thought twice before invading" Tooze, Preface, xxiii: Combined GDP of the UK and France exceeded Germany & Italy by 60%. - page 454: "It was poor because of the incomplete industrial and economic development of Germany". Interesting: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/publications/twerp603.pdf Snippets: "Soviet exceeded German GDP in 1940" "The Allies won the war because their economies supported a greater volume of war production and military personnel in larger numbers. This was true of the war as a whole, and it was also true on the eastern front where the Soviet economy, of a similar size to Germany's but less developed and also seriously weakened by invasion, supplied more soldiers and weapons." "the technological key to Soviet superiority in the output of weapons was mass production. At the outbreak of war Soviet industry as a whole was not larger and not more productive than German industry. The non-industrial resources on which Soviet industry could draw were larger than Germany's in the sense of territory and population, but of considerably lower quality, more far-flung, and less well integrated. Both countries had given considerable thought to industrial mobilisation preparations, but the results were of questionable efficacy. In both countries war production was poorly organised at first and productivity in the military-industrial sector had been falling for several years. The most important difference was that Soviet industry had made real strides towards mass production, while German industry was still locked into an artisan mode of production that placed a premium on quality and assortment rather than quantity. Soviet industry produced fewer models of each type of weapon, and subjected them to less modification, but produced them in far larger quantities. Thus the Soviet Union was able to make considerably more effective use of its limited industrial resources than Germany. "Before the war Soviet defence industry was in a state of permanent technological reorganisation as new models of aircraft, tanks, and other weapons were introduced and old ones phased out at dizzying rate." The USSR had access to oil and more natural resources and far more men, giving them the ability to produce in far greater quantities than Germany, which actually happened.
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  11. The German army attacking the USSR...... The Germans thought they had formulated a version of Blitzkrieg in France that was a sure-fire success. If the belt broke the whole movement stopped. They used this in the USSR, just scaling up forces. They did not have the intelligence to assess properly, that the reason for their success in France was allied incompetence not anything brilliant they did. The Germans vastly underestimated the quality of design and make of Soviet weapons. The T-34 took them by surprise and they knew they were fighting an army they had hopelessly underestimated in all aspects. The Germans did not take into account the British supplying the USSR - 40% of the tanks used at the vital battle of Moscow were British supplied. The USSR had more tanks than the rest of the world combined in 1940. The Germans underestimated the Soviets so much they decided to attack them with no reserves, all the German forces were involved in Barbarossa, lack of proper logistics to re-supply, short of steel, rubber, oil, an industry that could not re-supply at the rate required, short of fuel for industry and the forces, etc, etc. The Germans were so inept at assessing the Soviets they did not envisage fighting in the Russian winter in 1942/1942 thinking they would have overcome the USSR in three months. When they did not break the USSRs back they did not have enough winter clothes and equipment designed for such low temperatures. It was not just the logistics of getting to the troops, they just did not have the equipment. The Germans thought the Soviets could field 360 divisions, they fielded over 600. Soviet industry was large and had moved to the east after the initial German attack. Much was in the east anyhow. This was working 24/7 to re-supply. The T-34 tank by Dec 1941 was well established and available in numbers. The Germans first faced The T-34 in October 1941, reducing a German division to a few tanks. The Soviet counter-attack in Dec 1941 was well supplied, and heavily with T-34s. There was still 1,400 Soviet aircraft available in Dec 1941. The Soviet's mistake was attacking on a broad front and not aiming the the weakest point and pushing them right back, nevertheless they mauled the Germans. By Dec 1941 the Germans were exhausted in fuel, men and equipment. They could do no more. As early as July 1941, many German armies were at the end of their effective supply lines. As Prof Tooze said, most say the Germans failed to take Moscow, the reality was that they could not as they were on their last legs. The large Soviet air force was still attacking German supply lines as well, exasperating the situation. The Germans foolishly thought most supplies could be taken along three very long rail tracks, which were easily ripped up by the Soviets and bombed via the air. Thousands of German rail men worked to get lines partially operation. The Soviets evacuated lots of rail trucks. Prof Tooze: Wages of Destruction, page 453: 'Halder wrote, Barbarossa needed speed and motorized transport for supply. No waiting for railways. The Germans planned for three rail lines and 740,000 horses.' ...the Germans never had enough motorised transport to supply all the fast moving armies. Pre June 1941, they were considering de-motorising because of a shortage of rubber inflicted by the Royal Navy blockade. Tooze: page 454: 'Three rail lines were used. The existing Soviet rail network was not even good enough to supply the German army if taken intact. It was also of a narrower gauge too. The retreating Soviets took most wagons with them and destroyed the rail infrastructure on retreating. The Soviets had taken massive losses, but being so big they could absorb so many losses. The Soviets also had inflicted great losses on the Germans by Dec 1941. The only large power Germany conquered was France. This gave them a sense of superiority - their technique was now known, so succeeding twice was unlikely.' They largely dropped the blitzkrieg of coordinated air and ground attacks. Tooze: page 487. 'In July, all three German Army groups had reached the limit of resupply and stopped. The Soviets had taken devastating losses but not defeated. The Soviets saw the halt of the German armies and the re-supply problem and launched 17 armies against them forcing the Germans to dig in and defend.' The UK & US can be forgiven in underestimating the Red Army, which they did, not so the Germans as they would have to assess this force in detail as they were to fight it, unlike the UK & US. Soviet industry was turning out the arms and to advanced designs. I don't want to go into what ifs, but if the T-34 was in place in summer 1941 the Germans would never have had such spectacular progress. Stalin knew what was being produced. They knew once the weaponry was in place, they could defeat the Germans who would be operating over 1000kms along a few supply lines they could not fully supply. Apart from Stalingrad, which the Germans and the Soviets had an obsession with, the Soviets became less reckless as the UK and USA were in the fight and arms, and some well advanced arms, were building up. The Germans would not win, and the Soviets knew that. Once a western second front was in place, it was clear the Germans would quickly crumble, and they did. On D-Day 1944, the Germans were still way inside the USSR. The end came quickly once hit from both sides. It can be argued that the Soviets should have pushed the Germans out of the USSR by 1943 or even 1942, however they were inept at most levels. But the Soviets knew in a war of attrition the Germans were doomed.
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  18. The British were able to out-produce the Germans in aircraft even prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The UK and Germany were roughly equal in industrial output. Although Germany had access to the industrial plant of Northern Italy, France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands they were not able to use it to match either the Soviets or the British in war production. Ironically, the 1940 conquests only burdened the German war economy since Western Europe was a net importer of food and raw materials and Germany had to support them - the RN blockade was effective. French aircraft production aimed for Germany was minuscule. France had access to manufacturing plant and supplies of bauxite but it was not able to produce as it imported coal from Britain for its electricity production. With the RN blockade the main source of coal for France became Germany. However Germany was not able to increase its production sufficiently to overcome the short fall. The amount of food produced in Europe fell. Previously the production of meat and dairy products in countries such as Denmark had been dependant on the import of grain and animal feed from the Americas. That was not available and the amount of food available for the dairy industry collapsed as did food production. In the rest of Europe food production had been based on the widespread use of chemical fertilizer. Apart from the issues of the RN blockade huge amounts of the chemicals used for fertilizer production was diverted to the making of explosives affecting agriculture. French workers were moved on to subsistence rations and as the country had been dependant on motorized transportation. Most of France's oil imports came from abroad. Agricultural produce could not be distributed because of no fuel, and vehicles taken by the Germans, with milk being literally being poured away. In Germany on the outbreak of war the only available oil products came from Romania or from synthetic oil made in Germany. This was barely enough for the needs of the German armed forces and not enough to keep the Italian Navy operational. France reverted to a pre-petroleum transport economy. This economic background partially influenced Hitler's decision to invade the USSR. The USSR had the natural resources that would enable European industry to out-produce Britain and America and face the coming air war. Had Hitler won against Stalin, he would have gained unrestricted access to resources he needed to fight the UK. The conquest of the Soviets was a key step in Hitler's strategy and not irrational. However the Soviets were able stand up to an invasion and better able to marshal their resources so that they could outlast the Germans. The USSR in 1942 out-produced the USA in arms. Germany had 2.5 times the per capita GDP of the USSR. Invading the USSR was critical because Western European industry was dependent upon exports, and the Royal Navy blockade had cut them off.
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