Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "The BAD BOY of Operation Market Garden | General 'Boy' Browning" video.
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Patton was an average US general, no more, after WW2 most German generals had never heard of him. A US media creation, elevating the average beyond their status.
"The Allied armies closing the pocket now needed to liaise, those held back giving way to any Allied force that could get ahead, regardless of boundaries – provided the situation was clear. On August 16, realising that his forces were not able to get forward quickly, General Crerar attempted to do this, writing a personal letter to Patton in an attempt to establish some effective contact between their two headquarters and sort out the question of Army boundaries, only to get a very dusty and unhelpful answer. Crerar sent an officer, Major A. M. Irving, and some signal equipment to Patton’s HQ, asking for details of Patton’s intentions and inviting Patton to send an American liaison officer to the Canadian First Army HQ for the same purpose. Irving located but could not find Patton; he did, however, reach the First Army HQ and delivered Crerar’s letter which was duly relayed to Third Army HQ. Patton’s response is encapsulated in the message sent back by Irving to Canadian First Army; ‘Direct liaison not permitted. Liaison on Army Group level only except corps artillery. Awaiting arrival signal equipment before returning.’ Irving returned to Crerar’s HQ on August 20, with nothing achieved and while such uncooperative attitudes prevailed at the front line, it is hardly surprising that the moves of the Allied armies on Trun and Chambois remained hesitant."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle of Normandy 1944
Patton refused to liaise with other allied armies, exasperating a critical situation.
Patton’s corps duly surged away to the east, heading for Dreux, Chartres and Orléans respectively. None of these places lay in the path of the German retreat from Normandy: only Dreux is close to the Seine, Chartres is on the Beauce plain, south-east of Paris, and Orléans is on the river Loire. It appears that Patton had given up any attempt to head off the German retreat to the Seine and gone off across territory empty of enemy, gaining ground rapidly and capturing a quantity of newspaper headlines. This would be another whirlwind Patton advance – against negligible opposition – but while Patton disappeared towards the east the Canadians were still heavily engaged in the new battle for Falaise which had begun on August 14 and was making good progress."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle of Normandy 1944
Instead of moving east to cut retreating Germans at the Seine, Patton ran off to Paris. John Ellis in Brute Force described Patton's dash across northern France as well as his earlier “much overrated” pursuit through Sicily as more of “a triumphal procession than an actual military offensive.”
In Normandy, the panzer divisions had been largely worn down, primarily by the British and Canadians around Caen. The First US Army around St Lo then Mortain helped a little. Over 90% of German armour was destroyed by the British. Once again, Patton who came in late in Normandy, faced very little opposition in his break out in Operation Cobra performing mainly an infantry role. Nor did Patton advance any quicker across eastern France mainly devoid of German troops, than the British and Canadians did, who were in Brussels by early September seizing the vital port of Antwerp intact. This eastern dash devoid of German forces was the ride the US media claimed Patton was some sort of master of fast moving armour.
Patton at Metz advanced 10 miles in three months. The poorly devised Panzer Brigade concept was deployed in The Lorraine with green German troops. The Panzer Brigades were a rushed concept attempting to plug the gaps while the proper panzer divisions were re-fitting and rebuilt after the Normandy battles. The Panzer Brigades had green crews with little time to train, unfamiliar with their tanks, had no recon elements only meeting their unit commander on his arrival at the front. These were not elite forces. The 17th SS were not amongst the premier Waffen SS panzer divisions. It was not even a panzer division but a panzer grenadier division, equipped only with assault guns not tanks, with only a quarter of the number of AFVs as a panzer division. The 17th SS was badly mauled in Normandy being below strength at Arracourt in The Lorraine.
In The Lorraine, the Third Army faced a rabble full of eyes and ears units. Even the German commander of Army Group G in The Lorraine, Hermann Balck, who took command in September 1944 said: "I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again…can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans."
Patton failed to reach the Westwall.
Patton was not advancing or being heavily engaged at the time he turned north to Bastogne when the Germans pounded through US lines in the Ardennes. Bastogne was on the very southern German flank, their focus being west. The strategic significance of the stand at Bastogne, is over exaggerated. The 18,000 did not change the course of the battle. The German's bypassed Bastogne, placing a containment force around the town. Only when Patton neared Bastogne did he engage some German armour but not a great deal at all. Patton's ride to Bastogne was mainly through US held territory, with the road from Luxembourg to Bastogne having few German forces. The Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade was far from being one of the best German armoured units with about 80 tanks, 26th Volks-Grenadier having about 12 Hetzers, and the small element of Panzer Lehr (Kampfgruppe 901) left behind with a small number of operational tanks. Patton did not have to smash through full panzer divisions or Tiger battalions on his way to Bastogne.
Patton's armoured forces outnumbered the Germans by at least 6 to 1. Patton faced very little German armour when he broke through to Bastogne because the vast majority of the German 5th Panzer Army had already left Bastogne in their rear moving westwards to the River Meuse. They were being stopped by forces under Montgomery's 21st Army Group near Dinant by the Meuse. Monty's armies halted the German advance pushing them back.
▪ Start line for Patton's attack was at Vaux-les-Rosieres, 15km southwest of Bastogne;
It took him five days to get through to Bastogne;
▪ On the night of the 22 December 1944, Patton ordered Combat Command B of 4th Armored Division to advance through the village of Chaumont in the night;
▪A small number of German troops with anti tank weapons stopped the American attack who pulled back;
▪The next day, allied fighter bombers strafed the village of Chaumont weakening the defenders; The attack to resume the next afternoon;
▪A German counter attack north of Chaumont knocked out 12 Shermans with Combat Command B again retreating; It took Patton almost THREE DAYS just to get through the village of Chaumont;
▪They didn't get through Chaumont village until Christmas Day.
Hardly racing at breakneck speed.
Patton had less than 20 km of German held ground to cover during his actual 'attack' towards Bastogne, with the vast majority of his move towards Bastogne through American held lines devoid of the enemy. After the German attack in the Ardennes, US air force units were put under Coningham of the RAF, who gave Patton massive ground attack support and he still stalled. Patton's failure to concentrate his forces on a narrow front and his decision to commit two green divisions to battle without adequate reconnaissance resulted in his stall. US historian Roger Cirillo said, "Patton launched attack, after attack, after attack, after attack, that failed. Because he never waited to concentrate".
The 18,000 men in Bastogne pretty well walked out, even the commander of the US 101st stated that. The Germans had vacated the area heading west. Decades later, Eisenhower recalled how Patton would telephone with frustrating progress reports, saying: “General, I apologize for my slowness. This snow is God-awful. I’m sorry.”
Patton's Third Army was almost always where the weakest German divisions in the west where.
▪ Who did the 3rd Army engage?
▪ Who did the 3rd Army defeat?
▪ Patton never once faced a full strength premier Waffen SS panzer division nor a Tiger battalion.
▪ Patton was not at E Alamein, D-Day or the main area of the Bulge.
Patton repeatedly denigrated his subordinates:
▪ In Sicily he castigated Omar Bradley for the tactics Bradley's II Corps were employing;
He accused the commander of 3rd Infantry Division, Truscott of being "afraid to fight";
▪ In the Ardennes he castigated Middleton of the US VIII Corps and Millikin of the US III Corps;
▪ When his advance from Bastogne to Houffalize stalled, he criticised the 11th Armoured Division for being "very green and taking unnecessary casualties to no effect";
▪ He called the 17th Airborne Division "hysterical" in reporting their losses;
Patton rarely took any responsibility for his own failures. It was always somebody else at fault. A poor general who thought he was reincarnated, had incestual relationships and wore cowboy guns. Patton detested Hodges, did not like Bradley disobeying his and Eisenhower's orders. He also hated Montgomery. About the only person he ever liked was himself.
Read:
Monty and Patton: Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds and
Fighting Patton: George S. Patton Jr. Through the Eyes of His Enemies by Harry Yeide
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@arcanondrum6543
They landed 1330 hrs local time. RAF was clear it could land land in daylight.
10 of the 12 howitzers that landed on the 17th were in operation immediately. These howitzers broke up German pockets of attack in the first 24 hrs.
Monty didn’t plan Market Garden, coming up with the idea and broad outline only. He had no involvement in its execution.
It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF and Hollinghurst of the RAF.
It was Bereton and Williams who:
▪ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset; rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
▪ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges; Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity;
▪Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“;
A destruction of an Arnhem myth. The choice of drop zones was in the gift of the US Air Force commanders, not the airborne commanders.
The air planners decision was that ground-attack fighters were not to be sent over the battlefield while escort fighters were in the air protecting supply drops. This decision denied the airborne units the vital assistance that these ground-attack aircraft had been giving to the troops in Normandy just a month before, and a lack of air support exacerbated the problems of the airborne units.
From THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE 1944-1945. Rick Atkinson:
“General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in Dragoon the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision.”
These kind of decisions ended up being crucial flaws and it was Brereton who enforced them, not Montgomery. The US air commanders made the wrong choices throughout the planning.
XXX Corps took and kept 100km of ground up that road to the Rhine. Monty’s idea was actually a good one, as nearly all the relevant personnel involved agreed. Including the Americans. Eisenhower and Brereton, were the ones who had to agree with it and give it the go ahead. They very much liked the idea.
Eisenhower:
“I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.”
Beyond the initial broad outline, Monty didn’t plan the operation and nor did he have any jurisdiction over the air forces. He can consult and discuss but he cannot give them orders. Monty’s aides tried to persuade Brereton to double missions on the 17th but Brereton refused.
Do not get your history from Hollywood.
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@arcanondrum6543
You are very confused.
The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) a few scattered about along the road; 5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition, hanging around in village. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
Evidently expecting that Major La Prade's flanking battalion would have captured the highway bridge, these two battalions made no apparent haste in moving through Zon. They methodically cleared stray Germans from the houses, so that a full two hours had passed before they emerged from the village. Having at last overcome the enemy 88 south of the Zonsche Forest, Major LaPrade's battalion caught sight of the bridge at about the same time. Both forces were within fifty yards of the bridge when their objective went up with a roar.
- US Official History.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up.
The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, largely making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen expecting to speed over the bridge, instead seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to run over.
If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
According to the official AMERICAN Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
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"The 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Shields Warren, was charged with taking the road bridge over the Waal at Nijmegen: a prime task of Operation Market was being entrusted here to just one battalion from an entire division. According to the US Official History, there was some dispute over exactly when the 1st Battalion should go for the bridge. General Gavin was to claim later that the battalion was to ‘go for the bridge without delay’. However, Colonel Lindquist, the 508th Regimental commander, understood that Warren’s battalion was not to go for the bridge until the other regimental objectives — securing the Groesbeek Ridge and the nearby glider LZs, had been achieved: General Gavin’s operational orders confirm Warren’s version. Warren’s initial objective was ground near De Ploeg, a suburb of Nijmegen, which he was to take and organise for defence: only then was he to ‘prepare to go into Nijmegen later’ and these initial tasks took Lieutenant Colonel Warren most of the day. It was not until 1830hrs that he was able to send a force into Nijmegen. This force was somewhat small, just one rifle platoon and an intelligence section with a radio — say forty men."
- Neillands
This was all on D-Day. Browning was expecting the bridge to have been taken immediately. So, Browning was guilty of believing Gavin about the 1,000 tanks, but not in failing to seize the bridge on the 1st day.
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@billfix1150
“Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4, after a week’s excruciating pause”
- Harry Yeide
"Eisenhower. He had now heard from both his Army Group commanders — or Commanders-in-Chief as they were currently called — and reached the conclusion that they were both right; that it was possible to achieve everything, even with lengthening supply lines and without Antwerp."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
“ It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the 'air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September 16th. On the other hand, three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th "for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.' “
- CHESTER WILMOT, THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE. 1954, P 589
"Despite objections raised to Montgomery's plan of an assault on a 40 division front, it was more sensible than Eisenhower's insistence on the entire front being in motion at all times, for no better reason than he could not abide the thought that the two American army groups would not participate as entities in the anticipated victory. Not only did Eisenhower fail to heed Montgomery's suggestions, but also he never seemed to understand the possible benefits. He was evidently unable to understand that to supply 40 divisions attacking on one front would have been an easier task than to supply first one army and then the other as each in turn went over to the offensive. It was this concentration of effort which Eisenhower failed to understand and to implement"
- Eisenhower at the Art of Warfare, by DJ Haycock, page 182.
Land supplies were not taken from Patton and given to Monty. It is a complete myth to claim otherwise. Monty didn't even have a full army for his attack at Market Garden, just a Corps and supporting elements, with much flow in from England.
Market Garden was not a very large ground operation. It was limited in size. The American attack into the Hurtgen Forest started when Market Garden was going on. The US advance on the Hurtgen Forest by First US Army 9th Infantry Division began on 14th September, 3 days before Market Garden began, and was continuing to try and advance into the Hurtgen even when Market Garden began 3 days later, but it was halted by the Germans however.
This was soon followed up by a larger advance by US First Army towards Aachen at the start of October. Market Garden didn't make a notable dent in allied supplies seeing as the US was able to put on a LARGER ground attack right afterwards. According to Bradley in his own book there was parity of supplies between the three allied armies, Second British, First and Third US by mid September 1944 and according to the official US Army History as cited in Hugh Cole's book, The Lorraine Campaign page ... "by 10th September the period of critical (gasoline) shortage had ended". This was a whole week before Market Garden took place. The gasoline drought was the end of August/beginning of September. It was over by the time of Market Garden.
It ain't how Ben Affleck, Ronald Reagan, Steven Spielberg and John Wayne told it.
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General Bodo Zimmermann, Chief of Operations, German Army Group D, said that had the strategy of Montgomery succeeded in the autumn of 1944, there would have been no need to fight for the West Wall, not for the central and upper Rhine, all of 24 which would have fallen automatically.
Indeed, had Monty's idea for a 40 division concentrated thrust towards the Ruhr been accepted by Eisenhower instead of messing about in the Lorraine, Alsace, Vosges, etc, it would have all been over for the Germans in the west.
"The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin.
By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany."
- Gunther Blumentritt in, The Other Side Of The Hill by Liddell Hart
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David Himmelsbach
Eisenhower had prioritised the north in his broad front strategy. Monty had the concept and some preparations for Operation Comet, a multiple crossing of the Rhine. This would have the US 1st Army on the right flank. On hearing of this Bradley disobeyed Eisenhower's orders and starving Hodge's 1st army of supplies giving them to Patton.
Comet, a pursuit operation, had to be cut down to Market Garden, with one crossing of the Rhine, with the US 1st Army omitted. Bradley and Patton should have been fired. The US had some excellent Corps commanders like Truscott who would have done a far better job. Of all the manpower available a vital thrust, which Eisenhower prioritised, was down to three corps operation. VIII Corps and XII Corps were on XXX Corps flanks to Eindhoven. Then XXX Corps by themselves above.
Monty wanted the crossing of the Rhine to be Kasel, but was overruled for Arnhem. Monty did not plan or take part in the execution of Market Garden. Brereton, an American, who was in command of the First Allied Airborne Army did a lot of it. The USAAF objected to fighter-bombers being used. So the vital tool that prevented the Germans from moving during the day was not there. The Germans in broad daylight moved tanks fro Germany to Arnhem.
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TIK, from Neillands in 2005, when all information had been revealed. ....
"The Comet plan [preceded Market Garden] stuck to the basic airborne rule — land as close to the objective as possible — and to the basic rule for capturing any bridge — take both ends at once."
"The choice of drop zones was in the gift of the US Air Force commanders, not the airborne commanders — and the factor that governed the Air Force commanders’ choice of parachute drop zones ( DZs) or glider landing zones (LZs) was the presence, actual or feared, of anti-aircraft batteries around the bridges. Since the US Air Force commanders considered that these bridges would be surrounded by flak guns, they selected landing zones that were, in the main, well away from the bridges."
"Nor was this the only error committed by the air planners. Another was their decision that ground-attack fighters were not to be sent over the battlefield while escort fighters were in the air protecting supply drops. This decision denied the airborne units the vital assistance that these ground-attack aircraft had been giving to the troops in Normandy just a month before"
- Neillands
"The enemy was able to bring reinforcements into Arnhem in broad daylight, with impunity, a move which would have been fraught with risk in Normandy a few weeks earlier.’"
- Neillands
TIK, the element of surprise was lost at Arnhem. Neillands says it was the USAAF who chose the landing zones not the RAF and also insisted on no fighter-bombers and also a protracted drop over 3 days.
"‘To the Americans Browning appeared too dapper and Brereton did not trust him; neither did Gavin. Browning in turn detested Brereton, who was disliked by many of his fellow-countrymen."
- Neillands
"The British transport commander, Air Vice Marshal Leslie Hollinghurst of No. 38 Group, RAF Transport Command, wanted to solve the aircraft shortage by flying-in two lifts on D-Day. His colleague of the US IX Troop Carrier Command, Major-General Paul L. Williams, did not agree, believing that time was needed to service the aircraft and rest the crews — and this view prevailed at Allied Airborne HQ where Brereton supported it. Since the principal asset of an airborne operation is surprise, the two- to three-day deployment — an attack by instalments — was throwing this vital asset away."
- Neillands
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"on 18 September, the 82nd’s next lift arrived from the UK, 450 gliders bringing in three fresh battalions, one parachute and two glider, and a quantity of artillery."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Knowing 3 battalions were to come, with artillery, Gavin could have still sent a large force to seize the bridge.
"The US History points out that there was ‘no incentive for urgency over taking the Nijmegen bridge as XXX Corps were not yet in Eindhoven’ and it might be some time before they arrived at the Nijmegen bridge. In fact, XXX Corps had already passed Eindhoven and were waiting to cross the Bailey bridge at Zon. The US Official Historian, Charles B. MacDonald, dismisses this casual approach to the question of taking the Nijmegen bridge, stating that: ‘According to this theory, General Gavin had another full day to tackle the Germans at Nijmegen.’ This theory also assumes that one day would be sufficient for Gavin to take the bridge — from one side only — having already sacrificed the advantage of surprise and with German strength increasing."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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@johnhenderson131
“A Bridge too Far” has far too many inaccuracies and does not go into why a bridgehead was not established over the Rhine. Not worth reading.
“It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September 16th. On the other hand, three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th " for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.' “
- CHESTER WILMOT, THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE. Page 589
Monty actually signaled Eisenhower’s headquarters postponing the operation. Eisenhower resurrecting it and a cable from the War office about V2s committed Montgomery to the operation. From Nigel Hamilton’s biography of Monty:
For Monty now to cancel the British part of ‘the main effort of the Allies because of stiffening enemy resistance, even had he wished to do so, would thus have been tantamount to insubordination, leaving him open to charges of timidity at a moment when American forces were thrusting towards the German border. Moreover the Arnhem-Nijmegan axis had been Monty’s proposal, making it doubly hard to rescind. Eisenhower’s directive was not the only signal committing Monty to the continuation of his planned thrust via Arnhem on 9 September - for during the afternoon a ‘Secret’ cable arrived from the War Office, sent by VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke: Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP-UTRECHT-ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared. By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to ‘rope off’ the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites. Few people are aware that there were supporting units on either flank who set off to the left and right of Hells Highway shortly after and in fact one of these supporting flanks advances pushed the Germans away from cutting the highway near Eindhoven on the 20th after XXX Corps had gone through ahead. They even widened the axis of advance with their follow on actions.
It should be borne in mind that promised supplies from SHAEF failed to arrive, leaving VIII Corps, supposed to attack alongside, mostly stranded in place. “Garden” launched with only half the troops it should have had. Montgomery had also wanted to use Hodges 1st US Army (and had in fact been promised) as a follow up flanking advance. But Bradley was stealing fuel and other resources from Hodges and giving it to Patton.
Eisenhower:
”I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations”.
Eisenhower insisted it go ahead and Eisenhower under-resourced it. MG wasn’t even an army just a corps.
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@spartacusgladiator
Monty didn’t plan Market Garden, coming up with the idea and broad outline only. Montgomery was largely excluded from the planning process. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF. The failure points were that two US para units, the 101st and the 82nd, failed to seize their bridges.
It was Bereton and Williams who:
▪ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset; rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
▪ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges; Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity;
▪Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“;
The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition, hanging around, spending 2 hours in the village. The Germans blew the bridge when they finally reached it. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
Evidently expecting that Major La Prade's flanking battalion would have captured the highway bridge, these two battalions made no apparent haste in moving through Zon. They methodically cleared stray Germans from the houses, so that a full two hours had passed before they emerged from the village. Having at last overcome the enemy 88 south of the Zonsche Forest, Major LaPrade's battalion caught sight of the bridge at about the same time. Both forces were within fifty yards of the bridge when their objective went up with a roar.
- US Official History.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up.
The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon, being right on time. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
According to the official AMERICAN Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
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oldtanker2
The British were the single biggest agents in the defeat of Nazi Germany. They were there from day one until the end. The so-called "invincible" Germans army tried and failed, with their allies, for two years in WW2 to defeat the British army in North Africa. The finest army in the world from mid 1942 onwards was the British. From El Alemein it moved right up into Denmark, through nine countries, and not once suffered a reverse taking all in its path. Over 90% of German armour in the west was destroyed by the British. Montgomery had to give the US armies an infantry role as they were not equipped or experienced enough to engage massed German SS armour.
Montgomery stopped the Germans in every event they attacked him:
♦ August 1942 - Alem el Halfa
♦ October 1942 - El Alamein
♦ March 1943 - Medenine
♦ June 1944 - Normandy
♦ Sept/Oct 1944 - The Netherlands
♦ December 1944 - Battle of the Bulge
Not on one occasion were Monty's ground armies pushed back into a retreat by the Germans. The US Army were struggling in 1944/45 retreating in the Ardennes. The Americans didn't perform well at all east of Aachen, then the Hurtgen Forest defeat with 33,000 casualties and Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months with over 50,000 casualties. The Battle of the Bulge, with 100,000 US casualties, took all the US effort, and vital help from Montgomery and the British 21st Army Group, just to get back to the start line. The Germans took 20,000 US POWs in the Battle of The Bulge in Dec 1944. No other allied country had that many prisoners taken in the 1944-45 timeframe. The USA retreat at the Bulge, again, the only allied army to be pushed back into a retreat in the 1944-45 timeframe. Montgomery was effectively in charge of the Bulge having to take control of the US First and Ninth armies. Parts of the USAAF was put under RAF control. The Ninth stayed under his control until the end of the war just about.
Normandy was planned and commanded by the British with Montgomery leading, which was a great success coming in ahead of schedule and with less casualties than predicted. The German armour in the west was wiped out by primarily the British - the US forces were impotent against the panzers. Monty assessed the US armies (he was in charge of them) and had to give them a supporting infantry role, as they were just not equipped to fight tank v tank battles. On 3 Sept 1944 when Eisenhower took over overall allied command of ground forces everything went at a snail's pace. The fastest advance of any western army in Autumn/early 1945 was the 60 mile thrust by the British XXX Corps to the Rhine at Arnhem.
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David Himmelsbach
"This kind of decision belonged in the lap of Browning and Monty."
You really have no idea how these things work. Browning was in the First Allied Airborne Army. They look after their own army and their own back yard, which was led by an American, Brereton. Montgomery was in charge an army group, that is a number of armies. Get it?
"Montgomery did not need to hold committee meetings to discuss operational plans and choose options because he knew what was going on with his forces all the time. He kept his Tactical Headquarters close to the front, employed a large number of liaison officers — including American officers — who went out every day to find out the front-line facts and report back every evening, while Monty himself spent a great deal of his time out visiting the troops and the commanders. Montgomery concentrated on keeping a feel for the battle: he was much less interested in attending brain-storming sessions at SHAEF. Since he knew what he was doing — and what he wanted — Monty’s orders were direct, clear and simple, and this was good because in war simplicity works, and direct, clear orders are most easily followed."
"The fact that Monty rarely turned up for those meetings at SHAEF, sending his chief of staff, Major-General Freddie de Guingand instead, was one of the many things about Monty that irritated his American colleagues. They regarded his absence as an insult to Ike and — probably — to them as well. The real reason was that Monty did not believe in command by committee, was well aware that most of his colleagues loathed him, and that the well-liked de Guingand would be the best advocate for his views."
"Monty’s abrasive character brought on a no-win situation with his American colleagues. His habit of reducing his orders to simple terms inevitably produced criticism, not least from American historians, that he was patronising his US subordinates. This is not a complaint often heard from those subordinates —including, in moments of stress, subordinates like Simpson or Hodges during the Bulge — or even Bradley in Normandy. The first two generals appreciated the fact that Montgomery was a regular visitor to their headquarters and was always ready with help or advice — if needed. Neither American general has accused Monty of condescension"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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Monty did not have an ego, that was a part of the Yanks makeup, he was professional. Monty wanted to know at all levels of his command what was going on. If he was a control freak he would not have allowed others to plan Market Garden and stand back in its execution.
You are very confused. Eisenhower prioritized the northern thrust over other fronts:
On 4 September, the day Antwerp fell, Eisenhower issued another directive, ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes — 21st Army Group and two corps of the US First Army — to take Antwerp, reach the Rhine and seize the Ruhr
- Robin Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Eisenhower did not know Antwerp had fallen when he issued the directive. Montgomery also wanted a thrust up and over the Rhine prior to Eisenhower's directive. He devised Operation Comet to be launched on 2 September 1944. It was cancelled due to German resistance and poor weather.
Eisenhower's directive of 4 September incorporating divisions of the US 1st Army had Montgomery view the thrust to take the bridges on the Rhine from Arnhem to Wesel. To do this the British 2nd Army, some divisions of Hodges' US 1st army and the First Allied Airborne Army (which Monty controlled anyhow) would clearly be needed. Hodges' would protect the right flank. The Canadians would be on the coast of Belgium and Holland protecting the left flank from the German 15th army. The idea was to chase a disorganized retreating enemy preventing them from manning the German West Wall gaining a footing over the Rhine, consolidating and then clearing the Scheldt to open up Antwerp. A sound concept which even the German generals agreed would have worked.
Neillands on this point...
"the evidence also suggests that certain necessary objectives on the road to Berlin, crossing the Rhine and perhaps even taking the Ruhr, were possible with the existing logistical set-up, provided the right strategy to do so was set in place. Montgomery’s popular and astute Chief of Staff, Freddie de Guingand, certainly thought so: 'If Eisenhower had not taken the steps he did to link up at an early date with Anvil and had held back Patton, and had he diverted the resources so released to the north, I think it possible we might have obtained a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter - but not more.' "
- Robin Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Perhaps not more then, but that much alone would have been very useful — and much more than was actually achieved. This view was confirmed after the war in interviews with the senior surviving German commanders, von Rundstedt, Student, Blumentritt and Rommel’s former chief of staff, General Speidel. They were unanimous in declaring that a full-blooded thrust from Belgium in September would have succeeded in crossing the Rhine and might have ended the war in 1944, since they had no means of stopping such a thrust reaching the Ruhr. In the event, largely due to the faulty command set-up [by Eisenhower] and lack of grip, even a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter was still a dream in 1944.
- Robin Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Bradley was starving Hodges' 1st Army of supplies, against Eisenhower's orders, giving them to Patton who was running off into unimportant territory - again. This thrust over the Rhine obviously would not work with the resources starved US 1st Army, so a lesser Market Garden operation was devised by Montgomery, eliminating the US 1st Army, with only one crossing of the Rhine. Market Garden would also eliminate V rocket launching sites, of which London wanted eliminating ASAP, and give a buffer between German forces and Antwerp. This would only have one corps above Eindhoven. This was a disgrace considering the forces in Europe at the time. Eisenhower had no grasp of the situation as it was and no strong strategy to advance. Montgomery, although not liking Eisenhower's strategy making that clear continuously, being a professional soldier he always obeyed Eisenhower's orders, unlike Bradley who also allowed Patton to disobey his own orders.
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David Himmelsbach
On 12 September, Bradley had told Patton about Market Garden and warned him that if it succeeded, the Third Army might be held back on the west bank of the Moselle for weeks while the detested Montgomery performed wonders in the north.
Patton therefore suggested to Bradley that he cross the Moselle and get his forces so involved beyond the river that Eisenhower would be unable to stop him and must therefore support him. This ploy proved unnecessary: Eisenhower changed his mind yet again, at least in part, telling Bradley that he might ‘push his right wing [Patton’s Army] only far enough for the moment so as to hold adequate bridgeheads beyond the Moselle, and thus create a constant threat'.
This was all that Patton needed to cross the river and surge ahead as far as he could, never mind the point about bridgeheads. By the evening of 14 September, the day V and VII Corps of the US First Army opened their attacks, Patton had established half a dozen crossing points over the Moselle, and was heading east, consuming great quantities of fuel and ammunition. The outcome was that Patton did not stop until brought to a halt by the German army in front of Metz. It should be noted that this move, designed by Bradley and Patton to check Montgomery, actually had a dire effect on Bradley’s other contingent, the US First Army, which was starved of fuel and artillery ammunition at Aachen.
On 16 September, when Eisenhower told Bradley that logistical priority must go to First Army and Patton must stop, Patton again told Bradley that the Third Army must get involved ‘at once’ and asked Bradley to ignore this order and ‘not to call me until after dark on the nineteenth.’
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944:
There has been speculation that Market Garden was sabotaged by the US 82nd, who were taking one of the largest bridges in Europe at Nijmegen, just to get one over Montgomery. Take that at face value.
As Neillands states, "It should be noted that this move, designed by Bradley and Patton to check Montgomery." The move was not to gain an advantage over the enemy it was to spite a fellow allied general. This was when there was problems with the logistical train as well, so supplies were precious.
"and Patton ignored or watered down any of Ike’s orders he did not like, aided and abetted by Bradley. Ike should have gripped Monty and Patton, telling them bluntly and in so many words to obey his orders or face the sack"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Once Ike had delivered his verdict or announced his current strategy, Montgomery obeyed orders and did his best to make the strategy work."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Bradley and Patton should have been sacked for gross insubordination.
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Larry Brown
I will let the Germans have an intial say on the Bulge:
Genral Hasso von Manteuffel:
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
By November 1944, British SHEAF officer, Strong, noted that there was a possibility of a German counteroffensive in the Ardennes or the Vosges. Strong went to personally warn Bradley, who said, let 'em come.
Montgomery on hearing of the attack immediately took British forces to the Meuse to prevent any German forces from making a bridgehead, securing the rear. He was prepared to halt their advance and attack them. This was while Eisenhower and Bradley were doing nothing.
even by 19 December, three days into the offensive, no overall plan had emerged from 12th Army Group or SHAEF, other than the decision to send Patton’s forces north to Bastogne. Overall, the Ardennes battle was in urgent need of grip.
General Hodges had yet to see Bradley or receive more than the sketchiest orders from his Army Group commander.
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
On 20 December, Montgomery had sent a signal to Alanbrooke regarding the US forces:
"Not good... definite lack of grip and control. I have heard nothing from Ike or Bradley and had no orders or requests of any sort. My own opinion is that the American forces have been cut in half and the Germans can reach the Meuse at Namur without opposition."
Omar Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group, did very little:
16 Dec, the first day, for 12 hours did nothing.
16 Dec, after 12 hours, he sent two armoured divisions from
the flanking Ninth and Third Armies.
17 Dec, after 24 Hours, he then called in two US airborne
divisions from Champagne.
18 Dec, he ordered Patton to halt his pending offensive in
the Saar.
18 Dec, he had still not established contact with the First Army,
while Monty had.
19 Dec, he withdrew divisions from the Aachen front to shore
up the Ardennes.
19 Dec, he had still not produced an overall defensive plan.
19 Dec, the Supreme Commander intervened directly late in the day.
20 Dec, Eisenhower telephoned Montgomery telling him to take
command of the US First and Ninth Armies
While all this dillying by Bradley was going on, German armies were pounding forward into his lines.
British SHEAF officer Whiteley & American officer Betts visited the U.S. First Army HQ seeing the shambles. Strong, Whiteley, and Betts recommended that command of the armies north of the Ardennes be transferred from Bradley to Montgomery. Unfortunately only two British officers approached Beddel Smith of their recommendations, who immediately fired the pair, claiming it was a nationalistic thing. The next morning, Beddel Smith apologized seeing the three were right, recommending to Eisenhower to bring in Monty.
During the Battle of the Bulge Eisenhower was stuck self imprisoned on his HQ in des-res Versailles near Paris in fear of German paratroopers wearing US uniforms with the objective to kill allied generals. He had remained locked up more than 30 days without sending a single message or order to Montgomery, and that is when he thought he was doing ground control of the campaign, when in effect Montgomery was in control as two US armies had to be put under his control after the German attack, the US First and Ninth armies. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war, just about. Coningham of the RAF had to take control of US air force units.
And yet biased American authors such as Stephen Ambrose said that Eisenhower took control of the Bulge and made the battle his veneering it as an all American victory. Ambrose completely falsified history. The only thing Eisenhower did was tell Monty to get control of two out of control US armies, tell the US 101st to go to Bastogne (who were in northern France after the buffer Market Garden was created) and men under Bradley to counterattack. That is it.
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The Market Garden concept was derived from Monty's pursuit operation Comet, which was never presented to Eisenhower. Eisenhower rightly wanted to chase the Germans who were on the retreat. Market Garden was primarily a strategic operation. But Monty said it was tactical.
The planning was mainly by Americans Brereton and Williams. Brereton was a no-can-do general, unsuited for risky airborne operations. The plan had only one corps in the end above Eindhoven - a disgrace.
Eisenhower prioritized the northern thrust over other fronts and even seizing Antwerp and clearing the Schedlt. Clearing the Scheldt would take time as the German 15th SS army, highly experienced from the Russian front, had set up shop in the Scheldt and not retreated back into Germany, under Hitler's orders. All available supplies would be directed to this northern thrust.
"Since Eisenhower — the Supreme Commander and Ground Force Commander — approved the Arnhem operation rather than a push to clear the Scheldt, then surely he was right, as well as noble, to accept the responsibility and any resulting blame? The choice in early September was the Rhine or Antwerp: to continue the pursuit or secure the necessary facilities to solve the logistical problem? The decision was made to go for the Rhine, and that decision was Eisenhower’s."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"On 4 Sept, the day Antwerp fell, Eisenhower issued another directive, ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes — 21st Army Group and two corps of the US First Army — to take Antwerp, reach the Rhine and seize the Ruhr"
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Eisenhower did not know Antwerp had fallen to British troops when he issued the northern thrust directive. Montgomery wanted a thrust up and over the Rhine prior to Eisenhower's directive, devising Operation Comet, multiple crossings of the Rhine, to be launched on 2 Sept, being cancelled due to German resistance and poor weather. Operation Comet was not presented to Eisenhower for his approval. Montgomery asked Brereton, an American, of the First Allied Airborne Army, to drop into the Scheldt in early September - he refused.
Eisenhower's directive of 4 Sept had divisions of the US 1st Army and Montgomery's view of taking multiple bridges on the Rhine from Arnhem to Wesel. The British 2nd Army needed some divisions of Hodges' US 1st army and the First Allied Airborne Army (which Monty controlled anyhow). Hodges' would protect the right flank. the Canadians would protect the left flank from the German 15th army. "the narrow thrust was reduced to the Second Army and two US corps, the XIX and VII of Hodges’ First Army, a total of around eighteen Allied divisions"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
The northern thrust was to chase a disorganized retreating enemy preventing them from manning the German West Wall, gaining a footing over the Rhine, consolidating and then clearing the Scheldt to open up the port of Antwerp. A sound concept which even the German generals agreed would have worked.
"Perhaps not more then, but that much alone would have been very useful — and much more than was actually achieved. This view was confirmed after the war in interviews with the senior surviving German commanders, von Rundstedt, Student, Blumentritt and Rommel’s former chief of staff, General Speidel. They were unanimous in declaring that a full-blooded thrust from Belgium in September would have succeeded in crossing the Rhine and might have ended the war in 1944, since they had no means of stopping such a thrust reaching the Ruhr. In the event, largely due to the faulty command set-up [by Eisenhower] and lack of grip, even a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter was still a dream in 1944."
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Eisenhower’s reply of 5 September to Montgomery deserves analysis, not least the part that concerns logistics. The interesting point is that Eisenhower apparently believes that it is possible to cross the Rhine and take both the Ruhr and the Saar — and open the Scheldt — using the existing logistical resources."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Eisenhower. He had now heard from both his Army Group commanders — or Commanders-in-Chief as they were currently called — and reached the conclusion that they were both right; that it was possible to achieve everything, even with lengthening supply lines and without Antwerp. In thinking this Ike was wrong."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Post-Normandy Bradley seemed unable to control Patton, who persistently flouted Eisenhower’s directives and went his own way, aided and abetted by Bradley. This part of their relationship quickly revealed itself in matters of supply, where Hodges, the commander of the US First Army, was continually starved of fuel and ammunition in order to keep Patton’s divisions rolling, even when Eisenhower’s strategy required First Army to play the major role in 12th Army Group’s activities."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Bradley was starving Hodges' First Army of supplies, against Eisenhower's orders, giving them to Patton who was running off into unimportant territory - again, and being bogged down - again. The resources starved First Army could not be a part of northern thrust as Bradley and Patton, against Eisenhower's orders, were syphoning off supplies destined for the First army. This northern thrust over the Rhine, as Eisenhower envisaged, obviously would not work as he thought. A lesser operation was devised by Montgomery, Market Garden, eliminating the divisions of US First Army, with only ONE crossing of the Rhine. Market Garden would also eliminate V rocket launching sites, of which London wanted eliminating ASAP, giving a 60 mile long salient buffer between German forces and the important port of Antwerp. This would only have one corps above Eindhoven, a disgrace considering the forces in Europe at the time. Eisenhower had no grasp of the situation as it was and no strong strategy to advance. Eisenhower should have fired Bradley and Patton for sabotaging the Northern Thrust operation.
Montgomery did not plan or was in involved in Market Garden's execution. Montgomery, after fixing the operations objectives with Eisenhower to the measly forces available, gave Market Garden planning to others, mainly USAAF generals, Brereton and Williams. General Brereton, who liked the plan, agreed to it with even direct input. Brereton ordered the drops will take place during the day with Brereton also overseeing the troop carrier and supply drops schedules. Williams forbid fighter-bombers to be used. A refusal by Brereton and the operation would never have gone ahead; he earlier rejected Montgomery's initial plan of a drop into the Scheldt at Walcheren Island.
"it was not until 9 October, more than a month after the fall of Antwerp, that General Eisenhower told Montgomery to devote his entire attention to the clearance of the Scheldt. By that time the Canadians had cleared, or were investing, many of the Channel ports"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Operation MARKET-GARDEN had two major objectives:
to get Allied troops across the Rhine
and to capture the Ruhr.
Three major advantages were expected to accrue:
( I) cutting the land exit of those Germans remaining in western Holland;
(2) outflanking the West Wall, and
(3) positioning British ground forces for a subsequent drive into Germany along the North German Plain."
- US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN. Page 120.
"Eisenhower approved the operation with certain conditions. Market Garden would commence on 17 September. Securing the approaches to the port at Antwerp would be delayed until Montgomery seized bridgeheads over the Rhine. His priority after seizing the bridgeheads would be gaining the much needed deep water port. He would not continue the attack to Berlin as he had proposed."
- A FRAMEWORK FOR MILITARY DECISION MAKING UNDER RISKS
by JAMES V. SCHULTZ
AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE,
ALABAMA
JUNE 1996. Page 50.
"later, on 15 September, General Eisenhower himself reopened the wound, perhaps with a view to healing it once and for all through a process of bloodletting. Looking beyond both Arnhem and Antwerp, he named Berlin as the ultimate Allied goal"
- US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN. Page 210.
One of the prime aims of Market Garden was to be the northern grip of the the pincer on the Ruhr. Wayward Eisenhower changed yet again his strategy from the Ruhr to Berlin two days before Market Garden.
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"The 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Shields Warren, was charged with taking the road bridge over the Waal at Nijmegen: a prime task of Operation Market was being entrusted here to just one battalion from an entire division. According to the US Official History, there was some dispute over exactly when the 1st Battalion should go for the bridge. General Gavin was to claim later that the battalion was to ‘go for the bridge without delay’. However, Colonel Lindquist, the 508th Regimental commander, understood that Warren’s battalion was not to go for the bridge until the other regimental objectives — securing the Groesbeek Ridge and the nearby glider LZs, had been achieved: General Gavin’s operational orders confirm Warren’s version. Warren’s initial objective was ground near De Ploeg, a suburb of Nijmegen, which he was to take and organise for defence: only then was he to ‘prepare to go into Nijmegen later’ and these initial tasks took Lieutenant Colonel Warren most of the day. It was not until 1830hrs that he was able to send a force into Nijmegen. This force was somewhat small, just one rifle platoon and an intelligence section with a radio — *say forty men."
*
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
So Gavin thought that Linquist was moving onto the bridge immediately, with Warren joining later. Warren moved to the bridge only to find now a bunch of SS men there, instead of US paras.
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TIK, the RAF deny they spotted armour around Nijmegen.
http://www.airpowerstudies.co.uk/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Arnhem.pdf
From the RAF document:
"the composition of the German forces at Arnhem was far more complex than most published histories of Market Garden had tended to suggest. The two SS panzer divisions had been operating far below their full strength on the eve of the operation and, while 1st Airborne was ultimately confronted by armour in considerable strength, hardly any tanks were actually present in the Arnhem area on 17 September. The vast majority deployed from Germany or other battle fronts after the airborne landings" - ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the RAF
Some low level pictures of a few Panzer IIIs and IVs were taken in early September for operation Comet. "Brian Urquhart’s account is therefore somewhat perplexing. Further problems arise if we seek to document the events he described. Several extensive searches for the photographs have failed to locate them. Ostensibly, this might not seem surprising, as most tactical reconnaissance material was destroyed after the war, but Urquhart insisted that the Arnhem sortie was flown by a Spitfire squadron based at Benson; this would almost certainly mean 541 Squadron. Far more imagery from the Benson squadrons survived within the UK archives, but no oblique photographs showing tanks at Arnhem. In addition, although the Benson missions were systematically recorded at squadron and group level, not one record matches the sortie Urquhart described."
"The low-level missions targeting the bridges on 6 September were scrupulously noted down, but all other recorded reconnaissance sorties over Arnhem were flown at higher altitudes and captured vertical imagery. Equally, it has proved impossible as yet to locate an interpretation report derived from a low-level mission that photographed German armour near Arnhem before Market Garden." "As for Brian Urquhart’s famous account of how a low-level Spitfire sortie took photographs of tanks assumed to belong to II SS Panzer Corps, the reality was rather different. In all probability, the low-level mission that Urquhart recalled photographed the bridges and not the tanks"
- ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the RAF
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"the US comprised between 65% and 75% of the boots on the ground "
That was at the end of WW2, not at the time of Market Garden. The US were losing so many men in ETO operations (50,000 Lorraine, 33,000 at the Hurtgen Forest defeat, 12,000 Aachen, 80,000 Battle of the Bulge, etc), they brought far too men from the USA in fear of a big defeat. Men destined for the Far East.
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ALA
Market Garden failed by a whisker. Because the 82nd did not seize the Nijmegen bridge immediately. They were ready at 2 pm on the jump day and never moved to the bridge. The gigantic bridge was guarded by 19 guards. Germans occupied the bridge at 1900 hrs. Six hours after the 82nd were ready to march.
Events on the 1st day:
♦ "At 1328, the 665 men of US 82nd 1st Battalion began
to fall from the sky." Poulussen, R. Lost at Nijmegen.
♦ "Forty minutes after the drop, around 1410, the
1st Battalion marched off towards their objective,
De Ploeg, three miles away." Poulussen,
♦ The 82nd were digging in and performing recon
in the area looking for 1000 tanks in the Reichswald
- Neillands, R. The Battle for the Rhine 1944.
♦ The 82nd were dug in and preparing to defend their
newly constructed regimental command post, which
they established at 1825. Then Colonel Lindquist
"was told by General Gavin, around __1900,_ to move_
into Nijmegen." Poulussen, location 445.
Events on the evening of the first day:
♦ Having dug in at De Ploeg, Warren's battalion wasn't prepared
to move towards the Nijmegen at all. Poulussen,
♦ Once Lindquist told Lieutenant Colonel Warren that his
Battalion was to move, Warren decided to visit the HQ
of the Nijmegen Underground first - to see what info the
underground had on the Germans at the Nijmegen bridge.
- Poulussen,
♦ This was not a direct route to the bridge from Warren's
original position, and placed him in the middle of the town.
It was also around 2100 when "A" Company left to attempt
to capture the Nijmegen road bridge.
♦ "B" Company was not with them because they'd split up
due to it being dark with "visibility was less than ten yards".
- Poulussen,
♦ The 82nd attacks were resisted by the Germans until the
next day.
Events of the 2nd day:
♦ Gavin drove up in a jeep the next morning and
was told by Warren that although they didn't have the bridge
yet, another attack was about to go in.
♦ Gavin then told Warren to hold because the Germans were
attacking in the southeast portion of the 82nd perimeter.
♦ At around 1100, Warren was ordered to withdraw from
Nijmegen completely. - Poulussen
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@VaderGhost124
Fixed. Beevor is poor. He panders to the lucrative US market as does Hastings. A waste of time.
Paul Woody on WW2TV will not have him on the show.
The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition, hanging around in village. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it._Evidently expecting that Major La Prade's flanking battalion would have captured the highway bridge, these two battalions made no apparent haste in moving through Zon.
They methodically cleared stray Germans from the houses, so that a full_ two hours had passed before they emerged from the village. Having at last overcome the enemy 88 south of the Zonsche Forest, Major LaPrade's battalion caught sight of the bridge at about the same time. Both forces were within fifty yards of the bridge when their objective went up with a roar.- US Official History. XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready.
Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter.
The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem. XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
According to the official AMERICAN Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
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oldtanker2
Idiot, the Germans tried for nearly three years to defeat the British in Africa and failed. Despite the Germans knew what the British were doing in Africa thanks to a Yank named Fenner Bonner. Look the dope up.
The Germans could not take the home island as the home island had the largest navy in the world. Every time the Germans locked horns with the RAF they lost. They could try but would have ended up mince meat.
After the Bulge when Monty saved the Yanks asses, he should have been given back the ground forces commander role from an incompetent named Eisenhower. But the stupidest Yank general, Bradley, in the Bulge was given a special medal after it. You couldn't make this crap up.
Operation Dragoon was supposed to have been an invasion of Brittany, but then maybe Northern Italy, but then southern France. The British vehemently protested that it should be Trieste, the Ljubljana gap and onto to Vienna and into the heart of Germany. Then the Germans are fighting on three fronts. The Yanks said southern France. They did then the army under Patch, few know of him, melted in with the ridiculous Eisenhower broad front strategy, that stalled all along the thin front from Switzerland to the North Sea.
You are just a stupid Yank.
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German general Günther Blumentritt:
"Field-Marshal Montgomery was the one general who never suffered a reverse."
Blumentritt giving his impression of the different qualities of the British and American troops:
"The Americans attacked with zest, and had a keen sense of mobile action, but when they came under heavy artillery fire they usually fell back, even after they had made a successful penetration. By contrast, once the British had got their teeth in, and had been in a position for twenty-four hours, it proved almost impossible to shift them. To counter-attack the British always cost us very heavy losses. I had many opportunities to observe this interesting difference in the autumn of 1944, when the right half of my corps faced the British, and the left half the American."
The Germans avoided counter attacking Montgomery in 1944/45 instead choosing the American sectors: Mortain in August 1944, The Ardennes in Dec 1944, Alsace in January 1945. Having experienced the British from Alam el Halfa in August 1942 onwards, they avoided direct attacks on Montgomery's forces, unless they had no choice. The Germans knew it was futile.
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oldtanker2
Oh my God! Patton.
Patton was fired for cowardly hitting a sick soldier in a hospital bed. He believed he was re-incarnated a number of times.
1985 US Army report on the Lorraine Campaign.
Patton does not come out well at all.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a211668.pdf
Combat Studies Institute. The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, September-December 1944. by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel February, 1985
From the document is in italics:
"Soldiers and generals alike assumed that Lorraine would fall quickly, and unless the war ended first, Patton's tanks would take the war into Germany by summer's end. But Lorraine was not to be overrun in a lightning campaign. Instead, the battle for Lorraine would drag on for more than 3 months."
"Despite its proximity to Germany, Lorraine was not the Allies' preferred invasion route in 1944. Except for its two principal cities, Metz and Nancy, the province contained few significant military objectives." "Moreover, once Third Army penetrated the province and entered Germany, there would still be no first-rate military objectives within its grasp. The Saar industrial region, while significant, was of secondary importance when compared to the great Ruhr industrial complex farther north."
Another Patton chase into un-needed territory, like
he did when running his troops into Brittany.
"With so little going for it, why did Patton bother with Lorraine at all? The reason was that Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, made up his mind to destroy as many German forces as possible west of the Rhine."
In other words a waste of time, as was the broad-front strategy.
"Communications Zone organized the famous Red Ball Express, a non-stop conveyor belt of trucks connecting the Normandy depots with the field armies."
They were getting fuel via 6,000 trucks.
"The simple truth was that although fuel was plentiful in Normandy, there was no way to transport it in sufficient quantities to the leading elements. On 31 August , Third Army received no fuel at all."
In short, Patton overran his supply lines. What was
important was to secure the Port of Antwerp's
approaches. Montgomery approached the US leaders
of the First Airborne Army and they would not drop into
the Scheldt.
"Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be considered First-rate troops. Third Army encountered whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and others consisting entirety of soldiers with stomach ulcers."
Some army wonderboy Patton was going to fight
"Was the Lorraine campaign an American victory' From September through November, Third Army claimed to have inflicted over 180,000 casualties on the enemy. But to capture the province of Lorraine, a problem which involved an advance of only 40 to 60 air miles, Third Army required over 3 months and suffered 50,000 casualties, approximately one-third of the total number of casualties it sustained in the entire European war."
Huge losses for taking unimportant territory,
against a poor German army.
"Ironically, Third Army never used Lorraine as a springboard for an advance into Germany after all. Patton turned most of the sector over to Seventh Army during the Ardennes crisis, and when the eastward advance resumed after the Battle of the Bulge, Third Army based its operations on Luxembourg, not Lorraine. The Lorraine campaign will always remain a controversial episode in American military history."
It's getting worse. One third of all European casualties
in Lorraine and never used the territory to move into Germany.
"Finally the Lorraine Campaign demonstrated that Logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful and aggressive the commanding general may be." "Patton violated tactical principles" "His discovered that violating logistical principles is an unforgiving and cumulative matter."
Not flattering at all. And Americans state Patton
was the best general they had.
Bradley stated later:
“Patton was developing as an unpopular guy. He steamed about with great convoys of cars and great squads of cameramen … To George, tactics was simply a process of bulling ahead. Never seemed to think out a campaign. Seldom made a careful estimate of the situation. I thought him a shallow commander … I disliked the way he worked, upset tactical plans, interfered in my orders. His stubbornness on amphibious operations, parade plans into Messina sickened me and soured me on Patton. We learned how not to behave from Patton’s Seventh Army.”
Patton? Most German generals had never heard of him because he was a US media creation.
US Army officer Nic Moran giving a talk. Look at the first 4 minutes:
https://youtu.be/bNjp_4jY8pY
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The RAF reccie emphatically stated they found no armour in or around Arnhem prior to the jump. The first armour to attack the paras was on the 2nd day in the evening, that came in from Germany. A myth has risen that when the British 1st Airborne dropped around Arnhem they dropped onto 2 powerful Waffen SS panzer divisions with lots of armour. The two Waffen SS panzer divisions were very understrength with no more than around 3,000 fighting troops each, with a few heavy weapons and no tanks around Arnhem.
There was not a single German tank attack against British 1st Airborne D-Day, the 17th, with Frost's men getting to the Arnhem bridge pretty well unopposed. The Germans could not send tanks in because they didn't have any in the Arnhem area at the time.
The first German tank attack against the British 1st Airborne did not occur until late on the 18th, D-Day+1, using tanks that came in from Germany. The tanks were Panzer IVs from Panzer-Ersatz-Regiment ”Bielefeld”, Panzer Kompanie Mielke which only arrived in the Netherlands earlier on the 18th, via Bocholt in Germany.
The tanks units that attacked the British 1st Airborne around Arnhem were four units that were not there when the paras jumped, being all in Germany and quickly sent to Arnhem in the days following the jump. None of these armoured units were identified by allied intelligence as being around Arnhem:
♦ Panzer-Ersatz-Regiment”Bielefeld” Panzer Kompanie Mielke
was not in Holland on the 17th.
♦ Sturmgeshutz Brigade 280 was also not in Holland
when the paras dropped but was on the way towards Aachen,
Germany when it was ordered diverted to Arnhem arriving at
Arnhem in the early hours of the 19th.
♦ The Tiger Is of Schwere Panzer Kompanie Hummel were
also in Germany and only arriving on the 19th.
♦ The King Tigers of Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506 arrived
between the 22nd and 24th.
♦ The eight Panthers out of the factory on the inventory of the
9th SS did not arrive at Arnhem until the 21st, too late to take
part in the fighting against Frost's men at the bridge, so were
sent to Elst as part of Kampfgruppe Knaust, which blocked
XXX Corps from reaching Arnhem in the following days.
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I will let the Germans have the first say on the Bulge:
Genral Hasso von Manteuffel:
‘The operations of the American First Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
By November 1944, British SHEAF officer, Strong, noted that there was a possibility of a German counter-offensive in the Ardennes or the Vosges. Strong went to personally warn Bradley at his HQ, who said, "let 'em come".
Montgomery on hearing of the attack immediately took British forces to the Meuse to prevent any German forces from making a bridgehead, securing the rear. He was prepared to halt their advance and attack them. This was while Eisenhower and Bradley were doing nothing.
even by 19 December, three days into the offensive, no overall plan had emerged from 12th Army Group or SHAEF, other than the decision to send Patton’s forces north to Bastogne. Overall, the Ardennes battle was in urgent need of grip.
General Hodges had yet to see Bradley or receive more than the sketchiest orders from his Army Group commander.
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
On 20 December, Montgomery had sent a signal to Alanbrooke regarding the US forces:
"Not good... definite lack of grip and control. I have heard nothing from Ike or Bradley and had no orders or requests of any sort. My own opinion is that the American forces have been cut in half and the Germans can reach the Meuse at Namur without opposition."
Omar Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group, did very little:
16 Dec, the first day, for 12 hours did nothing.
16 Dec, after 12 hours, he sent two armoured divisions from
the flanking Ninth and Third Armies.
17 Dec, after 24 Hours, he then called in two US airborne
divisions from Champagne.
18 Dec, he ordered Patton to halt his pending offensive in
the Saar.
18 Dec, he had still not established contact with the First Army,
while Monty had.
19 Dec, he withdrew divisions from the Aachen front to shore
up the Ardennes.
19 Dec, he had still not produced an overall defensive plan.
19 Dec, the Supreme Commander intervened directly late in the day.
20 Dec, Eisenhower telephoned Montgomery telling him to take
command of the US First and Ninth Armies
While all this dillying by Bradley was going on, German armies were pounding forward into his lines.
British SHEAF officer Whiteley & American officer Betts visited the U.S. First Army HQ seeing the shambles. Strong, Whiteley, and Betts recommended that command of the armies north of the Ardennes be transferred from Bradley to Montgomery. Unfortunately only two British officers approached Beddel Smith of their recommendations, who immediately fired the pair, claiming it was a nationalistic thing. The next morning, Beddel Smith apologized seeing the three were right, recommending to Eisenhower to bring in Monty.
During the Battle of the Bulge Eisenhower was stuck self imprisoned in his HQ in des-res Versailles near Paris in fear of German paratroopers wearing US uniforms with the objective to kill allied generals. He had remained locked up more than 30 days without sending a single message or order to Montgomery, and that is when he thought he was doing ground control of the campaign, when in effect Montgomery was in control as two US armies had to be put under his control after the German attack, the US First and Ninth armies. Coningham of the RAF had to take control of US air force units. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war, just about.
And yet biased American authors such as Stephen Ambrose said that Eisenhower took control of the Bulge and made the battle his veneering it as an all American victory. Ambrose completely falsified history. The only thing Eisenhower did was tell Monty to get control of two out of control US armies, tell the US 101st to go to Bastogne (who were in northern France after the buffer Market Garden was created) and men under Bradley to counterattack. That is it.
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Eisenhower prioritized the northern thrust over other fronts:
On 4 Sept, the day Antwerp fell, Eisenhower issued another directive, ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes — 21st Army Group and two corps of the US First Army — to take Antwerp, reach the Rhine and seize the Ruhr
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Eisenhower did not know Antwerp had fallen when he issued the directive. Montgomery wanted a thrust up and over the Rhine prior to Eisenhower's directive, devising Operation Comet to be launched on 2 Sept, being cancelled due to German resistance and poor weather.
Eisenhower's directive of 4 Sept had divisions of the US 1st Army and Montgomery's view of taking multiple bridges on the Rhine from Arnhem to Wesel. The British 2nd Army needed some divisions of Hodges' US 1st army and the First Allied Airborne Army (which Monty controlled anyhow). Hodges' would protect the right flank. the Canadians would protect the left flank from the German 15th army. It was to chase a disorganized retreating enemy preventing them from manning the German West Wall, gaining a footing over the Rhine, consolidating and then clearing the Scheldt to open up the port of Antwerp. A sound concept which even the German generals agreed would have worked.
"the evidence also suggests that certain necessary objectives on the road to Berlin, crossing the Rhine and perhaps even taking the Ruhr, were possible with the existing logistical set-up, provided the right strategy to do so was set in place. Montgomery’s popular and astute Chief of Staff, Freddie de Guingand, certainly thought so: 'If Eisenhower had not taken the steps he did to link up at an early date with Anvil and had held back Patton, and had he diverted the resources so released to the north, I think it possible we might have obtained a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter - but not more.' "
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Perhaps not more then, but that much alone would have been very useful — and much more than was actually achieved. This view was confirmed after the war in interviews with the senior surviving German commanders, von Rundstedt, Student, Blumentritt and Rommel’s former chief of staff, General Speidel. They were unanimous in declaring that a full-blooded thrust from Belgium in September would have succeeded in crossing the Rhine and might have ended the war in 1944, since they had no means of stopping such a thrust reaching the Ruhr. In the event, largely due to the faulty command set-up [by Eisenhower] and lack of grip, even a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter was still a dream in 1944.
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Bradley was starving Hodges' First Army of supplies, against Eisenhower's orders, giving them to Patton who was running off into unimportant territory - again. This northern thrust over the Rhine obviously would not work with the resources starved First Army, so a lesser operation was devised by Montgomery, Market Garden, eliminating the divisions of US First Army, with only ONE crossing of the Rhine. Market Garden would also eliminate V rocket launching sites, of which London wanted eliminating ASAP giving a 60 mile long salient buffer between German forces and the important port of Antwerp. This would only have one corps above Eindhoven, a disgrace considering the forces in Europe at the time. Eisenhower had no grasp of the situation as it was and no strong strategy to advance.
Montgomery, although not liking Eisenhower's broad front strategy, making that clear continuously since the Normandy breakout, being a professional soldier he always obeyed Eisenhower's orders keeping to the laid down strategy, unlike Bradley who also allowed Patton to disobey his own orders.
Montgomery after fixing the operations objectives with Eisenhower to what forces were available, gave Market Garden planning to others, mainly Genl Brereton, an American, of the First Allied Airborne Army. Genl Brereton, who liked the plan, agreed to it with even direct input. Brereton ordered the drops will take place during the day and Brereton oversaw the troop carrier and supply drops schedules. A refusal by Brereton and the operation would never have gone ahead, as he earlier rejected Montgomery's initial plan of a drop into the Scheldt at Walcheren Island.
Montgomery left all the planning to his generals to plan and execute: Brereton, Williams, Browning, Urquhart, Gavin, Taylor, Horrocks, etc. Monty gave them a free run at it with their own discretion and did not interfere. Montgomery had no involvement whatsoever in its execution. Montgomery was an army group commander, in charge of armies. The details were left to 'competent' subordinates.
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oldtanker2
"some of those who knew Patton well had no great faith in his military abilities. Bradley was less than enchanted to have Patton commanding the Third Army in 12th Army Group and admitted as much after the war, writing: ‘He (Patton) had not been my choice for army commander"
-Neillands, Robin. The Battle of Normandy 1944
"point Jack Capell of the 4th Infantry Division writes: When we became part of Third Army later in the war we heard this rumour that Patton had actually swum across the Saar river to get at the enemy. I never met anyone who saw this feat which was probably the invention of Patton’s fertile publicity machine. We in the 4th Division were not admirers of General Patton. He was an accomplished battlefield commander but more reckless with the lives of his troops than other generals we had served with."
-Neillands, Robin. The Battle of Normandy 1944
"In a paper in the British Defence Studies Journal, Brigadier G. W. Berrigan, considering Patton’s conduct in the 1944 campaign on the Moselle, concludes that he was ‘an over-ambitious, egotistical commander on an economy of effort mission seeking glory at any cost, who refused to live within the available means.’"
-Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Much of Patton’s success in the later stages of the Normandy battle, and the subsequent rush of the Third Army towards Metz and the Saar, stemmed from the fact that the enemy had little on that front to oppose him. Then his troops got to Metz and Lorraine, where the German army promptly stopped Patton in his tracks."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Ike should have gripped Monty and Patton, telling them bluntly and in so many words to obey his orders or face the sack"
-Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"A fair conclusion from all this is that Patton’s efforts from August to December 1944 made no great contribution to the Allied cause and we would be right in that conclusion: his campaign for the Saar and the Rhine was longer on sound and fury than on useful results."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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oldtanker2
As with Montgomery, George Patton’s problem lay in his character. Patton was a war-lover, arrogant and tactless, barely controllable by his superiors, hardly in control of himself, the epitome of the ‘gung-ho’, fighting American general, a latter-day Custer. This was the image Patton loved to portray; he was never seen without his steel helmet and his pearl-handled revolver, always ready for action although, by comparison with his detested rival, Bernard Montgomery, George Patton had not actually seen much action.
This may have been part of the reason for Patton’s deep and open dislike of Monty. By September 1944, without counting active service on the North-west Frontier of India and in Palestine, Montgomery had had nine years of front-line service in two world wars, in every rank from second lieutenant to field marshal. All the American generals put together could not match this experience and Patton for one resented it.
-Neillands, Robin. The Battle of Normandy 1944
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Oldtanker2
There you go...
http://www.airpowerstudies.co.uk/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Arnhem.pdf
"the composition of the German forces at Arnhem was far more complex than most published histories of Market Garden had tended to suggest. The two SS panzer divisions had been operating far below their full strength on the eve of the operation and, while 1st Airborne was ultimately confronted by armour in considerable strength, hardly any tanks were actually present in the Arnhem area on 17 September. The vast majority deployed from Germany or other battle fronts after the airborne landings" - ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the RAF
Some low level pictures of a few Panzer IIIs and IVs were taken in early September for operation Comet. Ryan on speaking to Urquhart got it wrong. "Urquhart’s account is therefore somewhat perplexing. Further problems arise if we seek to document the events he described. Several extensive searches for the photographs have failed to locate them. Ostensibly, this might not seem surprising, as most tactical reconnaissance material was destroyed after the war, but Urquhart insisted that the Arnhem sortie was flown by a Spitfire squadron based at Benson; this would almost certainly mean 541 Squadron. Far more imagery from the Benson squadrons survived within the UK archives, but no oblique photographs showing tanks at Arnhem. In addition, although the Benson missions were systematically recorded at squadron and group level, not one record matches the sortie Urquhart described."
"The low-level missions targeting the bridges on 6 September were scrupulously noted down, but all other recorded reconnaissance sorties over Arnhem were flown at higher altitudes and captured vertical imagery. Equally, it has proved impossible as yet to locate an interpretation report derived from a low-level mission that photographed German armour near Arnhem before Market Garden." "As for Brian Urquhart’s famous account of how a low-level Spitfire sortie took photographs of tanks assumed to belong to II SS Panzer Corps, the reality was rather different. In all probability, the low-level mission that Urquhart recalled photographed the bridges and not the tanks" - ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the RAF
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The US Official History makes the point that even after the Nijmegen bridge had finally been taken:
The Guards Armoured’s Coldstream Guards Group still was needed as a reserve for the Airborne division. This left but two armoured groups to go across the Waal. Even those did not make it until next day, D plus 4, 21 September, primarily because of diehard German defenders who had to be ferreted out from the superstructure and bridge underpinnings. Once on the north bank, much of the British armour and infantry had to be used to help hold and improve the bridgehead that the two battalions of the 504th Parachute Infantry had forged. By the time the Nijmegen bridge fell on D plus 3, it was early evening and it would be dark before an armoured column could be assembled to march on Arnhem. North of Nijmegen the enemy had tanks and guns and infantry of two SS Panzer divisions, in unknown but growing strength, established in country ideal for defence.
This account adds that:
At the village of Ressen, less than three miles north of Nijmegen, the Germans had erected an effective screen composed of an SS battalion reinforced by eleven tanks, another infantry battalion, two batteries of 88mm guns, 20 20mm anti-aircraft guns and survivors of earlier fighting in Nijmegen.
American readers should note that the above comments come from the US Official History, where the notion that Lord Carrington and his five tanks could have penetrated this screen and got up to Arnhem on the night of D plus 3 — even supposing such a move was ever suggested — is revealed as a delusion.
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
A more perceptive analysis comes from Major-General John Frost, commander of the 2nd Parachute Battalion at the Arnhem bridge:
The worst mistake of the Arnhem plan was the failure to give priority to capturing the Nijmegen bridge. The capture would have been a walkover on D-Day, yet the 82nd Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure the Groesbeek heights where the Corps HQ was to be sited.
These numerous attempts to divert attention from this failure, and pass the blame to a captain in the Guards Armoured Division, have been shameful... and highly successful. The myths surrounding the Nijmegen bridge have persisted and been engraved on the public mind by the media and the cinema. Given the US commanders’ chronic tendency to pass the buck and blame their British allies at every opportunity, it certainly might have been better if some effort had been made to get elements of the Guards Division on the move to Arnhem that night.
That, however, is the romantic view, bolstered by hindsight. In practical terms it takes time to assemble an entire armoured division from a battlefield in the dark streets of a town, issue fresh orders and prepare it for another advance.
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
by Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.G., 1993
Page 161:
Colonel Lindquist's 508th Parachute Infantry and of Colonel Ekman's 505th Parachute Infantry had assembled within an hour after the D-Day drop.
Page 162:
General Gavin's understanding, as recalled later, was that Warren's battalion was to move "without delay after landing." On the other hand, Colonel Lindquist's understanding, also as recalled later, was that no battalion was to go for the bridge until the regiment had secured its other objectives, that is to say, not until he had established defenses protecting his assigned portion of the high ground and the northern part of the division glider landing zone. Instead of moving immediately toward the Nijmegen bridge, Colonel Warren's battalion was to take an "assigned initial objective" in the vicinity of De Ploeg, a suburb of Nijmegen a mile and a quarter southeast of the city astride the Nijmegen-Groesbeek highway.
It is clear the 82nd did not a have clue what they were doing.
Page 163:
Colonel Warren about 1830 sent into Nijmegen a patrol consisting of a rifle platoon and the battalion intelligence section. This patrol was to make an aggressive reconnaissance, investigate reports from Dutch civilians that only eighteen Germans guarded the big bridge, and, if possible, capture the south end of the bridge.
Colonel Warren directed Companies A and B to rendezvous at a point just south of Nijmegen at I900
As the scouts neared a traffic circle surrounding a landscaped circular park near the center of Nijmegen, the Keizer Karel Plein, from which a mall-like park led northeast toward the Nijmegen bridge, a burst of automatic weapons fire came from the circle. The time was about two hours before midnight. (2200 hrs)
Page 164:
No one could have said so with any finality at the time, but the chance for an easy, speedy capture of the Nijmegen bridge had passed. This was all the more lamentable because in Nijmegen during the afternoon the Germans had had nothing more than the same kind of "mostly low quality" troops encountered at most other places on D Day.
The 82nd hung about for 6 hours allowing the SS troops to enter Nijmegen on the bridge.
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On page 47 of Max Hasting's:Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-45, he makes the point that confusion in the orders from German General Bittrich saved it for the Germans. Bittrich wanted the 9th SS to secure the north and south sides of Arnhem bridge, as he saw this bridge as vital as it was over the Rhine. But, the part of the 9th SS that were supposed to stay on the south side of the Arnhem bridge, by mistake went south to Nijmegen bridge preventing the US 82nd, who dawdled, from seizing that bridge. If the 9th SS did stay at Arnhem on the south side to Bittrich's orders, it would have been probable that XXX Corps would have wiped them out on the south side of the Rhine at Arnhem on the 19th - D-Day plus 2.
After the 9th SS had moved to Nijmegen with the Arnhem bridge uncontested on the south side, the Germans were pointing fingers at each other.
A screw up won it for the Germans, while a screw up for the allies lost it (Gavin not moving onto Nijmegen bridge immediately). This German error proved decisive in the allies not winning 100%. Nevertheless this German error does not detract from the point that the allies should have won, if Gavin had done his job properly. If Gavin had seized Nijmegen bridge immediately, the allies would have won irrespective of what the 9th SS did.
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@KMN-bg3yu
"Despite objections raised to Montgomery's plan of an assault on a 40 division front, it was more sensible than Eisenhower's insistence on the entire front being in motion at all times, for no better reason than he could not abide the thought that the two American army groups would not participate as entities in the anticipated victory.
Not only did Eisenhower fail to heed Montgomery's suggestions, but also he never seemed to understand the possible benefits. He was evidently unable to understand that to supply 40 divisions attacking on one front would have been an easier task than to supply first one army and then the other as each in turn went over to the offensive. It was this concentration of effort which Eisenhower failed to understand and to implement"
- Eisenhower at the Art of Warfare
by DJ Haycock, page 182.
Eisenhower on Montgomery:
‘General Montgomery is a very able, dynamic type of army commander’.
Another Eisenhower view of Montgomery (This time, specifically about D-Day and the battle of Normandy):
'He got us there and he kept us there'.
A view from another American about Montgomery:
'small,very alert, wonderfully conceited, and the best soldier--or so it seems--I have met in this war’.
- General George S Patton.
A German view of Montgomery:
‘Field Marshall Montgomery was the one general who never suffered a reverse’
- General der Infanterie Günther Blumentritt
Another German view of Montgomery (This time with regard to the Battle of the Bulge):
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
- The commander of the 5th Panzer Army, Hasso von Manteuffel.
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St.Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
“I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...[Montgomery] was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Hasbrouck of 7th Armor - “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
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@waynes.3380
The first armour into Arnhem was in the evening of d-day plus 1 - shot up by the British paras.
There are a lot of inaccurate myths written claiming that Montgomery ignored intelligence reports of German tanks ready and waiting around Arnhem. In fact there was not even a single German tank attack against the British paras on the day they dropped, the 17th September Frost's men reached the Arnhem bridge without facing any German tanks whatsoever, because none were there.
The tanks and other armour that caused the paras around Arnhem problems were those that were SENT IN FROM GERMANY in the days that followed. They were not in the Netherlands prior to Market Garden. They were not identified by Dutch intelligence or by SHAEF. They were in Germany and they detrained in Bocholt, Germany and then they road marched towards Arnhem in the days that followed.
The first actual tank supported attack against the British paras around Arnhem did not take place until late on the 18th and this attack was stopped by 6 pounder anti tank guns and PIATS by the British paras. Tanks from Panzer-Ersatz-Regiment ”Bielefeld” Panzer Kompanie Mielke which was not even in the Netherlands on the 17th.
Sturmgeshutz Brigade 280, a unit that was instrumental in the German defence of Arnhem, was also not in the Netherlands when the paras dropped but was on the way towards Aachen, Germany when it was ordered to divert to Arnhem arriving at Arnhem in the early hours of the 19th. The Tiger Is of Schwere Panzer Kompanie Hummel were also in Germany and only arrived on the 19th. The King Tigers of Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506 arrived between the 22nd and 24th.
It was THESE armoured units that caused the problems for the British paras. NONE of these armoured units were in the Arnhem area prior to the paras dropping and NONE of them were identified by any allied intelligence reports. The famous pictures of the Sturmgeschutz assault guns alongside Waffen SS troops in the streets of Arnhem actually shows Stugs of Sturmgeshutz Brigade 280. They aren't Waffen SS stugs, as many believe.
This myth that the paras dropped onto two well equipped Waffen SS panzer divisions with lots of tanks is completely wrong. Even the two Waffen SS 'panzer' divisions (9th and 10th SS) were at half strength and numbered no more than 6,000 to 7,000 men each and only around half of those were actual combat troops. The other half were service and supply units. They had no armour.
1st Airborne actually brought along enough 6 pounder and 17 pounder anti tanks guns to deal with the armored situation that allied and Dutch intelligence said was there at the time. It was actually SHAEF's intelligence in the week ending September 4th that persuaded Monty and others to go for Market Garden. SHAEF's Intelligence Summary for 4th September assured Monty that the German forces in the way of 21st Army Group was "no longer a cohesive force, disorganised and demoralised, short of equipment and arms." They were correct.
The time window created by the US 101st and 82nd not seizing vital bridges, resulted in German armour being brought in from Germany, being heavily used against British paras.
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@waynes.3380
In an interview with Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission in Washington, in 1955, General Browning said the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges must be seized "as soon as possible", although the wooded Groesbeek Heights on the route to the bridge must be held.
Field Order 11 of 13 Sept is clear in section 2 a), putting the bridges first in the writing, that they were to be seized, then the high ground secured and then the roads. Order 1, of 13 September, written by Lindquist of the 508th, states he will wait at the high ground for a Division Order to move from the Heights to the bridge. In short, wait for an Order from Gavin to move.
The heights near De Ploeg, which are really pretty flat being a wooded area but high for Holland, are pretty well between the Drop Zone (DZ) and bridge. The 508th would go through the Heights to reach the bridge. Browning and Gavin naturally did not want German troops between the LZ and the bridge, so the Heights had to be occupied and secure. The 508th CP would be established at the Heights.
Gavin understood the priorities in sending the 508th to the bridge and Groesbeek heights immediately, with Coln Warren's battalion of the 508th assigned the bridge. To get to the bridge from the DZ you have to pass the Groesbeek Heights, so any enemy at the Heights naturally had to be subdued, then secure the area, which could take time, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge.
It took the 665 men of 508th a painfully slow 3.5 hours to march a few miles from the DZ to the heights, reaching the Groesbeek heights at 1730. They encountered only a few Labour troops in opposition. There were no Germans at the Groesbeek Heights as forward scouts relayed back the situation. So, on route Coln Lindquist the head of the 508th could have sent Warren's A and B companies directly to the bridge, bypassing the Groesbeek Heights, immediately via the riverbank as instructed by Gavin. The rest of the battalion could move to the empty Groesbeek Heights setting up defences at De Ploeg on the heights.
Dutch resistance men informed the 508th that the Germans had largely cleared out of Nijmegen with only 19 guards on the bridge. So all was easy and fine, so the two companies assigned the bridge could move immediately to their objective without being involved with securing the Groesbeek Heights.
Despite hearing the good news from the Dutch Underground, Lindquist in command of the 508th was not moving at all, keeping all his men static at De Ploeg. Lindquist was waiting for a Divisional Order from Gavin informing him that the DZ was secure, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge. When Gavin found out Lindquist was static via a liaison officer he was livid, running over to De Ploeg in a Jeep telling Lindquist to get moving to the bridge. Even then, took Lindquist another two hours to send men in force to the bridge.
Three stray men from a forty man patrol sent to the Nijmegen bridge immediately by Warren to confirm what the Dutch Underground told them on reaching DePloeg, took the guards on the south end of the bridge prisoner. They left when no one turned up. When leaving they saw hundreds of Germans pour from the north onto the previously lightly guarded bridge. Later, a company of Warren's main force became lost when they eventually moved towards the bridge. By the time Warren's two companies did reach the bridge in force, the Germans had reinforcing the bridge with hundreds of men. Too late. The first attack on the bridge was just before midnight, 10.5 hours after landing.
The 82nd were expecting German resistance from the east, however it came from the north via the Nijmegen bridge.
▪ Gavin was expecting Lindquist to secure the Groesbeek heights, which were devoid of enemy forces, then immediately move to the bridge, which meant sending Warren's battalion immediately.
▪ Lindquist was expecting Gavin to notify him that the DZ was clear.
Gavin was expecting Lindquist to go to the bridge when it was obvious the Groesbeek heights, on the way to the bridge, were secure. As no Germans were about, the heights were naturally secure.
Regarding Lindquist's expected clearing of the LZ before moving from DePloeg. Lindquist did write a Field Order for the 508th on 13 September copied to Gavin, stating that once the heights were secure he would wait for a Divisional Order [from Gavin] to move. Two days later at the jump briefing Gavin verbally overruled Lindquist's Field Order, using a map he told him that he should move to the bridge "without delay". Poor command communications by Gavin. Poulussen, in Lost at Nijmegen discovered that the 508th jumped without any written offensive orders from Gavin. All was verbal from Gavin to Lindquist of the 508. Chester Graham, the 82nd liaison officer, was at the pre jump meeting in England. He said there was no ambiguity amongst anyone there that the bridge was the prime target.
In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, was wanting confirmation that if the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the objectives. In response, dated 25 July 1945, General Gavin was clear: "About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city."
General Browning never knew men were static at De Ploeg. Like Gavin he was expecting men to be seizing the bridge. Being corps commander, he was busy attempting to communicate with all three parachute divisions. The 82nd did launch a few failed attacks on the bridge. In the afternoon of the next day, 18th, Gavin asked permission to launch another attack. Browning, seeing the bridge was well defended, and the failed attacks, refused, opting to wait for XXX Corps to arrive to seize the bridge. Inexplicably Gavin moved all his men out of Nijmegen town completely to the heights and DZ, giving the town back to the Germans. This made matters worse when XXX Corps arrived who had expended vital time, and ammunition, in flushing them out.
On page 162 of the U.S. Official History:
"many documents regarding the extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files."
Read:
1) Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment In World War II by Phil Nordyke.
2) Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergström.
3) Market Garden, Then and Now by Karl Magry.
4) Lost at Nijmegen by R Poulusson
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@thevillaaston7811
"‘Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 454 By April 1945 the 61 American divisions formed the bulk of the Allied Armies,supported by 13 British,11 French,5 Canadian and one Polish."
The USA in the ETO were losing so many troops against the Germans they panicked. Their performance was so bad they thought they may be wiped out. Casualties: Bulge: 90,000, Queen: 12,000, Hurtgen Forest: 33,000, Lorraine: 55,000, etc. They diverted troops to the ETO that were destined to face the Japanese.
These US troops in the ETO came in mainly at the last minute when the war was over because of the panic in Washington, inflating the US contribution. They were all green, with green troops, officers and generals, with second rate tanks. Most, if any, never saw the enemy in action. A German force a quarter to one third of the size of one of those green US forces would have wiped it out.
Yet the British outnumbered US ground forces by a long margin against the Japanese. 2.6 million in the British Indian Army alone.
In 1942 alone the British fielded 100 divisions compare to the USAs 88 in total in WW2.
This Barr geezer has not a clue.
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@steveosullivan5262
If Ike had let Monty go for a Rhine crossing in force in late August/early September in force, instead of the under resourced Market Garden, with the intent of making the inland sea in Holland they could have got Rotterdam and even Amsterdam instead, and in a position to launch tanks east on the North German Plains.
Antwerp is an awkward port, being 80km inland with a warren of tidal inlets, islands and estuaries covering its approaches. It would take many weeks to get the 80km river cleared of mines and wrecks. Monty half wrote off the port. Many armies came to grief in that part of the world - the British did in 1809 in the Walcheren Campaign. Monty would be aware of that.
Monty was all for bypassing the problems of Antwerp and gaining Rotterdam. The Germans were still reeling, the paras were on standby and there was fuel in the tanks. Rotterdam was possible. Stopping to open up Antwerp was always going to take considerable time at the fastest. Ike felt it was better to secure the line and concentrate on Antwerp as the supply head before pressing on - operation Market Garden was that plan to secure Noord Brabant to protect Antwerp, and then the endless operations from Hurtgen Forest, Operation Queen and to Walcheren.
Antwerp wouldn't be fully open to allied shipping until early January 1945. The first ships entered in October 1944, but the majority of supplies came from Normandy until November. That was three months from Antwerp's capture. Twice the time it took to break out of Normandy. By that time the French railway service had been largely rebuilt with supplies coming in from Normandy, for Bradley’s 12th Army Group, and Marseilles, for Devers’ 6th Army Group, could be shifted faster.
In August 1944 Monty was for pushing on, his 40 Division Thrust to the North, Ike was for caution. Ike’s caution allowed the Germans breathing space to reinforce gifting them an opportunity to strike back, as we saw in the Bulge attack.
.
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oldtanker2
Patton was an average US general promoted to superstar status by the US media - the US never had any exceptional generals. Montgomery said Patton would be good as a Corps commander.
Patton at Metz advanced 10 miles in three months. The poorly devised Panzer Brigade concept was deployed there with green German troops. The Panzer Brigades were a rushed concept attempting to plug the gaps while the proper panzer divisions were re-fitting and rebuilt after the summer 1944 battles.
The Panzer Brigades had green crews with little time to train, did not know their tanks properly, had no recon elements and didn't even meet their unit commander until his arrival at the front. These were not elite forces.
17th SS were not amongst the premier Waffen SS panzer divisions. It was not even a panzer division but a panzer grenadier division, only equipped with assault guns, not tanks, with only a quarter of the number of AFVs as a panzer division. The 17th SS was badly mauled in Normandy and not up to strength at Arracourt in The Lorraine.
Patton's Third Army was almost always where the best German divisions in the west were NOT.
♦ Who did the 3rd Army engage?
♦ Who did 3rd Army defeat?
♦ Patton never once faced a full strength
Waffen SS panzer division nor a
Tiger battalion.
In The Lorraine, the 3rd Army faced a rabble. Even the German commander of Army Group G in The Lorraine, Hermann Balck, who took over in September 1944 said:
"I have never been in command of such irregularly
assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we
have been able to straighten out the situation again…
can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating
command of the Americans."
Patton was mostly facing a second rate rabble in The Lorraine. Patton was neither on the advance nor being heavily engaged at the time he turned north to Bastogne when the Germans pounded through US lines.
The road from Luxembourg to Bastogne was pretty well devoid of German forces, with Bastogne being on the very southern German flank. Only when Patton neared Bastogne did he engage some German armour but not a great amount at all. The Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade wasn't one of the best German armoured units, while 26th Volks-Grenadier only had a dozen Hetzers, and the small element of Panzer Lehr (Kampfgruppe 901) left behind only had a small number of tanks operational. Patton did not have to smash through full panzer divisions or Tiger battalions on his way to Bastogne. Patton's armoured forces outnumbered the Germans by at least 6 to 1.
Patton faced very little German armour when he broke through to Bastogne because the vast majority of the German 5th Panzer Army had already left Bastogne in their rear moving westwards to the River Meuse. They were still engaging forces under Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Leading elements were engaging the Americans and British under Montgomery's command near Dinant by the Meuse. Monty's armies halted the German advance and pushed them back.
In Normandy in 1944, the panzer divisions had been largely worn down, primarily by the British and Canadians around Caen. The First US Army around St Lo then Mortain helped a little. Over 90% of German armour was destroyed by the British. Once again, Patton faced very little opposition in his break out in Operation Cobra performing mainly an infantry role. Nor did Patton advance any quicker across eastern France mainly devoid of German troops, than the British and Canadians did, who were in Brussels by early September seizing the vital port of Antwerp intact.
Patton repeatedly denigrated his subordinates.
♦ In Sicily he castigated Omar Bradley for the tactics
Bradley's II Corps were employing
♦ He accused the commander of 3rd Infantry Division,
Truscott of being "afraid to fight".
♦ In the Ardennes he castigated Middleton of the
US VIII Corps and Millikin of the US III Corps.
♦ When his advance from Bastogne to Houffalize
stalled he criticised the 11th Armoured Division for being
"very green and taking unnecessary casualties to no effect".
♦ He called the 17th Airborne Division "hysterical" in
reporting their losses.
After the German attack in the Ardennes, US air force units were put under Coningham of the RAF. Coningham, gave Patton massive ground attack plane support and he still stalled. Patton failed to concentrate his forces on a narrow front, committing two green divisions to battle and inadequate reconnaissance resulted in him stalling. Patton rarely took any responsibility for his own failures. It was always somebody else at fault, including his subordinates. A poor general who thought he was reincarnated. Oh, and wore cowboy guns.
Patton detested Hodges, did not like Bradley disobeying his orders, and Eisenhowers orders. He also hated Montgomery. About the only person he ever liked was himself.
Read Monty and Patton: Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds
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oldtanker2
The US never had any exceptional top generals. Most were mediocre at best. Eisenhower was a political man in a field role, who knew little about strategy to Montgomery's annoyance. Look at their performance at the Battle of the Bulge when the US armies retreated. Monty had to take control of two US armies and parts of the USAAF put under RAF control.
The US media elevated an average US general to superstar status. Bradley stated of Patton:
“Patton was developing as an unpopular guy. He
steamed about with great convoys of cars and
great squads of cameramen
A self publicist as well. Look at that idiot, General Clark, at Rome. If he was German he would have been shot. Read what I wrote about Patton. Montgomery was in charge of many armies, Patton, the US wonderboy, was in charge of one army that hardly went anywhere fast - look at Lorraine. The US media put across during and after WW2, that Patton was some fast moving general - the reality was very different. Montgomery was two levels above Patton in Normandy rarely dealing with him.
Your knowledge of Falaise is little more than nil. Bradley stopped the forces so they would not collide with each other head on. Montgomery was in charge of all armies in Normandy, he got Demsey to draw in and hold the Germans around Caen destroying their armour allowing the US armies, given an infantry role by Montgomery, to break out. That was his plan and it worked. The US did not break out because they were wonder generals, Monty's plan allowed that. The Brits and Canadians held the Germans down allowing the US forces to break out.
Montgomery constantly complained about the amateurism of the green US generals. He was also with his men a lot knowing all about their supplies and morale, sending is No.2 to meaningless meetings with the Americans. he constantly told Eisenhower, and Churchill, to give him back the ground forces commander role and Eisenhower was incompetent. He told Eisenhower to give him the job near the end of the Battle of the Bulge, as the US performance showed they had to. Incompetent generals like Bradley were screaming blue murder. For Bradley's role in the Bulge Eisenhower gave him a medal, when he should have been fired for such incompetence. You couldn't make up.
Montgomery did not like the poor inter-forces cooperation in Sicily allowing the Germans to move over the Straights of Medina. He changed all that for Normandy.
"Montgomery was a hands-on commander who issued clear orders via his staff, orders based on his estimate of the situation, a commander who gripped his subordinates, kept in close touch with their actions — and expected his orders to be obeyed. Eisenhower — not least because of his wide-ranging responsibilities as Supreme Commander — had a more remote style, relying on consultation and discussion before the issuing of orders that often resembled a wish-list rather than a precise series of commands."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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oldtanker2
Is your name Finnigan?
"if England was to get in a major war they would either have to rely on nukes or havwe the US bail them out again."
Will you tell us where the US bailed the British out? I am lost where. I can give you examples of where the British bailed the Yanks out.
Only two countries can put down forces at a moments notice anywhere in the world, the British and US. The British are so professional they could take on Russian forces and initially wipe them out. The greater number of the Russian over time would then prevail.
"The problems arose — and the arguments have continued since 1945 — because the Americans believed, and still believe, that there were only two military command styles, that of the US army, which was the right one, a one-size-fits-all doctrine suitable for every occasion, and all other doctrines which were, quite simply, not just different but wrong. The American experience in a number of post-1945 wars, including Korea and the one that concluded with that unseemly scramble into helicopters from the roof of the US embassy in Saigon, have not greatly dented this perception."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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Larry Brown
Patton at Metz advanced 10 miles in three months. The poorly devised Panzer Brigade concept was deployed there with green German troops. The Panzer Brigades were a rushed concept to try and plug the gaps while the panzer divisions proper were being re-fitted and rebuilt after the summer 1944 battles.
The Panzer Brigades had green crews that never had enough time to train, did not know their tanks properly, did not have any recon elements and didn't even meet their unit commander until his arrival at the front. These were not means elite forces.
17th SS were not amongst the premier Waffen SS panzer divisions. The 17th SS was not even a panzer division but a panzer grenadier division, only equipped with assault guns, not tanks, with only a quarter of the number of AFVs as a panzer division. The 17th SS was badly mauled in Normandy and not up to strength at Arracourt in The Lorraine.
Patton's Third Army was almost always where the best German divisions in the west were NOT.
♦ Who did the 3rd Army engage?
♦ Who did 3rd Army defeat?
♦ Patton never once faced a full strength
Waffen SS panzer division nor a
Tiger battalion.
In The Lorraine, the 3rd Army faced a rabble. Even the German commander of Army Group G in The Lorraine, Hermann Balck, who took over in September 1944 said:
"I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again…can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans."
Patton was facing a second rate rabble in The Lorraine for the most part. Patton was also neither on the advance nor being heavily engaged at the time he turned north to Bastogne when the Germans pounded through US lines.
The road from Luxembourg to Bastogne pretty well devoid of German forces, as Bastogne was on the very southern German flank. Only when Patton got near to Bastogne did he engage some German armour but it was not a great amount at all. The Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade wasn't one of the best German armoured units, while 26th Volks-Grenadier only had a dozen Hetzers, and the small element of Panzer Lehr (Kampfgruppe 901) left behind only had a small number of tanks operational. Its not as if Patton had to smash through full panzer divisions or Tiger battalions on his way to Bastogne, he never. Patton's armoured forces outnumbered the Germans by at least 6 to 1.
Patton faced very little German armour when he broke through to Bastogne because the vast majority of the German 5th Panzer Army had already left Bastogne in their rear moving westwards to the River Meuse. They where were still engaging forces under Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Leading elements were engaging the Americans and British under Montgomery's command near Dinant by the Meuse. Monty's armies halted the German advance and pushed them back.
In Normandy in 1944, the panzer divisions had been largely worn down, primarily by the British and Canadians around Caen. The First US Army around St Lo then Mortain helped a little. Over 90% of German armour was destroyed by the British. Once again, Patton faced very little opposition in his break out in Operation Cobra performing mainly an infantry role. Nor did Patton advance any quicker across eastern France mainly devoid of German troops, than the British and Canadians did, who were in Brussels by early September seizing the vital port of Antwerp intact.
Patton repeatedly denigrated his subordinates.
♦ In Sicily he castigated Omar Bradley for the tactics
Bradley's II Corps were employing
♦ He accused the commander of 3rd Infantry Division,
Truscott of being "afraid to fight".
♦ In the Ardennes he castigated Middleton of the
US VIII Corps and Millikin of the US III Corps.
♦ When his advance from Bastogne to Houffalize
stalled he criticised the 11th Armoured Division for being
"very green and taking unnecessary casualties to no effect".
♦ He called the 17th Airborne Division "hysterical" in
reporting their losses.
After the German attack in the Ardennes, US air force units were put under Coningham of the RAF. Coningham, gave Patton massive US ground attack plane support and he still stalled. It was Patton's failure to concentrate his forces on a narrow front and his decision to commit two green divisions to battle without adequate reconnaissance that were the reasons for his stall. Patton rarely took any responsibility for his own failures. It was always somebody else at fault, including his subordinates. A poor general who thought he was reincarnated. Oh, and wore cowboy guns.
Patton detested Hodges, did not like Bradley disobeying his orders, and Eisenhowers orders. He also hated Montgomery. About the only person he ever liked was himself.
Read Monty and Patton: Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds
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Larry Brown
Patton at Metz advanced 10 miles in three months. The poorly devised Panzer Brigade concept was deployed there with green German troops. The Panzer Brigades were a rushed concept attempting to plug the gaps while the proper panzer divisions were re-fitting and rebuilt after the summer 1944 battles.
The Panzer Brigades had green crews with little time to train, did not know their tanks properly, had no recon elements and didn't even meet their unit commander until his arrival at the front. These were not elite forces.
17th SS were not amongst the premier Waffen SS panzer divisions. It was not even a panzer division but a panzer grenadier division, only equipped with assault guns, not tanks, with only a quarter of the number of AFVs as a panzer division. The 17th SS was badly mauled in Normandy and not up to strength at Arracourt in The Lorraine.
Patton's Third Army was almost always where the best German divisions in the west were NOT.
♦ Who did the 3rd Army engage?
♦ Who did 3rd Army defeat?
♦ Patton never once faced a full strength
Waffen SS panzer division nor a
Tiger battalion.
In The Lorraine, the 3rd Army faced a rabble. Even the German commander of Army Group G in The Lorraine, Hermann Balck, who took over in September 1944 said:
"I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again…can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans."
Patton was mostly facing a second rate rabble in The Lorraine. Patton was neither on the advance nor being heavily engaged at the time he turned north to Bastogne when the Germans pounded through US lines.
The road from Luxembourg to Bastogne was pretty well devoid of German forces, with Bastogne being on the very southern German flank. Only when Patton neared Bastogne did he engage some German armour but not a great amount at all. The Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade wasn't one of the best German armoured units, while 26th Volks-Grenadier only had a dozen Hetzers, and the small element of Panzer Lehr (Kampfgruppe 901) left behind only had a small number of tanks operational. Its not as if Patton had to smash through full panzer divisions or Tiger battalions on his way to Bastogne, he never. Patton's armoured forces outnumbered the Germans by at least 6 to 1.
Patton faced very little German armour when he broke through to Bastogne because the vast majority of the German 5th Panzer Army had already left Bastogne in their rear moving westwards to the River Meuse. They were still engaging forces under Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Leading elements were engaging the Americans and British under Montgomery's command near Dinant by the Meuse. Monty's armies halted the German advance and pushed them back.
In Normandy in 1944, the panzer divisions had been largely worn down, primarily by the British and Canadians around Caen. The First US Army around St Lo then Mortain helped a little. Over 90% of German armour was destroyed by the British. Once again, Patton faced very little opposition in his break out in Operation Cobra performing mainly an infantry role. Nor did Patton advance any quicker across eastern France mainly devoid of German troops, than the British and Canadians did, who were in Brussels by early September seizing the vital port of Antwerp intact.
Patton repeatedly denigrated his subordinates.
♦ In Sicily he castigated Omar Bradley for the tactics
Bradley's II Corps were employing
♦ He accused the commander of 3rd Infantry Division,
Truscott of being "afraid to fight".
♦ In the Ardennes he castigated Middleton of the
US VIII Corps and Millikin of the US III Corps.
♦ When his advance from Bastogne to Houffalize
stalled he criticised the 11th Armoured Division for being
"very green and taking unnecessary casualties to no effect".
♦ He called the 17th Airborne Division "hysterical" in
reporting their losses.
After the German attack in the Ardennes, US air force units were put under Coningham of the RAF. Coningham, gave Patton massive ground attack plane support and he still stalled. Patton's failure to concentrate his forces on a narrow front and his decision to commit two green divisions to battle without adequate reconnaissance resulted in his stall. Patton rarely took any responsibility for his own failures. It was always somebody else at fault, including his subordinates. A poor general who thought he was reincarnated. Oh, and wore cowboy guns.
Patton detested Hodges, did not like Bradley disobeying his orders, and Eisenhowers orders. He also hated Montgomery. About the only person he ever liked was himself.
Read Monty and Patton: Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds
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The First Airbourne seized one end of the Arnhem bridge denying its use to the Germans. The 9th SS and its vehicles were shot up on the Arnhem bridge. If XXX Corps had arrived, not being delayed by two US para units, the whole bridge would have been in British hands.
Gavin did prioritize the Nijmegen bridge. He sent a battalion, the 508, headed by Lindquist immediately on landing. They set off around 1400 hrs. Lindquist stopped at DePloeg setting up shop digging in for an attack from the bridge. Gavin found out around 1830 hrs, driving over hopping mad telling Lindquits to move to the bridge. The stop at DePloeg was too long to secure the bridge.
The 82nd never seized the Nijmegen bridge. Three 82nd scouts took prisoner seven of the 18 bridge guards on the south end of Nijmegen bridge, together with their 20mm cannon, but had to let them go after an hour as no one turned up.
The 9th SS came south to reinforce the bridge about 6 hours after the 82nd landed. The 82nd had 6 hours to move and occupy the bridge but hung around in DePloeg. They could have walked on the bridge whistling Dixie.
Browning was not there to hold Gavin's hand. Browning had full faith in Gavin as up until then he had an excellent record. Browning was in the air when the 82nd 508 should have been moving to the bridge. He was two hours after the first jump. Then Browning had to set up his CP when on the ground. He was to communicate with three airborne generals, not focus on the 82nd.
The 82nd around midnight on d day made their fist attack on the bridge, staying all night around the southern approaches. Browning was informed they had not seized the bridge in the morning of d day plus 1. He ordered Gavin to take the bridge ASAP. Gavin deprioritized the bridge, moving all his men out of Nijmegen town and the bridge approaches, after being near the southern approaches all night. Gavin said to Browning that XXX Corp can take the bridge when they arrive. They did. The resulting two day delay due to the 101st and 82nd failing to seize key bridges precluded a bridgehead over the Rhine.
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The concept was Monty's coming from his pursuit operation Comet, which was never presented to Eisenhower. Eisenhower wanted to chase the Germans who were on the retreat. Market Garden was primarily a strategic operation.
The plan was mainly by Americans Brereton and Williams. Brereton was a no-can-do general, unsuited for risky airborne operations. The plan had only one corps in the end above Eindhoven - a disgrace.
Eisenhower prioritized the northern thrust over other fronts and even seizing Antwerp and clearing the Schedlt. Clearing the Scheldt would take time as the German 15th SS army, highly experienced from the Russian front, had set up shop in the Scheldt and not retreated back into Germany, under Hitler's orders. All available supplies would be directed to this northern thrust.
"Since Eisenhower — the Supreme Commander and Ground Force Commander — approved the Arnhem operation rather than a push to clear the Scheldt, then surely he was right, as well as noble, to accept the responsibility and any resulting blame? The choice in early September was the Rhine or Antwerp: to continue the pursuit or secure the necessary facilities to solve the logistical problem? The decision was made to go for the Rhine, and that decision was Eisenhower’s."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"On 4 Sept, the day Antwerp fell, Eisenhower issued another directive, ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes — 21st Army Group and two corps of the US First Army — to take Antwerp, reach the Rhine and seize the Ruhr"
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Eisenhower did not know Antwerp had fallen to British troops when he issued the northern thrust directive. Montgomery wanted a thrust up and over the Rhine prior to Eisenhower's directive, devising Operation Comet, multiple crossings of the Rhine, to be launched on 2 Sept, being cancelled due to German resistance and poor weather. Operation Comet was not presented to Eisenhower for his approval. Montgomery asked Brereton, an American, of the First Allied Airborne Army, to drop into the Scheldt in early September - he refused.
Eisenhower's directive of 4 Sept had divisions of the US 1st Army and Montgomery's view of taking multiple bridges on the Rhine from Arnhem to Wesel. The British 2nd Army needed some divisions of Hodges' US 1st army and the First Allied Airborne Army (which Monty controlled anyhow). Hodges' would protect the right flank. the Canadians would protect the left flank from the German 15th army. "the narrow thrust was reduced to the Second Army and two US corps, the XIX and VII of Hodges’ First Army, a total of around eighteen Allied divisions"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
The northern thrust was to chase a disorganized retreating enemy preventing them from manning the German West Wall, gaining a footing over the Rhine, consolidating and then clearing the Scheldt to open up the port of Antwerp. A sound concept which even the German generals agreed would have worked.
"Perhaps not more then, but that much alone would have been very useful — and much more than was actually achieved. This view was confirmed after the war in interviews with the senior surviving German commanders, von Rundstedt, Student, Blumentritt and Rommel’s former chief of staff, General Speidel. They were unanimous in declaring that a full-blooded thrust from Belgium in September would have succeeded in crossing the Rhine and might have ended the war in 1944, since they had no means of stopping such a thrust reaching the Ruhr. In the event, largely due to the faulty command set-up [by Eisenhower] and lack of grip, even a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter was still a dream in 1944."
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Eisenhower’s reply of 5 September to Montgomery deserves analysis, not least the part that concerns logistics. The interesting point is that Eisenhower apparently believes that it is possible to cross the Rhine and take both the Ruhr and the Saar — and open the Scheldt — using the existing logistical resources."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Eisenhower. He had now heard from both his Army Group commanders — or Commanders-in-Chief as they were currently called — and reached the conclusion that they were both right; that it was possible to achieve everything, even with lengthening supply lines and without Antwerp. In thinking this Ike was wrong."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Post-Normandy Bradley seemed unable to control Patton, who persistently flouted Eisenhower’s directives and went his own way, aided and abetted by Bradley. This part of their relationship quickly revealed itself in matters of supply, where Hodges, the commander of the US First Army, was continually starved of fuel and ammunition in order to keep Patton’s divisions rolling, even when Eisenhower’s strategy required First Army to play the major role in 12th Army Group’s activities."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Bradley was starving Hodges' First Army of supplies, against Eisenhower's orders, giving them to Patton who was running off into unimportant territory - again, and being bogged down - again. The resources starved First Army could not be a part of northern thrust as Bradley and Patton, against Eisenhower's orders, were syphoning off supplies destined for the First army. This northern thrust over the Rhine, as Eisenhower envisaged, obviously would not work as he thought. A lesser operation was devised by Montgomery, Market Garden, eliminating the divisions of US First Army, with only ONE crossing of the Rhine. Market Garden would also eliminate V rocket launching sites, of which London wanted eliminating ASAP, giving a 60 mile long salient buffer between German forces and the important port of Antwerp. This would only have one corps above Eindhoven, a disgrace considering the forces in Europe at the time. Eisenhower had no grasp of the situation as it was and no strong strategy to advance. Eisenhower should have fired Bradley and Patton for sabotaging the Northern Thrust operation.
Montgomery did not plan or was in involved in Market Garden's execution. Montgomery, after fixing the operations objectives with Eisenhower to the measly forces available, gave Market Garden planning to others, mainly USAAF generals, Brereton and Williams. General Brereton, who liked the plan, agreed to it with even direct input. Brereton ordered the drops will take place during the day with Brereton also overseeing the troop carrier and supply drops schedules. Williams forbid fighter-bombers to be used. A refusal by Brereton and the operation would never have gone ahead; he earlier rejected Montgomery's initial plan of a drop into the Scheldt at Walcheren Island.
"it was not until 9 October, more than a month after the fall of Antwerp, that General Eisenhower told Montgomery to devote his entire attention to the clearance of the Scheldt. By that time the Canadians had cleared, or were investing, many of the Channel ports"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Operation MARKET-GARDEN had two major objectives:
to get Allied troops across the Rhine
and to capture the Ruhr.
Three major advantages were expected to accrue:
( I) cutting the land exit of those Germans remaining in western Holland;
(2) outflanking the West Wall, _and
(3) positioning British ground forces for a subsequent drive into Germany along the North German Plain."
- US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN. Page 120.
"Eisenhower approved the operation with certain conditions. Market Garden would commence on 17 September. Securing the approaches to the port at Antwerp would be delayed until Montgomery seized bridgeheads over the Rhine. His priority after seizing the bridgeheads would be gaining the much needed deep water port. He would not continue the attack to Berlin as he had proposed."
- A FRAMEWORK FOR MILITARY DECISION MAKING UNDER RISKS
by JAMES V. SCHULTZ
AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA J. JUNE 1996. Page 50.
"later, on 15 September, General Eisenhower himself reopened the wound, perhaps with a view to healing it once and for all through a process of bloodletting. Looking beyond both Arnhem and Antwerp, he named Berlin as the ultimate Allied goal"
- US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN. Page 210.
One of the prime aims of Market Garden was to be the northern grip of the the pincer on the Ruhr. Wayward Eisenhower changed yet again his strategy from the Ruhr to Berlin two days before Market Garden.
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@davidrendall2461
Monty was not particularly interested in Antwerp as it would take many, many, week to become operational, being accessed down a 40 mile river. By chasing a retreating army north, Monty could get Amsterdam or Rotterdam on the coast, getting them operational quite quickly.
As you pointed out, Eisenhower wanted Antwerp to supply his broad front.
As an aside. There is a book to be published soon, by Christian Wolmar, a railway expert. His upcoming book is on the rebuilding of the bombed French railways directly after D-Day. He is astonished at the rate of rebuilding to supply the allied armies. He says:
In the book i'm writing about railway rebuilding in France etc after Normandy landings, I relate how many far larger bridges were rebuilt in 10 days or less...time to call in the Royal Engineers
It negates this obsession by Eisenhower to get Antwerp online, as the likes of Le Havre, opened 6 October, etc, were supplying the front via the repaired French railways.
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