Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "Who's to Blame for the Failure of Operation Market Garden? BattleStorm 8/8" video.

  1. The 508th also had a vital task — ‘a special destiny’, says the US Official History. The 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Shields Warren, was charged with taking the road bridge over the Waal at Nijmegen: a prime task of Operation Market was being entrusted here to just one battalion from an entire division. According to the US Official History, there was some dispute over exactly when the 1st Battalion should go for the bridge. General Gavin was to claim later that the battalion was to ‘go for the bridge without delay’. However, Colonel Lindquist, the 508th Regimental commander, understood that Warren’s battalion was not to go for the bridge until the other regimental objectives — securing the Groesbeek Ridge and the nearby glider LZs, had been achieved: General Gavin’s operational orders confirm Warren’s version. Warren’s initial objective was ground near De Ploeg, a suburb of Nijmegen, which he was to take and organise for defence: only then was he to ‘prepare to go into Nijmegen later’ and these initial tasks took Lieutenant Colonel Warren most of the day. It was not until 1830hrs that he was able to send a force into Nijmegen. This force was somewhat small, just one rifle platoon and an intelligence section with a radio — say forty men. "Unfortunately, Company ‘B’ got lost on its way to the rendezvous so only Company ‘A’ moved on the bridge — the efforts of an entire airborne division were now reduced to just one company. It was now around 2000hrs on D-Day, H-Hour plus seven." Company ‘A’ entered Nijmegen — a city of some 100,000 people in 1944 —and moved cautiously up the main road, the Groesbeekscheweg. After two hours they reached a traffic island near the centre of the town and immediately came under automatic fire from directly ahead. As they went to ground and deployed, a German convoy arrived in one of the side streets on their flank and they heard the clatter of boots and kit as enemy soldiers leapt from their trucks. Company ‘A’ was just a few minutes too late: the Germans were moving troops into Nijmegen from the north and the fight for the road bridge was on. The US Official History mourns this fact, pointing out that ‘the time for the easy, speedy capture of Nijmegen had passed’, which was all the more lamentable because during the afternoon, when the division had been engaged on other tasks, the Germans had ‘nothing in the town but mostly low quality troops’ — and not many of those. - Neillands It was clear who was to blame for Market Garden not being a 100% success. Gavin of the 82nd.
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  2. The Son bridge was a Bailey bridge supplied by XXX Corps. British engineers built the bridge, using 101st men to do some pushing. ;)
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  3. One problem that has bedevilled any objective study of Anglo-US military history in the post-war decades is the tendency of some US commanders and many US historians to play the ‘British’ or ‘Montgomery’ card in order to conceal some glaring American blunder. Omar Bradley’s disastrous failure to provide adequate armoured support for the US divisions landing on Omaha on D-Day, with the terrible losses thus caused to the infantry companies of the 1st and 29th Divisions, have been largely expunged from the public mind — at least in the United States — by constant harping about the British or ‘Montgomery’s failure to take Caen on D-Day — a failure that turned out to have no strategic significance whatsoever. Nor is Omaha the only example. As we have seen in earlier chapters, harping on about the ‘slowness’ of XXX Corps or the ‘flawed’ plan of General Urquhart at Arnhem, has successfully diverted critical minds from the cock-up in command that prevented the 82nd Division from either taking the Nijmegen bridge on the first day of the attack or avoiding a frontal attack across the Waal in borrowed boats three days later. It appears that all that was necessary to avoid critical press comment in the USA and any unwelcome Congressional interest in the competence of any American commander, was to murmur ‘the British’ or — better still — ‘Montgomery’, and critical comment in the USA either subsided or went unvoiced. - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 The fact is, that XXX Corps were not slow, reaching Nijmegen ahead of schedule. Urquart's paras took one end of the Arnhem bridge preventing its use by the Germans. If the US 82nd had taken the Nijmegen bridge immediately XXX Corps would have been in Arnhem on time relieving the paras and fully securing the bridge. Caen was a nice to have objective, but Monty saw no need to tie up vital resources on a strategically unimportant target. As Neillands stated it was of "no strategic significance whatsoever." Neillands highlights the glaring unthruths of the US press and historians.
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  4. Tim Veriinder Monty wanted Kasel as the point over the Rhine, not Arnhem, the US leader of the First Allied Airborne Army wanted Arnhem. Monty gave them their way. Eventually Monty did go for Kasel - successfully. The USAAF wanted no fighter-bombers, so there was none. This was an appalling mistake. If it was left entirely to Monty it would have been a success. It was when the American amateurs got involved matters went pear shaped. It is therefore important to separate the character of Montgomery from his professional expertise: it is more than probable the former aroused American hostility and the latter aroused American jealousy. Montgomery had seen more service than all the US generals put together, and he did not trouble to conceal the fact that he regarded some of them — but by no means all of them —as amateurs. - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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  5. Eisenhower stated this a communication to Monty on 5 Sept. I have always given priority to the Ruhr - rpt Ruhr - and the northern route of advance, as indicated in my directive of yesterday, Eisenhower was deluded. "My intention is initially to occupy the Saar and the Ruhr and by the time we have done this Havre and Antwerp should both be available to maintain one or both of the thrusts". Antwerp had not been taken when he wrote the above. He had no idea of logistics, thinking he had enough supplies to support two main thrusts over a broad front. "On 10 Sept Eisenhower met Monty in Brussels and said that his broad front policy would continue despite Monty objecting. Montgomery was urged to press on with his plan to use the Allied Airborne Army in one powerful, full-blooded thrust to the Lower Rhine at _Arnhem — a thrust that just a week later would become Operation Market Garden. - Neillands. "Therefore, since the air planners — specifically [American] Brereton and Major-General Paul L. Williams of the IX US Troop Carrier Command — had the casting vote over the air element in Market, the decision was made for Arnhem" - Neillands Horrocks’ orders to XXX Corps for Garden were quite specific: "XXX Corps will break out of the existing bridgehead on 17 September and pass through the airborne carpet which has been laid down in front of us, in order to seize the area Nunspeet-Arnhem and exploit north to the Zuider Zee... the Corps will advance and be supplied down one road - the only major road available - 20,000 vehicles will be involved. Tough opposition must be expected at the break out and the country is very difficult. Speed is absolutely vital as we must reach the lightly equipped 1st Airborne Division, if possible in forty-eight hours." "The orders of the Airborne Army commander, American Lieutenant General Brereton specify, these bridges were to be taken ‘with thunderclap surprise’. That meant on D-Day, 17 September, for after D-Day the vital element of surprise would be lost. The bridges must be taken on D-Day — not when the various airborne divisional commanders got around to it." - Neillands Gavin moved on the Nijmegen bridge when he got around to it, ignoring his orders of "thunderclap surprise". The bridge was actually taken by the British.
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  6. My uncle was in XXX Corps. When I was a teenager I worked with two men who were at Arnhem in the paras, and I mentioned the tea thing to them all. They all laughed. They ate and drank when they could, no army stopped for tea time. That is derisory propaganda by the Americans. I think your father was having you on.
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  7. Ei Pi It was simple. The paras had to seize the bridge and XXX Corps run up the road across the bridges and into Arnhem. The problem that one unit, the US 82nd, were incompetent. XXX Corps never put a foot wrong, getting to Nijmegen ahead of schedule only to find the bridge still in German hands.
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  8. Ei Pi Comparing Montgomery to Patton, an average US general, is grossly insulting.
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  9. bandholm You are feeding the Yanks, who are filled with propaganda, even talking of Montgomery and Patton in the same paragraph.
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  10. Slippery Storm OH no! The US 1st and 9th armies were put under Montgomery's command at the Bulge. The 9th Army was under British control until the end of the war. In effect in the early stages of the Bulge Montgomery was commanding, as Ike was AWOL not even communicating with Montgomery for about 30 days. Part of the US air force were put under RAF command. On Paton's ride up to the Bulge, the road from Luxembourg to Bastogne was largely devoid of German forces, as Bastogne was on the very southern German periphery. Only when Patton got near to Bastogne did he face 'some' German armour. The Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade wasn't one of the best armoured units, while 26th Volks-Grenadier only had a dozen Hetzers, and the tiny element of Panzer Lehr (Kampfgruppe 901) left behind had only a small number of tanks operational. Its not as if Patton had to smash through full panzer divisions or Tiger battalions on his way to Bastogne. Patton's armoured forces outnumbered the Germans by at least 6 to 1. Patton faced little German armour when he broke through to Bastogne because the vast majority of the German 5th Panzer Army had already left Bastogne in their rear and moved westwards to the River Meuse, where they were engaging forces under Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Leading elements were engaging the Americans and British under Montgomery's command near Dinant by the Meuse. It was Patton's failure to concentrate his forces on a narrow front and his own decision to commit two green divisions to battle without adequate reconnaissance that were the reasons for his stall. After the German attack in the Ardennes, US air force units were put under the command of Coningham of the RAF. Coningham, gave Patton massive ground attack plane support and he still stalled. Patton rarely took any responsibility for his own failures. It was always somebody else at fault, including his subordinates. In the Lorraine, Patton only moved 10 miles in 3 months. Read Monty and Patton:Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds
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  11. William Smith There was no race to Messina. Montgomery and Patton arranged who did what by-passing the top command. Because of the high command arrangement in Sicily, which Montgomery heavily criticized, it was changed for Normandy on Monty's insistence. The Germans and Italians sail to Italy unmolested, because there was no plane to attack them retreating by allied navies and air forces.
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  12. William Smith The Americans after WW2 have constantly belittled Montgomery because his professionalism showed them to be near egotistical amateurs. Even today, the more they carry on like this the bigger idiots they look as fact and history has put Montgomery as the finest general in WW2.
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  13. William Smith Some facts for you. The British were the single biggest agents in the defeat of Nazi Germany. They were there from day one until the end. The so-called "invincible" Germans army tried and failed, with their allies, for two years in WW2 to defeat the British army in North Africa. The finest army in the world from mid 1942 onwards was the British. From El Alemein it moved right up into Denmark, through nine countries, and not once suffered a reverse taking all in its path. Over 90% of German armour in the west was destroyed by the British. Montgomery had to give the US armies an infantry role as they were not equipped to engage massed German SS armour. Montgomery stopped the Germans in every event they attacked him: ♦ August 1942 - Alem el Halfa ♦ October 1942 - El Alamein ♦ March 1943 - Medenine ♦ June 1944 - Normandy ♦ Sept/Oct 1944 - Holland ♦ December 1944 - Battle of the Bulge Not on one occasion were Monty's ground armies pushed back into a retreat by the Germans. The US Army were struggling in 1944/45 retreating in the Ardennes. The Americans didn't perform all that great east of Aachen, then the Hurtgen Forest defeat with 33,000 casualties and Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months with over 50,000 casualties. The Battle of the Bulge took all the US effort, and vital help from Montgomery and the British 21st Army Group, just to get back to the start line. The Germans took 20,000 US POWs in the Battle of The Bulge in Dec 1944. No other allied country had that many prisoners taken in the 1944-45 timeframe. The USA retreat at the Bulge, again, the only allied army to be pushed back into a retreat in the 1944-45 timeframe. Montgomery was effectively in charge of the Bulge having to take control of the US 1st and 9th armies. The 9th stayed under his control until the end of the war just about. Normandy was planned and commanded by the British which was a great success coming in ahead of schedule and with less casualties than predicted. The German armour in the west was wiped out by the primarily British - the US forces were impotent against the panzers. Monty assessed the US armies (he was in charge of them) and had to give them a supporting infantry role, as they were just not equipped to fight tank v tank battles. On 3 Sept 1944 when Eisenhower took over overall allied command of ground forces everything went at a snail's pace. The fastest advance of any western army in Autumn/early 1945 was the 60 mile thrust by the British XXX Corps to the Rhine at Arnhem.
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  14. Jonathan Muscella The failure at Nijmegen was 100% down to Gavin of the 82nd. Browning dropping in on the 2nd day and found the bridge, to his annoyance, still in German hands. He ordered Gavin to take the bridge.
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  15. William Smith "Everyone knows that Britain was scared by the loss of life in WWI and refused to commit their troops to the fight." Drivelous Yankee nonsense.
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  16. William Smith Monty's plan in Normandy was not for British forces to take territory. He specifically wanted to draw in German armour onto British forces to grind them up to keeping them away from the US forces for them to break out (Operation Cobra). That was even stated at St.Paul's school in Fulham in the planning, but low key so as not to lower British soldiers morale. To do that Monty was confident British armour could match German armour - US armour would struggle or most likely be overwhelmed. A 12 mile sector around Caen saw more concentrated German armour in all of WW2. Goodwood was not British forces taking territory, as the plan was for the US forces to do that, Monty specifically states this here in this link in an interview with Edward R Murrow. Transcript.... "The acquisition of territory on the eastern flank of the beachhead in the Caen sector was not really important. What was important there was to draw the maximum number of German divisions, and especially the armour, into that flank. The acquisition of territory was important on the western flank [the US sector]." ...."an accusation drawn at me, that I ought to have taken Caen in the programme on D-Day! And we didn't. I didn't mind about that because....The air force would get very het up because I didn't go further down towards Falaise and get the ground suitable for airfields. I didn't bother about that, it would have meant enormous casualties in doing it and it wasn't necessary." "I could reply to that criticism that on the American front the line from which the breakout was finally launched was a line the St.Lo-Periers road, should have been captured in the initial plan by the American 1st Army on D-Day plus 5, that was the 11th June. But they didn't actually capture it until the 18th July. But I have never returned the charge with that accusation. ...until now" "I have never understood why Ike said in his dispatches that, when the British failed to break out towards Paris on the eastern flank. The Americans were able [to break out], because of our flexibility, to take it on, on our western flank. I have always thought that was an unfair criticism of Dempsey and the 2nd British Army." - Field Marshall Montgomery (1959) The RAF chief Tedder, wanted Monty fired as he wanted open territory to the south towards Falaise to setup his airfields saying Monty was not pursing territory aggressively enough. Monty would have none of it. Operation Goodwood was engaging the massed armoured German defences drawing them in to British lines, grinding them up moving slowly. Here is a 1970s objective British Army Sandhurst internal video analysing Operation Goodwood, with even German commanders who were there taking part. At the beginning it specifically states Monty told Generals O'Connor and Dempsey not to run south to Falaise, not to take territory. Look at 6 mins: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=udW1UvSHXfY Monty was not too concerned with Caen as it would consume too many resources to take. He was more concerned with grinding up German armour in the field and acting as a decoy for the American armies to break out. Although by the time of Goodwood only the southern suburbs of Caen were in German hands. Monty was in charge of all of Operation Overlord. He wanted the German armour away from US forces, to allow them to break out. It worked. That is what he wanted and planned. Monty never saw Caen as important but never criticised US forces..... until 1959 when they were at him about Caen, he criticised them for taking St.Lo a month late - with little German armour around for a month. The Germans did eventually send some armour to St.Lo with the US forces making it worse for themselves to capture the place. Even Bradley agreed with Monty. Bradley wrote that: "The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we [the Americans] were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride, this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for while we tramped around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded". At Goodwood's the Germans had five lines of dug-in anti-tank defence and heavy Tiger and fast Panther tanks for mobility. Goodwood was mostly 'not' bocage but open ground more suitable for tank battles, where the German long range 88mm's would be at an advantage. Caen saw the densest concentration of German armour ever seen in WW2. At Kursk the Germans were attacking over a near 50 mile front. There was not 8 panzer divisions within 12 miles. There were EIGHT Panzer Divisions in the Caen sector by end of June 1944. Monty had no option but to engage them head on and also draw in their reserves. The Germans kept sending more and more panzer divisions around the Caen area as June progressed and into July. The panzer divisions deployed to the Caen area: • 21st Panzer Division - 117 Panzer IVs. • Panzer Lehr Division - 101 Panzer IVs, 89 Panthers. • 2nd Panzer Division - 89 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers. • 116th Panzer Division - 73 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers. (In reserve just behind the front). • 1st SS Panzer Division - 98 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers. • 9th SS Panzer Division - 40 Stugs, 46 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers. • 10th SS Panzer Division - 38 Stugs, 39 Panzer IVs. • 12th SS Panzer Division - 98 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers. • Tiger Battalion SS101 - 45 Tigers. • Tiger Battalion SS102 - 45 Tigers. • Tiger Battalion 503 - 45 Tigers. Source. Bernages Panzers and the Battle For Normandy and Zetterling's Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness. Subsequently the US forces hardly met German armour in Normandy, performing mainly an infantry role, with most German armour being eliminated by British forces.
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  17.  @danwelch8547  More German prisoners were taken in Tunisia than in Stalingrad.
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  18.  @danwelch8547  ♦ North Africa was vital. If the Germans got to the Middle East and the oil it would have been all over. The Germans wanted to link up with the Japanese in India or Iran. Mesopotamia plan. ♦ Only the Yanks criticise Monty, in a veiled attempt to disguise their inept performance in Europe. Monty never retreated, not once. ♦ From mid-1942 onwards the British Army was the finest in the world, taking all in its path. ♦ Bradley felt humiliated having 2 of his 3 armies taken from him and giving to Monty in the Bulge. ♦ The depleted and demoralised US armies at the Bulge should have been pushed to the rear of the British 21st Army Group. Monty never humiliated them. He kept them at the front. ♦ Monty filled the losses of the two US armies with British troops. British troops under US command with the US command under British command. It worked. ♦ The Yanks always criticise Monty for not being aggressive. Which is a way of saying he was not stupid overrunning his supply lines as Rommel always did along with some British generals in North Africa, and as did US Patton. ♦ A US report in the 1980s criticised Patton heavily in the Lorraine. One point was that he constantly overran supplies. When the US First and Ninth armies were given to Monty at the Bulge, Monty chose the right option. Instead of joining a grindmeat where the Americans lost almost 100,000 and the Germans around 75,000, Monty decided to choose his own ground, not fighting in the Ardennes. The result was that more than 100,000 Germans were made casualties in Operation Veritable and Grenade, British (and American) casualties were less than 20.000. In Operation Plunder the British went further to make 30,000 German casualties, for an remarkable number of only 4,000 allied casualties. Monty's operations were on the offensive, and yet the Germans suffered a gigantic number of casualties compared to the minimum of the British. Of the three main powers, the British managed the most cost effective advances in the war, while still keeping up the pace, and even facing the majority of the Germans in Normandy, while advancing faster than everyone else after the break out, to Belgium. Patton was stuck in Metz for three months suffering 50.000 casualties, Bradley had 42.000 in the Hurtgen Forest defeat. The Americans were having manpower troubles after the Bulge. - mostly because of their head on tactics and lack of interest in keeping their soldiers alive. They counterattacked in the Bulge not because it was the most sane thing to do, but just to try make Bradley and the Americans at large less humiliated. Monty in the Bulge had the same thinking as in Operation Luttich. Let the Germans go as far as west as possible while minimizing casualties.
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  19.  @danwelch8547  You are one screwed up man. ♦ Alem el Halfa the German had equal men, tanks (and better tanks) , and enough fuel to reach the Suez Canal. Rommel was outfoxed and well beaten. ♦ To say the British and American Torch landing forced Rommel to retreat is total ignorance. ♦ It was Eisenhower who thought Market Garden should go ahead at the same time as Antwerp was being cleared. Eisenhower didn't put all his eggs into one basket in clearing Antwerp. He even wrote to Monty on the 7th September and said that his idea was to get to the Ruhr WHILE Antwerp was being cleared and that by the time they reached the Ruhr then Antwerp should be cleared......so blame Eisenhower. He was the man in overall command at that point. Eisenhower NEVER told Monty "forget the thrust to the Ruhr. Concentrate on Antwerp first". Far from it. Eisenhower gave Market Garden his blessing. The buck stops with Eisenhower. Not Monty. In fact on the 8th September Monty did actually propose an alternate plan for a para drop into the Scheldt Estuary to clear Antwerp but Brereton, and American, the general commanding the First Allied Airborne Army said "no", rejecting this alternative proposal with nothing Monty could do about it. He had to abide by Brereton's decision, Breton preferred Market Garden instead.
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  20.  @danwelch8547  I will let the Germans have the first say on the Bulge: General Hasso von Manteuffel: ‘The operations of the American First Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’. By November 1944, British SHEAF officer, Strong, noted that there was a possibility of a German counter-offensive in the Ardennes or the Vosges. Strong went to personally warn Bradley at his HQ, who said, "let 'em come".  Montgomery on hearing of the attack immediately, without consulting Eisenhower, took British forces to the Meuse to prevent any German forces from making a bridgehead, securing the rear. He was prepared to halt their advance and attack them.  This was while Eisenhower and Bradley were doing nothing.   even by 19 December, three days into the offensive, no overall plan had emerged from 12th Army Group or SHAEF, other than the decision to send Patton’s forces north to Bastogne. Overall, the Ardennes battle was in urgent need of grip. General Hodges had yet to see Bradley or receive more than the sketchiest orders from his Army Group commander. - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 On 20 December, Montgomery had sent a signal to Alanbrooke regarding the US forces: "Not good... definite lack of grip and control. I have heard nothing from Ike or Bradley and had no orders or requests of any sort. My own opinion is that the American forces have been cut in half and the Germans can reach the Meuse at Namur without opposition." Omar Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group, did very little:    16 Dec, the first day, for 12 hours did nothing.    16 Dec, after 12 hours, he sent two armoured divisions from the flanking Ninth and Third Armies.    17 Dec, after 24 Hours, he then called in two US airborne divisions from Champagne. 18 Dec, he ordered Patton to halt his pending offensive in the Saar. 18 Dec, he had still not established contact with the First Army, while Monty had. 19 Dec, he withdrew divisions from the Aachen front to shore up the Ardennes.    19 Dec, he had still not produced an overall defensive plan.    19 Dec, the Supreme Commander intervened directly late in the day.    20 Dec, Eisenhower telephoned Montgomery telling him to take command of the US First and Ninth Armies While all this dillying by Bradley was going on, German armies were pounding forward into his lines. Bradley should have been fired. Hodges ran away from his command post. British officer Whiteley & American officer Betts of SHEAF visited the U.S. First Army HQ after the German attack, seeing the shambles.  Strong, Whiteley, and Betts recommended that command of the armies north of the Ardennes be transferred from Bradley to Montgomery. Unfortunately only the two British officers approached Beddel Smith of their recommendations, who immediately fired the pair, claiming it was a nationalistic thing. The next morning, Beddel Smith apologized seeing the three were right, recommending to Eisenhower to bring in Monty. During the Battle of the Bulge Eisenhower was stuck self imprisoned in his HQ in des-res Versailles near Paris in fear of German paratroopers wearing US uniforms with the objective to kill allied generals. He had remained locked up more than 30 days without sending a single message or order to Montgomery, and that is when he thought he was doing ground control of the campaign, when in effect Montgomery was in control as two US armies had to be put under his control after the German attack, the US  First and Ninth armies.  Coningham of the RAF had to take control of US air force units. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war, just about. Biased American authors such as Stephen Ambrose wrote that Eisenhower took control of the Bulge and made the battle his veneering it as an all American victory.  Ambrose completely falsified history. The only thing Eisenhower did was tell Monty to get control of two out of control US armies, tell the US 101st to go to Bastogne (who were in northern France after the buffer Market Garden was created) and men under Bradley to counterattack. That is it. At the end of the Bulge would you believe it, Eisenhower gave Bradley an award.
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  21.  @danwelch8547  Some facts for you. The British were the single biggest agents in the defeat of Nazi Germany. They were there from day one until the end. They did not enter because they attacked another country or were attacked. The so-called "invincible" Germans army tried and failed, with their allies, for two years in WW2 to defeat the British army in North Africa. The finest army in the world from mid 1942 onwards was the British. From  Alem el Halfa  it moved right up into Denmark, through nine countries, and not once suffered a reverse taking all in its path. Over 90% of German armour in the west was destroyed by the British. Montgomery had to give the US armies an infantry role as they were not equipped to engage massed German SS armour. Montgomery stopped the Germans in every event they attacked him: ♦ August 1942 - Alem el Halfa  ♦ October 1942 - El Alamein  ♦ March 1943 - Medenine  ♦ June 1944 - Normandy  ♦ Sept/Oct 1944 - The Netherlands  ♦ December 1944 - Battle of the Bulge Not on one occasion were ground armies, British or US, under Monty's command pushed back into a retreat by the Germans. The US Army were struggling in 1944/45 retreating in the Ardennes. The Americans didn't perform well at all east of Aachen, then the Hurtgen Forest defeat with 33,000 casualties and Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months with over 50,000 casualties. The Battle of the Bulge took all the US effort, with Montgomery in command and the British 21st Army Group, just to get back to the start line, with nearly 100,000 casualties. The Germans took 20,000 US POWs in the Battle of The Bulge in Dec 1944. No other allied country had that many prisoners taken in the 1944-45 timeframe. The USA retreat at the Bulge, again, the only allied army to be pushed back into a retreat in the 1944-45 timeframe.  Montgomery was effectively in charge of the Bulge having to take control of the US First and Ninth armies. The US Third Army constantly stalled after coming up from the south. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war just about.  The US armies were losing men at unsustainable rates due to poor generalship. Normandy was planned and commanded by the British with Montgomery leading all ground forces, which was a great success coming in ahead of schedule with less casualties than predicted. The Royal Navy was in command of all naval forces with the RAF all air forces. The German armour in the west was wiped out by primarily the British - the US forces were impotent against the panzers. Monty assessed the US armies (he was in charge of them) and had to give them a supporting infantry role, as they were just not equipped, or experienced, to fight concentrated tank v tank battles. On 3 Sept 1944 when Eisenhower took over overall allied command of ground forces everything went at a snail's pace. The fastest advance of any western army in Autumn/early 1945 was the 60 mile thrust by the British XXX Corps to the Rhine at Arnhem. Then the ignored British naval blockade on the Axis economy, which was so successful the substantial Italian navy could not put to sea in full strength, or even at all on some occasions, because of a lack of oil. Then the British bomber offensive on the German economy, taking the war right into German cities, wiping out Hamburg in one night. You need to give respect where it is due.
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  22.  @danwelch8547  The advance of the British Eigth Army from El Alemein to Tunisia was the longest, and fastest in WW2 of any army. The Germans ran back as fast as they could. The US forces at Kasserine were about to be annihilated by the Germans and Italians when the Axis forces did an about turn as the British Eighth Army came up their rear. The Brits saved the Yankee asses for sure.
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  23.  @kaled1977  Harry Yeides wrote that after WW2 the British interviewed all German generals. Most had never heard of Patton. He was a Hollywood/US media star as the US had none - they made one up.
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  24. Clive Sinclair The radios never worked because of the high iron content in the soil, which was not known.
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  25. +Simon Warnes "hardly any tanks were actually present in the Arnhem area on 17 September. The vast majority deployed from Germany or other battle fronts after the airborne landings" - ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the RAF but no oblique photographs showing tanks at Arnhem Equally, it has proved impossible as yet to locate an interpretation report derived from a low-level mission that photographed German armour near Arnhem before Market Garden. - ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the RAF
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  26. "the composition of the German forces at Arnhem was far more complex than most published histories of Market Garden had tended to suggest. The two SS panzer divisions had been operating far below their full strength on the eve of the operation and, while 1st Airborne was ultimately confronted by armour in considerable strength, hardly any tanks were actually present in the Arnhem area on 17 September. The vast majority deployed from Germany or other battle fronts after the airborne landings" - ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the RAF Some low level pictures of a few Panzer IIIs and IVs were taken in early September for operation Comet. Ryan on speaking to Urquhart got it wrong. "Urquhart’s account is therefore somewhat perplexing. Further problems arise if we seek to document the events he described. Several extensive searches for the photographs have failed to locate them. Ostensibly, this might not seem surprising, as most tactical reconnaissance material was destroyed after the war, but Urquhart insisted that the Arnhem sortie was flown by a Spitfire squadron based at Benson; this would almost certainly mean 541 Squadron. Far more imagery from the Benson squadrons survived within the UK archives, but no oblique photographs showing tanks at Arnhem. In addition, although the Benson missions were systematically recorded at squadron and group level, not one record matches the sortie Urquhart described." "The low-level missions targeting the bridges on 6 September were scrupulously noted down, but all other recorded reconnaissance sorties over Arnhem were flown at higher altitudes and captured vertical imagery. Equally, it has proved impossible as yet to locate an interpretation report derived from a low-level mission that photographed German armour near Arnhem before Market Garden." "As for Brian Urquhart’s famous account of how a low-level Spitfire sortie took photographs of tanks assumed to belong to II SS Panzer Corps, the reality was rather different. In all probability, the low-level mission that Urquhart recalled photographed the bridges and not the tanks" - ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY written by the Royal Air Force
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  27. Big Woody This one must be another dumb Yank. They breed them.
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  28. antares4s Must be a Yank to come out with such uninformed opinionated drivel.
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  29. 1. Thousands of vehicles mustered around Eindhoven - they were continually arriving bumper to bumper - all this needed control and management. They could not all wonder off into the night, as there were too many of them. They needed support by infantry. 2. Horrocks got to Nijmegen ahead of schedule despite a 12 hour delay at Son. The aim was to secure the bridges and make a foothold over the Rhine. Supporting troops and armour would move up and flesh out the penetration, which happened, creating a 60 mile buffer in front of Antwerp. A buffer the Germans had to go around when later attacking the US armies in the Ardennes. If the buffer was not created, the shortest, and flat, route to Antwerp was through the buffer. 3. Cook's Waal crossing was to secure the north end of the bridge while XXX Corps secured the south. Then XXX Corps tanks and troops would roll over. The tanks did roll over, however no US troops secured the north end of the bridge. XXX Corps took all the bridge themselves. They met the US paras 1 km north of the bridge at Lent as they never managed to get to the bridge. Twenty percent of the Waal crossing troops were British Sappers. The failure point was not seizing the Nijmegen bridge immediately. At the end of D-Day all crossings were denied to the Germans, except one - the Nijmegen bridge.  General Gavin of the US 82nd was tasked to seize the Nijmegen bridge as soon as landing. Gavin never, he failed with only a few German guards on the bridge.  He failed because his 82nd did not move to and seize the Nijmegen bridge immediately. Gavin even de-prioritised the bridge the prime target and focus. The 82nd were ready at 2 pm on the jump day not moving to the bridge. The gigantic bridge was guarded by only 19 guards. The Germans occupied the bridge at 1900 hrs. Six hours after the 82nd were ready to march. The 82nd could have easily secured the bridge if they moved to it immediately. They never. Events on the 1st day:    ♦  "At 1328, the 665 men of US 82nd 1st Battalion began to fall from the sky."         - Poulussen, R. Lost at Nijmegen.   ♦  "Forty minutes after the drop, around 1410, _the 1st Battalion marched off towards their objective, De Ploeg, three miles away." _ Poulussen,    ♦  "The 82nd were digging in and performing recon in the area looking for 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald         - Neillands, R. The Battle for the Rhine 1944.    ♦ The 82nd were dug in and preparing to defend their newly constructed regimental command post, which they established at 1825. Then Colonel Lindquist "was told by General Gavin, around 1900, to move into Nijmegen."       -Poulussen Events on the evening of the 1st day:    ♦ Having dug in at De Ploeg, Warren's battalion wasn't prepared to move towards Nijmegen at all.       -Poulussen,     ♦ Once Lindquist told Lieutenant Colonel Warren that his battalion was to move, Warren decided to visit the HQ of the Nijmegen Underground first - to see what info the underground had on the Germans at the Nijmegen bridge.       - Poulussen,     ♦ It was not until 1830hrs that he [Warren] was able to send a force into Nijmegen. This force was somewhat small, just one rifle platoon and an intelligence section with a radio — say forty men.       - Neillands. The Battle for the Rhine 1944  ♦ This was not a direct route to the bridge from Warren's  original position, and placed him in the middle of the town. It was also around 2100 when "A" Company left to attempt to capture the Nijmegen road bridge.     ♦ "B" Company was not with them because they'd split up due to it being dark with "visibility was less than ten yards".  - Poulussen,     ♦ The 82nd attacks were resisted by the Germans until the next day.  Events of the 2nd day:    ♦ Gavin drove up in a jeep the next morning and told by Warren that although they didn't have the bridge yet, another attack was about to go in.     ♦ Gavin then told Warren to hold because the Germans were  attacking in the southeast portion of the 82nd perimeter. ♦ At around 1100, Warren was ordered to withdraw from Nijmegen completely. - Poulussen
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  30. On 17 September, again defying his Supreme Commander and with the backing of his Army Group commander [Bradley], Patton launched an all-out attack on his two prime objectives, sending XX Corps against Metz and XII Corps in a drive for the Rhine. Success can justify such actions, but neither attack succeeded. The XX Corps was quickly halted at Metz and XII Corps was stopped by a German counter-attack at Luneville. Although he did not know it, George Patton’s glory days of rapid advances against slight opposition were over - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 On the 1st day of Market Garden Patton's two attacks had been repelled - he was going nowhere and moved 10 miles in three months. Also around the time of Market Garden General Collins' attacks around Archen had also failed. This nonsense by Bradley and Patton in not obeying Eisenhower's orders had depleted the US First Army of resources preventing a joint First Army and British 21st Army Group attack to encircle the vital Ruhr. For this Bradley or Patton, most likely Patton, should have been sacked immediately.
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  31. thebritishww2man It was a good daring plan and totally achievable. One unit, the 82nd, let the whole plan down. The delay meant more German troops were poured in, and they fought thinking they had a chance. If the 82nd had taken Nijmegen bridge on time, which they should have as no one was guarding it except a few troops, the Germans would not have poured in and fought like they did. Probability would have been they would have been demoralised even further after the trek from Normandy.
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  32. TIK is correct. The reason XXX Corps did not reach Arnhem bridge was that the 82nd did not take the bridge at Nijmegen on the 1st day. That is clear. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen just ahead of schedule and found the bridge in German hands. If XXX Corps reached Arnhem, what would have happen in and around Arnhem with the Germans bringing in panzers is a what if matter.
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  33. Not so. No substantial German armour was on the island on the 17 & 18th. That is why Harmel states that if the bridge was seized immediately, it would have been all over for us. The 10th SS Panzer infantry would have been held off by a 82nd cordon on the north of the bridge equipped with 6pdr anti-tanks weapons until XXX Corps arrived on the morning of the 19th. No heavy armour got on the island until the British paras capitulated about 10 pm on the 20th. Three hours after XXX Corps seized the Nijmegen bridge.
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  34. Kershaw interviewed Harmel, who said that it would have been all over for us if Nijmegen bridge was taken on the 17th.
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  35. ODDBALL SOK Harmel does not mean that at all. He never even wrote that. Harmel said that to Kershaw in the 1970s. Kershaw's book was published in 1990. Harmel knew the allied plan by then. Even Harmel knew that XXX Corps tanks could not run up the 50 odd miles to Nijmegen in a few hours. He knew that XXX Corps were scheduled to reach Nijmegen on the 19th, which they did. Harmel, the man in charge, said: "what is seldom understood, that the Arnhem battle was lost in Nijmegen. If the allies had taken the [Nijmegen] bridge on the first day, it would have been all over for us. Even if we had lost it on the second day we would have had difficulty stopping them. By the time the English tanks had arrived, the matter was already decided". Nothing was on the island that the 82nd could not deal with, with their 6dpr anti-tank guns once a cordon was in place around Lent at the north end of the bridge. The 10th SS Panzer infantry were the only troops the 82nd would need to fight - for 42 hours. Not Tigers, just infantry. Even if a MK IV turned up in Lent they could have dealt with that. Stop making things up.
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  36. ODDBALL SOK You do not take any notice of what people write. You wrote, "The 508th was not able to overcome the garrison and flak teams on the bridge" That is tripe. LOL. If the 82nd had moved to the bridge immediately they would have walked over it shooting the odd German hanging about. Teams of men could have dragged 6pdrs over the bridge and set them up on the north side, all within about half an hour. Later in the day on the 17th, when the 10th SS infantry had already crossed the bridge south into Nijmegen re-inforcing the bridge the 82nd could not take the bridge.
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  37. Sosobowski was a difficult and cantankerous character. Was this an excuse to get rid of him from the 1st Allied Airborne Army and divert blame from where it really lay?
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  38.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo a quiz. Name the bridge the US 82nd failed to seize? 20 points for the correct answer.
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  39. TIK If XXX Corps ran over the bridge at Nijmegen when they reached it, there would have been no resistance at Elst.
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  40. On 12 September, Bradley had told Patton about Market Garden and warned him that if it succeeded, the Third Army might be held back on the west bank of the Moselle for weeks while the detested Montgomery performed wonders in the north. Patton therefore suggested to Bradley that he cross the Moselle and get his forces so involved beyond the river that Eisenhower would be unable to stop him and must therefore support him. This ploy proved unnecessary: Eisenhower changed his mind yet again, at least in part, telling Bradley that he might ‘push his right wing [Patton’s Army] only far enough for the moment so as to hold adequate bridgeheads beyond the Moselle, and thus create a constant threat'. This was all that Patton needed to cross the river and surge ahead as far as he could, never mind the point about bridgeheads. By the evening of 14 September, the day V and VII Corps of the US First Army opened their attacks, Patton had established half a dozen crossing points over the Moselle, and was heading east, consuming great quantities of fuel and ammunition. The outcome was that Patton did not stop until brought to a halt by the German army in front of Metz. It should be noted that this move, designed by Bradley and Patton to check Montgomery, actually had a dire effect on Bradley’s other contingent, the US First Army, which was starved of fuel and artillery ammunition at Aachen. On 16 September, when Eisenhower told Bradley that logistical priority must go to First Army and Patton must stop, Patton again told Bradley that the Third Army must get involved ‘at once’ and asked Bradley to ignore this order and ‘not to call me until after dark on the nineteenth.’ - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944: There has been speculation that Market Garden was sabotaged by the US 82nd, who were taking one of the largest bridges in Europe at Nijmegen, just to get one over Montgomery. As Neillands states, "It should be noted that this move, designed by Bradley and Patton to check Montgomery." The move was not to gain an advantage over the enemy it was to spite a fellow allied general. This was when there was problems with the logistical train and resources scarce. Unbelievable.
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  41. Tim Veriinder Monty did not need bailing out, his record said it for him.
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  42. Market Garden failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. Because the 82nd did not seize the Nijmegen bridge immediately. They were ready at 2 pm on the jump day and never moved to the bridge. The gigantic bridge was guarded by 19 guards. Germans occupied the bridge at 1900 hrs. Six hours after the 82nd were ready to march. Events on the 1st day: ♦ "At 1328, the 665 men of US 82nd 1st Battalion began to fall from the sky." - Poulussen, R. Lost at Nijmegen. ♦ "Forty minutes after the drop, around 1410, the 1st Battalion marched off towards their objective, De Ploeg, three miles away." - Poulussen, ♦ The 82nd were digging in and performing recon in the area looking for 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald - Neillands, R. The Battle for the Rhine 1944. ♦ The 82nd were dug in and preparing to defend their newly constructed regimental command post, which they established at 1825. Then Colonel Lindquist "was told by General Gavin, around 1900, to move into Nijmegen." - Poulussen Events on the evening of the 1st day: ♦ Having dug in at De Ploeg, Warren's battalion wasn't prepared to move towards the Nijmegen at all. - Poulussen, ♦ Once Lindquist told Lieutenant Colonel Warren that his Battalion was to move, Warren decided to visit the HQ of the Nijmegen Underground first - to see what info the underground had on the Germans at the Nijmegen bridge. - Poulussen, ♦ This was not a direct route to the bridge from Warren's original position, and placed him in the middle of the town. It was also around 2100 when "A" Company left to attempt to capture the Nijmegen road bridge. ♦ "B" Company was not with them because they'd split up due to it being dark with "visibility was less than ten yards". - Poulussen, ♦ The 82nd attacks were resisted by the Germans until the next day. Events of the 2nd day: ♦ Gavin drove up in a jeep the next morning and was told by Warren that although they didn't have the bridge yet, another attack was about to go in. ♦ Gavin then told Warren to hold because the Germans were attacking in the southeast portion of the 82nd perimeter. ♦ At around 1100, Warren was ordered to withdraw from Nijmegen completely. - Poulussen
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  43.  @nickdanger3802  RAMBO ALERT! RAMBO ALERT! He is back again as someone else.
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  44.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, what else did the screaming voices tell you today?
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  45.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, the failure point of Market Garden was clearly the US 82nd not seizing the Nijmegen bridge. XXX Corps had to take it for them.
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  46.  @nickdanger3802  British paras denied the Arnhem bridge to the Germans. Unlike the US 82nd at Nijmegen, who failed to seize any part of the bridge. XXX Corps had to seize it themselves the 82nd were so inept, which took time. The delay meant a foothold over the Rhine was out for now. All because of the Yanks.
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  47.  @nickdanger3802  In 1944, the real XXX Corps reached Nijmegen ahead of schedule, despite beiing held up for 12 hours at Son because the US 101st failed to sieze the bridge there. At Nijmegen XXX Corps found the bridge they were supposed to roll over to Arnhem, 7 miles away, still held by the Germans. XXX Corps had to seize the bridge themselves.
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  48.  @bigwoody4704  RAMBO ALERT! Rambo, the Waal crossing was unnecessary. It was to save Gavin's face because he and his 82nd failed to seize the bridge. He sacrificed men for no advantage - 20% were British Sappers. XXX Corps seized the bridge for them. Carington's few tanks took the bridge, while the 82nd were wanderings around hiding from Germans way north of the bridge. A disgraceful performance by the 82nd.
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  49.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, a quiz. Name the US para unit that crossed the Waal in order to seize the north end of the bridge, but failed to get on the bridge? 20 points for the correct answer.
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  50. capralean It was already decided who would take Berlin. Even if the operation was a 100% success, the war would not have been over in 1944. Read The Battle for the Rhine by Robin Neilands. The only way the war could have been over in 1944 was to keep Monty in charge of all ground forces as he was in Normandy. Monty wanted 40 division thrusting towards the Ruhr. It was possible. Monty, right up to the Bulge was continually telling Eisenhower to put him back in charge, as he could see little progress on the US side. They had to run to him at the Bulge giving him two US armies.
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  51. Gavin was a general.
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  52. redsabreanakin The operation failed by a whisker, with the failure not where Sosabowski he had reservations.
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  53. By dawn on the morning of 1 September all these armies were across the Seine. - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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  54. fishmonger Nonsense.
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  55.  John Cornell  Most of the planners were Americans.
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  56.  John Cornell  The RAF offered to fly the US transport planes in between the US pilots "resting", So as to get more troops and equipment in on the first day. The American's refused.
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  57.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, a quiz. Name the US Supreme commander who deferred the taking of the Scheld? 20 points for the correct answer.
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  58. Whosoever Gavin was a general. Browning only dropped in on the 2nd day thinking the bridge had been taken. He ordered Gavin to take it immediately on finding out it was still in German hands.
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  59. The Germans never knew about the landings until they started. If they did they would have secured the bridges. There was no barbed wire or ditches around them, just a few low grade guards.
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  60. Chester Graham liaison officer 508 82nd wrote: "Prior to the Holland jump I sat in a high-level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division’s contribution to the success of the operation. After we were dropped in Holland, I went to the 508th Regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, “As soon as the DZ (drop zone) is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.” So I went cross-country through Indian country to the Division CP and relayed Lindquist’s message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his jeep, he told me to, “Come with me let’s get him moving.” On arriving at the 508th Regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, “I told you to move with speed.” " http://508pir.org/pdf_files/memoirs_graham_chester_e.pdf The delay meant the Germans had flooded in reinforcing the bridge and town - using the bridge to flood in. A bridge the 82nd could have walked on if they went immediately to the bridge. If the 82nd had secured the bridge, when XXX Corps tanks arrived the tanks and troops (inc' 82nd men) would have wiped the SS infantry to the north of the bridge aside moving to Arnhem with speed. The 82nd took with them an airborne artillery unit with 6-pdr anti-tank guns. They would have put a ring around the north of the bridge until XXX Corps arrived - if they had seized the bridge of course.
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  61.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, "The 82nd were dug in and preparing to defend their newly constructed regimental command post, which they established at 1825. Then Colonel Lindquist "was told by General Gavin, around 1900, to move into Nijmegen." -Poulussen By 1900 hrs the German SS infantry had poured south across the bridge reinforcing Nijmegen town and bridge. That was the time the 82nd decided to just move towards the bridge. The 82nd had at least five hours to move and seize the unguarded bridge. I already wrote this. Now you know, but you knew anyhow. Rambo, but you knew that anyhow. One thing is clear Rambo, is that the 82nd were a disgrace.
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  62.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, Market Garden was Eisenhower's baby. Monty did not plan or was involved in the execution of the operation. Rambo you already know this.
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  63.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, you have posted that inaccurate drivelous opinionated nonsense by lousy authors many times, with each time having been put in your place.
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  64.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, It is proven that Gavin was shelling the Riechwald forest thinking a 1,000 tanks were there. He was.
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  65.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, it was Eisenhower who put Antwerp on hold not Monty. Monty requested that the First Allied Airborne Army drop into the Scheldt. Its leader, an American, said "no".
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  66.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, you have been told about making things up.
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  67.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, clearly Eisenhower moved focus on Market Garden thinking the Scheldt could be cleared at the same time. Eisenhower was the man, he carries the can.
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  68.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, Ike was insisting he was a soldier taking control of two, then three army groups on the ground. Of course Ike wasn't, he was only playing around. Everything he touched turned sour.
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  69.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, the Yanks were an amateur disgrace at times. Especially the 82nd at Nijmegen. Shocking Rambo, shocking.
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  70.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, you have told about writing silly things.
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  71.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, I give you historical facts. No more.
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  72. Zionistathome123 You need to look at all the video. Monty had no say in the execution of Market Garden
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  73. amargen I didn't matter what happened at Arnhem, if the Nijmegen bridge was not taken nothing works.
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  74. Nighthawk Dutch chameleon Monty never failed in Sicily or Caen. You need to do a lot of reading.
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  75. Peter Borenius "It was Browning who diverted Gavin to the Groesbeek Heights" Browning do not such thing. Gavin had the element of surprise and an undefended bridge and never moved on the bridge. Browning only dropped in on the 2nd day thinking the bridge was already secured.
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  76. Panzerdeal So the Germans who control the lower reaches of the Rhine, would stand and allow Marines to said up the river. Are you serious?
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  77. Eisenhower prioritized the northern thrust over other fronts and even seizing Antwerp and clearing the Schedlt. Clearing the Scheldt would take time as the German 15th SS army, highly experienced from the Russian front, had set up shop in the Scheldt and not retreated back into Germany, under Hitler's orders.  All available supplies would be directed to this northern thrust.  "Since Eisenhower — the Supreme Commander and Ground Force Commander — approved the Arnhem operation rather than a push to clear the Scheldt, then surely he was right, as well as noble, to accept the responsibility and any resulting blame? The choice in early September was the Rhine or Antwerp: to continue the pursuit or secure the necessary facilities to solve the logistical problem? The decision was made to go for the Rhine, and that decision was Eisenhower’s." - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 "On 4 Sept, the day Antwerp fell, Eisenhower issued another directive, ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes — 21st Army Group and two corps of the US First Army — to take Antwerp, reach the Rhine and seize the Ruhr" - Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944 Eisenhower did not know Antwerp had fallen to British troops when he issued the northern thrust directive. Montgomery wanted a thrust up and over the Rhine prior to Eisenhower's directive, devising Operation Comet, multiple crossings of the Rhine, to be launched on 2 Sept, being cancelled due to German resistance and poor weather.  Operation Comet was not presented to Eisenhower for his approval. Montgomery asked Brereton, an American, of the First Allied Airborne Army, to drop into the Scheldt in early September - he refused.  Eisenhower's directive of 4 Sept had divisions of the US 1st Army and Montgomery's view of taking multiple bridges on the Rhine from Arnhem to Wesel. The British 2nd Army needed some divisions of Hodges' US 1st army and the First Allied Airborne Army (which Monty controlled anyhow). Hodges' would protect the right flank.  the Canadians would protect the left flank from the German 15th army.  "the narrow thrust was reduced to the Second Army and two US corps, the XIX and VII of Hodges’ First Army, a total of around eighteen Allied divisions" - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 The northern thrust was to chase a disorganized retreating enemy preventing them from manning the German West Wall, gaining a footing over the Rhine, consolidating and then clearing the Scheldt to open up the port of Antwerp. A sound concept which even the German generals agreed would have worked.  "Perhaps not more then, but that much alone would have been very useful — and much more than was actually achieved. This view was confirmed after the war in interviews with the senior surviving German commanders, von Rundstedt, Student, Blumentritt and Rommel’s former chief of staff, General Speidel. They were unanimous in declaring that a full-blooded thrust from Belgium in September would have succeeded in crossing the Rhine and might have ended the war in 1944, since they had no means of stopping such a thrust reaching the Ruhr. In the event, largely due to the faulty command set-up [by Eisenhower] and lack of grip, even a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter was still a dream in 1944." - Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944 "Eisenhower’s reply of 5 September to Montgomery deserves analysis, not least the part that concerns logistics. The interesting point is that Eisenhower apparently believes that it is possible to cross the Rhine and take both the Ruhr and the Saar — and open the Scheldt — using the existing logistical resources." - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 "Eisenhower. He had now heard from both his Army Group commanders — or Commanders-in-Chief as they were currently called — and reached the conclusion that they were both right; that it was possible to achieve everything, even with lengthening supply lines and without Antwerp. In thinking this Ike was wrong." - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 "Post-Normandy Bradley seemed unable to control Patton, who persistently flouted Eisenhower’s directives and went his own way, aided and abetted by Bradley. This part of their relationship quickly revealed itself in matters of supply, where Hodges, the commander of the US First Army, was continually starved of fuel and ammunition in order to keep Patton’s divisions rolling, even when Eisenhower’s strategy required First Army to play the major role in 12th Army Group’s activities." - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 Bradley was starving Hodges' First Army of supplies, against Eisenhower's orders, giving them to Patton who was running off into unimportant territory - again, and being bogged down - again. The resources starved First Army could not be a part of northern thrust as Bradley and Patton, against Eisenhower's orders, were syphoning off supplies destined for the First army.  This northern thrust over the Rhine, as Eisenhower envisaged, obviously would not work as he thought. A lesser operation was devised by Montgomery, Market Garden, eliminating the divisions of US First Army, with only ONE crossing of the Rhine. Market Garden would also eliminate V rocket launching sites, of which London wanted eliminating ASAP, giving a 60 mile long salient buffer between German forces  and the important port of Antwerp. This would only have one corps above Eindhoven,  a disgrace considering the forces in Europe at the time. Eisenhower had no grasp of the situation as it was and no strong strategy to advance.  Eisenhower should have fired Bradley and Patton for sabotaging the Northern Thrust operation.  Montgomery did not plan or was in involved in Market Garden's execution. Montgomery, after fixing the operations objectives with Eisenhower to the measly forces available, gave Market Garden planning to others, mainly USAAF generals, Brereton and Williams. General Brereton, who liked the plan, agreed to it with even direct input. Brereton ordered the drops will take place during the day with Brereton also overseeing the troop carrier and supply drops schedules.  Williams forbid fighter-bombers to be used. A refusal by Brereton and the operation would never have gone ahead; he earlier rejected Montgomery's initial plan of a drop into the Scheldt at Walcheren Island. "it was not until 9 October, more than a month after the fall of Antwerp, that General Eisenhower told Montgomery to devote his entire attention to the clearance of the Scheldt. By that time the Canadians had cleared, or were investing, many of the Channel ports"  - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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  78.  @nickdanger3802  Market Garden was a success: ♦ It created a 60 mile buffer between Antwerp and German forces. Antwerp was the only port taken intact. This buffer proved itself in the German Bulge attack right through US lines. ♦ It created a staging point to move into Germany at Nijmegen, which happened. ♦ It eliminated V rocket launching sites aimed at London. ♦ It isolate the German 15th army in Holland. ♦ They reached the Rhine. ♦ The salient was fleshed out. ♦ The Germans never retook one mm of ground taken. All this while Patton was stalled at Metz moving 10 miles in three months against a 2nd rate German army. And US forces were stopped before Aachen and eventually defeated at Hurtgen Forest - you know that engagement the US historians and History channels ignore.
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  79.  @nickdanger3802  Brian Urquhart had a chip on his shoulder over Market Garden. He was fired from Market Garden. Most of the time he prattled inaccuracies post war. I comment in the comments section in that video. My comments are below His cousin or nephew contributed to some of the comments in the vids by TIK. Forget his name.
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  80.  @nickdanger3802  Montgomery never failed to capture Antwerp (well the approaches), as he never even tried to capture the approaches.
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  81. ​ @nickdanger3802  "Operation MARKET-GARDEN had two major objectives: to get Allied troops across the Rhine and to capture the Ruhr. Three major advantages were expected to accrue: ( I) cutting the land exit of those Germans remaining in western Holland; (2) outflanking the West Wall, and (3) positioning British ground forces for a subsequent drive into Germany along the North German Plain." - US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN (Page 120). "Eisenhower approved the operation with certain conditions. Market Garden would commence on 17 September. Securing the approaches to the port at Antwerp would be delayed until Montgomery seized bridgeheads over the Rhine. His priority after seizing the bridgeheads would be gaining the much needed deep water port. He would not continue the attack to Berlin as he had proposed." - A FRAMEWORK FOR MILITARY DECISION MAKING UNDER RISKS BY JAMES V. SCHULTZ A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES FOR THE COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA J UNE 1996 (Page 50). "later, on I5 September, General Eisenhower himself reopened the wound, perhaps with a view to healing it once and for all through a process of bloodletting. Looking beyond both Arnhem and Antwerp, he named Berlin as the ultimate Allied goal" - US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN (Page 210). One of the prime aims of Market Garden was to be the northern grip of the the pincer on the Ruhr, Eisenhower changed yet again his strategy from the Ruhr to Berlin two days before Market Garden.
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  82.  @nickdanger3802  Brian Urquhart is wrong. He seems bitter because of being dropped from the operation. After the breakout in Normandy there were few German troops in France, those that were there were retreating. The US went to near the German border very fast as did the British right into Belgium. Patton had a whole poor German army in front of him in Lorraine. Patton moved only 10 miles in 3 months at Metz such was the German resistance. The fuel situation was rectified quite quickly. The US army was beaten in Hurtgen Forest just over the German border. To suggest that giving Patton all the supplies he needed, as Brian Urquhart did, would have made a bigger impact in defeating the Germans is pure naivety. Patton went on a chase into nowhere - again. General Eisenhower had agreed at the conference with his commanders in Brussels on I0 September to defer the Antwerp operation while awaiting the outcome of Operation MARKET-GARDEN. "The attractive possibility of quickly turning the German north flank led me to approve the temporary delay in freeing the vital port of Antwerp . . .," the Supreme Commander wrote later. - US Official History, BREACHING THE SIEGFRIED LINE (Page 209). The First Allied Airborne Army was a joint British, American and Polish army of paratroopers to be used in operations to assist any western allied ground army when needed. It was an army in its own right with all troops wearing the 1st Airborne Army insignia.
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  83. ​ @nickdanger3802 ​ RAMBO ALERT! RAMBO ALERT! He is back again as someone else.
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  84.  @danwelch8547  The Battleships over shot the Omaha beach. Bradley never used the Funnies. Big mistake. Operation Goodwood's focus was not specifically tanks, as the Germans had five lines of defence with dug in 88mm's and heavy Tiger and fast Panther tanks for mobility. Goodwood was mostly 'not' bocage but open ground more suitable for tank battles, where the German long range 88mm's would be at an advantage. Monty's plan was not for British forces to take territory. He specifically wanted to draw in German armour onto British forces to grind them up to keeping them away from the US forces for them to break out (Operation Cobra). That was even stated at St.Paul's school in Fulham.  To do that he was confident British armour could match German armour - US armour would struggle or most likely be overwhelmed. A 12 mile sector around Caen saw more concentrated German armour in all of WW2. Goodwood was not British forces taking territory, as the plan was for the US forces to do that, Monty specifically states this here in this link in an interview with Edward R Murrow. Transcript.... "The acquisition of territory on the eastern flank of the beachhead in the Caen sector was not really important. What was important there was to draw the maximum number of German divisions, and especially the armour, into that flank. The acquisition of territory was important on the western flank [the US sector]."  ...."an accusation drawn at me, that I ought to have taken Caen in the programme on D-Day! And we didn't. I didn't mind about that because....The air force would get very het up because I didn't go further down towards Falaise and get the ground suitable for airfields. I didn't bother about that, it would have meant enormous casualties in doing it and it wasn't necessary." "I could reply to that criticism that on the American front the line from which the breakout was finally launched was a line the St.Lo-Periers road, should have been captured in the initial plan by the American 1st Army on D-Day plus 5, that was the 11th June. But they didn't actually capture it until the 18th July. But I have never returned the charge with that accusation.  ...until now" "I have never understood why Ike said in his dispatches that, when the British failed to break out towards Paris on the eastern flank. The Americans were able [to break out], because of our flexibility, to take it on, on our western flank. I have always thought that was an unfair criticism of Dempsey and the 2nd British Army." - Field Marshall Montgomery (1959) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_TB9wHRRSw The RAF chief Tedder, wanted Monty fired as he wanted open territory to the south towards Falaise to setup his airfields saying Monty was not pursing territory aggressively enough. Monty would have none of it. Operation Goodwood was engaging the massed armoured German defences drawing them in to British lines, grinding them up moving slowly. Here is a 1970s objective British Army Sandhurst internal video analysing Operation Goodwood, with even German commanders who were there taking part. At the beginning it specifically states Monty told Generals O'Connor and Dempsey not to run south to Falaise, not to take territory. Look at 6 mins: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=udW1UvSHXfY Monty was not too concerned with Caen as it would consume too many resources to take, being a strategically unimportant target. He was more concerned with grinding up German armour in the field. Although by the time of Goodwood only the southern suburbs were in German hands. Monty was in charge of all of Operation Overlord. He wanted the German armour away from US forces, to allow them to break out. It worked. That is what he wanted and planned. Monty never saw Caen as important but never criticised US forces..... until 1959 when they were at him about Caen, he criticised them for taking St.Lo a month late - with little German armour around for a month. The Germans did send some armour to St.Lo with the US forces making it worse for themselves to capture the place. Even Bradley agreed with Monty. Bradley wrote that: "The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we (the Americans)were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride, this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for while we tramped around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded".
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  85.  @bigwoody4704  Oh Rambo, you keep coming up with discredited American scribblers. Sad. Very sad.
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  86.  @bigwoody4704  The Brits were the biggest agents in the defeat of the Nazis. The 82nd were a disgrace.
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  87.  @bigwoody4704  Rambo, within three months british forces were in Brussels with US forces in The Lorraine. Monty was superb! Eisenhower: ‘General Montgomery is a very able, dynamic type of army commander’. Eisenhower on D-Day and Normandy: 'He got us there and he kept us there'. General Günther Blumentritt: ‘Field Marshall Montgomery was the one general who never suffered a reverse’ Genral Hasso von Manteuffel on the Bulge: ‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’. Patton on Monty: 'small,very alert, wonderfully conceited, and the best soldier - or so it seems - I have met in this war’. American Major General Matt Ridgway liked and praised Monty. - Major General Matt Ridgway, commander of the US XVIII Airborne Corps, 17 Jan 1945 "It has been an honored privilege and a very great personal pleasure to have served, even so briefly, under your distinguished leadership [Montgomery]. To the gifted professional guidance you at once gave me, was added to your own consummate courtesy and consideration. I am deeply grateful for both. My warm and sincere good wishes will follow you and with them the hope of again serving with you in pursuit of a common goal".
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