Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "History is a Debate | Responding to a Comment from my Operation Market Garden Documentary" video.

  1. 10th SS were in Nijmegen because they poured south over the uncaptured bridge. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen slightly ahead of schedule ready to speed over the bridge only to see it still in German hands and 10th SS fighting the 82nd in Nijmegen. If XXX Corps had been delayed and not reached Nijmegen on time it is possible the 82nd would have been annihilated by the 10th SS.
    5
  2. Until what is known what Gavin told Browning, Gavin has to take the blame. In Normandy General Patton asked Bradley if he could go south into Brittany to see if he could seize some port(s). Bradley said OK. Patton took one third of his force. Bradley was shocked at how much of his force his took to wander into open country with no enemy. Bradley assumed Patton would take a small force to peel off from the prime objectives in Normandy. Bradley never asked Patton how many troops he would take. When Gavin said he was taking a force top Goesbeek did Browning know how many and that he would neglect his prime task?
    3
  3. Monty wanted three Channel ports for all supply to all allied armies. Antwerp was 35 miles up a narrow, winding, dredged river. One or two ships sunk by German planes will block the port. Antwerp was last on the list. Ostend was secured with half the port destroyed. Bolougne was secured with destroyed port, and operational at the same time as Antwerp. The Canadians, Poles and Czechs tried to take Dunkirk but failed leaving the port in German hands until surrender. Montgomery knew the Germans had destroyed the port of Dunkirk. The failure to get three Channel ports operational quickly meant focus had to be shifted be on unfavourable Antwerp and clearing all the river approaches - The Scheldt.
    2
  4. ODDBALL SOK It is like talking to a child. How old are you?
    1
  5. ODDBALL SOK How old are you?
    1
  6. ODDBALL SOK You come across as immature, confused and childish.
    1
  7. ODDBALL SOK I gave an honest view based on what you write.
    1
  8. ***** You can only go around in circles for so long. ;)
    1
  9. +tigerhunter77 Gavin's mistake was one he could not recover. It was a basic mistake of ignoring the prime objective. The 82nd rowing over a river in engineers boats was suicide. Gavin never took boats with him in country full of rivers and canals, XXX Corps engineers had to provide them. A stupid decision to row over when XXX Corps were there to take the bridge and did. Look up Churchill in promoting Land Value Taxation and the 1909 House of Lords upheaval. In peacetime at time he was very good.
    1
  10. The last thing the British Army needed was a Gavin. Or a Clark, Patton, Bradley, Hodges, MacArthur or an Admiral King.
    1
  11. Once the army was greatly expanded, professional men went in from industry. Their knowledge of logistics, engineering, and how to adapt quickly to markets all came in very useful in WW2 when applied to war. They were bright men and filled the officer ranks adding the greatest value. The private school buffoons (think Boris Johnson) were sidelined. From mid-1942 onwards the finest army in the world was the British. It changed its doctrine, training and equipment. It took all in its path - even in the Far East. It was also an excellent army in 1940 The French looked to them as how to do it when in France. The BEF was the first in the world to be motorised - men never marched.
    1
  12. +oldtanker2 Some of your conclusions make sense but others ignore basic tactical principals.1. You fail to address the decision to ignore intel that said that heavy armor was present. There was no proof heavy armour was present. None was there in the Arnhem, area. Read on... "the composition of the German forces at Arnhem was far more complex than most published histories of Market Garden had tended to suggest. The two SS panzer divisions had been operating far below their full strength on the eve of the operation and, while 1st Airborne was ultimately confronted by armour in considerable strength, hardly any tanks were actually present in the Arnhem area on 17 September. The vast majority deployed from Germany or other battle fronts after the airborne landings" - ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the Royal Air Force Some low level pictures of a few Panzer IIIs and IVs were taken in early September for operation Comet. Ryan on speaking to Urquhart got it wrong. "Urquhart’s account is therefore somewhat perplexing. Further problems arise if we seek to document the events he described. Several extensive searches for the photographs have failed to locate them. Ostensibly, this might not seem surprising, as most tactical reconnaissance material was destroyed after the war, but Urquhart insisted that the Arnhem sortie was flown by a Spitfire squadron based at Benson; this would almost certainly mean 541 Squadron. Far more imagery from the Benson squadrons survived within the UK archives, but no oblique photographs showing tanks at Arnhem. In addition, although the Benson missions were systematically recorded at squadron and group level, not one record matches the sortie Urquhart described." "The low-level missions targeting the bridges on 6 September were scrupulously noted down, but all other recorded reconnaissance sorties over Arnhem were flown at higher altitudes and captured vertical imagery. Equally, it has proved impossible as yet to locate an interpretation report derived from a low-level mission that photographed German armour near Arnhem before Market Garden." "As for Brian Urquhart’s famous account of how a low-level Spitfire sortie took photographs of tanks assumed to belong to II SS Panzer Corps, the reality was rather different. In all probability, the low-level mission that Urquhart recalled photographed the bridges and not the tanks" - ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the Royal Air Force
    1
  13. +oldtanker2 The British paras at Arnhem did have the Poles coming in later. They also took their prime objective - the bridge. They were not the reason for failure - that is obvious. The overall commander was Eisenhower. Market Garden was a strategic plan that evolved. From drops on the the Scheldt, to Comet then MG. Montgomery had no involvement in the planning of the operation - none. He left that to the others having confidence in them. The First Airborne Army was heavily involved in the planning. Attacking on a very narrow front is not always ill advised. It worked wonderfully for the Germans in 1940. There is the problem of German counter-attacks all along the front, so taking a part of Holland is not that much different. Everything did hinge on taking of the bridges in a timely manner - that was the whole idea. A bold plan to leapfrog. It was feasible and high probability of success if all did their jobs professionally. Gavin's actions? Plain incompetence. His near 2,000 men were assembled and ready to move by 3 pm with only 12 Germans on the bridge. The 508th were sitting around in fields for 2 hours drinking coffee before Gavin found out and directed them to the bridge. By then it was too late. The 10th SS panzer infantry had poured men south over into Nijmegen town. The 508th moved on the bridge and were beaten back. Gavin never bothered to gain information on the location and movements of his men. A basic mistake. He assumed Linquist was moving on the bridge. There is nothing stated that Gavin did not like the plan.
    1