Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "The Numbers Say it All | The Myth of German Superiority on the WW2 Eastern Front" video.
-
Nice one TIK. I have quoted Tooze who I think you are not keen on..
The German army attacking the USSR......
The Germans thought they had formulated a version of Blitzkrieg in France that was a sure-fire success. If the belt broke the whole movement stopped. They used this in the USSR, just scaling up forces. They did not have the intelligence to assess properly, that the reason for their success in France was allied incompetence not anything brilliant they did.
The Germans vastly underestimated the quality of design and make of Soviet weapons. The T-34 took them by surprise and they knew they were fighting an army they had hopelessly underestimated in all aspects. The Germans did not take into account the British supplying the USSR - 40% of the tanks used at the vital battle of Moscow were British supplied. The USSR had more tanks than the rest of the world combined in 1940.
The Germans underestimated the Soviets so much they decided to attack them with no reserves, all the German forces were involved in Barbarossa, lack of proper logistics to re-supply, short of steel, rubber, oil, an industry that could not re-supply at the rate required, short of fuel for industry and the forces, etc, etc. The Germans were so inept at assessing the Soviets they did not envisage fighting in the Russian winter in 1942/1942 thinking they would have overcome the USSR in three months. When they did not break the USSRs back they did not have enough winter clothes and equipment designed for such low temperatures. It was not just the logistics of getting to the troops, they just did not have the equipment. The Germans thought the Soviets could field 360 divisions, they fielded over 600.
Soviet industry was large and had moved to the east. Much was in the east anyhow. This was working 24/7 to re-supply. The T-34 tank by Dec 1941 was well established and available in numbers. The Germans first faced The T-34 in October 41, reducing a German division to a few tanks. The Soviet counter-attack in Dec 1941 was well supplied, and heavily with T-34s. There was still 1,400 Soviet aircraft available in Dec 1941. Glantz is a little out. Lend-Lease only really became "significant" in 1943 onwards. In 1942, the critical year, the USSR outproduced the USA.
A Soviet mistake after Moscow was counter attacking on a broad front and not aiming at the the weakest point and pushing them right back, nevertheless they mauled the Germans. By Dec 1941 the Germans were exhausted in fuel, men and equipment. They could do no more. As early as In July 1941, many German armies were at the end of their effective supply lines. As Prof Tooze emphasises, most say the Germans failed to take Moscow, the reality was that they could not as they were on their last legs. The large Soviet air force was still attacking German supply lines as well, exasperating the situation. The Germans foolishly thought most supplies could be taken along three very long rail tracks, which were easily ripped up by the Soviets and bombed via the air. Thousands of German rail men worked to get lines partially operation. The Soviets evacuated lots of rail trucks.
Prof Tooze: Wages of Destruction, page 453:
'Halder wrote, Barbarossa needed speed and motorized transport for supply. No waiting for railways. The Germans planned for three rail lines and 740,000 horses.'
...the Germans never had enough motorised transport to supply all the fast moving armies. Pre June 1941, they were considering de-motorising because of a shortage of rubber inflicted by the Royal Navy blockade.
Tooze: page 454:
'Three rail lines were used. The existing Soviet rail network was not even good enough to supply the German army if taken intact. It was also of a narrower gauge too. The retreating Soviets took most wagons with them and destroyed the rail infrastructure on retreating.
The Soviets had taken massive losses, but being so big they could absorb so many losses. The Soviets also had inflicted great losses on the Germans by Dec 1941. The only large power Germany conquered was France. This gave them a sense of superiority - their technique was now known, so succeeding twice was unlikely.'
They largely dropped the blitzkrieg of coordinated air and ground attacks.
Tooze: page 487.
'In July, all three German Army groups had reached the limit of resupply and stopped. The Soviets had taken devastating losses but not defeated. The Soviets saw the halt of the German armies and the re-supply problem and launched 17 armies against them forcing the Germans to dig in and defend.'
The UK & US can be forgiven in underestimating the Red Army, which they did, not so the Germans as they would have to assess this force in detail as they were to fight it, unlike the UK & US. Soviet industry was turning out the arms and to advanced designs. I don't want to go into what ifs, but if the T-34 was in place in summer 1941 the Germans would never have had such initial spectacular progress. Stalin knew what was being produced. They knew once the weaponry was in place, they could defeat the Germans who would be operating over 1000kms along a few supply lines they could not fully supply.
Apart from Stalingrad, which the Germans and the Soviets had an obsession with, the Soviets became less reckless as the UK and USA were in the fight and arms, and some well advanced arms, were building up. The Germans would not win, and the Soviets knew that. Once a western second front was in place on the ground, it was clear the Germans would quickly crumble, and they did. On D-Day 1944, the Germans were still way inside the USSR. The end came quickly once the German army was hit from both sides. It can be argued that the Soviets should have pushed the Germans out of the USSR by 1943 or even 1942, however they did display ineptness in most levels after reorganisation from 1942 onwards. But the Soviets knew in a war of attrition the Germans were doomed. As Stalin said, "quantity has a quality all of its own."
3
-
1
-
1