Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "The BIG Stalingrad Airlift Myth" video.

  1. TIK, this typical. One leading reputable author just after WW2 writes a well received book and all after have him as the reference, without checking that his findings were correct on some points. So there is a massive ripple effect over many decades from one generation to the next with many authors - on a number of levels. WW2 is still full of myths and many myths in individual countries. In the UK it is that a few Oxbridge pilots saved our bacon. The reality is they never, as most pilots were sergeant-pilots and the highest kills of a Briton was via one of these. I believe a Czech held the record of most kills. We were also just about wiped in the BofB - which there was no such thing. Similar with the U-Boat war - the Germans at no time were in any position to destroy the Atlantic conveyor belt. The government at the time perpetuated this backs to the wall, triumph over adversity approach to motivate the population. They never rescinded any of it after the war in order to be viewed as fibbers.
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  2. A Polish squadron had the highest kills in the battle. I believe some RAF officers refused to be led out by sergeant-pilots, even though they were battle proven and obviously better pilots than them. The type of ranks never mixed if I recall correctly.
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  3. Goering did promise he would wipe out RAF Fighter Command in 1940, after being defeated over Dunkirk.
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  4. TIK The Battle of Britain was a rather one sided affair. The Germans withdrew the Stuka as it was being blown out of the sky. The RAF had more fighters at the end than the beginning, British industry was turning them out so quick. British pilots would be shot down, bail out and be given a brand new plane the next day, with all the new mods like self-sealing fuel tanks, etc - some even in the same day. Lee Mallory's early warning system was the world's first `Intranet`. Planes could even be stored out of German fighter reach and taken into the south and eastern parts of the country. People forget that fighting was even on the Northumberland coast, not just in Kent. The Germans realised they never had the edge in fighters.
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  5. longwitt They did try and hit airfields hard. But I think it was no more than about 3 or 4 hours one, Biggin Hill, was out of action. The rest just kept on operating.
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  6. Wood and Dempster , their data comes from Luftwaffe Quartermaster General 6th Abteilung reports, state losses from 10 July to 31 Oct 1940: • RAF lost 1,100 fighters to all causes, such as training accidents as well as battle. • Luftwaffe lost 1,733 fighters and bombers. The RAF claimed 2,692 German planes shot down. Germans admitted the loss of 896 aircraft. Wood and Dempster give the number of RAF fighter aircraft available for operations on a daily average, week endings: • 22 June, 644 out of 871; • 6 July - 565 out of 814; • 3 August - 708 out of 1061. From then on the total then does not fall below 700 available - including Blenheims and Defiants. John Alcorn in the Sept 1996 Aeroplane Monthly. In the period 1 July to 30 Oct, 1940: • British lost 887 fighters in combat. • Germans lost 1,218 aircraft to fighter attack. Ratio of 1.4/1.
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  7. The RAF had a vested interest in promoting the Battle of Britain as near run. They had priority claims on resources which transpired into the night bombing campaign. The RAF created the myth that if the Germans had just pressed a little harder, they would have won. More people in the UK were employed building planes than in the army in 1945. The army suffered as a result. The delay in getting the tanks right was a consequence.
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  8. The British establishment promoted The Few, that a small group of upper class Oxbridge types in Spitfires saved us all . This was also promoted post war. This was to reinforce the privileged British class system.
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  9. The Battle of Britain was a major defeat for Germany. They failed to achieve any of their strategic objectives in the campaign. By December 1940, Fighter Command had seen an increase of 40% in its pilots, the German fighter pilots had dropped by 30% and the bomber crews by 25%. The famous event in the BoB where all available aircraft were in the air, with no reserves at all. This occurred on 16 August. Churchill and Ismay happened to be present at the 11 Group HQ at Uxbridge. That afternoon, all of the Group's Squadrons were listed as not immediately available, while new hostile trackings were being placed on the table. Three days later, the Luftwaffe commanders gathered and went over the battle so far. The orders they issued were intended to minimize losses, giving a fair idea of what was happening. The Luftwaffe had no idea what they were facing. On the day after this order the German intel chief assessed the RAF had about 300 operational fighters. He was just 550 short if he counted the 850 or so fighters with the line units. If the fighters with storage and maintenance units (but the good-to-go ones, not those under repairs) were counted and with training units, the total was around 1,200. The Germans did not know what they were doing. Stephen Bungay's, The Most Dangerous Enemy is worth reading on this subject.
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  10. • The British were producing more fighters and delivering them to the units faster than the Germans; • The Bf109s were more maintenance-intensive than both British planes; • Many of the Bf109s were taking off and landing from improvised airfields with their landing gear being more vulnerable than the British planes; • A damaged British fighter could often make an emergency landing somewhere in Britain, with the recovery and repair organization being rather efficient; • A damaged German fighter would still have to cross the Channel before finding friendly fields, and many did not make it; • The German fighters, or at least a sizable part of them, would be chained to the bombers they had to escort, while the British fighters would be free to intercept or disengage; • The British supported their fighters with a battle management system the Germans did not even dream was possible;
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  11. The Germans, before turning to London, made a sustained effort against the airfields of 11 Group. They attacked 13 airfields, hitting them with 40 raids in 3 weeks. For all that the results were: • Lympne Near Romney Marsh remained non-operational, not because of the Germans attacks but because the RAF had chosen not to use it. It was too far forward and exposed; • Manston was the only air base that was non-operational for more than a few hours; • Biggin Hill remained operational as a base, but was not operational as a sector station for under 8 hours; • The average loss ratio during those three weeks remained in favor of the RAF, as before, as after, as for the whole campaign.
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  12. The Battle of Britain was a major defeat for Germany. They failed to achieve any of their strategic objectives in the campaign. By December 1940, Fighter Command had seen an increase of 40% in its pilots, the German fighter pilots had dropped by 30% and the bomber crews by 25%. The famous event in the BoB where all available aircraft were in the air, with no reserves at all. This occurred on 16 August. Churchill and Ismay happened to be present at the 11 Group HQ at Uxbridge. That afternoon, all of the Group's Squadrons were listed as not immediately available, while new hostile trackings were being placed on the table. Three days later, the Luftwaffe commanders gathered and went over the battle so far. The orders they issued were intended to minimize losses, giving a fair idea of what was happening. The Luftwaffe had no idea what they were facing. On the day after this order the German intel chief assessed the RAF had about 300 operational fighters. He was just 550 short if he counted the 850 or so fighters with the line units. If the fighters with storage and maintenance units (but the good-to-go ones, not those under repairs) were counted and with training units, the total was around 1,200. The Germans did not know what they were doing. Stephen Bungay's, The Most Dangerous Enemy is worth reading on this subject.
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  13. Richard Marlborough I have read many books on the BofB. Most are rubbish. It was not close run at all. True, about the barges. Few would have even reached shore.
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  14. Richard Marlborough The myth, and I recall an old guy who was in WW2 telling me, "that those posh fellas saved us." It was all to reinforce the class system - the country was very socialistic after WW2. People were not going to put up with what they did pre WW2. They never put up with that, and were not going back to square 1. Those with the power in the media, etc, who were of that ilk, spread myths to preserve their privileged ways. It worked. Look at social history pre WW2. A horrible place to live. Few had hot running water. I prefer a "multicultural mess."
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  15. Richard Marlborough Most pilots were sergeant-pilots, who had a superior success rate than the officers.
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  16. Richard Marlborough Rather upper middle class than "toffs". Toffs were few and far between.
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  17. http://indiantranslogistics.in/images/slider006.jpg A 40 ton truck. So they were to supply a whole army with 8 of these per day?
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