Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "The MAIN Reason Why Germany Lost WW2 - OIL" video.
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David Himmelsbach
Not this nut again...
1985 US Army report on the Lorraine Campaign.
Patton does not come out well.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a211668.pdf
From the document is in italics:
"Soldiers and generals alike assumed that Lorraine would fall quickly, and unless the war ended first, Patton's tanks would take the war into Germany by summer's end. But Lorraine was not to be overrun in a lightning campaign. Instead, the battle for Lorraine would drag on for more than 3 months."
"Despite its proximity to Germany, Lorraine was not the Allies' preferred invasion route in 1944_._ Except for its two principal cities, Metz and Nancy, the province_ contained few significant military objectives." "Moreover, once Third Army penetrated the province and entered Germany, there would still be no first-rate military objectives within its grasp. The Saar industrial region, while significant, was of secondary importance when compared to the great Ruhr industrial complex farther north."
Another Patton chase into un-needed territory, like
he did when running his troops into Brittany.
"With so little going for it, why did Patton bother with Lorraine at all? The reason was that Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, made up his mind to destroy as many German forces as possible west of the Rhine."
In other words a waste of time.
"Communications Zone organized the famous Red Ball Express, a non-stop conveyor belt of trucks connecting the Normandy depots with the field armies."
They were getting fuel via 6,000 trucks.
"The simple truth was that although fuel was plentiful in Normandy, there was no way to transport it in sufficient quantities to the leading elements. On 31 August , Third Army received no fuel at all."
In short, Patton overran his supply lines. What was
important was to secure the Port of Antwerp's
approaches. Montgomery approached the US leaders
of the First Airborne Army and they would not drop into
the Scheldt.
"Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be considered First-rate troops. Third Army encountered whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and others consisting entirety of soldiers with stomach ulcers."
Some army the Americans were going to fight
"Was the Lorraine campaign an American victory' From September through November, Third Army claimed to have inflicted over 180,000 casualties on the enemy. But to capture the province of Lorraine, a problem which involved an advance of only 40 to 60 air miles, Third Army required over 3 months and suffered 50,000 casualties, approximately one-third of the total number of casualties it sustained in the entire European war."
Huge losses for taking unimportant territory,
against a poor German army.
"Ironically, Third Army never used Lorraine as a springboard for an advance into Germany after all. Patton turned most of the sector over to Seventh Army during the Ardennes crisis, and when the eastward advance resumed after the Battle of the Bulge, Third Army based its operations on Luxembourg, not Lorraine. The Lorraine campaign will always remain a controversial episode in American military history."
It's getting worse. One third of all European casualties
in Lorraine and never used the territory to move into Germany.
"Finally the Lorraine Campaign demonstrated that Logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful and aggressive the commanding general may be." "Patton violated tactical principles" "His discovered that violating logistical principles is an unforgiving and cumulative matter."
Not flattering at all. And Americans state Patton
was the best general they had.
Bradley stated later:
“Patton was developing as an unpopular guy. He steamed about with great convoys of cars and great squads of cameramen … To George, tactics was simply a process of bulling ahead. Never seemed to think out a campaign. Seldom made a careful estimate of the situation. I thought him a shallow commander … I disliked the way he worked, upset tactical plans, interfered in my orders. His stubbornness on amphibious operations, parade plans into Messina sickened me and soured me on Patton. We learned how not to behave from Patton’s Seventh Army.”
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"on 16 November, Patton’s attack, from which so much had been expected — and been promised — had already stalled. Since the end of August Patton had been promising that he would have Metz, the Saar, the West Wall, and probably the Rhine in a matter of days. Two and a half months later none of these objectives had been taken or were in any danger of being taken."
"The reasons for this failure are much the same as those given for the failure of other parts of Eisenhower’s broad front strategy: Eisenhower’s constant vacillation; logistics; the weather; failure to concentrate; the enemy’s resistance; the lack of a strategic plan. The point here is that, in spite of all his bluster, Patton had done no better than anyone else — and weakened Eisenhower’s strategy in the process. This is not chauvinism. The Lorraine campaign is widely regarded as a disaster, even among US historians. Patton’s biographer, Carlo d’ Este, writes that Patton:
"... had failed to concentrate his forces for
a decisive attack that might have taken Metz,
then refused to accept that he had anything to
do with that setback. A series of piecemeal attacks
were nothing more than a return to the penny-packet
warfare that had fared so badly in North Africa. In short,
instead of the hoped for triumph, Lorraine became
Patton’s bloodiest and least successful campaign."
Nor were the Germans any more charitable. When Metz finally fell on 22 November, after heavy fighting in the streets of the town and the tunnels of the fortifications, the commander of the defenders, Lieutenant General Hermann Balck of Army Group G declared that the German success in defending the city for so many weeks was due to ‘the bad and timid leadership of the Americans’, a comment that would have cut Patton to the bone. There was also the cost; the three-month Lorraine campaign cost the Third Army no fewer than 50,000 casualties, about one third of all the casualties Third Army sustained in the entire European war."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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Germany's biggest mistake was declaring war in the first place. Once they waged war when was the point they could not win? That was when the British refused to make peace in June 1940. With Britain still in the war the Royal Navy blockade starved Germany, and the Axis, of vital resources, including food (animal & human) and oil. Britain was even buying up rare metals from Turkey to ensure the Germans did not have them. The Royal Navy controlled and freely sailed the eastern Atlantic and the eastern Mediterranean, and both entrances to the Mediterranean. They even had Malta all through WW2, on the doorstep of Axis Italy. Britain's land forces were from Turkey to Libya. Essentially the British surrounded Europe, controlling the sea lanes.
The Royal Navy ensured the conflict with Germany would continue. Germany could not win from June 1940 onwards. Being a largely landlocked country, Germany's forces were heavily based on its army, while Britain's was heavily based on its navy and air force with a small highly mobile army. Germany could not remove Britain from the war having pretty well no surface fleet to Britain having the largest navy in the world.
Britain's approach was that every operation was to bleed Germany of resources, especially oil. Operations in Norway and Greece forced the Germans to deploy troops to these areas but also its surface fleet, which mainly was destroyed in Norway. The German occupied countries were also under the blockade, which were also a drain of German resources.
The British, because of its armed forces structure of massive navy, large air force and small highly mobile army were unable to engage the Germans on the European land mass, on which Germany had a massive army. Apart from the air, the two countries could not get at each other. Britain's war then was partially an economic war. Every German operation against the British had to be decisive whereas the British could lose to the Germans while still asserting economic pressure in its favour. This was the British way of war being very good at it. Britain used similar tactics against Germany in WW1 to devastating effects. This approach was used against the French on multiple occasions over 200 years. Smaller nations in Europe would follow Pax Britannica due British naval dominance. Britain could dictate any war's outcome by blocking trade and resources to one side or another.
The Germans like most of Europe relied on imported oil, raw materials and food (animal & human). For the Germans these resources can only come from two regions - the USSR or the rest of the world. By removing the rest of the world from the grasp of the Axis, the British forced the Germans to acquire Soviet oil - Romania did not produce enough. Hitler had no choice but to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941 because of the resources situation. He needed the resources of the USSR to fight the coming air war with Britain. In May 1940 Roosevelt stated the USA would produce 50,000 planes per year. Most of these would be directed towards Germany with British production on top.
Germany greatly expanded its U-Boat fleet. The popular view was that this fleet was to starve Britain into submission. That was valid but a high hope, however, it was also to divert and lock up Royal Navy resources in convoy protection and U-Boat hunting, allowing merchant ships to enter Germany and the occupied countries more freely.
Germany had been forced into a situation by the British that they knew they could not escape from. Even if Germany had seized the Caucuses' oil fields intact (the Soviets sabotaged them to the point new deep bore holes would need to be drilled) the British would have focused them for their bombing campaign operating from the Middle East - there were plans to bomb them as Britain held nearby Iraq and occupied Iran. This was to drain Germany of vital oil. Every British victory in Africa was decisive and every German victory was not, even if Germany won an operation, they were still being bled. Unless Germany could seize the Suez Canal and beyond, the British could just come back year after year and counter attack with new tanks and new men, with resources not being a problem for them.
Germany knew that they could not invade Britain as the royal Navy was just too powerful. The RAF could replace losses far quicker than they could, as they found out in the air Battle of Britain. Germany could not put their large army on British soil.
After June 1940 Germany has an enemy it can’t defeat not entertaining peace, economically throttling the Germans every day of the war. Germany never had time, the British did. The German invasion of the USSR with an army short of resources due to the Royal Navy blockade, may have quickened the war's end for Germany, however it was not the point that Germany was doomed. Germany had already lost the war it was just a matter of time when Germany collapsed.
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Patton at Metz advanced 10 miles in three months. The poorly devised Panzer Brigade concept was deployed there with green German troops. The Panzer Brigades were a rushed concept to try and plug the gaps while the panzer divisions proper were being re-fitted and rebuilt after the summer 1944 battles.
The Panzer Brigades had green crews that never had enough time to train, did not know their tanks properly, did not have any recon elements and didn't even meet their unit commander until his arrival at the front. These were not means elite forces.
17th SS were not amongst the premier Waffen SS panzer divisions. The 17th SS was not even a panzer division but a panzer grenadier division, only equipped with assault guns, not tanks, with only a quarter of the number of AFVs as a panzer division. The 17th SS was badly mauled in Normandy and not up to strength at Arracourt in The Lorraine.
Patton's Third Army was almost always where the best German divisions in the west were NOT.
♦ Who did the 3rd Army engage?
♦ Who did 3rd Army defeat?
♦ Patton never once faced a full strength
Waffen SS panzer division nor a
Tiger battalion.
In The Lorraine, the 3rd Army faced a rabble. Even the German commander of Army Group G in The Lorraine, Hermann Balck, who took over in September 1944 said:
"I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again…can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans."
Patton was facing a second rate rabble in The Lorraine for the most part. Patton was also neither on the advance nor being heavily engaged at the time he turned north to Bastogne when the Germans pounded through US lines.
The road from Luxembourg to Bastogne pretty well devoid of German forces, as Bastogne was on the very southern German flank. Only when Patton got near to Bastogne did he engage some German armour but it was not a great amount at all. The Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade wasn't one of the best German armoured units, while 26th Volks-Grenadier only had a dozen Hetzers, and the small element of Panzer Lehr (Kampfgruppe 901) left behind only had a small number of tanks operational. Its not as if Patton had to smash through full panzer divisions or Tiger battalions on his way to Bastogne, he never. Patton's armoured forces outnumbered the Germans by at least 6 to 1.
Patton faced very little German armour when he broke through to Bastogne because the vast majority of the German 5th Panzer Army had already left Bastogne in their rear moving westwards to the River Meuse. They where were still engaging forces under Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Leading elements were engaging the Americans and British under Montgomery's command near Dinant by the Meuse. Monty's armies halted the German advance and pushed them back.
In Normandy in 1944, the panzer divisions had been largely worn down, primarily by the British and Canadians around Caen. The First US Army around St Lo then Mortain helped a little. Over 90% of German armour was destroyed by the British. Once again, Patton faced very little opposition in his break out in Operation Cobra performing mainly an infantry role. Nor did Patton advance any quicker across eastern France mainly devoid of German troops, than the British and Canadians did, who were in Brussels by early September seizing the vital port of Antwerp intact.
Patton repeatedly denigrated his subordinates.
♦ In Sicily he castigated Omar Bradley for the tactics
Bradley's II Corps were employing
♦ He accused the commander of 3rd Infantry Division,
Truscott of being "afraid to fight".
♦ In the Ardennes he castigated Middleton of the
US VIII Corps and Millikin of the US III Corps.
♦ When his advance from Bastogne to Houffalize
stalled he criticised the 11th Armoured Division for being
"very green and taking unnecessary casualties to no effect".
♦ He called the 17th Airborne Division "hysterical" in
reporting their losses.
After the German attack in the Ardennes, US air force units were put under Coningham of the RAF. Coningham, gave Patton massive US ground attack plane support and he still stalled. It was Patton's failure to concentrate his forces on a narrow front and his decision to commit two green divisions to battle without adequate reconnaissance that were the reasons for his stall. Patton rarely took any responsibility for his own failures. It was always somebody else at fault, including his subordinates. A poor general who thought he was reincarnated. Oh, and wore cowboy guns.
Patton detested Hodges, did not like Bradley disobeying his orders, and Eisenhowers orders. He also hated Montgomery. About the only person he ever liked was himself.
Read Monty and Patton: Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds
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The British won the Battle of Dunkirk.
The British BEF was only 9% of the total allied forces in France and the Low Countries. The German advance was halted in France as the British with a vastly inferior force stopped them at Arras. Some German soldiers turned and ran. Directive 13, issued by German Supreme Headquarters on 24 May 1940 stated specifically for the annihilation of the French, English and Belgian forces in the Dunkirk pocket. The Luftwaffe was ordered to prevent the escape of the British forces across the English Channel.
The German southern advance was stopped at Arras by the British with a numerically inferior force. The Germans never moved much further after. The Germans could not have taken Dunkirk, they would have been badly beaten in and around the town. The Luftwaffe was defeated over Dunkirk by the RAF with the first showing of the Spitfire en-mass. More German than allied planes were destroyed in the Dunkirk pocket. The first defeat of the Nazis in WW2 was in the air by the British over Dunkirk. Only six small warships were sunk at Dunkirk by the Germans as the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe blunted.
The British were retreating after the French collapsed in front of them - a programme already in motion, a programme already in motion before the Germans showed up, as General Gort saw the disjointed performance of the French forces in front of him. If the French collapsed the small BEF had no hope against the large German force heading west. The French were amongst the British when General Gort decided to take the men back to England, as he did not trust the French in a joint counter-attack. French General Wiegand held a meeting to arrange a counter-attack and never invited General Gort head of the BEF. Gort was under the command of Weigand. Gort heard of the meeting and rushed to be a part. He got there after the French and Belgians had left. He ordered the evacuation having no faith in the elderly French leaders.
All armies retreat and regroup when the need is there. There happened to be a body of water in the line of the retreat. Were they to move down the English coast and enter France further west with more men from England? The Germans did not know what was to be the next British or allied move. The Germans could not have taken Dunkirk trying for nearly a week failing in the process. The British retreat operation was carried out as planned and in orderly fashion. All bridges to Dunkirk were destroyed by the allies.
The British counter-attack at Arras was with outdated Matilda 1 tanks, which only had machine guns, and a few of the brand new Matilda 2 tanks. The Germans fled in droves. In desperation the Germans turned a 88mm AA gun horizontal successful against the Matilda 2 - their conventional anti-tank weapons and tanks could not penetrate the tank. The Matilda 2 would roll over German gun emplacements killing the gunners. Rommel thought he had been hit by a force three times the size, which made them stop and rethink. The Germans countered with their superior numbers pushing back the British who fell back consolidating towards Dunkirk.
The British resolve and the new Matilda 2 made the Germans sit up and think about a street fight in Dunkirk against a consolidated force still with its weapons and the new Matilda 2 - the 88mm would be useless in Dunkirk streets while the Matilda 2 would be in its element, with the Matlida 2 easily destroying the Panzer MkIII & MkIVs. The Matilda 2 could knock out any German tank at the time, while no German tank could knock it out. The Germans were expecting the Matilda 2 to be shipped over in numbers and for all they knew many were in Dunkirk. The Germans could not stop the tanks coming as the British controlled the skies with a CAP and the waters of the Channel. Not a good prospect for the Germans. A Dunkirk street fight was a fight the German troops were untrained and unequipped for and unwise to get involved in.
Von Rundstedt and von Kluge suggested to Hitler that German forces around the Dunkirk pocket cease their advance, consolidating preventing an Allied break out from Dunkirk. Hitler agreed with the support of the Wehrmacht. German preoccupation rightly was with an expected attack from the fluid mainly French and some British forces to the south of the German line, not from dug-in Dunkirk which was too much of a formidable consolidated opponent, taking substantial resources to seize. The German column had Allied troops to each side with soft marshland to the south west of Dunkirk unsuitable for tanks. If German forces had engaged in a street battle for Dunkirk, they would be vulnerable on their weak flank from the south. In short the fast moving panzers were now static; German forces attacking Dunkirk in a battle of attrition would have been largely wiped out.
The German columns were consolidating their remaining armour and the important resupply from Germany, which was slow as it was via horses, for an expected attack by the British and French from the south - or maybe a combined attack from the south and the Dunkirk pocket. The Germans attacked on a remarkably narrow front. They had over-stretched their supply lines. The Germans had no option but to stop, being more concerned at defending from the mainly French forces in the south which were viewed as a greater threat than Dunkirk. French general Weigand implemented his creation of hedgehogs to attack German lines from the sides, with success - hedgehogs were adopted post war by NATO being a part of the tactics until the 1970s.
What were the Germans thinking? Are the British retreating to England from Dunkirk to move down the English coast and re-enter France further south with fresh forces, including Canadians and the new Matilda 2 tanks, which they feared, and join up with the French forces there? Are they going to reinforce the Dunkirk pocket supplied by the Royal Navy with a 24/7 air CAP? The British could easily do any of these as they controlled the Channel. This would create one large difficult to combat force at Dunkirk. They also saw the resolve of outnumbered British forces at Arras. German generals were trying to figure out what was happening. None thought that British troops would retreat to England and stay there. The British never did that sort of thing.
The Germans could divert most of their forces south and risk a Dunkirk breakout being attacked from their rear fighting on two fronts, or stay and consolidate, which they needed to do, awaiting a French/British attack from the south and use some forces and the Luftwaffe to attack Dunkirk, which they did. German forces resumed their attack on Dunkirk for over 6 days and failed to seize the port.
The plan to break out of the Dunkirk Pocket using British, Belgian and French forces was abandoned as Gort had no confidence in the French. All military school studies since, knowing what the German and allied positions and situations were in 1940, have shown it would have succeeded.
The Germans were defeated at the Battle of Dunkirk. They tried militarily to seize the port but failed. Only because the British did not trust the French and moved back to England did the Germans eventually occupy the town. The Germans did not let the British get away that is misguided myth, they tried for a week simply not able to seize Dunkirk.
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TIK, Prof Adam Tooze in Wages of Destruction, (you quoted the book) clearly has the driver for Hitler's aggression being the USA. The USA had access to vast resources inside the USA, a land stolen from indigenous people and the Mexicans by moving west. Hitler took this precedence and looked east to emulate the USA, and match them economically. However this was long term.
Tooze again states that the immediate impetus to attack the USSR was that Roosevelt had stated in May 1940 that the USA will make 50,000 planes per year, with of course UK production added to that. Germany needed the resources of the east urgently to counter this coming air threat.
Wages of Destruction - The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy by Adam Tooze:
"On 23 July 1940 British procurement agents in Washington were invited to a clandestine meeting with American industrial planners, from which emerged a scheme to expand the capacity of the United States aircraft industry so that it would be able to deliver no less than 72,000 aircraft per annum, guaranteeing a supply to the British of 3,000 planes per month, three times the current German output."
This confirms Hitler's fears:
Hitler to the Hungarian Premier.... "Following Roosevelt's re-election remarked to the Hungarian premier that American shipments to Britain would not get fully under way before the winter of 1941-42 and this was also the view taken by the German navy. This, as it turned out, was a fairly accurate assessment and it had clear implications for German strategy."
Tooze:
"in 1940 the USA produced 6,019 planes, the UK received 2.006 and France 557. In 1941 the USA produced 19,433,...of which the British share came to 5,012. In 1942 almost 48,000, just shy of Roosevelt's target. The UK only received 7,775. By 1943 the USA had surpassed the "utopian" target of 72,000, with a staggering production of 86,898. Even more were to come in 1944."
Tooze - Page 431:
"the strongest arguments for rushing to conquer the Soviet Union in 1941 were precisely the growing shortage of grain and the need to knock Britain out of the war before it could pose a serious air threat."
Tooze says it was two prime points..
"the strongest arguments for rushing to conquer the Soviet Union in 1941 were"
1. "precisely the growing shortage of grain"
2. "the need to knock Britain out of the war before
it could pose a serious air threat."
Number 1 above, can be extended to a resources shortage with grain being the prime resource shortage. In short, invading the USSR was an economic benefit.
Tooze Page 455:
"the chronic shortage of fuel and rubber"
"the fuel shortage of 1941 was expected to be so severe that the Wehrmacht was seriously considering demotorisation as a way of reducing its dependency on scarce oil."
Tooze Page 459:
"On 22 January 1941 Thomas had informed his boss, Keitel, that he was planning to submit a report urging caution with regard to the military-economic benefits of the invasion. Now he reversed directions. As it became clear that Hitler was justifying Barbarossa first and foremost as a campaign of economic conquest, Thomas began systematically working towards the Fuehrer."
Number 2, above...
In June 1940 Roosevelt put to Congress that the USA construct the world's largest military complex. The USA said it will produce at least 50,000 planes per ann. and large carrier fleets for two oceans. They would supply what the UK wanted and had not decided how the UK would pay. Later this 50,000 was increased to 72,000 by the industrialists.
From June 1940 to Dec 1941 the UK received nearly 11,000 planes and 13,000 aero engines from the USA and produced 15,000 planes at home, a total of near 27,000 planes.
The USA produced 19,500 planes in 1941 and was training the pilots to fly them.
A total UK & US of 46,500 planes. Germany produced only 12,000 planes in 1941.
In July 1940 the USA planned to supply the UK alone with 3,000 aircraft per month. In 1942 the USA produced 86,000 planes exceeding the 72,000 mark with even more in 1944. German intelligence in 1940/41 knew of this massive rise in aircraft fleets that would be set against them. They were not that stupid.
Hitler predicted (accurately) that the masses of US planes would start to come in, in late 1941 - it takes approx 18 months from raw metal to a finished plane. Indeed in the winter of 1940/41 the Luftwaffe was giving equal priority to plane procurement for the coming air war with the UK as with Barbarossa. Hitler had to see off the USSR by late 1941 to have any chance of facing the masses of aircraft in the west. The natural resources, especially grain, oil, rubber and precious metals, of which Germany was desperately short, would be alleviated.
In short, if the UK did not pose a serious air threat in the west, the USSR would not have been invaded. Resources was the motivator, oil being only one of them.
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Although Germany had access to the industrial plant of Northern Italy, France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands they were not able to use it to match either the Soviets or the British in war production. Ironically, the 1940 conquests only burdened the German war economy since Western Europe was a net importer of food and raw materials and Germany had to support them - the Royal Navy blockade was effective. French aircraft production aimed for Germany was minuscule. France had access to manufacturing plant and supplies of bauxite but it was not able to produce as coal was imported from Britain for its electricity production. With the RN blockade the main source of coal for France became Germany, who could not afford to give it, but did. However, Germany was not able to increase its coal production sufficiently to overcome the short fall.
The amount of food produced in Europe fell. Previously the production of meat and dairy products in countries such as Denmark had been dependant on the import of grain and animal feed from the Americas. That was not available and the amount of food available for the dairy industry collapsed as did food production. The Danes slaughtered their animals from lack of feed. In the rest of Europe food production had been based on the widespread use of chemical fertilizer. Apart from the issues of the Royal Navy blockade, huge amounts of the chemicals used for fertilizer production was diverted to the making of explosives affecting agriculture.
French workers were moved on to subsistence rations as the country had been dependant on motorized transportation. Most of France's oil imports came from abroad. Agricultural produce could not be distributed because a lack of fuel, and vehicles taken by the Germans, with milk being literally being poured away. In Germany on the outbreak of war the only available oil products came from Romania or a small amount from synthetic oil made in Germany. This was barely enough for the needs of the German armed forces and not enough to keep the Italian Navy operational. France reverted to a pre-petroleum transport economy.
This economic background partially influenced Hitler's decision to invade the USSR. The USSR had the natural resources that would enable European industry to out-produce Britain and America and face the coming air war. Had Hitler won against Stalin, he would have gained unrestricted access to resources he needed to fight the British. The conquest of the Soviets was a key step in Hitler's strategy and not irrational. However the Soviets were able stand up to an invasion and better able to marshal their resources so that they could outlast the Germans. The USSR in 1942 out-produced even the USA in arms.
Germany had 2.5 times the per capita GDP of the USSR. Invading the USSR was critical because Western European industry was dependent upon imports, with the RN blockade cutting them off.
The British were able to out-produce the Germans in aircraft even prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The British outproduced the Germans in all war production in WW2.
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Coffice
Wages of Destruction by Prof Adam Tooze:
page 442:
"Shipments of oil to Britain peaked at more than 20 million tons, nine times the maximum figure ever imported by Germany during the war. In January 1941, when Germany is sometimes described as being 'glutted' with oil, stocks came to barely more than 2 million tons. In London, alarm bells went off whenever stocks fell below 7 million tons. So great was the disparity that the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, charged with assessing Germany's economic situation, had difficulty believing its highly accurate estimates of German oil stocks. To the British it seemed implausible that Hitler could possibly have embarked on the war with such a small margin of fuel security, an incredulity shared by both the Soviets and the Americans, who agreed in overestimating Germany's oil stocks by at least 100 per cent."
"During 1941, Italy was only able to import 600,000 tons of fuel with 163,000 tons given to the navy. At this point the monthly consumption had to be reduced to 60,000 tons. The total amount of oil fuel available at the end of the year was about 200,000 tons. During this period it was decided to remove from service the older battleships. After the November 1941 British attack in Egypt, the high command and Mussolini requested that the Italian fleet defend the Libya-bound convoys. This paid off and was only possible by the special shipment of 80,000 tons of German oil fuel delivered at the end of the year."
"On January 10th, 1942 the Italians informed the Germans that their navy’s supplies of fuel had dropped to 90,000 tons. During these months, the bottom was hit with reserves down to 14,000 tons. The situation deteriorated by the shipment of 9,000 tons of German oil fuel of quality too low to use. At the end of April, it was possible to import 50,000 tons of fuel oil per month from Romania. Suspending escort and mining missions by Italian cruisers reduced consumption. These cuts and new shipments allowed for the deployment of the whole Italian fleet during the battle with the British of mid-June. The Germans supplied fuel oil of only 10,000 tons in July 1942 and 23,000 tons in September. At the end of November 1942 the oil fuel reserve was about 70,000 tons plus all which was stored aboard the ships, This was enough for one sortie of the whole fleet. At the end of December, the old battleships Cesare, Duilio and Doria were removed from service."
"The allied landing in North Africa in 1943 put the Italian navy in another state of fuel crisis. New missions were made possible by the shipment of 40,000 tons of quality German fuel oil. In January 1943, the fuel oil crisis reached its climax and the three modern battleships had to be removed from service eliminating the Italian battle force. The only naval division still operating was in Sardinia. Only 3,000 tons were received in February 1943 and in March and April the modern destroyers had to be removed from escort missions. By the 10th of April, the only major naval force was annihilated when the Trieste was sunk and the Gorizia seriously damaged by allied air attack. Expecting a possible Allied invasion, the remaining destroyers were reactivated along with the battleships which had only half their bunkers filled with diesel fuel."
"In April 1943, the Italian navy was partially active and destroyers were used in escort missions. But there was no reserves of fuel oil left. The Germans "loaned" 60,000 tons of fuel oil captured from the French fleet at Toulon, allowing the three battleships to be reactivated with some cruisers. When Italy surrendered on September 8th 1943, their fleet only had enough fuel to reach Malta to surrender."
Such was the effect of the Royal Navy blockade, the most effective and forgotten operation of WW2.
“Unfortunately, our petrol stocks were badly depleted, and it was with some anxiety that we contemplated the coming British attack [Battleaxe], for we knew that our moves would be decided more by the petrol gauge than by tactical requirements.”
- Rommel in - Hart, L. The Rommel Papers. 1953.
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SuperCaratacus & TIK,
This vid TIK linked to. I am sure he took a lot from it.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RgxEBGAXNRU&t=17s
Anand Toprani left a lot out on oil production clouding his analysis. The British refineries at Suez and Haifa and a pipeline all along the canal in case the canal is out of action by air bombing, he was not aware of. The refineries at Suez and Haifa were small but could easily be expanded. Haifa was supplied by pipeline from Iran, but the RN insisted it have crude oil tanker facilities to cope if the pipeline is cut. These refineries gave the same sailing distance from the Caribbean. Also pre WW2, a coal fed UK, got its small needs of oil from Scottish shale oil and crude found in Derbyshire in 1919.
Oil was discovered at Kelham Hills in Nottinghamshire in the 1920s. In 1939 oil was discovered Eakring in Sherwood Forest, also oil was found at Caunton. US oil men were brought over in secrecy setting up the equipment. The locals never knew what was happening with the men housed in a monastery. It produced a modest 700 barrels per day. By the end of 1942 demand for 100-octane fuel would grow to more than 150,000 barrels every day. By the end of WW2, 1.5 million barrels had been extracted from English oil fields. A fair amount, the equivalent of about 14 WW2 T2 tankers carrying 16,000 tons of oil. The oil was high quality and used in lubricants and plastic, etc.
Refineries opened at Grangemouth in Scotland (1924), Fawley on the south coast (1921) and Stanlow near Liverpool (1924). The UK was not totally reliant on oil from the USA, as Toprani suggests. Venezuela was an independent country and today still has the greatest oil reserves in the world. If only being 100% energy independent gave great riches, then post WW2 Japan would have been one of the poorest countries in the world.
Toprani did get it right in that the Royal Navy blockade was instrumental in determining the direction of WW2.
He did get it right, as did Prof Adam Tooze in Wages of Destruction, that the clear driver for Hitler's aggression being the rise of the USA very quickly into an economic super power. The USA had access to vast resources inside the USA, a land stolen from indigenous people and the Mexicans by moving west. Hitler took this precedence and looked east to emulate the USA, and match them economically. The Americans had few people in the land to the west of them, whereas the Germans had fully populated lands to their east. They had the Hunger Plan to de-populate and colonise the land with Germans. However this was long term. Hitler's immediate concerns from May 1940 were resources to build planes to fight the coming air war.
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SuperCaratacus
"Yay a TIK documentary. Very enjoyable and agree with almost everything you said about oil."
Having studied the economic side of WW2 I was disappointed in TIK in this vid. Others have been very good in research and analysis. The Dunkirk side was way out. The Germans never let the British off, they actually lost the Battle of Dunkirk. All points that Germany's prime concern was obtaining all types of resources, primarily food, as the prime motivators in invading the USSR.
Hitler's focus was on the coming air war with Britain. The bulk of the 50,000 per year US made planes promised by Roosevelt were to come his way, even if the USA does not enter WW2. Then British made planes on top of that - and Britain was out-producing Germany in planes. Hitler needed to build up the Luftwaffe urgently. As the armies were starting to roll into the USSR, German industry was changing to plane production.
Wages of Destruction by Prof Adam Tooze:
Page 431:
"the strongest arguments for rushing to conquer the Soviet Union in 1941 were precisely the growing shortage of grain and the need to knock Britain out of the war before it could pose a serious air threat."
"Meanwhile, the rest of the German military-industrialised complex began to gird itself for the aerial confrontation with Britain and America."
Germany rushed to invade the Soviet Union, with an ill-equipped army with no reserves to gain the eastern resources, in anticipation of a massive air war with Britain and maybe USA, hoping they could win the Soviet war within weeks.
Hitler's prime concern was what Britain was going to do next. Hitler was constantly attempting to get the Japanese to attack the British empire to divert the British away from Europe and North Africa.
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As to the wondrous German army I will let others say it for me.
The German army about to invade the USSR......
Wages of Destruction Prof Adam Tooze:
Page 454:
"Fundamentally the Wehrmacht was a poor army. The fast striking motorised element of the Germans army in 1941 consisted of only 33 divisions of 130. Three-quarters of the German army continued to rely on more traditional means of traction: foot and horse. The German army in 1941 invaded the Soviet Union with somewhere between 600,000 and 740,000 horses. The horses were not for riding. They were for moving guns, ammunition and supplies."
"The vast majority of Germany's soldiers marched into Russia, as they had in France, on foot."
"But to imagine a fully motorised Wehrmacht, poised for an attack on the Soviet Union is a fantasy of the Cold War, not a realistic vision of the possibilities of 1941. To be more specific, it is an American fantasy. The Anglo-American invasion force of 1944 was the only military force in WW2 to fully conform to the modern model of a motorised army."
........The reality was that the German Army was no super army with advanced equipment, as propaganda portrayed. The Allies attempted to cover their pitiful, inept defeats, and that includes the Americans at the Bulge, Metz and Hurtgen Forest.
The German army attacking the USSR......
The Germans thought they had formulated a version of Blitzkrieg in France that was a sure-fire success. If the belt broke the whole movement stopped. They used this in the USSR, just scaling up forces. They did not have the intelligence to assess properly, that the reason for their success in France was allied incompetence not anything brilliant they did.
The Germans vastly underestimated the quality of design and make of Soviet weapons. The T-34 took them by surprise and they knew they were fighting an army they had hopelessly underestimated in all aspects. The Germans did not take into account the British supplying the USSR - 40% of the tanks used at the vital battle of Moscow were British supplied. The USSR had more tanks than the rest of the world combined in 1940.
The Germans underestimated the Soviets so much they decided to attack them with no reserves, all the German forces were involved in Barbarossa, lack of proper logistics to re-supply, short of steel, rubber, oil, an industry that could not re-supply at the rate required, short of fuel for industry and the forces, etc, etc. The Germans were so inept at assessing the Soviets they did not envisage fighting in the 1941/1942 Russian winter thinking they would have overcome the USSR in three months. When the Germans did not break the USSRs back they did not have enough winter clothes and equipment designed for such low temperatures. It was not just the logistics of getting to the troops, they just did not have the equipment. The Germans thought the Soviets could field 360 divisions, they fielded over 600.
Soviet industry was large and had moved to the east. Much was in the east anyhow. This was working 24/7 to re-supply. The T-34 tank by Dec 1941 was well established and available in numbers. The Germans first faced The T-34 in October 41, reducing a German division to a few tanks. The Soviet counter-attack at Moscow in Dec 1941 was well supplied, and heavily with T-34s. There was still 1,400 Soviet aircraft available in Dec 1941.
The Soviet's mistake was attacking on a broad front and not aiming the the weakest point and pushing them right back, nevertheless they mauled the Germans. By Dec 1941 the Germans were exhausted in fuel, men and equipment. They could do no more. As early as In July 1941, many German armies were at the end of their effective supply lines. As Prof Tooze said, most say the Germans failed to take Moscow, the reality was that they could not take Moscow as they were on their last legs. The large Soviet air force was still attacking German supply lines as well, exasperating the situation. The Germans foolishly thought most supplies could be taken along three very long rail rail line, which were easily ripped up by the Soviets and bombed via the air. Thousands of German rail men worked to get lines partially operation. The Soviets evacuated lots of rail trucks.
Prof Tooze: Wages of Destruction, page 453:
'Halder wrote, Barbarossa needed speed and motorized transport for supply. No waiting for railways. The Germans planned for three rail lines and 740,000 horses.'
...the Germans never had enough motorised transport to supply all the fast moving armies. Pre June 1941, they were considering de-motorising because of a shortage of rubber inflicted by the Royal Navy blockade.
Tooze: page 454:
'Three rail lines were used. The existing Soviet rail network was not even good enough to supply the German army if taken intact. It was also of a narrower gauge. The retreating Soviets took most wagons with them and destroyed the rail infrastructure on retreating.
The Soviets had taken massive losses, but being so big they could absorb so many losses. The Soviets also had inflicted great losses on the Germans by Dec 1941. The only large power Germany conquered was France. This gave them a sense of superiority - their technique was now known, so succeeding twice was unlikely.'
The Germans largely dropped the blitzkrieg of coordinated air and ground attacks.
Prof Tooze: page 487.
'In July, all three German Army groups had reached the limit of resupply and stopped. The Soviets had taken devastating losses but not defeated. The Soviets saw the halt of the German armies and the re-supply problem and launched 17 armies against them forcing the Germans to dig in and defend.'
The UK & US can be forgiven in underestimating the Red Army, which they did, not so the Germans as they would have to assess this force in detail as they were to fight it, unlike the UK & US. Soviet industry was turning out the arms and to advanced designs. I don't want to go into what ifs, but if the T-34 was in place in summer 1941 the Germans would never have had such spectacular progress. Stalin knew what was being produced. They knew once the weaponry was in place, they could defeat the Germans who would be operating over 1000 km along a few supply lines they could not fully supply.
Apart from Stalingrad, which the Germans and the Soviets had an obsession with, the Soviets became less reckless as the UK and USA were in the fight and arms, and some well advanced arms, were building up. The Germans would not win, and the Soviets knew that. Once a western second front was in place, it was clear the Germans would quickly crumble, and they did. On D-Day 1944, the Germans were still way inside the USSR. The end came quickly once hit from both sides. It can be argued that the Soviets should have pushed the Germans out of the USSR by 1943 or even 1942, however they were inept in most levels. But the Soviets knew in a war of attrition the Germans were doomed.
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Андрей Борцов
In 1940 France was stronger than Germany.
Wages of Destruction, by Prof Adam Tooze.
Page 371.
"The German army that invaded France in May 1940 was far from being a carefully honed weapon of modern armoured warfare. Of Germany's 93 combat ready divisions on May 10 1940, only 9 were Panzer divisions, with a total of 2.438 tanks between them. These units faced a French army that was more heavily motorised, with 3,254 tanks in total."
....Half the German tanks that invaded the west were armed only with a machine gun!! The German Army was not on equal footing with the French when in fact it was vastly inferior.
"That gave a total of 308 [British] tanks"
-Source The Great Tank Scandal, David Fletcher
Dutch, Belgian, UK & French tanks in total were 4,200 tanks against 2.438 German tanks.
Prof Tooze, page 371/372.
"Nor should one accept unquestioningly the popular idea that the concentration of the Germans tanks in specialised tank divisions gave them a decisive advantage. Many French tanks were scattered amongst the infantry units, but with their ample stock of vehicles the French could afford to do this. The bulk of France's best tanks were concentrated in armoured units, that, on paper at least, were every bit a match for the Panzer divisions."
Page 377
"The Germans not only committed "all" their tanks and planes. In strictest conformity with the Schwerpunkt principle, they committed them on an astonishingly narrow front"
"The Luftwaffe sacrificed no less than 347 aircraft, including virtually all its transports used in the air landings in Holland and Belgium".
Page 378
"if Allied bombers had penetrated the German fighter screen over the Ardennes they could have wreaked havoc amongst the slow moving traffic"
"highly inflammable fuel tankers were interspersed with the fighting vehicles at the very front with the armoured fighting vehicles"
"The plan called for the German armoured columns to drive for three days and nights without interruption".
....The drivers were put on "Speed" pills.
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Андрей Борцов
Keegan, World War Two, chapter War Production:
♦ Germany was third behind the USA, then the UK in
GDP, in 1939.
♦ Germany = UK in capital goods production in 1939.
♦ UK economy grows 60% during WW2.
♦ Hitler says to Guderian, re: USSR, "had I known they
had so many tanks as that, I would have thought twice
before invading"
wages of Destruction by Prof Adam Tooze.
Preface, xxiii:
Combined GDP of the UK and France exceeded Germany & Italy by 60%.
page 454:
"It was poor because of the incomplete industrial and economic development of Germany".
Interesting.....
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/publications/twerp603.pdf
Snippets:
"Soviet exceeded German GDP in 1940"
"The Allies won the war because their economies supported a greater volume of war production and military personnel in larger numbers. This was true of the war as a whole, and it was also true on the eastern front where the Soviet economy, of a similar size to Germany's but less developed and also seriously weakened by invasion, supplied more soldiers and weapons."
"the technological key to Soviet superiority in the output of weapons was mass production. At the outbreak of war Soviet industry as a whole was not larger and not more productive than German industry. The non-industrial resources on which Soviet industry could draw were larger than Germany's in the sense of territory and population, but of considerably lower quality, more far-flung, and less well integrated. Both countries had given considerable thought to industrial mobilisation preparations, but the results were of questionable efficacy. In both countries war production was poorly organised at first and productivity in the military-industrial sector had been falling for several years. The most important difference was that Soviet industry had made real strides towards mass production, while German industry was still locked into an artisan mode of production that placed a premium on quality and assortment rather than quantity. Soviet industry produced fewer models of each type of weapon, and subjected them to less modification, but produced them in far larger quantities. Thus the Soviet Union was able to make considerably more effective use of its limited industrial resources than Germany.
"Before the war Soviet defence industry was in a state of permanent technological reorganisation as new models of aircraft, tanks, and other weapons were introduced and old ones phased out at dizzying rate."
The USSR had access to oil, more natural resources and far more men, giving their ability to produce far greater than Germany, which actually happened.
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In Wages of Destruction - The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy by Prof Adam Tooze, he does go into the German pre-Barbarossa economic objective.
Tooze page: 420
"In fact, in the short term the only way to sustain Germany's Western European Grossraum at anything like its pre-war level of economic activity was to secure a vast increase in fuel and raw material deliveries from the Soviet Union. Only the Ukraine produced the net agricultural surpluses necessary to support the densely packed animal populations of Western Europe. only in the Soviet Union were there the coal, iron and metal ores needed to sustain the military-industrial complex. Only in the Caucasus was there the oil necessary to make Europe independent of overseas supply."
Some were against invading the USSR....
Tooze Page 457:
"Halder noted in his diary: Barbarossa: purpose not clear, We do not hurt the English. Our economic base is not significantly improved."
Page 460:
"As late as the Spring of 1941, the Foreign Ministry was still opposing the coming war, preferring to continue the alliance with the Soviet Union against the British Empire."
Page 459:
"State Secretary Backe of the Agriculture Ministry...had long been an advocate of expansion towards the east."
"On 22 January 1941 Thomas had informed his boss, Keitel, that he was planning to submit a report urging caution with regard to the military-economic benefits of the invasion. Now he reversed direction. ... Thomas submitted a report to Hitler on 20 February that was completely unprecedented in its optimism."
page 459:
Tooze emphasises that Hitler misinterpreted Backe's comments about the Ukraine grain. A region that had little surplus and had a substantial population increase from WW1.
Backe of the Agriculture Ministry, who had long been an advocate of expansion towards the east. What precisely Backe said to Hitler in January 1941 was not clear even to insiders such as General Thomas. As one OKW memo put it: 'it is said that State Secretary Backe has informed the Fuhrer that possession of the Ukraine would relieve us of any economic worry. Actually what Backe is supposed to have said is that if any territory could help us, it was the Ukraine.
Hitler did interpreted the fact that the Ukraine was a food-producing region. The Germans had plans to further curb consumption in other areas - the Hunger Plan. Backe was only interested in food, being in the Ministry of Agriculture, but Hitler knew about other problems in the German economy like shortages of oil, coal, steel and non-ferrous ores.
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@waynepatterson5843
What dyslexic opinionated drivel.
Britain was key in WW2. Britain fought on every front, being in the war on the first day up to the last - the only country at the surrender of Japan in September 1945 to do so - Britain’s war actually ended in 1946 staying on in Viet Nam using Japanese troops alongside British troops to defeat the Viet Minh, but that is another story. Britain was not attacked or attacked anyone, going into WW2 on principle. The Turkish ambassador to the UK stated that the UK can raise 40 million troops from its empire so will win the war. This was noted by Franco who indirectly said to Hitler he would not win, fearing British occupation of Spanish islands and territory if Spain joined the war. Spain and Turkey stayed out of the war.
The Turkish ambassador’s point was given credence when an army of 2.6 million was assembled in India that moved into Burma to wipe out the Japanese. From day one the Royal Navy formed a ring around the Axis positioning ships from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Arctic off Norway, blockading the international trade of the Axis. This deprived the Axis of vital human and animal food, oil, rubber, metals, and other vital resources. By 1941 the successful Royal Navy blockade had confined the Italian navy to port due to lack of oil.
By the autumn of 1941 Germany's surface fleet was confined to harbour, by the British fleet and the chronic lack of fuel. A potential German invasion from the the USSR in the north into the oil rich Middle East entailed expanded British troop deployment to keep the Germans away from the oil fields, until they were defeated at Stalingrad.
Throughout 1942 British Commonwealth troops were fighting, or seriously expecting to be attacked, in:
♦ French North Africa;
♦ Libya;
♦ Egypt;
♦ Cyprus;
♦ Syria: where an airborne assault was expected, with preparations to reinforce Turkey if they were attacked;
♦ Madagascar: fighting the Vichy French to prevent them from inviting the Japanese in as they had done in Indochina;
♦ Iraq;
♦ Iran: the British invaded Iran in August 1941.
Those spread-out covering troops were more in combined numbers than were facing Japan and Rommel in North Africa. The British Commonwealth fielded over 100 divisions in 1942 alone, compared to the US total of 88 by the end of the war. The Americans and Soviets were Johnny-come-late in WW2, moreso the Americans. Before the USSR entered the conflict the Royal Navy’s blockade had reduced the Italian and German surface navies to the occasional sorties because of a lack of oil, with the British attacking the Germans and Italians in North Africa, also securing Syria, Iraq, the Levant and ridding the Italians from East Africa. The Germans were on the run by the time the USA had boots on the ground against the Axis.
The Germans had been stopped:
♦ in the west at the Battle of Britain in 1940;
♦ in the east at the Battle of Moscow in 1941. In which Britain provided 40% of the Soviet tanks.
The Germans were on the run after the simultaneous battles in late 1942 of:
♦ El Alemein;
♦ Stalingrad;
The Battle of El Alemein culminated in a quarter of a million Axis prisoners taken in Tunisia - more than taken at Stalingrad. Apart from the US Filipino forces that surrendered in early 1942, the US had a couple of divisions in Gaudalcanal after August 1942, and one in New Guinea by November 1942. In 1943 the US managed to get up to six divisions in the Pacific, but still not matching the British or British Indian armies respectively.
Until late 1943 the Australian Army alone deployed more ground fighting troops against the Japanese than the USA. The Americans never put more ground troops into combat against the Japanese at any point than just the British Indian Army alone, which was 2.6 million strong. The US had nowhere near 2.6 million men on the ground against the Japanese. The Soviets fielded about a million against the Japanese.
Most Japanese troops were put out of action by the British and Soviets, not the USA. At the battles of Khohima and Imphal the Japanese suffered their worst defeat in their history up to that point.
Then the British set the Eastern and Pacific fleets against the Japanese, not far off in numbers to the US fleet. The British Pacific Fleet assisted US troops protecting the western coast of Okinawa with its armoured carriers - they could operate way nearer to the coast than wooden decked US carriers, as kamikaze's bounced off them. The fleet also bombarded Japan, Sumatra and Taiwan, sinking one Japanese aircraft carrier and disabling another.
The Australian navy assisted the US navy all through the Japanese war. The USA was in the war for four years, yet it was less than 10 months before the Japanese surrender they actually fielded an entire army against the Japanese. That was in the Philippines. Before that it was just divisions fighting on scattered islands for a month or so at a time.
In Europe the British planned and ran the D-Day Normandy campaign which came in ahead of schedule with 22% less casualties than predicted, with the British in command of all the air, sea and land forces of all nationalities. Then also destroying 90% of German armour in the west in the process, with constant air raids on German cities and industry culminating with 1,000 bomber raids. The Canadian navy was heavily involved in anti U-Boat operations in the Atlantic.
The biggest agents in the defeat of the Nazis and Japanese were the British.
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