Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "Gavin wasn't to blame? 'New' evidence on Operation Market Garden's failure?" video.
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The Guards tanks seized the Nijmegen road bridge. Not one US soldier was on the bridge when seized.
U.S. 82nd Division records state that the first troop of British tanks, four of them, crossed the Waal road bridge at 1830 hours. Two tanks were hit with the crews taken POW bar one, Sgt Knight. The tanks charged across at full speed approaching 30 mph firing against German guns all the way, with a few hundred high in the girders. Gunner Leslie Johnson in the lead tank said: “They were falling like nine-pins. The incoming fire was so heavy that I swear to this day that Jesus Christ rode on the front of our tank. The Germans were so close that I didn’t bother to look through my sights. We could feel the tracks going over them as we shot them down, and there was blood and gore all over the tank.”
Once the two leading tanks of Pacey and Robinson got past the bridge obstacles at the northern end, Pacey stopped. The War Office report states: “At this point, Pacey stopped, he was not sure where to go as no Americans were seen, so Sergeant Robinson passed him and led on. Much to their surprise, they could not see any Americans so having passed through the concrete chicane they pushed on. Having crossed the road bridge, the four tanks moved down the northern embankment, where they destroyed another anti tank gun. Robinson and Pacey found themselves in a running battle against more guns, and against German infantry who poured out of the church in Lent, and then 1,500 yards further down the road from the bridge, where the main road goes under the railway line, contact was at last made with some Americans, both were very happy to see each other."
The 82nd men at Lent reached Lent following the railway embankment from the riverbank using it for cover. The first American troops that arrived at the bridge approaches/waterside after moving along the riverbank from their river landing point with Burriss’ company of about sixteen men, was at 1915 hours. 45 minutes. after the first tanks had already crossed. This was not the main bridge span, just the raised approach road over land. Official U.S. records confirm that 82nd troops from the 504th arrived at the northern road bridge approaches at 1938 hours. This would be the time they arrived in any real strength to consolidate, one hour 8 mins after the first tank crossed. The records state at 1938 hours:
“All seemed quiet at this point, with the enemy disorganised and in great confusion, suffering heavy losses. Prior to the physical occupation of the northern end of the bridge by 504th PIR, eight British light tanks had [already] crossed. Two of these were destroyed just north of the bridge”. The second troop of tanks crossed at least half an hour after the first. Capt Burris of the 82nd was there under the approach road when the second troop rolled over, thinking they were the first tanks over. Lord Carington's tank was one of them. Five rolled over the bridge, with two hit, being there to consolidate the bridgehead and ensure the Germans did not take the bridge back.
Horrock of XXX Corps in his plan had the 43 Wessex infantry to seize the ground from Nijmegen bridge to Arnhem, destroying anti-tank weapons. It was not tank country. The tanks were to follow behind the infantry. The tanks would have been sitting ducks if they went first. The 43rd Wessex were to do the river crossing in two columns. There was a contingency planned if the bridge was blown. The Wessex were to use dedicated assault boats, which they had in Nijmegen, and DUKW and Buffalo amphibious craft. But to save face as they failed to seize the bridge, Gavin of the 82nd pestered Horrocks for his men to do the crossing, Horrocks agreed. It appears that the 82nd did not know of the Buffalo amphibious craft using collapsible bridge engineers boats to cross the Waal. Or the Wessex did not want to give them fearing the valuable craft would be lost with an 82nd river assault failure - that needs more research.
Not one 82nd man was on the bridge when the first troop of four tanks crossed at 1830, or at 1915 when the second troop of four went over. Official XXX Corps records from the War Office highlight that the successful tank attack on the road bridge was at 1830 hours.
Thirty-four machine guns, an 88mm gun, and two 20mm cannons were found to be on the road bridge itself, and at least six anti-tank guns and a few 88mm guns were situated around the northern end.
All this nonsense of drinking tea by the British tankers disinterested in the battle seems to have started as an American diversion, after inquiries by the Official US historian Charles MacDonald into why the Nijmegen bridges were not taken on the first day.
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In 1941 the British were concurrently fighting in all theatres of war, in all corners of the globe and against better prepared forces of greater numbers. Germany’s war was regional, extending from their borders - all logistics went directly over land back to Germany, apart from North Africa where the Italians provided the sea transport back to nearby Italy. The British were fighting Italy and Vichy France too. Japan’s war was confined to a radius around Japan.
Taking on all these countries and securing wins for the free World was pure brilliance.
As well as achieving the first three victories against the ‘unstoppable’ German military war machine, Britain achieved that which no other nation in the world could even possibly dream of accomplishing in the early 1940.
Britain fought a global war in the:
♦ Middle East;
♦ Far East;
♦ Indian subcontinent;
♦ Pacific;
♦ North Africa;
♦ West Africa;
♦ East Africa;
♦ North Atlantic;
♦ South Atlantic;
♦ North Sea;
♦ Barents Sea;
♦ Arctic Sea;
♦ Mediterranean;
♦ Adriatic;
♦ Mainland Western Europe;
♦ Eastern Europe;
♦ Scandinavia.
The British were the only military power in human history to fight in such globally spread theatres of conflict.
For the third year running, Britain was propping up an ally - France, USSR, then the USA. The incompetence of US Navy to provide convoy protection on its east coast almost lost the allies the Battle of the Atlantic. Six hundred ships off the US eastern seaboard were lost in the first six months of 1942. Shipping losses climbed to a level that undermined British ability to supply themselves, keep the Soviets in the war, and keep reinforcements flowing to the Middle East and Asia. The British quickly deployed 60 escort vessels to cover the US coast.
In 1942 the USA was a liability. For most of 1942 the British Commonwealth held the line, kept back the combined efforts of Germany, Italy and Japan, with minimal input from the USA compared to her potential power, keeping the Atlantic and Indian oceans open with supplies flowing to the vital armies in the Middle East and Asia, and to the USSR. No other empire in the history of the world has been capable of such a sustained multi-continent and multi-ocean operation.
In 1942 the British Commonwealth was fighting a three continent, four ocean campaign, against three major powers and keeping the USSR supplied The thousands of tanks and aircraft sent to the USSR would have saved Singapore.
The total British losses of territory and people in the early war were:
♦ One third of the territory the Soviets lost;
♦ Half of the people the Americans lost - mainly Philippines;
Yet those nations were fighting only on one front and only against one of the three powers.
The British Commonwealth had far more ground troops in action against the Japanese than the Americans. Also the British were maintaining sea control over the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. And then provided aircraft carriers and cruisers to help in the Pacific - while the USA concentrated on just one of those theatres.
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ORDER
508- P-rcht Infantry will:
(a) Land on DZ "T"
(b) Seize, organise and hold key terrain features in area of responsibility, and be prepared to seize Waal River crossing at NIJMEGEN (714633) on order of Div Comdr.
Let us assume pre-jump in England Gavin did not verbally tell Lindquist to go for the Waal bridge overriding the Order, which Gavin and witnesses claim he did. So we have to go by the written Order which is freely available and a section copied above.
Regimental Liaison Officer of the 508th was Chester Graham: "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.'
Two battalions of the 508th were marching for just under three hours from the DZ to the empty Heights, arriving at 5 pm. One battalion remained at the DZ securing it. The DZ was secure when they left. As soon as they were in the Heights with no Germans in sight the Heights were secure. All secure. Lindquist should have had his two companies prepared which was written in the Order.
Lindquist should have contacted Gavin 'immediately', by radio or messenger, to get the Divisional Order to go to the bridge on reaching the vacant and secure Heights. Lindquist could not move to the bridge without it.
Lindquist:
1) was way too late in obtaining the Order to proceed by radio or messenger;
2) none of the two companies prepared to move to the bridge.
When informed Lindquist was not moving to the bridge, Gavin sped personally to Lindquist screaming at him to move to the bridge at 7 pm, two hours after the 508 arrived at the Heights. Half an hour later the Germans reinforced the bridge. It took another two hours to muster the two companies spread over the Heights under Cnl Warren before they started to march at 9 pm. Far too late.
Lindquist failed on two important points.
Again, this is all assuming Gavin never gave verbal orders to Lindquist in England, only going by the written Order.
Whichever way you cut it, Lindquist was amateurish and to blame. Gavin also takes blame as he never had Lindquist trained and alert enough.
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The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition, hanging around in the village. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
Evidently expecting that Major La Prade's flanking battalion would have captured the highway bridge, these two battalions made no apparent haste in moving through Zon. They methodically cleared stray Germans from the houses, so that a full two hours had passed before they emerged from the village. Having at last overcome the enemy 88 south of the Zonsche Forest, Major LaPrade's battalion caught sight of the bridge at about the same time. Both forces were within fifty yards of the bridge when their objective went up with a roar.
- US Official History.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up for the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem. XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
According to the official American Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
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@johnlucas8479
All you do is go around in circles in an attempt to obfuscate.
The state of play on the morning of the 17th:
1) There was condensed German resistance on the Dutch-Belgian border. There would be as it was the front line.
2) The road from Zon, north of Eindhoven, was clear all the way to Arnhem.
3) The bridges were largely undefended. No ditches, barbed wires and the likes. The large Nijmegen bridge had 19 guards on it.
4) About 750 men in the Nijmegen area, who were older men of a training unit, no match for the highly trained and experienced 82nd men.
5) There was no German armour anywhere along the road from Zon to Arnhem.
How it went
If the airborne units seized their assigned bridges, The ground troops, XXX Corps would breeze through to the Arnhem, the prime objective.
The British 1st Airborne made it to Arnhem bridge, taking the north end of the bridge, denying its use to the Germans. The other two airborne units, both US, failed to seize their assigned bridges immediately. If they had XXX Corps would have been in Arnhem on d-day+1, before any armour came in from Germany. Game set and match. The Germans would not have known what had hit them.
XXX Corps dealt with the initial German resistance making excellent progress. The US Official History states about XXX Corps, "progress was remarkable". The 12 hour delay caused by the 101st not seizing the Zon bridge, meant the Germans for 12 hours had a critical time window to pour in troops and get armour moving towards Arnhem. The longer the time delay the more Germans poured in, hence more resistance. Obvious.
On top of the 12 hour delay, the 82nd failing to seizing their bridge at Nijmegen (XXX Corps had to take it for them), caused an additional 36 hour delay. This meant another longer time window for the Germans to keep up the reinforcing. The extra 36 hour delay created by the 82nd, meant a bridgehead over the Rhine was precluded, as the two day time window in total given to the Germans was far too long.
The British paras did their part in securing a crossing over its assigned waterway, the Rhine - the crossing was denied to the Germans. The two US para units failed in theirs. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
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@johnlucas8479
From US Offcial history....
As night came the British stopped in Valkenswaard, their "formal" objective. The objective of Eindhoven, which General Horrocks had indicated he hoped to reach on D-Day, lay six miles to the north.
So, XXX Corps was on schedule meeting their objective. XXX Corps reached Eindhoven at 1230 hrs, [d-day+1] running through without stopping, only to stop at the Zon bridge which the US 101st failed to seize.
US Official history...
at 0645 (D plus 2, 19 September) the armor rumbled across [the Zon bridge].
That is about 19 hours delay - OK knock off an hour for getting through Eindhoven, say 18 hours. An 18 hours delay because the US 101st failed to seize their objective.
US Official history....
Spearheading the 30 Corps ground column, reconnaissance troops of the Guards Armoured Division linked with Colonel Tucker's S04th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 the morning of D plus 2, 19 September. Major formations of the British armor were not far behind.
XXX Corps covered over 26 miles in 2 hr 45 mins, averaging about 7 mph. They got to Zon at about 1330hrs d-day+1, So they would have reached the 82nd at 1615hrs d-day+1, at the latest. More like an hour earlier, or as fast as the vehicles could go.If the 82nd had secured the Nijmegen bridge XXX Corps would have linked up with the British paras early evening d-day+1.
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@scaleyback217
The state of play on the 17th, d-day, was that the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was clear. There was concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally. There were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen. Then a few scattered about along the road. There was no armour in Arnhem. That was it. If the bridges are secured by paras forming an airborne carpet then just a cruise up the road.
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 3 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured the bridge.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected.
XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, at the planned expected time, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over.
If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
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@thevillaaston7811
Since WW2 and up to the wildly inaccurate film A Bridge Too Far, the way Market Garden was portrayed was that XXX Corps were too slow, the US paras took all their bridges, the British after seizing Nijmegen bridge stopped for tea not wanting to move to Arnhem, the British planned the operation, etc, etc. This was US propaganda backed up by Hollywood, and poor US authors. US blame shifting. Since the film, many have researched the operation in depth collectively concluding another rather accurate story. The conclusion was that Market Garden was an American failure.
Americans:
1) Failed to seize two bridges immediately, putting the operation back 42 hours in total;
2) Primarily planned the operation;
3) Gave the operation the go ahead, despite British reservations expressed over its viability;
4) Under resourced the operation - only one corps above Eindhoven;
5) Had the final say over air operations;
6) Prevented fighter-bombers from operating;
7) Prevented two air drops in one day.
The British XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong getting to Nijmegen on schedule. Instead of rolling over the bridge onto Arnhem six miles away, they then had to seize a bridge themselves which they were not tasked for.
The British paras held one end of a bridge denying its use to the Germans, until they ran out of ammunition - the Germans said they were the best soldiers they had met in WW2.
Brereton after WW2, on film stated XXX Corps were too slow. He lied knowing they were not. All facts prove they were not slow. Since WW2 Americans have lied through their back teeth over Market Garden, constantly blaming Montgomery who had little involvement, with the OK given by ground forces commander Eisenhower.
This vid TIK on Gavin shows the lies that have been put in place by the US over the operation since WW2. Contrast the British.
1) Browning was corps commander saying I take responsibility, not casting any on the three divisional generals under him, of which one was clearly to blame;
2) It was Montgomery's 21st Army Group, so he said the buck stops with him;
3) Brereton, head of the First Allied Airborne Army, said nothing - except lies after WW2;
4) Gavin all though attempted to defect blame - even onto Lindquist, as this vid proves;
The British were gentlemen, the Americans chose the blame game pointing at anyone except themselves. A culture difference.
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@garynash7594
The US media, of which the US high command was very conscious of, needed a hero. They personify a lot. For e.g., they would call a TV sit-com by the leading actors name - the Dick Van Dyke show. Something that would never happen in the UK. A lacklustre US general in Sicily became infamous for hitting two sick men in hospital beds. So the US public knew his 'name'. Top US generals were of film star status in the USA at the time.
In Normandy nothing much was happening as the allied forces stayed pretty static, with the British drawing onto themselves German armour to grind it up, while keeping it away from the US forces. The British destroyed 90% of German armour in the west. The US media needed a hero and movement as that creates good stories to sell newspapers and newsreels.
Patton was late into Normandy. He was first to breakout after in Cobra, of which he had no part, after the US First Army did the work, so the US media hailed him as some sort of armoured warfare genius as territory was being gained after many weeks of no movement. As we know the British enabled the breakout, as part of MOnty's plan, but that is not how the US media portrayed it.
They now had movement and a name, which people knew, to hang it on. It was easy to laud this man as he accommodated the media gladly, looking after them. Bradley criticized Patton for having teams of cameramen following him, of which he encouraged, of which Cornelius Ryan was one.
So the US media had a hero - a goodie. The hero in typical Hollywood fashion could only be seen to be doing good. He even wore cowboy guns and a chrome tin hat to fill the hero role, so the visuals were good. They also needed a 'baddie', so they made one up as well. The evil Monty. Everything fell into place. The US media had all the ingredients they wanted and some they made up. Anything bad about the goodie was spun the other way.
The leading US media hero who happened to be in a position in Monty's plan to gain ground was kept a hero come what may. It was all of the goodies doing, not Monty's. No other US general did anything of note, so Patton stayed the hero, even though he failed to breach the Westwall, suffering horrendous casualties against 2nd to 3rd rate German opposition. Patton also moved 10 miles in three months at Metz. But he took north east France in a matter of days - the fact no Germans were there was not emphasized and it was more a triumphal procession than a military advance. When facing German opposition at the German border matters were different.
Patton was wayward in Sicily slowing down the operation, so Monty thought how do I play to this guys ego and get him back in the battle, which was letting him to Messina first. Patton was too slow reaching Bastogne, not relieving the 18,000 men inside - even the US 101st commander inside said so. He apologized to Eisenhower for being too slow. But Patton was fast and relieved them according to the US media.
OK, in wartime for home propaganda and morale purposes a hero was created. A government does not like its people to know it was telling them lies and never admits to doing so. The British spun it so a few Oxbridge RAF pilots won the Battle of Britain with it being a close thing. Backs to the wall and all. The reality was what they spun was wrong on both counts. So post war the governments just forget it.
The people post war still believe the war propaganda angle spun to them. The film industry and book publishers saw there was money to be made in WW2, so they pick up the propaganda then run with it. The US people were led to believe they won the war, well without them the Axis would have won. And also they supplied most of it. Which is all false. All totally wrong but telling them what they want to believe, and believed since children, sells.
So we are in a situation where a few historians are actually stating history as it was by looking at archives and actual accounts. They do not make much money though. If you are a writer, then the huge US market is where the money is. British authors Hastings and Beevor are guilty of towing the US WW2 propaganda media line, to make huge sums.
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@garynash7594
What US historian Harry Yeide wrote of what the Germans thought of Patton:
▪ for most of the war the Germans barely took notice [of Patton].
▪ on March 23 at the Battle of El Guettar—the first American victory against the experienced Germans. Patton’s momentum, however, was short-lived: Axis troops held him to virtually no gain until April 7, when they withdrew under threat from British Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army.
▪ There is no indication in the surviving German military records—which include intelligence reports at the theater, army, and division levels—that Patton’s enemies had any idea who he was at the time. Likewise, the immediate postwar accounts of the German commanders in Tunisia, written for the U.S. Army’s History Division, ignore Patton. Those reports show that ground commanders considered II Corps’s attacks under Patton to have been hesitant, and to have missed great opportunities.
▪ In mid-June [1943], another detachment report described Patton as “an energetic and responsibility-loving command personality”—a passing comment on one of the numerous Allied commanders. Patton simply had not yet done anything particularly noteworthy in their eyes.
▪ But his race to Palermo through country they had already abandoned left the commanders unimpressed. Major General Eberhard Rodt, who led the 15th Panzergrenadier Division against Patton’s troops during the Allied push toward Messina, thought the American Seventh Army fought hesitantly and predictably. He wrote in an immediate postwar report on Sicily, “The enemy very often conducted his movements systematically, and only attacked after a heavy artillery preparation when he believed he had broken our resistance. This kept him regularly from exploiting the weakness of our situation and gave me the opportunity to consolidate dangerous situations.” Once again, Patton finished a campaign without impressing his opponents.
▪ General Hermann Balck, who took command of Army Group G in September, thus did not think highly of Patton—or any other opposing commanders—during this time. Balck wrote to his commander, Runstedt, on October 10, “I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again…can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans” Looking back on his battles against Patton throughout the autumn, in 1979 Balck recalled, “Within my zone, the Americans never once exploited a success. Often [General Friedrich Wilhelm von] Mellenthin, my chief of staff, and I would stand in front of the map and say, ‘Patton is helping us; he failed to exploit another success.’”
▪ The commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, Hasso von Manteuffel, aimed a dismissive, indirect critique at Patton’s efforts at Bastogne, writing in his memoirs that the Americans did not “strike with full élan.” The commanders who fought against Patton in his last two mobile campaigns in the Saar-Palatinate and east of the Rhine already knew they could not win; their losses from this point forward were inevitable, regardless of the commanding Allied opponent.
▪ the Germans offered Patton faint praise during and immediately after the war.
▪ posterity deserves fact and not myth. The Germans did not track Patton’s movements as the key to Allied intentions. Hitler does not appear to have thought often of Patton, if at all. The Germans considered Patton a hesitant commanding general in the scrum of position warfare. They never raised his name in the context of worthy strategists.
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The state of play on the 17th was that the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was clear. There was concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally. There were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen. Then a few scattered about along the road. There was no armour in Arnhem. That was it.
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 3 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured the bridge.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected.
XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, at the planned expected time, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over.
If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
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The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up.
The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
According to the official AMERICAN Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
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@strikehold
Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Eisenhower, approved under resourcing the operation. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed. The Market part was planned by mainly Americans while Garden mainly the British. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who:
♦ Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practised and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
♦ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
♦ Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused;
♦ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
♦ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here by agreeing;
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, yet rarely seen at Market Garden;
♦ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak". The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.
General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgement or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives.
Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges. They arrived at 2200, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, five hours after the jump. The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800. An easy taking of the bridge had now passed.
XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 7 miles to go to Arnhem. Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men at the edge of the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself.
XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges themselves and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men in clearing the town, seizing the bridge themselves. What you see in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge. If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corp's Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge.
The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin.
Even the US Official War record confirms this. Charles B. MacDonald wrote the US Official history on Market Garden: https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_19.htm The Market part of Market Garden failed. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
"it was not until 9 October, more than a month after the fall of Antwerp, that General Eisenhower told Montgomery to devote his entire attention to the clearance of the Scheldt. By that time Monty had the Canadians cleared it, or were investing in many of the Channel ports"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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@davemac1197
Reading Chester Graham and Gavin, Lindquist was not given an order to wait for a divisional order to proceed. Gavin failed to put his order in writing. Or if he did it was inexplicably removed from the US archives.
US Official History...
"Although extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files. The story has been reconstructed from unit records; Gavin's letters to Westover and OCMH; letters to OCMH from Colonel Warren, 5 July 1955, Colonel Lindquist, 9 September 1955, Col. Thomas J. B. Shanley formerly Executive Officer, 508th Parachute Infantry, 2 Sep 55, and Rev. Bestebreurtje, 25 Oct 56; a postwar interview with Colonel Lindquist by Westover, 14 Sep 45, copy in 82d Airborne Division Combat Interview file; and Westover, The American Divisions in Operation MARKET, a preliminary narrative written in the European theater shortly after the war, copy in OCMH. Captain Westover had access to all the combat interviews when writing his narrative."
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@trickylifts
Kershaw wrote, "All that stood in the way of XXX Corps and Arnhem during much of the night of 20-21 September were a few security pickets". He is wrong.
Harmel: "At this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst".
Kershaw: "at the same time we lost the Nijmegen bridge, we were just about over the Arnhem bridge" Correct.
Kershaw said in an interview that there was two companies of German infantry at Elst as pickets. With Panzerfausts. He never mentioned that as soon as the Nijmegen bridge fell to XXX Corps, they were joined by tanks.
Armour, with a number of Tigers, were waiting to cross south on the Arnhem bridge. They moved immediately. The five British tanks that crossed the Nijmegen bridge, with two being hit, were to form a bridgehead on the north of the bridge. They were unable to move north to Arnhem.
Later, five unarmoured Achilles self propelled guns, not tanks, with the crews open to the atmosphere, moved north over the Nijmegen bridge, to protect the bridgehead against the German tanks that had moved south over the Arnhem bridge.
Harmel and Kershaw, were wrong. German records show otherwise.
When the Arnhem bridge was surrendered by the British paras, there is an account, from Private James Sims of 2nd Battalion, as he was led out under the bridge ramp, he turned left and then right into a tree-lined avenue, he saw an "unending line of Mark IV tanks" parked under the trees. The Germans had a lot of tanks available to send over the bridge once the wreckage was cleared and it was re-opened, which they cleared very quickly. They had far more tank available than the three the British had at the northern end of Nijmegen bridge.
There were two Tiger units deployed to Arnhem. The first was Panzer Kompanie 'Hummel' (named after Hauptmann Hummel, the commander) from schwere-Panzer-Abteilung 500 (heavy tank battalion 500) at Paderborn - it was a unit held in reserve as a fire brigade. The (1st) Kompanie was equipped with 14 Tiger I tanks, but because they could not be sent to a railhead near Arnhem due to air attacks, they were detrained at Bocholt road marching to Arnhem. This is not good for mechanically unreliable vehicles and all but two broke down on the way. The two that did arrive approached the bridge area, shot up a few British occupied buildings and then retreated when they came under anti-tank gun fire. By the time the whole of Kompanie Hummel was assembled in Arnhem, the siege at the bridge was over, ready to move south to Elst.
The other Tiger unit was schwere-Panzer-Abteilung 506, re-equipped with 45 King Tiger tanks in three companies. They were due to be sent to Aachen to deal with the American penetration of the Westwall, but instead the 3.Kompanie was detached to 9.SS-Panzer-Division being deployed against British 1st Airborne at Oosterbeek, and 2.Kompanie detached to 10.SS-Panzer-Division and deployed with Kampfgruppe Knaust. The 1.Kompanie and the Abteilung staff were either sent immediately to Aachen or held in reserve for a period at Elten, on the German-Dutch border.
SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 had 16 Mark IV tanks on the books, concentrated in 5.Kompanie of the II.Abteilung. They tried to raft them over the Pannerden canal (the canalised part of the Rijn at the Pannerden ferry location) but the Mark IVs were too heavy for the raft and had to wait for the Arnhem bridge to be cleared. They could raft their remaining 4 StuG III assault guns, concentrated in 7./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 and sent to reinforce Nijmegen. They fought a fighting retreat from Nijmegen northwards over the bridge. At least one survived to halt Sgt. Robinson's Firefly' and Shermans at the Lent railway viaduct, and again halted the Irish Guards the next day on a defence line established between Oosterhout and Ressen by Kampfgruppe Knaust.
They also had a few old surviving Mark III tanks from Panzer Kompanie Meikle (part of Knaust's battlegroup from the training units in Germany), the whole of Panzer Kompanie Hummel (14 x Tiger I) and 2.Kompanies.
Panzer-Abteilung 506 (14 x Tiger II). Heavy tank operations on the 'island' between Arnhem and Nijmegen were extremely difficult because of the terrain. They could not be deployed off the roads onto the soft polder, and a number were lost after falling into roadside ditches not being extricated. About 5 Tiger I tanks were lost in the area of Elst due to the terrain and an ambush by infantry units from 43rd (Wessex) Division. The tanks simply couldn't be deployed effectively.
GenFM Model also had 20 brand new Panthers delivered straight from the factory to Arnhem, with no camouflage paint or tactical markings. They were crewed by the 100 Panther crewmen of a 9.SS 'alarm kompanie' that had been quartered at the Saksen-Weimarkazerne in north Arnhem, the barracks were assigned to the remnants of SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 under a junior officer and possessed two alarm companies acting as infantry, the 100 dehorsed Panther crews and 100 or so men from the workshop company.
They also had three Panthers from Normandy, kept off the books, and two Flakpanzer IV 3.7cm. Two Panthers were lost to British paras dropping gammon bombs on them from upper floor windows in western Arnhem, and the Flakpanzers were deployed by Kampfgruppe Spindler against 4th Parachute Brigade with deadly effect. The 20 new Panthers were also attached to Kampfgruppe Knaust and several lost in the Elst area.
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@trickylifts wrote:
"No, there's no error there on XXX Corps' missed opportunity to drive on to Elst and thereby offer a last chance at saving Frost's force. If they'd taken off fast they would have certainly beaten the German tanks to Elst, while consolidating a tough position there."
Not this US blame diversion again. You have been watching too many Hollywood films.
One of the statements by Kershaw/Harmel was incorrect. Look...
At the village of Ressen, less than three miles north of Nijmegen, the Germans had erected an effective screen composed of an SS battalion reinforced with 11 tanks, another infantry battalion, 2 batteries of 88-mm. guns, 20 20-mm. anti-aircraft guns, and survivors of earlier fighting at Nijmegen, all operating under General Bittrich's II SS Panzer Corps. Arnhem lay seven miles north of this screen. The British could not pass.
- US Official History.
And it would have been a 100% success had the US 82nd Airborne captured the Nijmegen bridge when there were only 19 Germans guarding it. As it happens they didn’t move on it for hours, allowing time for it to be reinforced.
The biggest mistakes historians make is to glorify and narrow mindedly concern themselves with Arnhem and Oosterbeek. The Allies were stopped in the south just north of Nijmegen- that is why Arnhem turned out as it did.
- SS Major-General Heinz Harmel, 1987
”The US history points out that there ‘was no incentive for urgency over taking the Nijmegen bridge as XXX Corps were not yet in Eindhoven’ and it might be some time before they arrived at the Nijmegen bridge. In fact, XXX Corps had already passed Eindhoven and were waiting to cross the Bailey bridge at Zon. The US Official Historian, Charles B. MacDonald, dismisses this casual approach to the question of taking the Nijmegen bridge, stating that: ‘According to this theory, General Gavin had another full day to tackle the Germans at Nijmegen.’ This theory also assumes that one day would be sufficient for a Gavin to take the bridge - from one side only - having already sacrificed the advantage of surprise and with German strength increasing”.
- Neillands Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
You have selective amnesia. The US 82nd men held the southern approaches to the Nijmegen bridge overnight. This amazing German force in Nijmegen of non-combat troops you keep on about, was so good it could not suppress a small US force form holding the end of a bridge in a town they were based and holding.
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@trickylifts
Zaloga reinforces what I wrote. What I wrote was clear...
There were no combat troops in Nijmegen on the jump day, the 17th. There was none, besides Flak in the city at that time. There were HQ units in Nijmegen, who evacuated immediately - the Dutch HQ of the SS-Polizei, the equivalent to a divisional HQ. The figure of 19 men guarding the bridge came from the Dutch underground. That figure may have included the 11 manning an 88mm Flak gun north of Nijmegen bridge. The gun was taken out by the first British tank over the bridge - the tank took it out when it was half way across the bridge, firing on the move.
The few 82nd men who reached the bridge late, stayed near the southern approach road all night before Gavin ordered men out of Nijmegen completely, de-prioritising the bridge. That was a mixture of SS men who came down from Arnhem, and non-combat personnel. The German troops in Nijmegen on the 17th were non-combat being no match for the highly trained 82nd men. Once the Germans had secured the Nijmegen bridge German troops came over via the ferry. They manned the rubble in the town centre (the US air force bombed the town months earlier by mistake), making it more difficult to seize when XXX Corps arrived.
Zaloga states: Lieutenant-Colonel Warren and the Co. A of 1/508th PIR did not set out for Nijmegen until 2100hrs. That is 6.5 hours after landing. If they had gone to the bridge immediately they would have walked on it. Not only that one of the 82nd companies got lost.
Compare the 82nd men moving to Nijmegen bridge to the British First Airborne paras who got to Arnhem bridge. They landed after the 82nd men, getting to their bridge before the 82nd men got to the Nijmegen bridge, with further to go. The British paras, not to be detected, moved along the river bank, in and out of houses, over back yard walls, carrying all with them. They reached the undefended north end of Arnhem bridge, taking control of that end.
The Germans were so disorganised initially both bridges could have been seized by walking on them. The British walked on theirs the 82nd were so slow, the Germans had 8 hours to reinforce their bridge.
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Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Eisenhower, approved under resourcing the operation. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed. The Market part was planned by mainly Americans while Garden mainly the British. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who:
♦ Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practised and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
♦ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
♦ Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused;
♦ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
♦ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here by agreeing;
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, yet rarely seen at Market Garden;
♦ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak". The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.
General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgement or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives.
Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges. They arrived at 2200, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, five hours after the jump. The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800. An easy taking of the bridge had now passed.
XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 7 miles to go to Arnhem. Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men at the edge of the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself.
XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges themselves and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men in clearing the town, seizing the bridge themselves. What you see in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge. If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corp's Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge. The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin.
Even the US Official War record confirms this. Charles B. MacDonald wrote the US Official history on Market Garden: https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_19.htm The Market part of Market Garden failed. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
"it was not until 9 October, more than a month after the fall of Antwerp, that General Eisenhower told Montgomery to devote his entire attention to the clearance of the Scheldt. By that time Monty had the Canadians cleared it, or were investing in many of the Channel ports"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Eisenhower approved, under resourcing the operation. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed. The Market part was planned by mainly Americans while Garden mainly the British. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who:
♦ Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practised and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
♦ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
♦ Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused;
♦ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
♦ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here by agreeing;
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, yet rarely seen at Market Garden;
♦ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak". The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.
General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgement or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives.
Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges. They arrived at 2200, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, five hours after the jump. The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800. An easy taking of the bridge had now passed.
XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 7 miles to go to Arnhem. Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men at the edge of the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself.
XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges themselves and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men in clearing the town, seizing the bridge themselves. What you see in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge. If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corp's Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge. The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin.
Even the US Official War record confirms this. Charles B. MacDonald wrote the US Official history on Market Garden: https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_19.htm The Market part of Market Garden failed. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
"it was not until 9 October, more than a month after the fall of Antwerp, that General Eisenhower told Montgomery to devote his entire attention to the clearance of the Scheldt. By that time Monty already had the Canadians clear it, or were investing in many of the Channel ports"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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When Gavin found out the 508th were not moving, he was livid, expecting them to be moving on the bridge, if there was no opposition. The 508th did send a recon patrol. According to Phil Nordyke’s Put Us Down In Hell (2012) three lead scouts of the troop of 40, were separated making it to the vicinity of south end of the road bridge approaches, not the main steel span. They captured six Germans and also their small artillery gun. They waited about an hour for reinforcements that never arrived, having to withdraw then observed the 9.SS-Panzer recon battalion arriving from Arnhem.
These few scouts that reached the southern end of the Nijmegen bridge just before the 9th SS recon, reached the bridge about an hour before the 9th SS. Joe Atkins in The 508th said, "at the bridge, only a few German soldiers were standing around a small artillery weapon... The Germans were so surprised; the six or seven defenders of the bridge gave up without resisting. We held the prisoners at the entrance to the bridge for about an hour. It began to get dark and none of our other troops showed up. We decided to pull away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack. The German prisoners asked to come with us, but we refused, having no way to guard them. As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge." That was the 9th SS. The 82nd men had captured one third of the guards on the bridge.
US Official History, page 163:
Colonel Warren about 1830 sent into Nijmegen a patrol
After around 4.5 hours after landing a patrol of 40 men were sent.
Colonel Warren directed Companies A and B to rendezvous at a point just south of Nijmegen at 1900 and move with the Dutch guide to the bridge. Company C, a platoon of which already had gone into the city as a patrol, was withheld in regimental reserve. Although Company A reached the rendezvous point on time, Company B "got lost en route." After waiting until about 2000, Colonel Warren left a guide for Company B and moved through the darkness with Company A toward the edge of the city. Some seven hours after H-Hour, the first real move against the Nijmegen bridge began.
As the scouts neared a traffic circle surrounding a landscaped circular park near the center of Nijmegen, the Keizer Karel Plein, from which a mall-like park led northeast toward the Nijmegen bridge, a burst of automatic weapons fire came from the circle. The time was about two hours before midnight.
As Company A formed to attack, the men heard the noise of an approaching motor convoy emanating from a side street on the other side of the traffic circle. Enemy soldiers noisily dismounted (the 9th SS now in the town)
No one could have said so with any finality at the time, but the chance for an easy, speedy capture of the Nijmegen bridge had passed. This was all the more lamentable because in Nijmegen during the afternoon the Germans had had nothing more than the same kind of "mostly low quality" troops encountered at most other places on D Day.
Vandervoort's 505th had a number of failed attempts at seizing Nijmegen bridge, unable to get onto the southern approach road.
The 82nd men captured one third of the Guards on the bridge without a fight and also their big gun, probably a 2cm Flak 30. There was a similar gun at the northern end.
They literally got one end of the bridge, well the southern approaches, just before the 9th SS turned up. If they had got there in greater force a few hours earlier, they would have hopped and skipped onto the bridge whistling Dixie.
Regarding Zon, we do not know if the Germans would have blown the bridge if the 101st had got there within minutes. Probably they would not have, as to blow it takes authority, which takes time as an officer would want to know the whole picture before ordering an explosion. It took the Germans four hours to blow the Zon bridge.
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XXX Corps were NOT slow.
Brereton wrote: “It was the breakdown of the 2nd Army’s timetable on the first day—their failure to reach Eindhoven in 6 to 8 hours as planned—that caused the delay in the taking of the Nijmegen bridge and the failure at Arnhem.” Is this criticism justified?
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
- THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE 1954, CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY, P 588 by CHESTER WILMOT
XXX Corps slowed up when hearing of the blown bridge at Zon. The US 101st failed to take the bridge, not XXX Corps. Brereton lied. XXX Corps were not slow, as facts prove that.
From US Official history....
As night came the British stopped in Valkenswaard, their "formal" objective. The objective of Eindhoven, which General Horrocks had indicated he hoped to reach on D-Day, lay six miles to the north.
XXX Corps brushed aside the heavy German resistance on the Dutch-Belgian border, with "remarkable" progress as the US Official history states.
So, XXX Corps was on schedule meeting their objective. XXX Corps reached Eindhoven at 1230 hrs, [d-day+1] running through without stopping, only to stop at the Zon bridge which the US 101st failed to seize.
US Official history...
at 0645 (D plus 2, 19 September) the armor rumbled across [the Zon bridge].
That is about 19 hours delay - OK knock off an hour for getting through Eindhoven, say 18 hours. An 18 hours delay because the US 101st failed to seize their objective.
US Official history....
Spearheading the 30 Corps ground column, reconnaissance troops of the Guards Armoured Division linked with Colonel Tucker's S04th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 the morning of D plus 2, 19 September. Major formations of the British armor were not far behind.
XXX Corps covered over 26 miles in 2 hr 45 mins. Very fast indeed. They got to Zon at about 1330 hrs d-day+1. So XXX Corps would have reached the 82nd at 1615 hrs d-day+1, at the latest if the Zon bridge had been secured. More like an hour earlier, or as fast as the vehicles could go. If the 82nd had secured the Nijmegen bridge XXX Corps would have linked up with the British paras possibly early evening d-day+1.
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@dmbeaster
Montgomery or Browning never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Eisenhower insisted it go ahead, under resourcing the operation. Monty wanted it cancelled. Only the V rockets launched from Holland tipped to go with it. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed. The Market part was planned by mainly Americans, while Garden was mainly the British. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who:
▪Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practiced and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
▪Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
▪ Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused;
▪Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
▪Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here by agreeing;
▪ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, yet rarely seen at Market Garden;
▪Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak".
The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.
General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgment or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defenses such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives.
Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges. They arrived at 2200, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, five hours after the jump.
The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800. An easy taking of the bridge had now passed. XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 7 miles to go to Arnhem.
Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men at the edge of the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself. XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges themselves and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men in clearing the town, seizing the bridge themselves. What you see in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge. If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corp's Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge. The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin.Even the US Official War record confirms this. The Market part of Market Garden failed. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
but you know this anyhow.
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The American post war version of events is one that attempts to whitewash their failures, to capture the Zon and Nijmegen bridges on the first day. The largely fictitious film A bridge Too Far, made when Browning had already died, only cemented the false narrative in the minds of the public. Since then many researchers have uncovered the real facts of the operation.
The 508th launched some patrols into Nijmegen far too late. A patrol from the 3rd Battalion almost reached the bridge - but only after being delayed by the enemy with the bridge being reinforced in company strength by the time they reached it.
Warren's 1st Bn had launched a patrol or two patrols, yes, just patrols. Nordyke relates two versions from Warren and his exec' officer. It, or they, were led by the Bn S-2 Intelligence Section, followed and joined by Lt. Weaver's 3rd Platoon of the Bn reserve C Company, plus two squads from the HQ Company LMG Platoon and C Company's SCR-300 radio set and operator, for communication back to the battalion. Weaver's patrol met enemy resistance, then withdrawing when they heard the Bn were sending A and B Companies to take the bridge. They only went because of Gavin intervened; running livid to Lindquist's CP in a Jeep, screaming at him to get moving when he found, after many hours, he was not moving to the bridge.
"I knew all of the division staff and the other regimental commanders, and was included in the planning of operations and briefings. I was ‘bigoted.’ [This is a WWII military term for being read into/briefed on missions.]
Prior to the Holland jump, I sat in a high-level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important.
After we were dropped in Holland, I went to the 508th Regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, “As soon as the DZ (drop zone) is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.” So I went cross-country through Indian country [slang military term for enemy territory] to the Division CP and relayed Lindquist’s message to Gavin.
I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his jeep, he told me to, “Come with me — let’s get him moving.” "On arriving at the 508th Regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, “I told you to move with speed.”
- by Chester E Graham, liaison officer between the 508th and the 82nd Division Headquarters.
Bergström states that three of the S-2 Section patrol, got separated reaching the bridge. They managed to capture six or seven German troops and a small Falk artillery weapon. They waited an hour until dark at around 7:30 pm, withdrawing. They could hear heavy equipment approaching from Arnhem, being the SS-Panzer Recon Battalion 9, who just just missed Frost's men at Arnhem bridge at 7pm. The SS-Panzer Recon Battalion 9 reached Arnhem 5.5 hours after the 82nd had landed. It will take another 5 hours or so before the 82nd launched an attack. Bergström's source is Demolition Platoon, 508th by Zig Burroughs.
This contrasts sharply to Frost's progress in Arnhem, where his whole battalion following A Company moved away from the Germans, through people's houses, over walls, and back yards, carrying all their equipment, by-passing German positions, reaching the Arnhem bridge. The British First Airborne landed half an hours after the 508. They have an extra 4 or 5 miles march, met more resistance, yet reached the Arnhem bridge before the US paras reached the Nijmegen bridge.
Gavin obtained promotion 505th PIR command to Assistant Divisional commander for Normandy, being promoted again to Divisional commander for Holland Gavin inherited Lindquist as commander of the 508th, who were the least experienced regiment in the Division. Yet gave the least experienced regiment the prime task. Gavin says that in England he told Lindquist to go for the bridge "without delay." Lindquist denied Gavin said this.
Gavin chose the most experienced regiment, the 504th, who had just returned from Anzio, to secure the Grave bridge, because it was on the Division's supply line. Without the Grave bridge secured, the 82nd would be in serious trouble. The next most experienced regiment was Gavin's old unit the 505th. He gave them the defensive task of securing the landing zones from counter-attack from the Reichswald. The intelligence picture by SHAEF, on 16 September, suspected II.SS-Panzerkorps was drawing new tanks from a depot in the Kleve area of Germany.
Gavin had this mythical 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald, so he gave the less experienced 508th the task of securing Nijmegen and its bridges. This was a unit, better suited to the defensive role. The 508th, and Lindquist, were well dug-in on the Groesbeek ridge when Gavin was informed they were not moving on the bridges in Nijmegen. They were not following Gavin's divisional plan, Lindquist was waiting for an order from the division HQ before moving into Nijmegen. This was a clear command failure between Gavin and Lindquist.
When Ridgway was promoted to command XVIII Airborne Corps with Gavin moving up to command 82nd Division, Gavin's old position of assistant Divisional commander was left vacant. During Market Garden he was doing two jobs. Ridgway had no role to play in Market Garden as his two divisions of XVIII Corps were attached to the British First Airborne Corps for the operation, under Browning. Ridgway paid a visit to Gavin's CP to see why they had not secured the bridge, after XXX Corps made contact with the Division. Gavin entered to find Ridgway in the CP studying a map. Gavin ignored him and immediately left without even acknowledging Ridgway's presence. If Ridgway was still divisional commander for Market Garden operation, the 82nd would have secured the bridge immediately.
There were no German combat troops in Nijmegen on the jump day. None. That is a fact. The low grade aged troops were scared stiff of meeting well armed aggressive paras. The German HQs moved out immediately. Regarding Harmel, when interviewed by Kershaw in the 1970s, he said there was no German armour between the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridge when XXX corps secured the Nijmegen bridge. This was incorrect as German records show German tanks, inc' Tigers, were already crossing south on the Arnhem bridge to form a line at Elst - the British First Airborne had capitulated on the Arnhem bridge running out of ammunition, at the same time XXX Corps seized then secured the Nijmegen bridge. Harmel never knew this, as communications was skant in a fluid situation. After the episode, the last thing they were thinking of was where and what time, as they saw the allies in a few days had punched a 60 mile salient right into their lines on the German border, taking the largest road bridge in Europe at the time.
Add to your reading list:
1) Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment In World War II by Phil Nordyke.
2) Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergström
3) Market Garden, Then and Now by Karl Magry.
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In an interview with General Browning in the NY Times he said he gave equal priority to the Nijmegen bridge and the Groesbeek heights. The heights near De Ploeg, which are really pretty flat being a wooded area but high for Holland, are pretty well between the Drop Zone (DZ) and bridge. Browning and Gavin naturally did not want German troops between the DZ and the bridge, so the heights had to be occupied and secure.
Gavin understood the priorities in sending the 508th to the bridge and Groesbeek heights immediately, with Coln Warren's battalion of the 508th assigned the bridge. To get to the bridge from the DZ you have to pass the Groesbeek heights, so any enemy at the heights naturally had to be subdued, then secure the area, which could take time, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge.
It took the 508th a painfully slow 3.5 hours to march a few miles from the DZ to the heights, reaching the Groesbeek heights at 1730. There were no Germans at the Groesbeek heights as forward scouts relayed back the situation. So, on route Coln Lindquist could have sent Warren's battalion directly to the bridge, bypassing the Groesbeek heights, immediately via the riverbank as instructed by Gavin. The rest of the 508th could move to the empty Groesbeek heights setting up defences at De Ploeg on the heights. Dutch resistance men informed the 508th that the Germans had largely cleared out of Nijmegen with only 19 guards on the bridge. So all was easy and fine, men could move immediately to the bridge without a diversion via the Groesbeek heights.
Despite hearing the good news from the Dutch Underground, Lindquist in command of the 508th was not moving at all, staying static at De Ploeg. Lindquist was waiting for a Divisional Order from Gavin that the DZ was secure, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge. When Gavin found out via a liaison officer he was livid, running over to De Ploeg in a Jeep telling Lindquist to get moving to the bridge.
Three stray men from a patrol sent to the bridge by Warren to confirm what the Dutch Underground told them, took the guards on the south end of the bridge prisoner. They left when no one turned up. When leaving they saw hundreds of Germans pour onto the previously lightly guarded bridge. Some of Warren's men became lost when they eventually moved towards the bridge. By the time the 508th did get to the bridge in force, the Germans had come south reinforcing the bridge with hundreds of men. Too late. The 82nd were expecting German resistance from the east, however it came from the north via the Nijmegen bridge.
Gavin was expecting Lindquist to secure the Groesbeek heights, which were devoid of enemy forces, then immediately move to the bridge, which meant sending Warren's battalion immediately.
▪Lindquist was expecting Gavin to notify him that the DZ was clear.
▪Gavin was expecting Lindquist to go to the bridge when it was obvious the Groesbeek heights, on the way to the bridge, were secure. As no Germans were about, the heights were naturally secure.
Regarding Lindquist's expected clearing of the DZ before moving from DePloeg. Lindquist did write a Field Order for the 508th on 13 September copied to Gavin, stating that once the heights were secure he would wait for a Divisional Order [from Gavin] to move. Two days later at the jump briefing Gavin verbally overruled Lindquist's Field Order, using a map that he should move to the bridge "without delay". Poor command communications by Gavin.
Poulussen, in Lost at Nijmegen discovered that the 508th jumped without any written offensive orders from Gavin. All was verbal from Gavin to Lindquist. Chester Graham, the 82nd liaison officer, was at the pre jump meeting in England. He said there was no ambiguity amongst anyone there that the bridge was the prime target.
In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, was wanting confirmation that if the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the objectives. In response, dated 25 July 1945, General Gavin was clear: "About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, Commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city."
General Browning never knew men were static at De Ploeg. Like Gavin he was expecting men to be seizing the bridge. Being corps commander, he was busy attempting to communicate with all three parachute divisions. The 82nd did launch a few failed attacks on the bridge. In the afternoon of the next day, 18th, Gavin asked permission to launch another attack. Browning, seeing the bridge was well defended, and the failed attacks, refused, opting to wait for XXX Corps to arrive to seize the bridge. Inexplicably Gavin moved all his men out of Nijmegen town completely to the heights and DZ, giving the town back to the Germans. This made matters worse when XXX Corps arrived who had expended vital time, and ammunition, in flushing them out.
On page 162 of the U.S. Official History:
"many documents regarding the extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files."
Read:
▪Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment In World War II by Phil Nordyke.
▪Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergström.
▪Market Garden, Then and Now by Karl Magry.
▪Lost at Nijmegen by R Poulusson
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Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Eisenhower, approved and under resourced the operation. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed. The Market part was planned by mainly Americans while Garden mainly the British. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who:
♦ Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practised and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
♦ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
♦ Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused;
♦ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
♦ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here by agreeing;
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, yet rarely seen at Market Garden;
♦ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak". The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.
General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgement or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives.
Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges. They arrived at 2200, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, five hours after the jump. The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800. An easy taking of the bridge had now passed.
XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 7 miles to go to Arnhem. Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men at the edge of the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself.
XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges themselves and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men in clearing the town, seizing the bridge themselves. What you see in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge. If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corp's Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge. The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin.
Even the US Official War record confirms this. Charles B. MacDonald wrote the US Official history on Market Garden: https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_19.htm The Market part of Market Garden failed. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
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Since WW2 and up to the wildly inaccurate film A Bridge Too Far, the way Market Garden was portrayed was that XXX Corps were too slow, the US paras took all their bridges, the British after seizing Nijmegen bridge stopped for tea not wanting to move to Arnhem, the British planned the operation, etc, etc. This was US propaganda backed up by Hollywood and poor US authors. Since the film, many have researched the operation in depth collectively concluding another rather accurate story. The conclusion was that Market Garden was an American failure.
Americans:
1) Failed to seize two bridges immediately, putting the operation back 42 hours;
2) Primarily planned the operation;
3) Gave the operation the go ahead, despite British reservations expressed over its viability;
4) Under resourced the operation;
5) Had the final say over air operations;
6) Prevented fighter-bombers from operating;
7) Prevented two drops in one day.
The British XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong getting to Nijmegen on schedule. Instead of rolling over the bridge onto Arnhem six miles away, they then had to seize a bridge which they were not tasked for.
The British paras held one end of a bridge denying its use to the Germans, until they ran out of ammunition - the Germans said they were the best soldiers they had met in WW2.
Brereton after WW2, on film stated XXX Corps were too slow. He lied knowing they were not. All facts prove they were not slow. Since WW2 Americans have lied through their back teeth over Market Garden, constantly blaming Montgomery who had little involvement, with the OK given by ground forces commander Eisenhower.
This vid shows up Gavin and the lies that have been put in place by the US over the operation since WW2.
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Subsequent books by US authors quoting men who were actually there are useful.
When Gavin found out the 508th were not moving, he was livid, expecting them to be moving on the bridge, if there was no opposition. The 508th did send a recon patrol. According to Phil Nordyke’s Put Us Down In Hell (2012) three lead scouts of the patrol of 40, were separated making it to the vicinity of south end of the road bridge approaches, not the main steel span. They captured seven of the 18 Germans guards also their 20mm artillery gun guarding the south end of the bridge. They waited about an hour for reinforcements that never arrived, having to withdraw then observed the 9th SS Panzer recon battalion arriving from Arnhem.
The three scouts that reached the southern end of the Nijmegen bridge about an hour before the 9th SS arrived. Joe Atkins in The 508th Connection (2013) said:
"at the bridge, only a few German soldiers were standing around a small artillery weapon... The Germans were so surprised; the six or seven defenders of the bridge gave up without resisting. We held the prisoners at the entrance to the bridge for about an hour. It began to get dark and none of our other troops showed up. We decided to pull away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack. The German prisoners asked to come with us, but we refused, having no way to guard them. As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge."
That was the 9th SS arriving after being gifted a generous time window by the 82nd to reinforce.
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@Answer Questions
Market Garden failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. The failure point was not seizing the Nijmegen bridge immediately. At the end of D-Day all crossings were denied to the Germans, except one - the Nijmegen bridge. General Gavin of the US 82nd was supposed to get to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as landing. Gavin never, he failed with only a few German guards on the bridge. He failed because his 82nd did not seize the Nijmegen bridge immediately.
Gavin even de-prioritised the bridge the prime target and focus. The 82nd were ready at 2 pm on the jump day and never moved to the bridge. The gigantic bridge was guarded by only 19 guards. The Germans occupied the bridge at 1900 hrs. Six hours after the 82nd were ready to march.
Events on the 1st day:
♦ "At 1328, the 665 men of US 82nd 1st Battalion began to fall from the sky."
- Poulussen, R. Lost at Nijmegen.
♦ "Forty minutes after the drop, around 1410, the 1st Battalion marched off towards their objective, De Ploeg, three miles away."
-Poulussen,
♦ "The 82nd were digging in and performing reconnin the area looking for 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald
- Neillands, R. The Battle for the Rhine 1944.
♦ The 82nd were dug in and preparing to defend their newly constructed regimental command post, which they established at 1825. Then Colonel Lindquist "was told by General Gavin, around 1900, to move into Nijmegen."
-Poulussen
Events on the evening of the 1st day:
♦ Having dug in at De Ploeg, Warren's battalion wasn't prepared to move towards Nijmegen at all.
- Poulussen,
♦ Once Lindquist told Lieutenant Colonel Warren that his Battalion was to move, Warren decided to visit the HQ of the Nijmegen Underground first - to see what info the underground had on the Germans at the Nijmegen bridge.
- Poulussen,
♦ It was not until 1830hrs that he [Warren] was able to send a force into Nijmegen. This force was somewhat small, just one rifle platoon and an intelligence section with a radio — say forty men.
- Neillands. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
♦ This was not a direct route to the bridge from Warren's original position, and placed him in the middle of the town. It was also around 2100 when "A" Company left to attempt to capture the Nijmegen road bridge.
♦ "B" Company was not with them because they'd split up due to it being dark with "visibility was less than ten yards".
- Poulussen,
♦ The 82nd attacks were resisted by the Germans until the next day.
Events of the 2nd day:
♦ Gavin drove up in a jeep the next morning and was told by Warren that although they didn't have the bridge yet, another attack was about to go in.
♦ Gavin then told Warren to hold because the Germans were attacking in the southeast portion of the 82nd perimeter.
♦ At around 1100, Warren was ordered to withdraw from Nijmegen completely.
- Poulussen
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The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up.
The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
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@matthawkins123
Monty actually signaled Eisenhower’s headquarters postponing the operation. Eisenhower resurrecting it and a cable from the War office about V2s committed Montgomery to the operation.
From Nigel Hamilton’s biography of Monty:
For Monty now to cancel the British part of ‘the main effort of the Allies because of stiffening enemy resistance, even had he wished to do so, would thus have been tantamount to insubordination, leaving him open to charges of timidity at a moment when American forces were thrusting towards the German border. Moreover the Arnhem-Nijmegan axis had been Monty’s proposal, making it doubly hard to rescind.
Eisenhower’s directive was not the only signal committing Monty to the continuation of his planned thrust via Arnhem on 9 September - for during the afternoon a ‘Secret’ cable arrived from the War Office, sent by VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke:
Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP-UTRECHT-ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared.
By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to ‘rope off’ the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites.
Few people are aware that there were supporting units on either flank who set off to the left and right of Hells Highway shortly after and in fact one of these supporting flanks advances pushed the Germans away from cutting the highway near Eindhoven on the 20th after XXX corps had gone through ahead. They even widened the axis of advance with their follow on actions.
It should be borne in mind that promised supplies from SHAEF failed to arrive, leaving VIII Corps, supposed to attack alongside, mostly stranded in place. “Garden” launched with only half the troops it should have had.
Montgomery had also wanted to use Hodges 1st US Army (and had in fact been promised) as a follow up flanking advance. But Bradley was stealing fuel and other resources from Hodges and giving it to Patton.
Eisenhower:
”I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations”.
Eisenhower insisted it go ahead and Eisenhower under-resourced it. MG wasn’t even an army just a corps.
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@johnlucas8479
The state of play on the 17th was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) then a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 3 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured the bridge.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected.
XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over.
If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
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@johnlucas8479
The largest airborne contribution was the USAs. The 82nd was the largest division. The bridge at Grave was the only bridge to be taken from both ends as per established tactics.
Monty actually signaled Eisenhower’s headquarters postponing the operation. Eisenhower resurrecting it. A cable from the War Office about V2s committed Montgomery to the operation. Tactical Operation Market Garden was based on Operation Comet, with multiple Rhine crossings, which was a quick pursuit operation formed by Monty. He cancelled it due to reformed German resistance.
From Nigel Hamilton’s biography of Monty:
For Monty now to cancel the British part of ‘the main effort of the Allies because of stiffening enemy resistance, even had he wished to do so, would thus have been tantamount to insubordination, leaving him open to charges of timidity at a moment when American forces were thrusting towards the German border. Moreover the Arnhem-Nijmegan axis had been Monty’s proposal, making it doubly hard to rescind.
Eisenhower’s directive was not the only signal committing Monty to the continuation of his planned thrust via Arnhem on 9 September - for during the afternoon a ‘Secret’ cable arrived from the War Office, sent by VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke:
Two rockets so-called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP-UTRECHT-ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared.
By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to ‘rope off’ the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites.
Few people are aware that there were supporting units on either flank who set off to the left and right of Hells Highway shortly after and in fact one of these supporting flanks advances pushed the Germans away from cutting the highway near Eindhoven on the 20th after XXX corps had gone through ahead. They even widened the axis of advance with their follow on actions.
It should be borne in mind that promised supplies from SHAEF failed to arrive, leaving VIII Corps, supposed to attack alongside, mostly stranded in place. “Garden” launched with only half the troops it should have had.
Montgomery had also wanted to use Hodges First US Army (and had in fact been promised) as a follow up flanking advance. But Bradley was stealing fuel and other resources from Hodges and giving it to Patton.
Eisenhower:
”I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations”.
Eisenhower insisted it go ahead who also under-resourced it. Market Garden wasn’t even an army just a corps above Eindhoven. A disgrace.
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@johnlucas8479
From the US Official History:
"I personally directed Colonel Roy E. Lindquist, commanding the 508th Parachute Infantry," General Gavin recalled later, "to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen bridge without delay after landing"
Gavin did give urgency to the bridge for sure. And clearly equal priority.
US Official History:
As darkness approached, General Gavin ordered Colonel Lindquist "to delay not a second longer and get the bridge as quickly as possible with Warren's battalion."
Gavin's men failed to act with urgency dawdling at DePloge
US Official History:
The assembly and movement to De Ploeg took approximately three and a half hours. After organizing a defense of the objective, Colonel Warren about 1830 sent into Nijmegen a patrol consisting of a rifle platoon and the battalion intelligence section.
Until Gavin told them to move when finding they were doing nothing. About 40 men, a patrol, set off to the bridge about four hours after the jump, reaching the vicinity of the bridge over five hours after the jump. Instead of seizing the bridge, with only 19 guards guarding it and the adjacent rail bridge, they found it was now held by an SS recon battalion who moved down from Arnhem, in the time they were dawdling at DePloge. The SS recon men reached the bridge just prior to the Patrol reaching the bridge - about five hours after the jump.
The 82nd had a five hour window in which to launch an attack on a largely undefended bridge with no significant bridge defenses.
US Official History:
the chance for an easy, speedy capture of the Nijmegen bridge had passed. This was all the more lamentable because in Nijmegen during the afternoon the Germans had had nothing more than the same kind of "mostly low quality" troops encountered at most other places on D Day.
US Official History:
As the scouts neared a traffic circle surrounding a landscaped circular park near the center of Nijmegen, the Keizer Karel Plein, from which a mall-like park led northeast toward the Nijmegen bridge, a burst of automatic weapons fire came from the circle. The time was about two hours before midnight.
The first attack on the bridge was 8.5 hours after the jump.
So blaming Browning for the 82nd men dawdling is a slur on Browning in a poor attempt at defecting blame. Gavin did have the bridge as priority as the text above confirms. Blaming Browning for the incompetence of the 82nd in not moving to the bridge quickly is totally out of order. Browning did not order the 82nd men to dawdle at DePloge.
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@johnlucas8479
You must stop exaggerating, distorting and making things up.
PLANNING
Was primarily by Brereton and Williams of the USAAF. Hollingworth of the RAF is culpable as he agreed with many of their flawed proposals.
FAILURE POINTS
1) 101st failing to seize the Zon bridge.
They never planned a coup de main, attacking from one end. The 101st failed to seize the Zon bridge, taking 4 hours to travel 2 km to the bridge. If they moved to the bridge immediately they would have taken it from one end. The Germans blew the bridge after 4 hours.
2) 82nd failing to seize the Nijmegen bridge.
The 82nd's plan was to seize this large bridge from one end, not using a coup de main from both ends. The 82nd failed to seize the largest bridge in Europe, being defended by 18 guards, as they were far too late reaching the bridge. Three stragglers from the 82nd actually captured one third of the 18 guards, then let them go when no US troops turned up. The 82nd were far too late in moving to the largely undefended bridge, allowing the 9th SS to motor in reinforcing the bridge. The 82nd's first attack on the bridge was approaching midnight.
SUCCESS POINTS
1) XXX Corps reached the Rhine, yards from their objective, Arnhem.
2) An 60 mile salient had been rammed into German lines on their border splitting German armies.
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@kennethrosequist8963
In Market Garden XXX Corps moved at night.
Intelligence never revealed that the Germans had reinforced between Eindhoven and the Belgian border. Yet they brushed them aside within 24 hours, as the US official history states with remarkable progress. Being wise in hindsight, if the 101st had moved down from Eindhoven the Germans would have moved out quicker.
XXX Corps arrived at Zon seeing the bridge blown up at 1800hrs on d-day plus 1. With a Bailey Bridge ready to run over. This set them back 12 hours.
After erecting the Bailey bridge overnight, XXX Corps arrived at Nijmegen at around 0830hrs the next morning, d-day plus 2. Well on schedule, after covering the 20 miles in 2.75 hours. Instead of speeding over the Nijmegen bridge to Anhem, they found the Germans still occupying the bridge, with fighting going on in the town. An additional 36 hour delay as XXX Corps had to secure the crossing themselves, meant a bridgehead over the Rhine was precluded.
If the 101st had seized the Zon bridge and the 82nd the Nijmegen bridge, XXX Corps would have reached Arnhem on late evening on d-day plus 1. If the Nijmegen bridge was taken on d-day, even if the 101st failed to seize the Zon bridge, XXX Corps would have been in Arnhem on the afternoon of d-day plus 2.
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Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Eisenhower approved, under-resourcing the operation. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, who were the prime planners, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed. The Market part was planned by mainly Americans while Garden mainly the British. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who:
▪ Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practised and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
▪ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
▪ Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused;
▪ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
▪ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here by agreeing;
▪ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, yet rarely seen at Market Garden;
▪ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak".
The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.
The 101st failed to seize the bridge at Zon, taking around four hours to travel only a few km. This set the operation back around 12 hours as XXX Corps had to run over a Bailey bridge, in this 12 hour window the Germans were running in reinforcements from Eindhoven to Arnhem. Despite the setback at Zon, if the Nijmegen bridge was seized the operation could still succeed. The 82nd failed to seize the bridge at Nijmegen setting the operation back a further 36 hours, with the Germans given an even longer time window to pour in reinforcements. The time delay was too great to form a bridgehead over the Rhine.
General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgment or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives.
Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges. They arrived at 2200, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, five hours after the jump. The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800. An easy taking of the bridge had now passed.
XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 7 miles to go to Arnhem. Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men at the edge of the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself.
XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges themselves and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men in clearing the town. What you see in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge. If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corp's Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge. The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
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@kenmazoch8499
The state of play on the 17th, d-day, was that the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was clear. There was concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally. There were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen. Then a few scattered about along the road. There was no armour in Arnhem. That was it. If the bridges are secured by paras forming an airborne carpet then just a cruise up the road.
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 3 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster, the 101st would have secured the bridge.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected.
XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, at the planned expected time, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over.
If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
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@kenmazoch8499
Eisenhower prioritized the northern thrust of his broad-front over other fronts and even seizing Antwerp and clearing the Schedlt. Clearing the Scheldt would take time as the German 15th SS army, highly experienced from the Russian front, under Hitler's orders had set up shop in the Scheldt not retreating back into Germany. All available supplies would be directed to this northern thrust.
"Since Eisenhower — the Supreme Commander and Ground Force Commander — approved the Arnhem operation rather than a push to clear the Scheldt, then surely he was right, as well as noble, to accept the responsibility and any resulting blame? The choice in early September was the Rhine or Antwerp: to continue the pursuit or secure the necessary facilities to solve the logistical problem? The decision was made to go for the Rhine, and that decision was Eisenhower’s."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Eisenhower's decision was the correct choice.
"On 4 Sept, the day Antwerp fell, Eisenhower issued another directive, ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes — 21st Army Group and two corps of the US First Army — to take Antwerp, reach the Rhine and seize the Ruhr"
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Eisenhower did not know Antwerp had fallen to British troops when he issued the northern thrust directive. Montgomery wanted a thrust up and over the Rhine prior to Eisenhower's directive, devising pursuit Operation Comet, multiple crossings of the Rhine, to be launched on 2 Sept, being cancelled due to German resistance and poor weather. Operation Comet was not presented to Eisenhower for his approval.
Montgomery asked Brereton, an American, of the First Allied Airborne Army, to drop into the Scheldt in early September - he refused.
Eisenhower's directive of 4 Sept had divisions of the US First Army and Montgomery's view of taking multiple bridges on the Rhine from Arnhem to Wesel. The British Second Army needed some divisions of Hodges' US First Army and the First Allied Airborne Army (which Monty semi controlled anyhow). Hodges' would protect the right flank. the Canadians would protect the left flank from the German 15th army.
"the narrow thrust was reduced to the Second Army and two US corps, the XIX and VII of Hodges’ First Army, a total of around eighteen Allied divisions"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
The northern thrust was to chase a disorganized retreating enemy preventing them from manning the German West Wall, gaining a footing over the Rhine, consolidating and then clearing the Scheldt to open up the port of Antwerp. A sound concept which even the German generals agreed would have worked.
"Perhaps not more then, but that much alone would have been very useful — and much more than was actually achieved. This view was confirmed after the war in interviews with the senior surviving German commanders, von Rundstedt, Student, Blumentritt and Rommel’s former chief of staff, General Speidel. They were unanimous in declaring that a full-blooded thrust from Belgium in September would have succeeded in crossing the Rhine and might have ended the war in 1944, since they had no means of stopping such a thrust reaching the Ruhr. In the event, largely due to the faulty command set-up [by Eisenhower] and lack of grip, even a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter was still a dream in 1944."
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Eisenhower’s reply of 5 September to Montgomery deserves analysis, not least the part that concerns logistics. The interesting point is that Eisenhower apparently believes that it is possible to cross the Rhine and take both the Ruhr and the Saar — and open the Scheldt — using the existing logistical resources."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Eisenhower. He had now heard from both his Army Group commanders — or Commanders-in-Chief as they were currently called — and reached the conclusion that they were both right; that it was possible to achieve everything, even with lengthening supply lines and without Antwerp. In thinking this Ike was wrong."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Post-Normandy Bradley seemed unable to control Patton, who persistently flouted Eisenhower’s directives and went his own way, aided and abetted by Bradley. This part of their relationship quickly revealed itself in matters of supply, where Hodges, the commander of the US First Army, was continually starved of fuel and ammunition in order to keep Patton’s divisions rolling, even when Eisenhower’s strategy required First Army to play the major role in 12th Army Group’s activities."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Bradley was starving Hodges' First Army of supplies, against Eisenhower's orders, giving them to Patton who was running off into unimportant territory - again, and being bogged down - again. The resources starved First Army could not be a part of northern thrust as Bradley and Patton, against Eisenhower's orders, were syphoning off supplies destined for the First Army. This northern thrust over the Rhine, as Eisenhower envisaged, obviously would not work as he thought. A lesser operation was devised by Montgomery, Market Garden, eliminating the divisions of US First Army, with only ONE crossing of the Rhine. Market Garden would also eliminate V rocket launching sites, of which London wanted eliminating ASAP, giving a 60 mile long salient buffer between German forces and the important port of Antwerp. This would only have one corps above Eindhoven, a disgrace considering the forces in Europe at the time.
Eisenhower had no grasp of the situation as it was and no strong strategy to advance. Eisenhower should have fired Bradley and Patton for sabotaging the Northern Thrust operation.
Montgomery did not plan or was in involved in Market Garden's execution. Montgomery, after fixing the operations objectives with Eisenhower to the measly forces available, gave Market Garden planning to others, mainly USAAF generals, Brereton and Williams. General Brereton, who liked the plan, agreed to it with even direct input. Brereton ordered the drops will take place during the day with Brereton also overseeing the troop carrier and supply drops schedules. Williams forbid fighter-bombers to be used. A refusal by Brereton and the operation would never have gone ahead; he earlier rejected Montgomery's initial plan of a drop into the Scheldt at Walcheren Island.
"it was not until 9 October, more than a month after the fall of Antwerp, that General Eisenhower told Montgomery to devote his entire attention to the clearance of the Scheldt. By that time the Canadians had cleared, or were investing, many of the Channel ports"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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@kenmazoch8499
From 21st Army Group Orders:
Final point of PHASE I:
(f) The Div may conc SOUTH of EINDHOVEN in areas of the CL preparatory to further adv.
conc = concentration area:
Which is an area, usually in the theatre of operations, where troops are assembled before beginning, or continuing, active operations. It says: preparatory to further adv. adv = advance.
So, on phase 1 they were to concentrate South of Eindhoven before (preparatory) to advancing. That is clear. They were to stop overnight south of Eindhoven while the vehicle built up, before advancing in strength.
When concentrating, that is gathering all vehicles in one location. Vehicles will still be moving into this concentration location at 35 vehicles to every mile of the train at a hoped 10 mph. If the vehicles move at 10mph from the starting point, the lead vehicles should be south of Eindhoven in 1 hour. But the lead have to stop to concentrate. And 35 vehicles in each mile at a hoped 10 mph are pouring into the concentration location. It does not say how many vehicles have to be in the concentration area before moving off again. Vehicles will pouring into the concentration area overnight.
Now onto phase 2. Phase 2 clearly states that it will start at 1st light on D+1. It says:
PHASE II: (a) The Div will continue the adv
That is advance after phase 1 is concluded of course. To continue the advance you have to be stopped. Phase 1 concludes south of Eindhoven as the force concentrated overnight Clear. The document says a hoped 10 mih (10mph), but not for phase 1 as the forces are concentrated south of Eindhoven at end of phase 1. South of Eindhoven is approx 11 miles from the start point. It only expects 11 miles of advance in the first 5 hours, which is understandable as German forces formed a line in front of British forces at the northern British front on the Belgian/Dutch border.
So, on D-day XXX Corps have to get to Eindhoven which is 11 miles and depending on tactic conditions it is hoped they will move at 10 mph when moving north out of Eindhoven. Scouts will run ahead to meet up with the 101st men.
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@kenmazoch8499 wrote:
"he told a much different story of the drive up "hell's highway"
The Germans only reached and attacked the road after XXX Corps had started to run up it, and were still pouring vehicles up the road.
XXX Corps had to clear the Germans out of Nijmegen because Gavin gave them the town and bridge by pulling all his troops out completely.
Second Army now had three corps along the Meuse-Escaut Canal, but VIII Corps on the right was not yet ready to attack and XII Corps on the left was facing a belt of difficult, marshy country. Moreover, there were sufficient supplies forward to maintain a deep penetration only by XXX Corps.
- The Struggle for Europe by Chester Wilmot
Owing to the shortage of transport for troops and ammunition, XII Corps could secure only one small bridgehead beyond the Meuse-Escaut Canal before the 17th, and VIII Corps could not join the offensive until the 19th. Even then this corps had only two divisions, for the 51st Highland was grounded throughout the Arnhem operation so that its transport could be used to supply the forward troops. On the first two days of MARKET GARDEN Dempsey was able to employ offensively only three of the nine British divisions available, and, as already recorded, the actual break-out was made by two battalions advancing along one narrow road. This was the direct result of Eisenhower’s policy. If he had kept Patton halted on the Meuse, and had given full logistic support to Hodges and Dempsey after the capture of Brussels, the operations in Holland could have been an overwhelming triumph"
- The Struggle for Europe by Chester Wilmot
XII Corps and VIII Corps hardly got above Eindhoven.
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Timeline
Events on the 1st day - D day:
▪ "At 1328, the 665 men of US 82nd 1st Battalion began to fall from the sky." - R Poulussen, Lost at Nijmegen.
▪ "Forty minutes after the drop, around 1410, the 1st Battalion marched off towards their objective, De Ploeg, three miles away." - R Poulussen.
▪ "The 82nd were digging in and performing reconn in the area looking for 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald - Neillands, R. The Battle for the Rhine 1944.
▪ "Colonel Warren about 1830 sent into Nijmegen a patrol consisting of a rifle platoon and the battalion intelligence section. This patrol was to make an aggressive reconnaissance, investigate reports from Dutch civilians that only eighteen Germans guarded the big bridge"- US Official history, page 163.
▪ It was not until 1830hrs that he [Warren] was able to send a force into Nijmegen. This force was somewhat small, just one rifle platoon and an intelligence section with a radio — say forty men. - Neillands. The Battle for the Rhine 1944.
▪ The 82nd were dug in and preparing to defend their newly constructed regimental command post, which they established at 1825. Having dug in at De Ploeg, Warren's battalion wasn't prepared to move towards Nijmegen at all. - R Poulussen.
▪ Then Colonel Lindquist "was told by General Gavin, around 1900, to move into Nijmegen." - R Poulussen.
▪Warren sent a patrol of about 40 men to reconnoiter the bridge at 1830. Three strays from the patrol captured seven of the 18 guards and their 20mm cannon who were guarding the south end of the bridge, having to let them go as no reinforcements arrived. The 508th had actually captured the south end of the largely undefended bridge. The three scouts that reached the southern end of the Nijmegen bridge about an hour before the 9th SS arrived. Joe Atkins of the patrol said:
"at the bridge, only a few German soldiers were standing around a small artillery weapon... The Germans were so surprised; the six or seven defenders of the bridge gave up without resisting. We held the prisoners at the entrance to the bridge for about an hour. It began to get dark and none of our other troops showed up. We decided to pull away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack. The German prisoners asked to come with us, but we refused, having no way to guard them. As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge." - The 508th Connection by Zig Boroughs.
That was the 9th SS arriving at 1930.
▪ Unfortunately, the patrol's radio failed to function so that Colonel Warren was to get no word from the patrol until the next morning - US Official History, page 163.
▪ Once Lindquist told Lieutenant Colonel Warren [at 1900] that his Battalion was to move, Warren decided to visit the HQ of the Nijmegen Underground first - to see what info the underground had on the Germans at the Nijmegen bridge. - R Poulussen,
▪ "Although Company A reached the rendezvous point on time, Company B "got lost en route." After waiting until about 2000, Colonel Warren left a guide for Company B and moved through the darkness with Company A toward the edge of the city. Some seven hours after H-Hour, [2030] the first real move against the Nijmegen bridge began." - US Official History, page 163.
▪ As the scouts neared a traffic circle surrounding a landscaped circular park near the center of Nijmegen, the Keizer Karel Plein, from which a mall-like park led northeast toward the Nijmegen bridge, a burst of automatic weapons fire came from the circle. The time was about two hours before midnight. [2200 hrs] - US Official History, page 163.
D Day plus 1
▪ In the meantime Colonel Warren had tried to get a new attack moving toward the highway bridge; but this the Germans thwarted just before dawn with another sharp counterattack. - US Official History, page 165.
▪ "While the counterattack was in progress, General Gavin arrived at the battalion command post." "General Gavin directed that the battalion "withdraw from close proximity to the bridge and reorganize"." This was to mark the end of this particular attempt to take the Nijmegen bridge" - US Official History, page 165.
▪ "A new attack to gain the bridge grew out of an early morning conference between General Gavin and Colonel Lindquist." "At 0745 on 18 September, D plus 1, Company G under Capt. Frank J. Novak started toward the bridge." - US Official History, page 165.
▪ At around 1100, Warren was ordered to withdraw from Nijmegen completely. - R Poulussen.
▪ At 1400 on 18 September Colonel Mendez ordered Company G to withdraw from Nijmegen - US Official History, page 166.
"the chance for an easy, speedy capture of the Nijmegen bridge had passed. This was all the more lamentable because in Nijmegen during the afternoon the Germans had had nothing more than the same kind of "mostly low quality" troops encountered at most other places on D Day." - US Official History, page 164.
The 82nd completely withdrew from Nijmegen town, allowing the Germans to pour the 10th SS infantry, who come over on the ferry, south over the Nijmegen bridge to reinforce the town. This made matters worse when the 82nd and XXX Corps went into the town to clear them out.
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Subsequent books by US authors quoting men who were actually there are useful.
When Gavin found out the 508th were not moving, he was livid, expecting them to be moving on the bridge, if there was no opposition. The 508th did send a recon patrol. According to Phil Nordyke’s Put Us Down In Hell (2012) three lead scouts of the patrol of 40, were separated making it to the vicinity of south end of the road bridge approaches, not the main steel span. They captured seven of the 18 Germans guards also their 20mm artillery gun guarding the south end of the bridge. They waited about an hour for reinforcements that never arrived, having to withdraw then observed the 9th SS Panzer recon battalion arriving from Arnhem.
The three scouts that reached the southern end of the Nijmegen bridge about an hour before the 9th SS arrived. Joe Atkins in The 508th Connection (2013) said:
"at the bridge, only a few German soldiers were standing around a small artillery weapon... The Germans were so surprised; the six or seven defenders of the bridge gave up without resisting. We held the prisoners at the entrance to the bridge for about an hour. It began to get dark and none of our other troops showed up. We decided to pull away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack. The German prisoners asked to come with us, but we refused, having no way to guard them. As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge."
That was the 9th SS arriving after being gifted a generous time window by the 82nd to reinforce.
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XXX Corps were not slow. No British tanks stopped for tea time ignoring the bridges. XXX Corps had to secure two crossing for themselves, as two US para units failed.
The state of play on the 17th, d-day, was that the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was clear. There was concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally. There were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen, with a few scattered about along the road. There was no German armour in Arnhem. That was it. If the bridges are secured by paras forming an airborne carpet then just a cruise up the road.
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 3 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved, the 101st would have secured the bridge.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting a Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected.
XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, at the planned expected time, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over.
If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
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@uffa00001
Browning only found out that the bridge was not seized on the morning of d-day plus 1. He was very concerned ordering Gavin to take it ASAP. Gavin was about to launch another attack on the bridge, then Gavin said to Browning that he needed to take troops to the heights as Germans had been seen (and I suppose the mythical 1,000 tanks). Browning agreed, but Gavin took the lot.
Browning always said that the bridge and heights were of equal priority. Giving the bridge equal importance does not mean neglecting and de-prioritizing it.
Gavin took all his men out of Nijmegen. The 10th SS men, had arrived via the ferry. These poured them south over the bridge into the town, which previously only had easy non-combat troops there, who the 508th just walked through to the bridge. Three men of a 508 patrol even seized the guards on the south of the bridge. They let them go as no support turned up. The guards did not want to be set free wanting to go with the 508 men. That was the quality of the German troops there.
When XXX Corps turned up they had to clear stubborn Germans from the rubble in the town (US air force bombed it by mistake months earlier), which was not complete until after XXX Corps seized the bridge. This clearing of the town involved most of XXX Corps tanks, who were also using the 82nd men for support, with only five tanks available to cross the bridge and only form a bridgehead.
Gavin made a bad situation even worse by taking his men out of the town. Gavin was bad communicator. He _never- issued written orders to Lindquist, head of 508, to move immediately to the bridge, so he hung around DePloeg. He never verbally communicated effectively to Browning on the morning of d-day plus 1.
What Browning said...
"I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it
There is nothing there that de-prioritizes the bridge.
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Gavin told Lindquist to go to the bridge, "without delay". Gavin was clearly going for the bridge as a matter of urgency. The problem was the incompetent delay to move to the bridge - that is why the 82nd failed to seize the bridge. Gavin's command structure failed.
After receiving General Gavin's pre jump orders in regard to the Nijmegen bridge, Colonel Lindquist had earmarked Colonel Warren's battalion as one of two battalions from which he intended to choose one to move to the bridge, depending upon the developing situation. General Gavin's understanding, as recalled later, was that Warren's battalion was to move "without delay after landing." On the other hand, Colonel Lindquist's understanding, also as recalled later, was that no battalion was to go for the bridge until the regiment had secured its other objectives, that is to say, not until he had established defenses protecting his assigned portion of the high ground and the northern part of the division glider landing zone.
- US Official History
Prior to the Holland jump, I sat in a high-level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important.
After we were dropped in Holland, I went to the 508th Regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, “As soon as the DZ (drop zone) is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.”
..
I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his jeep, he told me to, “Come with me — let’s get him moving.” "On arriving at the 508th Regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, “I told you to move with speed.”
- by Chester E Graham, liaison officer between the 508th and the 82nd Division Headquarters.
As darkness approached, General Gavin ordered Colonel Lindquist "to delay not a second longer and get the bridge as quickly as possible with Warren's battalion."
- US Official History
"I personally directed Colonel Roy E. Lindquist, commanding the 508th Parachute Infantry," General Gavin recalled later, "to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen bridge without delay after landing
- US Official History
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@BaronsHistoryTimes
Frost's men prevented the Germans from using the bridge. No German troops crossed the bridge when Frost's men were there. The 9th SS recon returned from Nijmegen on the morning of d-day plus 1, to be shot up on the bridge by the First Airborne. Their shot up vehicles and bodies littered the bridge rendering it unusable. The Germans did manage to run a tank south over the bridge, escaping Frost's 6-pdrs, running over their own dead men.
On the evening of d-day plus 3, The Guards seized Nijmegen bridge, and then had to secure it by forming a northern perimeter. By the time the bridge was secured from German counter-attack (they always counter-attacked), it was running towards midnight, Frost's men had capitulated.
If the 82nd had seized Nijmegen bridge immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the southern end of Arnhem bridge on d-day plus 2 around midday. Frost's men were still on the northern end.
The 82nd jump at Nijmegen was unopposed. While other troops were securing the LZ, some of Col. Lindquist's men made their way towards the Nijmegen bridge immediately.
Instead of moving immediately toward the Nijmegen bridge, Colonel Warren's battalion was to take an "assigned initial objective" in the vicinity of DePloeg, a suburb of Nijmegen.
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then was to "be prepared to go into Nijmegen later." The assembly and movement to DePloeg took approximately three and a half hours.
- US Official History
Col. Warren, who was assigned the bridge, was to move when given orders by Lindquist. Gavin was expecting them to go directly to the bridge. He spent most of the time setting up shop in a hotel.
There was about 600 non-combat German troops in Nijmegen who were old men of a training unit and HQs. The HQs immediately started to move out when they knew paras had dropped. The road and railway bridges had no anti-tank ditches or barbed wire guarded by 18 men.
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@BaronsHistoryTimes
A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp and keeping it from German counter-attack - the logistics problem to supply all allied armies when they moved into Germany. It was:
1) Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or;
2) Take the Schedlt.
Eisenhower had a Northern Thrust strategy, moving north on his broad front. Taking Noord Babant fell in line with the desires for both SHEAF and Eisenhower.
Noord Brabant had to be taken before the Scheldt, as it was essential. It was taken with limited forces, with forces also sent to take the Schedlt. Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat or Northern Thrust strategy, actually being a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen needed to be under allied control. The low-lying lands, boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen with land strewn with rivers and canals, is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces and supply directly back to Germany in perfect position for a counter-attack.
Market Garden was the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans were in disarray, so should be easy enough to gain. Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine to fall in line with Eisenhower's priority Northern Thrust strategy at the time. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation. You needed Arnhem for an easier jump into Germany. Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all - that is, protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital, and was successfully seized. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans a few miles away and still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all.
SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view - they got Nijmegen.
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"About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping up well," that they could risk sending one battalion in a quick strike for the bridge. This was admittedly a minimum force, but if the Germans were not in strength at the bridge and if the expected counterattacks from the Reichswald could be held with a smaller force than originally deduced, the risk would be justified because of the nature of the prize. "I personally directed Colonel Roy E. Lindquist, commanding the 508th Parachute Infantry," General Gavin recalled later, "to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen bridge without delay
- US Official History page 158
The official history states that there was only 18 guards on the bridge. Colonel Warren's battalion of 665 men was assigned the bridge, The 508th regiment took three and half hours to reach DePloeg, less than 2 miles away.
Instead of moving immediately toward the Nijmegen bridge, Colonel Warren's battalion was to take an "assigned initial objective" in the vicinity of DePloeg
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then was to "be prepared to go into Nijmegen later." The assembly and movement to DePloeg took approximately three and a half hours.
- US Official History
Col. Warren, who was assigned the bridge, was to move when given orders, spent most of the time setting up shop at DePloeg.
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Dave M A C wrote:
"Field Order No.1 for the 508th PIR, and reproduced in the appendix of his book, was 'the' plan for the Nijmegen operation. My problem is that Field Order No.1 was signed by "LINDQUIST Commanding" and not by Gavin. It was Lindquist's detailed plan for his subordinate battalion commanders to occupy their initial objectives."
So, Field Order No.1, date 13 Sept, was a 508 regiment order from Lindquist to his unit, not a Division Order by Gavin?
If so:
▪Lindquists only orders from Gavin were verbal at the pre-briefing in England, 48 hours before the jump on the 17th.
▪In that meeting it was clear, by two witnesses, that Lindquist was told to go for the bridge after securing the Grosbeak heights.
▪The heights are on the way to the bridge from the DZ.
▪Lindquists advance scouts relayed back to the 508th as they were slowly marching to Groesbeek, that the heights were clear of the enemy.
▪Lindquist was assured by Dutch Resistance men that the town was mainly clear with 19 guards on the bridge.
▪ A patrol was sent to the bridge to confirm what the Dutch Resistance said.
▪Lindquist could send men to take the bridge immediately, while others set up shop at De Ploeg near the heights.
Dave M A C wrote:
"Field Order No.1 for the 508th PIR, and reproduced in the appendix of his book, was 'the' plan for the Nijmegen operation.
This Order was written by Lindquist. Gavin must have read it as it was distributed to the 82nd A/B Div. He must have approved of it, not needing for him to add anything further in writing to Lindquist. Gavin must have thought Lindquist had covered all the bases.
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@trickylifts
Add to your reading list:
1) Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment In World War II by Phil Nordyke.
2) Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergström
3) Market Garden, Then and Now by Karl Magry.
Yes, one of these apologist, shift the blame US views, that Nijmegen was heavily manned and even if the 82nd had moved to the bridge immediately in force, instead of 8 hours late, they could not have taken the bridge. Facts say otherwise. The American post war version of events is one that attempts to whitewash their failure at Nijmegen, to capture the bridge on the first day. The film A bridge Too Far, made when Browning had already died, only cemented the false narrative in the minds of the public. Since then many researchers have uncovered the real facts.
"I knew all of the division staff and the other regimental commanders, and was included in the planning of operations and briefings. I was ‘bigoted.’ [This is a WWII military term for being read into/briefed on missions.]
Prior to the Holland jump, I sat in a high-level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important.
After we were dropped in Holland, I went to the 508th Regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, “As soon as the DZ (drop zone) is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.” So I went cross-country through Indian country [slang military term for enemy territory] to the Division CP and relayed Lindquist’s message to Gavin.
I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his jeep, he told me to, “Come with me — let’s get him moving.” "On arriving at the 508th Regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, “I told you to move with speed.”
- by Chester E Graham, liaison officer between the 508th and the 82nd Division Headquarters.
The 508th did launch some patrols into Nijmegen. A patrol from the 3rd Battalion almost reached the bridge - but only after being delayed by the enemy with the bridge being reinforced in company strength by the time they reached it.
Warren's 1st Bn had launched a patrol or two patrols, yes, just patrols. Nordyke relates two version from Warren and his exec' officer. It, or they, were led by the Bn S-2 Intelligence Section, followed and joined by Lt. Weaver's 3rd Platoon of the Bn reserve C Company, plus two squads from the HQ Company LMG Platoon and C Company's SCR-300 radio set and operator, for communication back to the Battalion. Weaver's patrol met enemy resistance, then withdrawing when they heard the Bn were sending A and B Companies to take the bridge. They only came because of Gavin intervened, running livid to Lindquist's CP in a Jeep, screaming at him to get moving when he found, after many hours, out he was not moving to the bridge.
Bergström states that three of the S-2 Section patrol, got separated reaching the bridge. They managed to capture six or seven German troops and a small artillery weapon. They waited an hour until dark at around 7:30 pm, withdrawing. They could hear heavy equipment approaching from Arnhem, being the SS-Panzer Recon Battalion 9, who just just missed Frost's men at Arnhem bridge at 7pm. Bergström's source is Demolition Platoon, 508th by Zig Burroughs.
This contrasts sharply by Frost's progress in Arnhem, where his whole battalion followed A Company moved away from the Germans, through people's houses, over walls, and back yards, carrying all their equipment, by-passing German positions, reaching the Arnhem bridge. The British First Airborne landed half an hours after the 508. They have an extra 4 or 5 miles march, met more resistance, yet reached the Arnhem bridge before the US paras reached the Nijmegen bridge.
Whether there was 19 or 11 guards on the Nijmegen bridge, could have been 11 or 19, is neither here or there.
Gavin obtained promotion 505th PIR command to Assistant Divisional commander for Normandy, being promoted again to Divisional commander for Holland. Gavin inherited Lindquist as commander of the 508th, who were the least experienced regiment in the division. Yet gave the least experienced regiment the prime task. Gavin says that in England he told Lindquist to go for the bridge "without delay." Lindquist denied Gavin said this.
Gavin chose the most experienced regiment, the 504th, who had just returned from Anzio, to secure the Grave bridge, because it was on the Division's supply line. Without the Grave bridge secured, the 82nd would be in serious trouble. The next most experienced regiment, was Gavin's old unit the 505th. He gave them the defensive task of securing the landing zones from counter-attack from the Reichswald.
The intelligence picture by SHAEF, on 16 September, suspected II.SS-Panzerkorps was drawing new tanks from a depot in the Kleve area of Germany. Gavin had this mythical 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald, so he gave the less experienced 508th the task of securing Nijmegen and its bridges. This was a unit, better suited to the defensive role. The 508th, and Lindquist, were well dug-in on the Groesbeek ridge when Gavin was informed they were not moving on the bridges in Nijmegen. They were not following Gavin's divisional plan, Lindquist was waiting for an order from the division HQ before moving into Nijmegen. This was a clear command failure between Gavin and Lindquist.
When Ridgway was promoted to command XVIII Airborne Corps with Gavin moving up to command 82nd Division, Gavin's old position of assistant Divisional commander was left vacant. During Market Garden he was doing two jobs. Ridgway had no role to play in Market Garden as his two divisions of XVIII Corps were attached to the British First Airborne Corps for the operation, under Browning.
Ridgway paid a visit to Gavin's CP to see why they had not secured the bridge, when XXX Corps made contact with the Division. Gavin entered to find Ridgway in the CP studying a map. Gavin ignored him and immediately left without even acknowledging Ridgway's presence. If Ridgway was still divisional commander for Market Garden operation, the 82nd would have secured the bridge immediately.
There was no German combat troops in Nijmegen on the jump day. None. That is a fact. The low grade aged troops were scared stiff of meeting well armed aggressive paras. The German HQs moved out immediately. Regarding Harmel, when interviewed by Kershaw in the 1970s, he said there was no German armour between the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridge when XXX corps secured the Nijmegen bridge. This was incorrect as German records show German tanks, inc' Tigers, were already crossing south on the Arnhem bridge to form a line at Elst - the British First had capitulated on the Arnhem bridge running out of ammunition, at the same time XXX Corps crossed the Nijmegen bridge. Harmel never knew this, as communications was skant in a fluid situation.
After the event, the last thing the Germans were thinking of was, where, what and what time, as they saw the allies in a few days had punched a 60 mile salient right into their lines on the German border, taking the largest road bridge in Europe at the time. Was there to be a massive push immediately by the allies using the feared Jabos? German minds were elsewhere, not on the details of a bridge secured by the allies and one they failed to secure.
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@trickylifts
The prime planners, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF who:
♦ Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practised and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
♦ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
♦ Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused;
♦ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
♦ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here by agreeing;
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, yet rarely seen at Market Garden;
♦ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Zon, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak".
The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.
General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges.There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. In short, so lightly defended they were undefended.
Gavin sent only two companies of the 508th seven hours after they had landed to capture the road bridge. They arrived at 2200hr, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 old non-combat men - a training unit. Men scared stiff of meeting, hard, experienced, well trained paras.
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Market Garden failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. The failure point was not moving to seize the Nijmegen bridge immediately. At the end of D-Day all crossings were denied to the Germans, except two - the Nijmegen bridge and Zon bridge. General Gavin of the US 82nd was supposed to get to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as landing. Gavin never, he failed with only a few German guards on the bridge. He failed because his 82nd did not seize the Nijmegen bridge immediately.
Gavin even de-prioritised the bridge, the prime target and focus. The 82nd were ready at 2 pm on the jump day not moving to the bridge. The gigantic bridge was guarded by only 18 guards. The Germans occupied the bridge at 1900 hrs. Six hours after the 82nd were ready to march. The 82nd's first attack on the bridge was at 2200 hrs, eight hours after being ready to march.
Events on the 1st day:
♦ "At 1328, the 665 men of US 82nd 1st Battalion began to fall from the sky."
- Poulussen, R. Lost at Nijmegen.
♦ "Forty minutes after the drop, around 1410, the 1st Battalion marched off towards their objective, De Ploeg, three miles away."
-Poulussen,
♦ "The 82nd were digging in and performing reconnin the area looking for 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald
- Neillands, R. The Battle for the Rhine 1944.
♦ The 82nd were dug in and preparing to defend their newly constructed regimental command post, which they established at 1825. Then Colonel Lindquist "was told by General Gavin, around 1900, to move into Nijmegen."
-Poulussen
Events on the evening of the 1st day:
♦ Having dug in at De Ploeg, Warren's battalion wasn't prepared to move towards Nijmegen at all.
- Poulussen,
♦ Once Lindquist told Lieutenant Colonel Warren that his Battalion was to move, Warren decided to visit the HQ of the Nijmegen Underground first - to see what info the underground had on the Germans at the Nijmegen bridge.
- Poulussen,
♦ It was not until 1830hrs that he [Warren] was able to send a force into Nijmegen. This force was somewhat small, just one rifle platoon and an intelligence section with a radio — say forty men.
- Neillands. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
♦ This was not a direct route to the bridge from Warren's original position, and placed him in the middle of the town. It was also around 2100 when "A" Company left to attempt to capture the Nijmegen road bridge.
♦ As the scouts neared a traffic circle surrounding a landscaped circular park near the center of Nijmegen, the Keizer Karel Plein, from which a mall-like park led northeast toward the Nijmegen bridge, a burst of automatic weapons fire came from the circle. The time was about two hours before midnight. (2200 hrs)
- US Official History, Siegfried Line Campaign.
♦ The 82nd attacks were resisted by the Germans until the next day.
Events of the 2nd day:
♦ Gavin drove up in a jeep the next morning and was told by Warren that although they didn't have the bridge yet, another attack was about to go in.
♦ Gavin then told Warren to hold because the Germans were attacking in the southeast portion of the 82nd perimeter.
♦ At around 1100, Warren was ordered to withdraw from Nijmegen completely.
- Poulussen
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@trickylifts wrote:
"So again, Harmel and Kershaw were correct: there was a period of up to c.17 hours where XXX Corps with 82AD grunts had a very good chance of taking Elst, pressed right up near Arnhem."
Complete nonsense! More apologist deflect blame from the 82nd. Three Tiger tanks, one heavy gun and two companies of infantry were heading south over the Arnhem bridge to Lent as the Guards tanks crossed the Nijmegen bridge. Do you understand that? Stated in:
♦ Operation Market Garden then and Now, Volume 2, Allies Capture Nijmegen bridge by Karel Margry
♦ Nijmegen: U.S. 82nd Airborne Division – 1944, chapter nine, by Tim Saunders
At nightfall on D plus 3, the British had at Nijmegen only the Guards Armoured Division. Because inclement weather continued to deny arrival of the 82d Airborne Division's glider infantry, the Guards Armoured's Coldstream Guards Group still was needed as a reserve for the [82nd] airborne division. This left but two armored groups to go across the Waal. Even these did not make it until the next day (D plus 4, 21 September), primarily because of die-hard German defenders who had to be ferreted from the superstructure and underpinnings of the bridge.
- US Official history
For all the concern that must have existed about getting to Arnhem, only a small part of the British armor was freed late on D plus 4, 21 September, to start the northward drive. As the attack began, British commanders saw every apprehension confirmed. The ground off the main roads was low-lying, soggy bottomland, denying employment of tanks. A few determined enemy bolstered with antitank guns might delay even a large force. Contrary to the information that had been received, Colonel Frost and his men had been driven away from the north end of the Arnhem bridge the afternoon before, so that since the preceding night the bridge had been open to German traffic.
- US Official History
The German traffic was tanks. Read my posts above. After 2 days fighting, split up, spread out and disjointed, assisting the 82nd, the Guards Armored Division had to regroup, re-arm, re-fuel and give the crews some sleep. It was simply not possible for them to have moved onto Arnhem that night, even if they had wanted to. If a few of them foolishly did move up the road to Arnhem, they would have found the Arnhem bridge in German hands being blocked by Tiger tanks, which would have made them scrap metal on the raised roads.
The task the five tanks that crossed the bridge were given, was to defend the bridge and consolidate against enemy attacks. There was not a 'whole corps' of tanks ready to go. Two of the tanks were hit with one having men killed. Carington's tank was a radio relay, that stood at the northern end of the bridge as a radio link back to Horrocks from the leading tanks at Lent. It was under attack.
Do not get your history from Hollywood. And stop making things up. The reason for not gaining a foothold over the Rhine was that two US para units failed to seize their bridges on d-day.
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@trickylifts
More ad hom attacks, showing that you clearly lost it. You keep saying black is white, even when faced with facts. Burriss was a liar! The embarrassment of failing to seize the Nijmegen bridge has put Americans on a divert blame/lying game since 1945. This vid shows just some of it.
The 82nd had little part in the eventual seizure of the Nijmegen bridge at all, as it was taken in the dark by the British XXX Corps' Guards tanks and infantry. The film A Bridge Too Far has Robert Redford as one of the 82nd men taking the vital road bridge after rowing the river in canvas boats. This never happened. Another part of the film has Redford insisting to a British commander of the British XXX Corps tanks, after the tanks crossed the bridge, to run onto Arnhem and relieve the British paratroopers with the commander refusing, leaving his tanks idle. The reality is very different..
Moffat Burriss of the 82nd, on film stated he ordered the tank captain to run his tanks to Arnhem, saying on film, "I just sacrificed half of my company capturing that bridge". Twenty per cent of the men in the boats were British Sappers. The tank officer was Capt (Lord) Carington, who eventually became head of NATO. Moffatt Burris stated: “I cocked my tommy gun, pointed it at his head and said, ‘Get down that blankety-blank road before I blow your blankety-blank head off." Carington explained politely that Captain Burriss surely didn’t expect him to obey orders of a foreign officer, but then, Burris says, Carington “ducked into his tank and locked the hatch” so, as Burriss recalls, “I couldn’t get at him.”
There is no record of this event occurring and there were many men around, implying Burriss is lying. The tanks were to secure the north end of the bridge after seizing the bridge, not to run off to Arnhem in the dark leaving the bridge vulnerable to counter-attack. Captain Lord Carrington's own autobiography entitled 'Reflect on Things Past':
"My recollection of this meeting is different. Certainly I met an American officer but he was perfectly affable and agreeable. As I said the Airborne were all very glad to see us and get some support, no one suggested we press on to Arnhem. This whole allegation is bizarre, just to begin with I was a captain and second-in-command of my squadron so I was in no position either to take orders from another captain or depart from my own orders which were to take my tanks across the bridge, join up with the US Airborne and form a bridgehead. This story is simple lunacy and this exchange did not take place."
At that stage my job - I was second-in-command of a squadron - was to take a half-squadron of tanks across the bridge. Since everybody supposed the Germans would blow this immense contraption we were to be accompanied by an intrepid Royal Engineer officer to cut the wires and cleanse the demolition chambers under each span. Our little force was led by an excellent Grenadier, Sergeant Robinson, who was rightly awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his action. Two of our tanks were hit not lethally - by anti-tank fire, and we found a number of Germans perched in the girders who tried to drop things on us but without great effect. Sergeant Robinson and the leading tank troop sprayed the opposite bank and we lost nobody, When I arrived at the far end my sense of relief was considerable: the bridge had not been blown, we had not been plunged into the Waal. In fact it seems the Germans never intended to blow the bridge. The demolition chambers were packed with German soldiers, who surrendered. We seemed to have silenced the opposition in the vicinity, we were across one half of the Rhine.
A film representation of this incident has shown American troops as having already secured the far end of the bridge. That is mistaken - probably the error arose from the film-maker's confusion of two bridges, there was a railway bridge with planks placed between the rails and used by the Germans for [light] road traffic, to the west of the main road bridge we crossed; and the gallant American Airborne men reached it. When Sergeant Robinson and his little command crossed our main road bridge, however, only Germans were there to welcome him; and they didn't stay."
Sergeant Peter Robinson, of the of the Guards Armored Division who led the charge over the Nijmegen road bridge in his Firefly tank stated:
"The Nijmegen bridge wasn’t taken [by the 82nd] which was our objective. We reached the far end of the bridge and immediately there was a roadblock. So the troop sergeant covered me through and then I got to the other side and covered the rest of the troop through. We were still being engaged; there was a gun in front of the church three or four hundred yards in front of us. We knocked him out. We got down the road to the railway bridge; we cruised round there very steady. We were being engaged all the time. Just as I got round the corner and turned right I saw these helmets duck in a ditch and run, and gave them a burst of machine gun fire. I suddenly realised they were Americans. They had already thrown a gammon grenade at me so dust and dirt and smoke were flying everywhere. They jumped out of the ditch; they kissed the tank; they kissed the guns because they’d lost a lot of men. They had had a very bad crossing.
Well, my orders were to collect the American colonel who was in a house a little way back, and the first thing he said to me was "I have to surrender." Well I said, 'I'm sorry. My orders are to hold this bridge. I've only got two tanks available but if you'd like to give me ground support for a little while until we get some more orders then we can do it. He said he couldn’t do it, so I said that he had better come back to my wireless and talk to General Horrocks because before I started the job I had freedom of the air. Everybody was off the air except myself because they wanted a running commentary about what was going on - So he came over and had a pow-wow with Horrocks. The colonel said 'Oh very well’ and I told him where I wanted the men, but of course you can't consolidate a Yank and they hadn’t been there ten minutes before they were on their way again."
The 82nd men wanted to surrender! Even though they met the British tanks. And never gave support which was what they were there to do.
The first meeting of the 82nd men (the 2nd wave) and the tanks was 1 km north of the bridge at the village of Lent where the railway embankment from the railway bridge met the north running road running off the main road bridge. The 1st wave of the 82nd men (Burriss) did not reach the north end of the actual road bridge's approach road until 45 minutes after Robinson's tank rolled over, taking out an 88mm gun on the move. The Guards tanks and infantry got there first from the south. Burriss met Carrington's lone tank which came under fire, acting as a radio relay back to Horrocks from the tanks at Lent.
Now you know.
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SHAEF tended to focus on the strategic side of the armies. A prime problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp - the logistics issue.
It was:
1) Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or;
2) Take the Schedlt.
Noord Branant had to be taken first, as it was essential. It was, with limited forces also sent to start the taking of the Schedlt.
Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat, actually being a success.
To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, you needed to control everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen. The low-lying lands and boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen make a perfect geographical feature to stop behind and prepare a defence of Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp. The Germans were actually directing artillery at Antwerp.
Market Garden was the offensive launched to solve the Antwerp problem, in keeping the Germans away - it made sense as the Germans were is disarray. Monty’s decision to push on to Arnhem may have been one last attempt at his single front northern thrust argument, and making complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation.
You only needed Arnhem if you wanted to springboard into Germany, but you needed everything up to Nijmegen if you wanted to do anything at all. Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital and accomplished.
Fighting in the low lying mud, canals & waterways and raised roads of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans are still holding Noord Brabant, made no sense at all.
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@Gearparadummies
Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Eisenhower approved, under resourcing the operation. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed. The Market part was planned by mainly Americans while Garden mainly the British. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who:
♦ Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practised and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
♦ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
♦ Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused;
♦ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
♦ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here by agreeing;
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, yet rarely seen at Market Garden;
♦ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak". The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.
General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgement or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives.
Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges. They arrived at 2200, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, five hours after the jump. The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800. An easy taking of the bridge had now passed.
XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 7 miles to go to Arnhem. Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men at the edge of the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself.
XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges themselves and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men in clearing the town, seizing the bridge themselves. What you see in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge. If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corp's Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge. The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin.
Even the US Official War record confirms this. Charles B. MacDonald wrote the US Official history on Market Garden: https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_19.htm The Market part of Market Garden failed. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
"it was not until 9 October, more than a month after the fall of Antwerp, that General Eisenhower told Montgomery to devote his entire attention to the clearance of the Scheldt. By that time Monty had the Canadians cleared it, or were investing in many of the Channel ports"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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@johnlucas8479
For many years you have attempted to say black is white. It has been explained to you in great detail. But the same infactual dross comes back. Then you have been demolished each time, by many people. Each time, like Rambo, you come back with the same dross.
What you are stating is that the bridge was so heavily defended the well trained, with some well experienced, 82nd had no chance of seizing it anyhow.
Again...
The 82nd held overnight the southern approaches with a small scratch team. Henke's old men and the 9th SS were in attendance. The 82nd never made an attack on the bridge, obviously waiting for reinforcements and daylight. Then Gavin ordered them out of the town, and away from the bridge, with them even having a foothold on the circle at the beginning of the southern approach road, despite turning up 7.5 hours late.
If the 82nd had held onto the southern approaches, when XXX Corps arrived, XXX Corps would have taken the whole bridge in a matter of hours. Not 36. Then XXX Corps would have reached the 1st Airborne at Arnhem. Operation a success.
Again...
German amour only was between the bridges after Frost's men capitulated when running out of ammo. That was simultaneously with XXX Corps seizing Nijmegen bridge. The German arrnour ran south over the Anhem bridge to Elst. When XXX Corps' armour ran over the Nijmegen bridge German armour was now between them and Arnhem bridge, which was not there 36 hours earlier.
XXX Corps were delayed 42 hours because two USA para units failed to seize their bridges, with XXX Corps having to secure the crossings themselves. If only one USA unit failed, a bridgehead over the Rhine would have been established. Two failing? No bridgehead. Total failure on the USA contingent.
Stop telling fibs!
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The state of play on the 17th was that the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was clear. There was concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally. There were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen. Then a few scattered about along the road. There was no armour in Arnhem. That was it.
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 3 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured the bridge.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected.
XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, at the planned expected time, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over.
If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
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@johnlucas8479
Firstly, XXX Corps were to move at night. Secondly, you need to do some easy sums.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. This was after a 10-12 hour delay to erect a Bailey bridge. The road was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter, which the two para units failed to close.
XXX Corps planned to muster all the vehicles south of Eindhoven overnight, with vehicles coming during the night.
Once XXX Corps heard that the Zon bridge was down, they slowed as the urgency had gone out of the operation.
Thirdly, XXX Corps reached the Rhine. They pulled back from the riverbanks for safety reason being away from German cannon fire on the north bank.
If the Zon bridge had not delayed XXX Corps 10-12 hours, XXX Corps would have set off at first light d-day plus 1.
Fourthly, XXX Corps were to move at night.
XXX Corps met up with the 82nd on d-day plus 2 at approx 8 am. Deduct 12 hours, that gives you 8 pm on d-day plus 1. As the urgency of XXX Corps diminished after hearing of the Zon bridge being blown more like reaching Nijmegen at around 6 pm on d-day plus 1, with 7 miles to go to Arnhem on a fully empty road with some Germans near south end of Arnhem bridge.
So, if the two US para units had taken their respective bridges, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on D-day plus 1 late in the evening.
That is simple to figure out. So, stop making things up to exonerate the two US para units from blame. Both screwed up big time.
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@gerhardris
What US historian Harry Yeide wrote of what the Germans thought of Patton:
◾ for most of the war the Germans barely took notice [of Patton].
◾ on March 23 at the Battle of El Guettar—the first American victory against the experienced Germans. Patton’s momentum, however, was short-lived: Axis troops held him to virtually no gain until April 7, when they withdrew under threat from British Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army.
◾ There is no indication in the surviving German military records—which include intelligence reports at the theater, army, and division levels—that Patton’s enemies had any idea who he was at the time. Likewise, the immediate postwar accounts of the German commanders in Tunisia, written for the U.S. Army’s History Division, ignore Patton. Those reports show that ground commanders considered II Corps’s attacks under Patton to have been hesitant, and to have missed great opportunities.
◾ In mid-June [1943], another detachment report described Patton as “an energetic and responsibility-loving command personality”—a passing comment on one of the numerous Allied commanders. Patton simply had not yet done anything particularly noteworthy in their eyes.
◾ But his race to Palermo through country they had already abandoned left the commanders unimpressed. Major General Eberhard Rodt, who led the 15th Panzergrenadier Division against Patton’s troops during the Allied push toward Messina, thought the American Seventh Army fought hesitantly and predictably. He wrote in an immediate postwar report on Sicily, “The enemy very often conducted his movements systematically, and only attacked after a heavy artillery preparation when he believed he had broken our resistance. This kept him regularly from exploiting the weakness of our situation and gave me the opportunity to consolidate dangerous situations.” Once again, Patton finished a campaign without impressing his opponents.
◾ General Hermann Balck, who took command of Army Group G in September, thus did not think highly of Patton—or any other opposing commanders—during this time. Balck wrote to his commander, Runstedt, on October 10, “I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again…can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans” Looking back on his battles against Patton throughout the autumn, in 1979 Balck recalled, “Within my zone, the Americans never once exploited a success. Often [General Friedrich Wilhelm von] Mellenthin, my chief of staff, and I would stand in front of the map and say, ‘Patton is helping us; he failed to exploit another success.’”
◾ The commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, Hasso von Manteuffel, aimed a dismissive, indirect critique at Patton’s efforts at Bastogne, writing in his memoirs that the Americans did not “strike with full élan.” The commanders who fought against Patton in his last two mobile campaigns in the Saar-Palatinate and east of the Rhine already knew they could not win; their losses from this point forward were inevitable, regardless of the commanding Allied opponent.
◾ the Germans offered Patton faint praise during and immediately after the war.
◾ posterity deserves fact and not myth. The Germans did not track Patton’s movements as the key to Allied intentions. Hitler does not appear to have thought often of Patton, if at all. The Germans considered Patton a hesitant commanding general in the scrum of position warfare. They never raised his name in the context of worthy strategists.
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@gerhardris
A lacklustre US general named Patton in Sicily became infamous for hitting two sick men in hospital beds. So the US public knew his 'name'. Top US generals were of film star status in the USA at the time.
In Normandy nothing much was happening as the allied forces stayed pretty static, with the British drawing onto themselves German armour to grind it up, while keeping it away from the US forces. The British destroyed 90% of German armour in the west. The US media needed a hero and movement as that creates good stories to sell newspapers and newsreels.
Patton was late into Normandy. He was first to breakout after Cobra, of which he had no part in Cobra, after the US First Army did the work, so the US media hailed him as some sort of armoured warfare genius as territory was being gained after many weeks of no movement. As we know the British enabled the breakout, as part of Monty's plan, but that is not how the US media portrayed it.
They now had movement and a name, which people knew, to hang it on. It was easy to laud this man as he accommodated the media gladly, looking after them. Bradley criticized Patton for having teams of cameramen following him, of which he encouraged, of which Cornelius Ryan was one.
So the US media had a hero - a goodie. The hero in typical Hollywood fashion could only be seen to be doing good. He even wore cowboy guns and a chrome tin hat to fill the hero role, so the visuals were good. They also needed a 'baddie', so they made one up as well. The evil Monty. Everything fell into place. The US media had all the ingredients they wanted and some they made up. Anything bad about the goodie was spun the other way.
The leading US media hero who happened to be in a position in Monty's plan to gain ground was kept a hero come what may. It was all of the goodies doing, not Monty's. No other US general did anything of note, so Patton stayed the hero, even though he failed to breach the Westwall, suffering horrendous casualties against 2nd to 3rd rate German opposition. Patton also moved only 10 miles in three months at Metz. But he took north east France in a matter of days - the fact no Germans were there was not emphasized and it was more a triumphal procession than a military advance. When facing German opposition at the German border matters were different.
Patton was wayward in Sicily slowing down the operation, so Monty thought how do I play to this guys ego, which was allowing him to get to Messina first. He was too slow reaching Bastogne, not relieving the 18,000 men inside - even the US 101st commander inside, McAuliffe, said so. He apologized to Eisenhower for being too slow. But Patton was fast and relieved them according to the US media.
OK, in wartime for home propaganda and morale purposes a hero was created. A government does not like its people to know it was telling them lies and never admits to doing so staying quiet. The British spun it so a few Oxbridge RAF pilots won the Battle of Britain with it being a close thing. Backs to the wall and all. The reality was what they spun was wrong on both counts. So post war the governments just forget it.
The people post war still believe the war propaganda angle spun to them. The film industry and book publishers saw there was money to be made in WW2, so they pick up the propaganda then run with it. The US people were led to believe they won the war, well without them the Axis would have won. And also they supplied most of it. Which is all false. All totally wrong but telling them what they want to believe, and believed since children, sells.
So we are in a situation where a few historians are actually stating history as it was by looking at archives and actual accounts. They do not make much money though. If you are a writer, then the huge US market is where the money is. Exaggerating what an average general did, Patton, brings in US dollars.
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The finest army in the world from mid 1942 onwards was the British under Montgomery. From Alem el Halfa it moved right up into Denmark, through nine countries, and not once suffered a reverse taking all in its path. Over 90% of German armour in the west was destroyed by the British. Montgomery, in command of all ground forces, had to give the US armies an infantry role in Normandy as they were not equipped to engage massed German SS armour.
Montgomery stopped the Germans in every event they attacked him:
▪ August 1942 - Alem el Halfa; October 1942 - El Alamein;
▪ March 1943 - Medenine;
▪ June 1944 - Normandy;
▪ Sept/Oct 1944 - The Netherlands;
▪ December 1944 - Battle of the Bulge;
A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2:
▪ Battle of Alam Halfa;
▪ Second Battle of El Alamein;
▪ Battle of El Agheila;
▪ Battle of Medenine;
▪ Battle of the Mareth Line;
▪ Battle of Wadi Akarit;
▪ Allied invasion of Sicily;
▪ Operation Overlord - the largest amphibious invasion in history;
▪ Market Garden - a 60 mile salient created into German territory;
▪ Battle of the Bulge - while taking control of two shambolic US armies;
▪ Operation Veritable;
▪ Operation Plunder.
Montgomery not once had a reverse.
Not on one occasion were ground armies, British, US or others, under Monty's command pushed back into a retreat by the Germans. Monty's 8th Army advanced the fastest of any army in WW2. From El Alamein to El Agheila from the 4th to 23rd November 1942, 1,300 km in just 17 days. After fighting a major exhausting battle at El Alemein through half a million mines. This was an Incredible feat, unparalleled in WW2. With El Alamein costing just 13,500 casualties.
The US Army were a shambles in 1944/45 retreating in the Ardennes. The Americans didn't perform well at all east of Aachen, then the Hurtgen Forest defeat with 33,000 casualties and Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months at Metz with over 50,000 casualties, with the Lorraine campaign being a failure. Then Montgomery had to be put in command of the shambolic US First and Ninth armies, aided by the British 21st Army Group, just to get back to the start line in the Ardennes, with nearly 100,000 US casualties. Hodges, head of the US First army, fled from Spa to near Liege on the 18th, despite the Germans never getting anywhere near to Spa. Hodges did not even wait for the Germans to approach Spa. He had already fled long before the Germans were stopped. The Germans took 20,000 US POWs in the Battle of The Bulge in Dec 1944. No other allied country had that many prisoners taken in the 1944-45 timeframe.
The USA retreat at the Bulge, again, was the only allied army to be pushed back into a retreat in the 1944-45 timeframe. Montgomery was effectively in charge of the Bulge having to take control of the US First and Ninth armies. Coningham of the RAF was put in command of USAAF elements. The US Third Army constantly stalled after coming up from the south. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war just about. The US armies were losing men at unsustainable rates due to poor generalship.
Normandy was planned and commanded by the British, with Montgomery involved in planning, with also Montgomery leading all ground forces, which was a great success coming in ahead of schedule and with less casualties than predicted. The Royal Navy was in command of all naval forces and the RAF all air forces. The German armour in the west was wiped out by primarily the British - the US forces were impotent against massed panzers. Monty assessed the US armies (he was in charge of them) giving them a supporting infantry role, as they were just not equipped, or experienced, to fight concentrated tank v tank battles. On 3 Sept 1944 when Eisenhower took over overall allied command of ground forces everything went at a snail's pace. The fastest advance of any western army in Autumn/early 1945 was the 60 mile thrust by the British XXX Corps to the Rhine at Arnhem.
You need to give respect where it is due.
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The state of play on the 17th was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) then a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 3 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured the bridge.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected.
XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over.
If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
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@dmbeaster
▪ "While the counterattack was in progress, General Gavin arrived at the battalion command post." "General Gavin directed that the battalion "withdraw from close proximity to the bridge and reorganize"." This was to mark the end of this particular attempt to take the Nijmegen bridge" - US Official History, page 165.
▪ "A new attack to gain the bridge grew out of an early morning conference between General Gavin and Colonel Lindquist." "At 0745 on 18 September, D plus 1, Company G under Capt. Frank J. Novak started toward the bridge."
▪ At around 1100, Warren was ordered to withdraw from Nijmegen completely. - R Poulussen.
▪ At 1400 on 18 September Colonel Mendez ordered Company G to withdraw from Nijmegen - US Official History, page 166. "the chance for an easy, speedy capture of the Nijmegen bridge had passed. This was all the more lamentable because in Nijmegen during the afternoon the Germans had had nothing more than the same kind of "mostly low quality" troops encountered at most other places on D Day." - US Official History, page 164.
The 82nd completely withdrew from Nijmegen town, allowing the Germans to pour the 10th SS infantry south over the Nijmegen bridge to reinforce the town, who come over on the ferry. This was after the 508th even had the south end of the bridge. This made matters much worse when the 82nd and XXX Corps went into the town to clear them out.
Gavin informed Browning there was a large German attack against the landing zones. In fact it was small and easily dealt with. He told Browning he wanted to take men out of Nijmegen to deal with the attack. Gavin took all his men out of Nijmegen, de-prioritizing the bridge. No official records of Gavin's and Browning's conversions exist. It is highly unlikely Browning would have approved of taking all men out of Nijmegen. Browning trusted and respected Gavin, as his record so far in Italy and Normandy was excellent. Browning said "yes," trusting in his judgement. Gavin was the man leading this division of US paras, not Browning.
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@dmbeaster
Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Eisenhower insisted it go ahead, under resourcing the operation. Monty wanted it cancelled. Only the V rockets launched from Holland tipped to go with it. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed. The Market part was planned by mainly Americans, while Garden was mainly the British. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who:
▪ Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practiced and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
▪ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
▪ Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused;
▪ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
▪ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here by agreeing;
▪ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, yet rarely seen at Market Garden;
▪ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak".
The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.
General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, compromising the operation. Gavin also totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the 82nd landings there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defenses such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives.
Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges. They arrived at 2200, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 650 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, five hours after the jump.
The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800. An easy taking of the bridge had now passed.XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 7 miles to go to Arnhem.
Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men at the edge of the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself.XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges themselves and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men in clearing the town, seizing the bridge themselves. What you see in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge.
If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corp's Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge. The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin.
Even the US Official War record confirms this. The Market part of Market Garden failed. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
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@dmbeaster
More inane ramblings.
The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up.
The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
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@0donny
The finest army in the world from mid 1942 onwards was the British under Montgomery. From Alem el Halfa it moved right up into Denmark, through nine countries, and not once suffered a reverse taking all in its path. Over 90% of German armour in the west was destroyed by the British. Montgomery, in command of all ground forces, had to give the US armies an infantry role in Normandy as they were not equipped to engage massed German SS armour.
Montgomery stopped the Germans in every event they attacked him:
♦ August 1942 - Alem el Halfa;
♦ October 1942 - El Alamein;
♦ March 1943 - Medenine;
♦ June 1944 - Normandy;
♦ Sept/Oct 1944 - The Netherlands;
♦ December 1944 - Battle of the Bulge;
A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2:
♦ Battle of Alam Halfa;
♦ Second Battle of El Alamein;
♦ Battle of El Agheila;
♦ Battle of Medenine;
♦ Battle of the Mareth Line;
♦ Battle of Wadi Akarit;
♦ Allied invasion of Sicily;
♦ Operation Overlord - the largest amphibious invasion in history;
♦ Market Garden - a 60 mile salient created into German territory;
♦ Battle of the Bulge - while taking control of two shambolic US armies;
♦ Operation Veritable;
♦ Operation Plunder.
Montgomery not once had a reverse.
Not on one occasion were ground armies, British, US or others, under Monty's command pushed back into a retreat by the Germans. Monty's 8th Army advanced the fastest of any army in WW2. From El Alamein to El Agheila from the 4th to 23rd November 1942, 1,300 km in just 17 days. After fighting a major exhausting battle at El Alemein through half a million mines. This was an Incredible feat, unparalleled in WW2. With El Alamein costing just 13,500 casualties.
The US Army were a shambles in 1944/45 retreating in the Ardennes. The Americans didn't perform well at all east of Aachen, then the Hurtgen Forest defeat with 33,000 casualties and Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months at Metz with over 50,000 casualties, with the Lorraine campaign being a failure.
Then Montgomery had to be put in command of the shambolic US First and Ninth armies, aided by the British 21st Army Group, just to get back to the start line in the Ardennes, with nearly 100,000 US casualties. Hodges, head of the US First army, fled from Spa to near Liege on the 18th, despite the Germans never getting anywhere near to Spa. Hodges did not even wait for the Germans to approach Spa. He had already fled long before the Germans were stopped. The Germans took 20,000 US POWs in the Battle of The Bulge in Dec 1944. No other allied country had that many prisoners taken in the 1944-45 timeframe.
The USA retreat at the Bulge, again, was the only allied army to be pushed back into a retreat in the 1944-45 timeframe. Montgomery was effectively in charge of the Bulge having to take control of the US First and Ninth armies. Coningham of the RAF was put in command of USAAF elements. The US Third Army constantly stalled after coming up from the south. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war just about. The US armies were losing men at unsustainable rates due to poor generalship.
Normandy was planned and commanded by the British, with Montgomery involved in planning, with also Montgomery leading all ground forces, which was a great success coming in ahead of schedule and with less casualties than predicted. The Royal Navy was in command of all naval forces and the RAF all air forces.
The German armour in the west was wiped out by primarily the British - the US forces were impotent against massed panzers. Monty assessed the US armies (he was in charge of them) giving them a supporting infantry role, as they were just not equipped, or experienced, to fight concentrated tank v tank battles. On 3 Sept 1944 when Eisenhower took over overall allied command of ground forces everything went at a snail's pace. The fastest advance of any western army in Autumn/early 1945 was the 60 mile thrust by the British XXX Corps to the Rhine at Arnhem.
You need to give respect where it is due.
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Market Garden failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. The failure point was not seizing the Nijmegen bridge immediately. At the end of D-Day all crossings were denied to the Germans, except one - the Nijmegen bridge. General Gavin of the US 82nd was supposed to get to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as landing. Gavin never, he failed with only a few German guards on the bridge. He failed because his 82nd did not seize the Nijmegen bridge immediately.
Gavin even de-prioritised the bridge the prime target and focus. The 82nd were ready at 2 pm on the jump day and never moved to the bridge. The gigantic bridge was guarded by only 19 guards. The Germans occupied the bridge at 1900 hrs. Six hours after the 82nd were ready to march.
Events on the 1st day:
♦ "At 1328, the 665 men of US 82nd 1st Battalion began to fall from the sky."
- Poulussen, R. Lost at Nijmegen.
♦ "Forty minutes after the drop, around 1410, the 1st Battalion marched off towards their objective, De Ploeg, three miles away."
-Poulussen,
♦ "The 82nd were digging in and performing reconnin the area looking for 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald
- Neillands, R. The Battle for the Rhine 1944.
♦ The 82nd were dug in and preparing to defend their newly constructed regimental command post, which they established at 1825. Then Colonel Lindquist "was told by General Gavin, around 1900, to move into Nijmegen."
-Poulussen
Events on the evening of the 1st day:
♦ Having dug in at De Ploeg, Warren's battalion wasn't prepared to move towards Nijmegen at all.
- Poulussen,
♦ Once Lindquist told Lieutenant Colonel Warren that his Battalion was to move, Warren decided to visit the HQ of the Nijmegen Underground first - to see what info the underground had on the Germans at the Nijmegen bridge.
- Poulussen,
♦ It was not until 1830hrs that he [Warren] was able to send a force into Nijmegen. This force was somewhat small, just one rifle platoon and an intelligence section with a radio — say forty men.
- Neillands. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
♦ This was not a direct route to the bridge from Warren's original position, and placed him in the middle of the town. It was also around 2100 when "A" Company left to attempt to capture the Nijmegen road bridge.
♦ "B" Company was not with them because they'd split up due to it being dark with "visibility was less than ten yards".
- Poulussen,
♦ The 82nd attacks were resisted by the Germans until the next day.
Events of the 2nd day:
♦ Gavin drove up in a jeep the next morning and was told by Warren that although they didn't have the bridge yet, another attack was about to go in.
♦ Gavin then told Warren to hold because the Germans were attacking in the southeast portion of the 82nd perimeter.
♦ At around 1100, Warren was ordered to withdraw from Nijmegen completely.
- Poulussen
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By Chester Graham. Liaison officer between the 508th and the 82nd Division Headquarters.
During the Holland operation, I was the liaison officer between the 508th and the 82nd Division Headquarters. I first became the Regimental Liaison Officer after we returned to Nottingham from the Normandy operation.
This assignment as Regimental Liaison Officer was a most enjoyable and interesting duty. I spent the nights with the Division, and each morning, I picked up reports and left in my jeep with my driver for Regimental Headquarters to pass the reports to the Regimental staff.
While at Division, I visited with various staff members and helped out in the G3 Section, and at the end of the day I returned to Regimental Headquarters with reports from Division. I saw places I would never have seen if I just stayed in the regimental area, and I met some very interesting people at the higher echelon. I knew all of the division staff and the other regimental commanders, and was included in the planning of operations and briefings. I was ‘bigoted.’ [This is a WWII military term for being read into/briefed on missions.]
Prior to the Holland jump, I sat in a high-level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible, as the bridge was the key to the division’s contribution to the success of the operation.
After we were dropped in Holland, I went to the 508th Regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, “As soon as the DZ (drop zone) is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.” So I went cross-country through Indian country [slang military term for enemy territory] to the Division CP and relayed Lindquist’s message to Gavin.
I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his jeep, he told me to, “Come with me — let’s get him moving.”
On arriving at the 508th Regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, “I told you to move with speed. The Germans are coming”
.
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You are wrong on most points.
Just one.....
“Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4, after a week’s excruciating pause”
- Harry Yeide
"Eisenhower. He had now heard from both his Army Group commanders — or Commanders-in-Chief as they were currently called — and reached the conclusion that they were both right; that it was possible to achieve everything, even with lengthening supply lines and without Antwerp. In thinking this Ike was wrong."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
“ It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September 16th. On the other hand, three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th " for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.' “
- CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE. 1954
P 589
"Despite objections raised to Montgomery's plan of an assault on a 40 division front, it was more sensible than Eisenhower's insistence on the entire front being in motion at all times, for no better reason than he could not abide the thought that the two American army groups would not participate as entities in the anticipated victory. Not only did Eisenhower fail to heed Montgomery's suggestions, but also he never seemed to understand the possible benefits. He was evidently unable to understand that to supply 40 divisions attacking on one front would have been an easier task than to supply first one army and then the other as each in turn went over to the offensive. It was this concentration of effort which Eisenhower failed to understand and to implement"
- Eisenhower at the Art of Warfare
by DJ Haycock, page 182.
Land supplies were not taken from Patton and given to Monty. It is a complete myth to claim otherwise. Monty didn't even have a full army for his attack at Market Garden, just a Corps and supporting elements, with much flow in from England.
Market Garden was not a very large ground operation. It was limited in size. The American attack into the Hurtgen Forest started when Market Garden was going on. The US advance on the Hurtgen Forest by First US Army 9th Infantry Division began on 14th September, 3 days before Market Garden began, and was continuing to try and advance into the Hurtgen even when Market Garden began 3 days later, but it was halted by the Germans however.
This was soon followed up by a larger advance by US First Army towards Aachen at the start of October. Market Garden didn't make a notable dent in allied supplies seeing as the US was able to put on a LARGER ground attack right afterwards. According to Bradley in his own book there was parity of supplies between the three allied armies, Second British, First and Third US by mid September 1944 and according to the official US Army History as cited in Hugh Cole's book, The Lorraine Campaign page 52... "by 10th September the period of critical (gasoline) shortage had ended". This was a whole week before Market Garden took place. The gasoline drought was the end of August/beginning of September. It was over by the time of Market Garden.
As far as Montgomery, Patton and all that stuff goes, USA media has sold you a pup and their version of events continues to unravel as the years go by. It ain't like Ben Affleck, Ronald Reagan, Steven Spielberg and John Wayne told it.
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Timeline
Events on the 1st day - D day:
▪ "At 1328, the 665 men of US 82nd 1st Battalion began to fall from the sky." - R Poulussen, Lost at Nijmegen.
▪ "Forty minutes after the drop, around 1410, the 1st Battalion marched off towards their objective, De Ploeg, three miles away." - R Poulussen.
▪ "The 82nd were digging in and performing reconn in the area looking for 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald - Neillands, R. The Battle for the Rhine 1944.
▪ "Colonel Warren about 1830 sent into Nijmegen a patrol consisting of a rifle platoon and the battalion intelligence section. This patrol was to make an aggressive reconnaissance, investigate reports from Dutch civilians that only eighteen Germans guarded the big bridge"- US Official history, page 163.
▪ It was not until 1830hrs that he [Warren] was able to send a force into Nijmegen. This force was somewhat small, just one rifle platoon and an intelligence section with a radio — say forty men. - Neillands. The Battle for the Rhine 1944.
▪ The 82nd were dug in and preparing to defend their newly constructed regimental command post, which they established at 1825. Having dug in at De Ploeg, Warren's battalion wasn't prepared to move towards Nijmegen at all. - R Poulussen.
▪ Then Colonel Lindquist "was told by General Gavin, around 1900, to move into Nijmegen." - R Poulussen.
▪Warren sent a patrol of about 40 men to reconnoiter the bridge at 1830. Three strays from the patrol captured seven of the 18 guards and their 20mm cannon who were guarding the south end of the bridge, having to let them go as no reinforcements arrived. The 508th had actually captured the south end of the largely undefended bridge. The three scouts that reached the southern end of the Nijmegen bridge about an hour before the 9th SS arrived. Joe Atkins of the patrol said:
"at the bridge, only a few German soldiers were standing around a small artillery weapon... The Germans were so surprised; the six or seven defenders of the bridge gave up without resisting. We held the prisoners at the entrance to the bridge for about an hour. It began to get dark and none of our other troops showed up. We decided to pull away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack. The German prisoners asked to come with us, but we refused, having no way to guard them. As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge." - The 508th Connection by Zig Boroughs.
That was the 9th SS arriving at 1930.
▪ Unfortunately, the patrol's radio failed to function so that Colonel Warren was to get no word from the patrol until the next morning - US Official History, page 163.
▪ Once Lindquist told Lieutenant Colonel Warren [at 1900] that his Battalion was to move, Warren decided to visit the HQ of the Nijmegen Underground first - to see what info the underground had on the Germans at the Nijmegen bridge. - R Poulussen,
▪ "Although Company A reached the rendezvous point on time, Company B "got lost en route." After waiting until about 2000, Colonel Warren left a guide for Company B and moved through the darkness with Company A toward the edge of the city. Some seven hours after H-Hour, [2030] the first real move against the Nijmegen bridge began." - US Official History, page 163.
▪ As the scouts neared a traffic circle surrounding a landscaped circular park near the center of Nijmegen, the Keizer Karel Plein, from which a mall-like park led northeast toward the Nijmegen bridge, a burst of automatic weapons fire came from the circle. The time was about two hours before midnight. [2200 hrs] - US Official History, page 163.
D Day plus 1
▪ In the meantime Colonel Warren had tried to get a new attack moving toward the highway bridge; but this the Germans thwarted just before dawn with another sharp counterattack. - US Official History, page 165.
▪ "While the counterattack was in progress, General Gavin arrived at the battalion command post." "General Gavin directed that the battalion "withdraw from close proximity to the bridge and reorganize"." This was to mark the end of this particular attempt to take the Nijmegen bridge" - US Official History, page 165.
▪ "A new attack to gain the bridge grew out of an early morning conference between General Gavin and Colonel Lindquist." "At 0745 on 18 September, D plus 1, Company G under Capt. Frank J. Novak started toward the bridge." - US Official History, page 165.
▪ At around 1100, Warren was ordered to withdraw from Nijmegen completely. - R Poulussen.
▪ At 1400 on 18 September Colonel Mendez ordered Company G to withdraw from Nijmegen - US Official History, page 166.
"the chance for an easy, speedy capture of the Nijmegen bridge had passed. This was all the more lamentable because in Nijmegen during the afternoon the Germans had had nothing more than the same kind of "mostly low quality" troops encountered at most other places on D Day." - US Official History, page 164.
The 82nd completely withdrew from Nijmegen town, allowing the Germans to pour the 10th SS infantry, who come over on the ferry, south over the Nijmegen bridge to reinforce the town. This made matters worse when the 82nd and XXX Corps went into the town to clear them out.
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@charlietipton8502
Lindquist should have been moving towards the bridge immediately on landing. I never made it up.
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By Chester Graham. Liaison officer between the 508th and the 82nd Division Headquarters.
During the Holland operation, I was the liaison officer between the 508th and the 82nd Division Headquarters. I first became the Regimental Liaison Officer after we returned to Nottingham from the Normandy operation.
This assignment as Regimental Liaison Officer was a most enjoyable and interesting duty. I spent the nights with the Division, and each morning, I picked up reports and left in my jeep with my driver for Regimental Headquarters to pass the reports to the Regimental staff.
While at Division, I visited with various staff members and helped out in the G3 Section, and at the end of the day I returned to Regimental Headquarters with reports from Division. I saw places I would never have seen if I just stayed in the regimental area, and I met some very interesting people at the higher echelon. I knew all of the division staff and the other regimental commanders, and was included in the planning of operations and briefings. I was ‘bigoted.’ [This is a WWII military term for being read into/briefed on missions.]
Prior to the Holland jump, I sat in a high-level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible, as the bridge was the key to the division’s contribution to the success of the operation.
After we were dropped in Holland, I went to the 508th Regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, “As soon as the DZ (drop zone) is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.” So I went cross-country through Indian country [slang military term for enemy territory] to the Division CP and relayed Lindquist’s message to Gavin.
I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his jeep, he told me to, “Come with me — let’s get him moving.”
On arriving at the 508th Regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, “I told you to move with speed. The Germans are coming”
.
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@bigwoody4704
Thank you Rambo...
Lt Gen Browning to Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C., 25 Jan 55, excerpt in OCMH....
"I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible"
Rambo, they left to seize the bridge about seven hours after landing. Seven hours is not as soon as possible.
The 82nd men who rowed over teh Waal to take the north end approaches of the bridge while XXX took the main structure, also failed. They met the XXX Corps tank 1km north of the bridge in Lent, not getting near the bridge.
A complete failure by the 82nd Rambo, a complete failure. Sad but true.
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@bigwoody4704 ~
Rambo,
Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Montgomery was an army group leader over armies, with Dempsey in command of the Second Army and Horrocks in command of XXX Corps.
Eisenhower, approved and under resourced the operation. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed. The Market part was planned by mainly Americans while Garden mainly the British. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who:
♦ Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practised and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
♦ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
♦ Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused;
♦ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
♦ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here by agreeing;
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, yet rarely seen at Market Garden;
♦ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak". The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.
General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgement or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives.
Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges. They arrived at 2200, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, five hours after the jump. The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800. An easy taking of the bridge had now passed.
XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 7 miles to go to Arnhem. Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men at the edge of the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself.
XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges themselves and using some 82nd men cleared the town, seizing the bridge themselves. What you see in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge. If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corp's Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge. The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin.
Even the US Official War record confirms this. Charles B. MacDonald wrote the US Official history on Market Garden: https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_19.htm The Market part of Market Garden failed. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
"it was not until 9 October, more than a month after the fall of Antwerp, that General Eisenhower told Montgomery to devote his entire attention to the clearance of the Scheldt. By that time Monty had the Canadians cleared it, or were investing in many of the Channel ports"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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The British 1st Airborne made it to Arnhem bridge, taking the north end of the bridge, denying its use to the Germans.
The other two airborne units, both US, failed to seize their assigned bridges immediately. If they had XXX Corps would have been in Arnhem on d-day+1, before any armour came in from Germany. Game set and match.
The Germans would not have known what had hit them.
The 12 hour delay caused by the 101st not seizing the Zon bridge, meant the Germans for 12 hours had a critical time window to pour in troops and get armour moving towards Arnhem.
The 36 hour delay, on top of the 12 hour delay, caused by the 82nd not seizing their bridge at Nijmegen (XXX Corps had to take it for them), meant another longer time window for the Germans to keep up the reinforcing. The 36 hour delay created by the 82nd, meant a bridgehead over the Rhine was precluded, as the two day time window given to the Germans was far too long.
The British paras did their part in securing a crossing over its assigned waterway, the Rhine. The two US para units failed in theirs. XXX Corps never put a foot wrong.
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@Franky46Boy
Eisenhower prioritized the northern thrust over other fronts and even seizing Antwerp and clearing the Schedlt. Clearing the Scheldt would take time as the German 15th SS army, highly experienced from the Russian front, had set up shop in the Scheldt and not retreated back into Germany, under Hitler's orders. All available supplies would be directed to this northern thrust.
"Since Eisenhower — the Supreme Commander and Ground Force Commander — approved the Arnhem operation rather than a push to clear the Scheldt, then surely he was right, as well as noble, to accept the responsibility and any resulting blame? The choice in early September was the Rhine or Antwerp: to continue the pursuit or secure the necessary facilities to solve the logistical problem? The decision was made to go for the Rhine, and that decision was Eisenhower’s."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"On 4 Sept, the day Antwerp fell, Eisenhower issued another directive, ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes — 21st Army Group and two corps of the US First Army — to take Antwerp, reach the Rhine and seize the Ruhr"
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Perhaps not more then, but that much alone would have been very useful — and much more than was actually achieved. This view was confirmed after the war in interviews with the senior surviving German commanders, von Rundstedt, Student, Blumentritt and Rommel’s former chief of staff, General Speidel. They were unanimous in declaring that a full-blooded thrust from Belgium in September would have succeeded in crossing the Rhine and might have ended the war in 1944, since they had no means of stopping such a thrust reaching the Ruhr. In the event, largely due to the faulty command set-up [by Eisenhower] and lack of grip, even a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter was still a dream in 1944."
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Eisenhower, approved and under resourced the operation. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed. The Market part was planned by mainly Americans while Garden mainly the British. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who:
♦ Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practised and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
♦ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
♦ Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused;
♦ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
♦ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here by agreeing;
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, yet rarely seen at Market Garden;
♦ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak". The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.
General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgement or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives.
Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges. They arrived at 2200, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, five hours after the jump. The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800. An easy taking of the bridge had now passed.
XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 7 miles to go to Arnhem. Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men at the edge of the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself.
XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges themselves and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men in clearing the town, seizing the bridge themselves. What you see in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge. If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corp's Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge. The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin.
Even the US Official War record confirms this. Charles B. MacDonald wrote the US Official history on Market Garden: https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_19.htm The Market part of Market Garden failed. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
"it was not until 9 October, more than a month after the fall of Antwerp, that General Eisenhower told Montgomery to devote his entire attention to the clearance of the Scheldt. By that time Monty had the Canadians cleared it, or were investing in many of the Channel ports"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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The finest general in WW2 was Montgomery.
From Alem el Halfa Montgomery moved right up into Denmark, through nine countries, and not once suffered a reverse taking all in its path. Over 90% of German armour in the west was destroyed by the British. Montgomery, in command of all ground forces, had to give the US armies an infantry role in Normandy as they were not equipped to engage massed German SS armour.
Montgomery stopped the Germans in every event they attacked him:
♦ August 1942 - Alem el Halfa;
♦ October 1942 - El Alamein;
♦ March 1943 - Medenine;
♦ June 1944 - Normandy;
♦ Sept/Oct 1944 - The Netherlands;
♦ December 1944 - Battle of the Bulge;
A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2:
♦ Battle of Alam Halfa;
♦ Second Battle of El Alamein;
♦ Battle of El Agheila;
♦ Battle of Medenine;
♦ Battle of the Mareth Line;
♦ Battle of Wadi Akarit;
♦ Allied invasion of Sicily;
♦ Operation Overlord - the largest amphibious invasion in history;
♦ Market Garden - a 60 mile salient created into German territory;
♦ Battle of the Bulge - while taking control of two shambolic US armies;
♦ Operation Veritable;
♦ Operation Plunder.
Montgomery not once had a reverse.
Not on one occasion were ground armies, British, US or others, under Monty's command pushed back into a retreat by the Germans. Monty's 8th Army advanced the fastest of any army in WW2. From El Alamein to El Agheila from the 4th to 23rd November 1942, 1,300 km in just 17 days. After fighting a major exhausting battle at El Alemein through half a million mines. This was an Incredible feat, unparalleled in WW2. With El Alamein costing just 13,500 casualties.
The US Army were a shambles in 1944/45 retreating in the Ardennes. The Americans didn't perform well at all east of Aachen, then the Hurtgen Forest defeat with 33,000 casualties and Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months at Metz with over 50,000 casualties, with the Lorraine campaign being a failure. Then Montgomery had to be put in command of the shambolic US First and Ninth armies, aided by the British 21st Army Group, just to get back to the start line in the Ardennes, with nearly 100,000 US casualties. Hodges, head of the US First army, fled from Spa to near Liege on the 18th, despite the Germans never getting anywhere near to Spa. Hodges did not even wait for the Germans to approach Spa. He had already fled long before the Germans were stopped. The Germans took 20,000 US POWs in the Battle of The Bulge in Dec 1944. No other allied country had that many prisoners taken in the 1944-45 timeframe.
The USA retreat at the Bulge, again, was the only allied army to be pushed back into a retreat in the 1944-45 timeframe. Montgomery was effectively in charge of the Bulge having to take control of the US First and Ninth armies. Coningham of the RAF was put in command of USAAF elements. The US Third Army constantly stalled after coming up from the south. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war just about. The US armies were losing men at unsustainable rates due to poor generalship.
Normandy was planned and commanded by the British, with Montgomery involved in planning, with also Montgomery leading all ground forces, which was a great success coming in ahead of schedule and with less casualties than predicted. The Royal Navy was in command of all naval forces and the RAF all air forces. The German armour in the west was wiped out by primarily the British - the US forces were impotent against massed panzers. Monty assessed the US armies (he was in charge of them) giving them a supporting infantry role, as they were just not equipped, or experienced, to fight concentrated tank v tank battles. On 3 Sept 1944 when Eisenhower took over overall allied command of ground forces everything went at a snail's pace. The fastest advance of any western army in Autumn/early 1945 was the 60 mile thrust by the British XXX Corps to the Rhine at Arnhem.
You need to give respect where it is due.
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Browning DID NOT de-prioritised the bridge.
"I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it—for … painfully obvious reasons …. If this ground had been lost to the enemy the operations of the 2nd Army would have been dangerously prejudiced as its advance across the Waal and Neder Rhein would have been immediately outflanked. Even the initial advance of the Guards Armoured Division would have been prejudiced and on them the final outcome of the battle had to depend."
- Lt Gen Browning to Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C., 25 Jan 55, excerpt in OCMH.
Browning said.. it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it. He did not say it was priority.
Browning did not de-prioritise the bridge, initially neither did Gavin, until he pulled all his men entirely out of Nijmegen after failing to seize the bridge.
Gavin told Lindquist to go to the bridge, "without delay". Gavin was clearly going for the bridge as a matter of urgency. The problem was the incompetent delay to move to the bridge - that is why the 82nd failed to seize the bridge. Gavin's command structure failed. He never gave written orders to the 508th.
After receiving General Gavin's pre jump verbal orders in regard to the Nijmegen bridge, Colonel Lindquist had earmarked Colonel Warren's battalion as one of two battalions from which he intended to choose one to move to the bridge, depending upon the developing situation. General Gavin's understanding, as recalled later, was that Warren's battalion was to move "without delay after landing." On the other hand, Colonel Lindquist's understanding, also as recalled later, was that no battalion was to go for the bridge until the regiment had secured its other objectives, that is to say, not until he had established defenses protecting his assigned portion of the high ground and the northern part of the division glider landing zone.
- US Official History
Prior to the Holland jump, I sat in a high-level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important.
After we were dropped in Holland, I went to the 508th Regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, “As soon as the DZ (drop zone) is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.”
..
I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his jeep, he told me to, “Come with me — let’s get him moving.” "On arriving at the 508th Regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, “I told you to move with speed.”
- by Chester E Graham, liaison officer between the 508th and the 82nd Division Headquarters.
As darkness approached, General Gavin ordered Colonel Lindquist "to delay not a second longer and get the bridge as quickly as possible with Warren's battalion."
- US Official History
"I personally directed Colonel Roy E. Lindquist, commanding the 508th Parachute Infantry," General Gavin recalled later, "to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen bridge without delay after landing
- US Official History
As the jump was unopposed, and other troops were securing the LZ, some of Lindquist's men made their way towards the Nijmegen bridge immediately.
Instead of moving immediately toward the Nijmegen bridge, Colonel Warren's battalion was to take an "assigned initial objective" in the vicinity of DePloeg, a suburb of Nijmegen.
..
then was to "be prepared to go into Nijmegen later." The assembly and movement to DePloeg took approximately three and a half hours.
- US Official History
Col. Warren, who was assigned the bridge, was to move when given orders, spent most of the time setting up shop in a hotel.
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