Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "History Buffs: A Bridge Too Far" video.
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@Current Batches
“Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4”
- Harry Yeide
"Eisenhower. He had now heard from both his Army Group commanders — or Commanders-in-Chief as they were currently called — and reached the conclusion that they were both right; that it was possible to achieve everything, even with lengthening supply lines and without Antwerp. In thinking this Ike was wrong."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
“It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the 'air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September 16th. On the other hand, three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th "for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.' “
- CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE. 1954
Page 589
"Despite objections raised to Montgomery's plan of an assault on a 40 division front, it was more sensible than Eisenhower's insistence on the entire front being in motion at all times, for no better reason than he could not abide the thought that the two American army groups would not participate as entities in the anticipated victory. Not only did Eisenhower fail to heed Montgomery's suggestions, but also he never seemed to understand the possible benefits. He was evidently unable to understand that to supply 40 divisions attacking on one front would have been an easier task than to supply first one army and then the other as each in turn went over to the offensive. It was this concentration of effort which Eisenhower failed to understand and to implement"
- Eisenhower at the Art of Warfare
by DJ Haycock, page 182.
Land supplies were not taken from Patton and given to Monty. It is a complete myth to claim otherwise. Monty didn't even have a full army for his attack at Market Garden, just a Corps and supporting elements, with much flown in from England.
Market Garden was not a very large ground operation. It was limited in size. The American attack into the Hurtgen Forest started when Market Garden was going on. The US advance on the Hurtgen Forest by First US Army 9th Infantry Division began on 14th September, 3 days before Market Garden began, and was continuing to try and advance into the Hurtgen even when Market Garden began 3 days later, but it was halted by the Germans.
This was soon followed up by a larger advance by US First Army towards Aachen at the start of October. Market Garden didn't make a notable dent in allied supplies seeing as the US was able to put on a LARGER ground attack right afterwards. According to Bradley in his own book there was parity of supplies between the three allied armies, Second British, First and Third US by mid September 1944 and according to the official US Army History as cited in Hugh Cole's book, The Lorraine Campaign page 52... "by 10th September the period of critical (gasoline) shortage had ended". This was a whole week before Market Garden took place. The gasoline drought was the end of August/beginning of September. It was over by the time of Market Garden.
As far as Montgomery, Patton and all, your media has sold you a pup and their version of events continues to unravel as time goes by. It is not like Ronald Reagan, Steven Spielberg and John Wayne told it.
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@snakey934Snakeybakey
Sgt Robinson and his crew who were in the first Firefly tank over the bridge state the US troops kissed the tanks.
Carington, who was head of NATO at one time, said it never happened. Burriss said it did.
The film A Bridge Too Far has Robert Redford (playing Capt Cook) as one of the 82nd men taking the vital road bridge after rowing the river in canvas boats. This never happened. Another part of the film has Redford (Cook) insisting to a British commander of the British XXX Corps tanks, after the tanks crossed the bridge, to run onto Arnhem and relieve the British paratroopers and the commander refusing, leaving his tanks idle.
Moffat Burris of the 82nd, on film stated he ordered the tank captain to run his tanks to Arnhem, saying on film, "I just sacrificed half of my company capturing that bridge". The tank officer was Capt (Lord) Carington, who eventually became head of NATO. Moffatt Burris stated: “I cocked my tommy gun, pointed it at his head and said, ‘Get down that blankety-blank road before I blow your blankety-blank head off." Carington explained politely that Captain Burriss surely didn’t expect him to obey orders of a foreign officer, but then, Burris says, Carington “ducked into his tank and locked the hatch” so, as Burris recalls, “I couldn’t get at him.” There is no record of this event occurring and there were many men around, implying Buffet is lying, maybe to save the face of the 82nd, as they played no part in seizing the bridge.
The tanks were to secure the north end of the bridge after seizing the bridge, not to run off to Arnhem in the dark leaving the bridge vulnerable. The Irish Guards after seizing the bridge and removing the 180 bodies from the girders with themselves used the 82nd men to form a defensive line around the bridge. The Irish Guards infantry advanced no further than the immediate vicinity of the bridge that night.
Sergeant Peter Robinson, of the of the Guards Armored Division who led the charge over the Nijmegen road bridge in his Firefly tank stated:
"The Nijmegen bridge wasn’t taken [by the 82nd] which was our objective. We reached the far end of the bridge and immediately there was a roadblock. So the troop sergeant covered me through and then I got to the other side and covered the rest of the troop through. We were still being engaged; there was a gun in front of the church three or four hundred yards in front of us. We knocked him out. We got down the road to the railway bridge; we cruised round there very steady. We were being engaged all the time. Just as I got round the corner and turned right I saw these helmets duck in a ditch and run, and gave them a burst of machine gun fire. I suddenly realised they were Americans. They had already thrown a gammon grenade at me so dust and dirt and smoke were flying everywhere. They jumped out of the ditch; they kissed the tank; they kissed the guns because they’d lost a lot of men. They had had a very bad crossing."
Captain Lord Carrington's own autobiography entitled 'Reflect on Things Past':
"My recollection of this meeting is different. Certainly I met an American officer but he was perfectly affable and agreeable. As I said the Airborne were all very glad to see us and get some support, no one suggested we press on to Arnhem. This whole allegation is bizarre, just to begin with I was a captain and second-in-command of my squadron so I was in no position either to take orders from another captain or depart from my own orders which were to take my tanks across the bridge, join up with the US Airborne and form a bridgehead. This story is simple lunacy and this exchange did not take place."
Lord Carrington again...
"At that stage my job - I was second-in-command of a squadron - was to take a half-squadron of tanks across the bridge. Since everybody supposed the Germans would blow this immense contraption we were to be accompanied by an intrepid Royal Engineer officer to cut the wires and cleanse the demolition chambers under each span. Our little force was led by an excellent Grenadier, Sergeant Robinson, who was rightly awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his action. Two of our tanks were hit not lethally - by anti-tank fire, and we found a number of Germans perched in the girders who tried to drop things on us but without great effect. Sergeant Robinson and the leading tank troop sprayed the opposite bank and we lost nobody, When I arrived at the far end my sense of relief was considerable: the bridge had not been blown, we had not been plunged into the Waal (In fact it seems the Germans never intended to blow the bridge. The demolition chambers were packed with German soldiers, who surrendered), we seemed to have silenced the opposition in the vicinity, we were across one half of the Rhine."
"A film representation of this incident has shown American troops as having already secured the far end of the bridge. That is mistaken - probably the error arose from the film-maker's confusion of two bridges, there was a railway bridge with planks placed between the rails and used by the Germans for [light] road traffic, to the west of the main road bridge we crossed; and the gallant American Airborne men: reached it. When Sergeant Robinson and his little command crossed our main road bridge, however, only Germans were there to welcome him; and they didn't stay."
The meeting of the 82nd men and the tanks was 1 km north of the bridge at the village of Lent where the railway embankment from the railway bridge met the north running road running off the main road bridge. The 82nd men did not reach the north end of the actual road bridge, the Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry got there first from the south.
Only five tanks were available at the north end of the bridge to secure it, with two hit. No tanks were available to run on any further to Arnhem and any that did would have been sitting ducks on the raised road.
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The state of play on the 17th was that the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was clear. There was concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally. There were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen. Then a few scattered about along the road. There was no armour in Arnhem. That was it.
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 3 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured the bridge.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected.
XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, at the planned expected time, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over.
If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
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@martinidry6300
For the Germans to reach Antwerp, the easiest route was north of the Ardennes straight across flat land. If Market Garden had not been undertaken the salient would have been in German hands, making it far easier for the massed German armoured forces at the Bulge to reach Antwerp.
The Market Garden salient protected vital Antwerp.
"Operation MARKET-GARDEN had two major objectives:
to get Allied troops across the Rhine
and to capture the Ruhr.
Three major advantages were expected to accrue:
( I) cutting the land exit of those Germans remaining in western Holland;
(2) outflanking the West Wall, and
(3) positioning British ground forces for a subsequent drive into Germany along the North German Plain."
- US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
(Page 120).
"Eisenhower approved the operation with certain conditions. Market Garden would commence on 17 September. Securing the approaches to the port at Antwerp would be delayed until Montgomery seized bridgeheads over the Rhine. His priority after seizing the bridgeheads would be gaining the much needed deep water port. He would not continue the attack to Berlin as he had proposed."
- A FRAMEWORK FOR MILITARY DECISION MAKING UNDER RISKS
BY JAMES V. SCHULTZ
A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES FOR THE COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES
AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE,
ALABAMA J
UNE 1996
(Page 50).
"later, on I5 September, General Eisenhower himself reopened the wound, perhaps with a view to healing it once and for all through a process of bloodletting. Looking beyond both Arnhem and Antwerp, he named Berlin as the ultimate Allied goal"
- US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
(Page 210).
One of the prime aims of Market Garden was to be the northern grip of the pincer on the Ruhr, Eisenhower changed yet again his strategy from the Ruhr to Berlin two days before Market Garden.
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The state of play on the 17th was that the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was clear. There was concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally. There were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen. Then a few scattered about along the road. There was no armour in Arnhem. That was it.
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 3 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured the bridge.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected.
XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, at the planned expected time, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over.
If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
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The state of play on the 17th was that the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was clear. There was concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally. There were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen. Then a few scattered about along the road. There was no armour in Arnhem. That was it.
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 3 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured the bridge.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected.
XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, at the planned expected time, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over.
If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
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The fact is the Americans were a very mediocre army, with not one general that stood out. In Normandy Monty who was in Monty never suffered a reverse moving 1,000 miles through nine countries from Egypt to Denmark taking all in his path. He was a general over generals. Montgomery was by far most successful western allied commander of WW2. Monty fought more battles, took more ground and engaged more elite German divisions than any other general. Monty commanded all the Normandy ground forces, being the man the Americans ran to in the Ardennes offensive. No other general in the western allied armies possessed his experience in dealing with the Germans or his expertise.
Monty stopped the Germans in every event they attacked him.
* August 1942 - Alem el Halfa
* October 1942 - El Alamein March
* 1943 - Medenine
* June 1944 - Normandy
* Sept/Oct 1944 - Holland
* December 1944 - Battle of the Bulge
Not on one occasion were Monty's ground armies, including US armies under his control, pushed back into a retreat by the Germans.
Eisenhower:
‘General Montgomery is a very able, dynamic type of army commander’.
Eisenhower on D-Day and Normandy:
'He got us there and he kept us there'.
General Günther Blumentritt:
‘Field Marshall Montgomery was the one general who never suffered a reverse’
Genral Hasso von Manteuffel on the Bulge:
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Patton on Monty:
'small,very alert, wonderfully conceited, and the best soldier - or so it seems - I have met in this war’.
American Major General Matt Ridgway commander of the US XVIII Airborne Corps, 17 Jan 1945
"It has been an honored privilege and a very great personal pleasure to have served, even so briefly, under your distinguished leadership [Montgomery]. To the gifted professional guidance you at once gave me, was added to your own consummate courtesy and consideration. I am deeply grateful for both. My warm and sincere good wishes will follow you and with them the hope of again serving with you in pursuit of a common goal".
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@dongilleo9743
The state of play on the 17th was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was clear.
2) there was concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally. T
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen.
4) A few German troops scattered about along the road.
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 3 km to the Zon bridge north of Eindhoven, with little opposition. The Germans had time to blow the bridge. If the 101st had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, they would have secured the bridge.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected.
XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, at the planned expected time, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over.
If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
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@scotty2877
U.S. 82nd Division records state that the first troop of British tanks, four of them, crossed the Waal road bridge at 1830 hours. Two tanks were hit with the crews taken POW bar one, Sgt Knight. The tanks charged across at full speed approaching 30 mph firing against German guns all the way, with a few hundred high in the girders. Gunner Leslie Johnson in the lead tank said:
“They were falling like nine-pins. The incoming fire was so heavy that I swear to this day that Jesus Christ rode on the front of our tank. The Germans were so close that I didn’t bother to look through my sights. We could feel the tracks going over them as we shot them down, and there was blood and gore all over the tank.”
Once the two leading tanks of Pacey and Robinson got past the bridge obstacles at the northern end, Pacey stopped. The War Office report states:
“At this point, Pacey stopped, he was not sure where to go as no Americans were seen, so Sergeant Robinson passed him and led on. Much to their surprise, they could not see any Americans so having passed through the concrete chicane they pushed on. Having crossed the road bridge, the four tanks moved down the northern embankment, where they destroyed another anti tank gun. Robinson and Pacey found themselves in a running battle against more guns, and against German infantry who poured out of the church in Lent, and then 1,500 yards further down the road from the bridge, where the main road goes under the railway line, contact was at last made with some Americans, both were very happy to see each other."
The 82nd men at Lent reached Lent following the railway embankment from the riverbank using it for cover. The first American troops that arrived at the bridge approaches/waterside after moving along the riverbank from their river landing point with Burriss’ company of about sixteen men, was at 1915 hours, 45 minutes after the first tanks had already crossed. This was not the main bridge span, just the raised approach road over land. Official U.S. records confirm that 82nd troops from the 504th arrived at the northern road bridge approaches at 1938 hours. This would be the time they arrived in any real strength to consolidate, one hour 8 mins after the first tank crossed. The records state at 1938 hours:
“All seemed quiet at this point, with the enemy disorganised and in great confusion, suffering heavy losses. Prior to the physical occupation of the northern end of the bridge by 504th PIR, eight British light tanks had [already] crossed. Two of these were destroyed just north of the bridge”.
The second troop of tanks crossed at least half an hour after the first. Burris was there under the approach road when the second troop rolled over, thinking they were the first tanks over. Lord Carington's tank was one of them. Eight rolled over the bridge, with two hit, being there to consolidate the bridgehead and ensure the Germans did not take the bridge back.
Horrock of XXX Corps in his plan had the 43 Wessex infantry to seize the ground from Nijmegen bridge to Arnhem, destroying anti-tank weapons. It was not tank country. The tanks were to follow behind the infantry. The tanks would have been sitting ducks if they went first. The 43rd Wessex were to do the river crossing in two columns. There was a contingency planned if the bridge was blown. The Wessex were to use dedicated assault boats, which they had in Nijmegen, and DUKW and Buffalo amphibious craft. But to save face as they failed to seize the bridge, Gavin of the 82nd pestered Horrocks for his men to do the crossing, Horrocks agreed. It appears that the 82nd did not know of the Buffalo amphibious craft using collapsible bridge engineers boats to cross the Waal. Or the Wessex did not want to give them fearing the valuable craft would be lost with an 82nd river assault failure - that needs more research.
Not one 82nd man was on the bridge when the first troop of four tanks crossed at 1830, or at 1915 when the second troop of four went over. Official XXX Corps records from the War Office highlight that the successful tank attack on the road bridge was at 1830 hours.
Thirty-four machine guns, an 88mm gun, and two 20mm cannons were found to be on the road bridge itself, and at least six anti-tank guns and a few 88mm guns were situated around the northern end.
All this nonsense of drinking tea by the British tankers disinterested in the battle seems to have started as an American diversion, after inquiries by the Official US historian Charles MacDonald into why the Nijmegen bridges were not taken on the first day.
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@Delogros
Your Granddad must have been grateful to Montgomery. Without Monty you may not have been here.
Ridgway wanted St. Vith’s defenders to stay east of the Salm, but Montgomery ruled otherwise. The 7th Armored Division, its ammunition and fuel in short supply and perhaps two-thirds of its tanks destroyed, and the battered elements of the 9th Armored, 106th, and 28th Divisions could not hold the extended perimeter in the rolling and wooded terrain. Meanwhile, Dietrich’s second wave of tanks entered the fray. The II SS Panzer Corps immediately threatened the Salm River line north and west of St. Vith, as did the LVIII Panzer Corps circling to the south, adding the 2d SS Panzer Division to its drive. Ordering the St. Vith defenders to withdraw through the 82d Airborne Division line to prevent another Schnee Eifel disaster, Montgomery signaled them that “they come back with all honor.”
- Ardennes-Alsace by Roger Cirillo. US Army Center of MIlitary History
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
“I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Hasbrouck of 7th Armor - “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
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Market Garden failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. The failure point was not seizing the Nijmegen bridge immediately. At the end of D-Day all crossings were denied to the Germans, except one - the Nijmegen bridge. General Gavin of the US 82nd was tasked to seize the Nijmegen bridge as soon as landing. Gavin never, he failed with only a few German guards on the bridge. He failed because his 82nd did not seize the Nijmegen bridge immediately. Gavin even de-prioritised the bridge the prime target and focus. The 82nd were ready at 2 pm on the jump day and never moved to the bridge. The gigantic bridge was guarded by only 19 guards. The Germans occupied the bridge at 1900 hrs. Six hours after the 82nd were ready to march.
Events on the 1st day:
♦ "At 1328, the 665 men of US 82nd 1st Battalion began
to fall from the sky."
- Poulussen, R. Lost at Nijmegen.
♦ "Forty minutes after the drop, around 1410, the
1st Battalion marched off towards their objective,
_De Ploeg, three miles away."
_ Poulussen,
♦ "The 82nd were digging in and performing recon
in the area looking for 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald
- Neillands, R. The Battle for the Rhine 1944.
♦ The 82nd were dug in and preparing to defend their
newly constructed regimental command post, which
they established at 1825. Then Colonel Lindquist
"was told by General Gavin, around 1900, to move
into Nijmegen."
-Poulussen
Events on the evening of the 1st day:
♦ Having dug in at De Ploeg, Warren's battalion wasn't prepared
to move towards Nijmegen at all.
-Poulussen,
♦ Once Lindquist told Lieutenant Colonel Warren that his
Battalion was to move, Warren decided to visit the HQ
of the Nijmegen Underground first - to see what info the
underground had on the Germans at the Nijmegen bridge.
- Poulussen,
♦ It was not until 1830hrs that he [Warren] was able to send
a force into Nijmegen. This force was somewhat small,
just one rifle platoon and an intelligence section with a
radio — say forty men.
- Neillands. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
♦ This was not a direct route to the bridge from Warren's
original position, and placed him in the middle of the town.
It was also around 2100 when "A" Company left to attempt
to capture the Nijmegen road bridge.
♦ "B" Company was not with them because they'd split up
due to it being dark with "visibility was less than ten yards".
- Poulussen,
♦ The 82nd attacks were resisted by the Germans until the next day.
Events of the 2nd day:
♦ Gavin drove up in a jeep the next morning and
was told by Warren that although they didn't have the bridge
yet, another attack was about to go in.
♦ Gavin then told Warren to hold because the Germans were
attacking in the southeast portion of the 82nd perimeter.
♦ At around 1100, Warren was ordered to withdraw from
Nijmegen completely.
- Poulussen
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