Comments by "Comm0ut" (@Comm0ut) on "" video.

@TurboNFRStwoK That makes sense. Could be the brake rider wasn't covering the charge handle, couldn't move their hand to it in time, and was distracted by events. I notice Navy wheel chocks are polyurethane with a (good idea) sliding bar but most polyurethane is a bit slippery. My F-16 unit tried plastic chocks (no bar, just conventional) on land and mere rain on the concrete ramp (let alone snow and ice in winter) was enough that they could slip dangerously. OTOH woods ability to conform to thus grab ramp surfaces made it much more reliable chock material. (That's also why placing wood between forklift tines and load reduces load slippage when moving steel, machine tools etc.) Given the short distance between main gear and the deep blue sea how long (guesstimated seconds) in your opinion does a brake rider have to react then apply the brakes? I've ridden brakes many times on other aircraft, mostly F-16 and just accepted I'd headbutt the HUD in an emergency stop but my hands stayed where they should be because there is so little reaction time if chit goes bad. Of course I inspected the tow bar before entering the cockpit no matter who else looked at it first.
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@MrWizardjr9 Because EVERY precaution that can be taken to avoid getting hit must be taken and a mere aircraft is an acceptable loss. Why do you assume they were "overwhelmed"?
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@Inkling777 How many years personal experience do you have in military aviation and if none why do you permit yourself an opinion? Aviation operations are not mountain climbing, they're a complex technical ballet even on land where an enormous number of things done by a large number of people and machines can go wrong. Carriers are immensely powerful and complex. In emergency necessary operational risks are taken. The loss of an aircraft impresses spectators but losing a few is the nature of the business. Be glad 1970s and '80s Class A mishap rates are not the norm. For example the Air Force safety folks reliably predicted Class A (which aren't just total loss of airframe but include that) causes and outcomes, but that's not the same as predicting WHICH of a given airframe will buy the proverbial farm. In those days (I worked on Phantom, Bronco and F-16s '81 to '07) losing well over a squadron's worth of fighter/attack airframes per year was not unusual but taking that risk was a necessity so it was acceptable.
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