Comments by "Comm0ut" (@Comm0ut) on "What's Going on With Shipping?" channel.

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  25. What I see is that harbor is effortlessly disabled by a blockship. It wouldn't take much for an adversary (small nations included who can send containers by proxy) to load a container or several with explosives and redundant detonators to blow the bottom out of (someone else's if budget matters!) container carriers in a simultaneous (or near enough) move to disable major US ports without killing anyone (or with depending on desired escalation level) outright. Future harbor modifications should include multiple access routes where practical. Ideally the bridge should be replaced by a tunnel though that's far more expensive because that permanently solves the problem. Being a strategic asset the Federal government should invest in that project. The US used to be able to do large infrastructure projects and because it did so many was rather good at it. We should remember the strategic lesson of 9/11, which is that US industrial society is easily broken at microscopic cost to the attacker. 9/11 was the worst defeat in US history by economic and social impact but much of that was due to how leadership responded. Conside the effect of blocking Baltimore, Charleston, New York and Savannah even for a short time. Humans are simple beasts and easily panicked, amplifying effects of logistic disruptions by hoarding or worse. This poses what I think is a question Sal is qualified to answer in detail and that might generate intelligent government response. What does each key US harbor require for SELF-recovery from a blockship or future accident at the worst possible location? The Navy and our shipyards should build the vessels and equipment so no one is at the mercy of private contractor availability as they may be elsewhere, though if available they could team to clear the blockage quickly. I consider Baltimore a useful civil defense recovery exercise because without something like that no serious public attention will be paid to such problems. Of course self-recovery units can deploy, train and perhaps assist useful civil engineering projects like other harbor mods if wisely configured. Sal, what do you think the US should learn from Baltimore and what would be optimal preparation? For example bridges should be sufficiently protected that no vessel can get at them. Obstacles that would ground accidents and ramming attempts (ships were hijacked thousands of years before aircraft) could be retrofitted to legacy bridges, and future crossings mandated to be tunnels where that matters.
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  27. Containerized TEL are cheap enough they don't need to be magnificent, just plentiful. The US is fond of fielding small numbers of highly effective systems, but those systems cannot be in two places at once. Chinese ships can dispatch from Chinese ports and not enter foreign ports at all if the missiles are to be used. Chinese ships do not need to hide their missiles to be a threat, and NOT hiding them makes a credible deterrent! Chinese ships do not need to be "Q" ships though the idea excites normies. They need only be disposable missile platforms good for one launch at the beginning of conflict. The "Q" nonsense is a media distraction. As both TEL and missiles are developed the angle of launch will cease to matter. Power is easily provided by containers fitted with gensets. Fuel is easily provided by flat rack tank containers and common hose and fittings. Power and plumbing quick disconnects are long solved problems. Second-layer containers could be fitted with passageways, power raceways, piping and gasketed connections between containers like the diaphraghms between railway passenger cars but with positive mechanical connections (ideally flanged QDs but bolts work fine).. They do NOT need to remain at sea at all times which would be a maintenance nightmare. Damage control doesn't matter because no one is more expendable to Beijing than its own troops. As with Russia there is a tradition of blithely expending manpower (see Mao's comments on nuclear war and take my word for nothing). Sinkings have little domestic visibility and even less in the bloodbath of an invasion. Crew survival doesn't matter because people lost at sea can be written off as heroes. The ships could be expended during an initial launch at Taiwan and supporting targets. They are easily replaceable over time.
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