Comments by "Sar Jim" (@sarjim4381) on "Drachinifel" channel.

  1. It became pretty clear by the mid-30's that the 8" guns of the Lexingtons were a lot of weight and space for something that was unlikely to have ever been used in battle. There were plans to replace them with 5"/38 guns after their outstanding trials successes in the first postwar destroyers. However, the one good thing about the 8" guns was they received the then experimental FC (Mk3) radar fire control director. The Lexington received two of these in late-1941 and participated in trials of the first radar directed surface gunfire. It turned out to be accurate enough that it was able to get a fix within 50 meters on the range and direction of a surface target. It worked particularly well on the Lexington due to less local interference by the superstructure compared to a battleship, and the operators on Lexington were able to confirm distance to target by being able to track her own shell splashes, using lobe switching. The FC (Mk3) was installed on a number of battleships in late 1941, and the lessons learned from the Lexington were used to improve accuracy with the FC (Mk3). One of the first FC (Mk3) battleship units was installed on the USS Washington, and her radar operators, trained by the Lexington operators, were able to straddle the Japanese battleship Kirishima on her first salvo during the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, probably saving the South Dakota by doing so. In a way, the Lexington actually did participate in surface action almost six months after she was sunk.
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  4. I visited the Texas last year. She is not being neglected. A large crew of volunteers supplemented by paid contractors when needed was hard at work when I was there sanding and painting rusted surfaces and reinforcing the interior of the hull in preparation for dry berthing. The money for this project is already in place, raised by the Battleship TEXAS Foundation and Texas state bonds. The problem had been required environmental impact reports that have sucked up a lot of money and delayed the project by over two years. The results of the reports were supposed to be finished by 2015. As any of you who have ever worked with environmental engineering consultants know, they never finish on time. The report was finally submitted, all 600 plus pages worth, and another year has been consumed addressing the results of the report. Of course, another round of responses to the responses was needed, and the vast majority of issues have been mitigated. Another impact to the project schedule has been hurricanes and tropical storms. The last two years in the Gulf of Mexico has been a time of intense hurricane and tropical storm activity affecting Houston and, as a result, the Texas. The storms caused the workers on the Texas to be evacuated, and flooding in the Houston area delayed any work on the ship and the dry berth project by months. It was hoped that the project could be completed y 2018, but now it looks more likely that it will be before hurricane season in 2020...assuming the Gulf behaves itself in 2019. All the preliminary engineering and construction planning is done for the dry berth and the sitework was started. We'll see what happens going forward. The bottom line is the ship is not just rotting away at anchor now and there's hope for the future.
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  6. This was a great discussion of the alternative outcomes. I suspect this was the last battle the Japanese would have had any chance of winning, as long as winning means "we sunk more ships that you did". In terms of the overall outcome of the war, the shipyards were pouring out huge numbers of the Fletcher class and their bigger and more dangerous brothers, the Sumner and Gearing classes. Vast numbers of Cleveland light and Baltimore heavy cruisers were still coming down the ways, not to mention the fearsome Iowa class. US carriers, from escort to fleet types, were also being commissioned and stationed in the Pacific, so any Japanese warship could count on meeting not only generally superior US surface ships but being swarmed by hundreds of US aircraft. As a final blow, the British Pacific Fleet shows up in January, 1945 with four more modern battleships, six fleet carriers, fifteen light carriers, and eleven excellent cruisers. This doesn't even take into account all the other smaller ships. The combined US and British logistic trains meant almost any ship damaged in battle could either be put back in service in a few days or made ready to sail to a rear repair area for heavier work. Japanese ships damaged really depended on whatever a crew could scrounge for repair work, all the while trying to remain camouflaged and dodging constant air attacks. By early 1945, very few ships were able to run the gauntlet of US subs to get back to mainland dockyards, and most of those they did were further damaged or sunk by allied air attacks. One can only wonder about the state of morale of many Japanese sailors in 1945. The Japanese were well and truly stuffed long before the events of August, 1945.
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  7. The Coast Guard cutter was the USCGC Modoc (WPG-46). She really played a more critical role in running down the Bismarck than she is often given credit for. She was on Greenland ice patrol and had responded to an SOS from several torpedoed ships from a convoy in the Bay of Biscay, along with her sister Northland and the much smaller USCGC General Greene. While rescuing survivors, she was amazed to see the grey outline of a large battleship loom up out of the gloom. The Modoc's radio operator had copied the British message ordering all RN ships to intercept the Bismarck. The captain was therefore aware of the rough position of the Bismark, but never expected to find herself this close to the path of the ship. She signaled Bismarck with signal lamps and radio but received no reply as she steamed past in silence. The Modoc's radioman immediately got on the aircraft radio the Modoc carried, raising that American piloted Catalina. She was able to give the Catalina the last seen position of the Bismarck. The Catalina was able to locate the Bismarck within fifteen minutes of getting the message from the Modoc, and was then able to notify Coastal Command. Thus, Modoc played an important part in the final location of the Bismarck. The three cutters continued to rescue men in the sea, all the while frantically signalling the Prince of Wales of their identities as Norfolk prepared to lob eight inch shells toward what it presumed to be a German destroyer. The Bismarck was already past the cutters, and the PoW was able to relay the cutter's friendly status to the other British ships and stop the Norfolk from opening fire, helped by a timely jam of her forward turrets. The three cutters patrolled the area looking for survivors but found none, only wreckage, floating corpses, and body parts, before making way again for Greenland. It was the closest to a major historic battle ever witnessed by Coast Guard Cutters
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  11. And fast forward to 2018 and planes and submarines are the battleships of today. Although Brazil once again had a second hand carrier, this time French rather than British, the worn out condition of the carrier combined with several major fires since being brought on strength in 2000 led to her decommissioning in 2017 and probable scrapping. Given the need for the Brazilians to have something that looked like a carrier in the fleet, she scrambled to make the British and offer they couldn't refuse and purchased the ex-HMS Ocean, renaming her the Atlantico. Since she is a mere 20 years old, the youngest major ship purchased from another navy since the Brooklyn class light cruisers in 1951, there's some chance that she may remain in service for another 15 years or so as a helicopter carrier. The dreams of Brazil to operate a true fixed wing carrier appear to be dashed at the moment. Argentina and Chile are no longer major players in South America. Argentina is in deep financial trouble, and her surface fleet has been relegated to possibly a few corvettes. Chile maintains a much more effective navy, but the youngest combat ships are the ex British Duke class frigates at 28 years old with other classes now being 30 years old or or older. Chilleans now seem content to control the Pacific coastline of her long borders while maintaining a navy strong enough to dissuade the Argentine and Peruvian Navies from any mischief. Speaking of Peru, while she wasn't part of the early 20th century arms race, she has now modernized most of her vessels and is probably the equal of Chile and much stronger than Argentina. The newest race is for submarines and naval aircraft. The Brazilians are still talking about building a nuclear sub, and Brazil, Peru, and Chile will all have air-independent submarines sometime in the 2020's. AI subs will be the new Dreadnoughts of the 21st century. Brazil is looking toward Embraer to build a new maritime patrol aircraft that would be the equal of the P-3 Orion, as well as maintaining their current fleet of upgraded Skyhawks, aircraft that don't have a carrier to operate from after a long battle with the Air Force to allow the Navy to operate fixed wing combat aircraft. There are rumors that Peru is in talks with Russia for a new maritime patrol platform as well as new SU-35s that could serve as maritime strike aircraft. Chile may cooperate with Brazil and Embraer in purchasing a new maritime patrol aircraft while continuing to upgrade its considerable fleet of F-16s. The Dreadnought race may be over but the arms race in South America continues unabated.
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  12. In addition to the Hipper being attacked by a blazing zombie ship headed straight for it with siren wailing, another strange incident occurred with one of Hipper's Arado Ar 196a float planes. It had taken off on a scouting flight on the morning of April 9, 1940. Due to the damage to the Hipper from the ramming, it was unable to return to the Hipper before it ran out of fuel. The crew then landed off the village of Eide and paddled ashore in their emergency raft. They posed as tourists trying to buy gas for their stranded car. Even though the locals didn't know Norway had been invaded, they were suspicious and called the local police - all three of them. After a short tussle, the identity papers on the two men (Ltn Polzin and Obit Techam) revealed them to be German navy pilots. This was shortly confirmed when a fishing boat towing the float plane returned to harbor. The crew were arrested and the aircraft turned over to the Royal Norwegian Navy Flying Service. They hastily painted out the German markings, substituted Norwegian insignia, and flew off to repel the Germans. The Norwegian Navy had a relatively large number of floatplanes. They were familiar with flying them, and several Norwegian pilots that understood German were recruited to fly the plane since they could understand the gauges and German instrument labels. The Arado flew several reconnaissance missions for the Norwegians and British, eventually ending up in an as hoc squadron of two British twin engine Walrus float planes, a Norwegian M.F. 11 floatplane, and the captured Arado. The British were eager to examine the Arado since it was the most modern float plane in German service. The British wanted to return to Britain before their planes were lost in the deteriorating situation in Norway, and the Norwegians wanted to fly to Britain to get modern planes and return to Norway to fight to the end. Plans were hastily made to fly this motley flotilla to a British seaplane base in the early morning of April 18. The two Norwegian pilots were not to return until 1945. The hazardous five hour flight went off without a hitch...until they got close to the British base. The Walrus's crew didn't have current radio codes or frequencies, the Arado had a German radio that couldn't operate on British frequencies, and the M.F. 11 didn't have a radio at all. The flight was picked up on radar and Gloster Gladiators were launched to intercept what was assumed to be an enemy flight. The two Walrus were faster than the Arado or M.F. 11 so they were ahead them on the flight. When the British fighter pilots spotted them, they knew the Arado was German and assumed the M.F. 11 was an unknown German type, since they appeared to be chasing the Walruses. They moved in for the kill, downing the M.F. 11 before the Walruses circled back, frantically wagging their wings, and the attack ceased. The pilot of the M.F. 11, a Lieutenant Diesen, was able to crash land on the water uninjured, and he and his crew were rescued. The story of the Admiral Hipper's float plane doesn't end here. The British started testing the Arado immediately, and personnel of the Marine Aircraft Experimental Establishment (MAEE) started to catalogue all the parts and make blueprints. A Fleet Air Arm commander was given flying duties to report on the attributes of the plane. All went well until April 26. The Arado landed safely after its fourth test flight. What happened next is a little murky, but it appears a strong wind gust got under the wing of the plane and, despite frantic efforts to save it, the fated Arado tipped over and sank in 150 feet of water. It was raised several days later but was too damaged to fly again. The engine fuselage, and instruments were examined and provided valuable data to the MAEF, and some of the features made it into later British float planes. Some bits are still left at the British and Norwegian navy's museums.
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  14. The USN's fleet train was the thing most responsible for the more varied and palatable food served on most USN ships. Whole ships were devoted to refrigeration and freezers, and those fresh foods were broken up into ship size loads for everything from minesweepers up. My dad's PT base in New Guinea and Solomons was visited every several weeks by these supply ships, who offloaded the food package to their tender. They would then be distributed to the individual boats. He'd get fresh milk, eggs, and frozen meat of all kinds, including turkeys for the holidays. His tender, the USS _Mobjack_, had added refrigeration space to hold all this food, but each PT also had a refrigerator. Not very big, but enough for five days of refrigerated food before they had to visit the tender for another load, generally needing to rearmed anyway. Each boat had a tiny galley, with one member of the crew being designated as the cook. This was pretty good duty on PT boat since they didn't have to do all the repetitive tasks like swabbing the deck and cleaning out the below decks spaces. A good cook was second only to a good skipper in terms of fighting effectiveness and morale. My dad's boat's Cookie (they were all called Cookie) was particularly good, turning out bread, pies, and even breakfast cinnamon rolls. He remembers his hams, steaks, and turkeys as being particularly good. When the boats were at base for heavier repairs and general shore duty, they had to eat at the base mess, and his memory of the food at these messes was nowhere near as good as they ate on the boat. Cookie and the skipper were both good horse traders, and they almost always ended up with a couple cases of cokes, a couple cases of beer, five or so gallons of ice cream, and some fresh vegetables. When they were at advance bases, they were stuck with C and K rations and whatever fish they could catch from the back of the boat. The best day he remembers from advance bases was when his boat sailed over a reef with about a foot of water under the keel. The sharp eyed lookouts didn't see just the reef but also a huge lobster colony! The boat immediately dropped anchor, and a couple of the good swimmers (my dad couldn't swim at all) dove down to start grabbing them. They managed to snatch about twenty of them before the squadron commander called on the radio and wanted to know why they were stalled in the lagoon. They "fixed" the engine problems and got underway again. That night they had the lobster feast to end all feasts. Cookie was even able to work some kind of magic with margarine to make it kinda taste like drawn butter. He said he didn't know if it was all the lobster or just being exhausted after having no nights off for almost three weeks, but he said it was the best night's sleep he ever had while in the Navy. :-)
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  22. While the hedgehog was a far superior A/S weapon over the stern discharge depth charges and the K-gun launcher. However, Hedgehog caused the Germans to start on a crash program to develop acoustic homing torpedoes. These could be fired just before a Hedgehog attack started, the torpedo homing on the sounds of the ship attacking it. These so called "down the throat" shots sank or seriously damaged a number of US DE's before an acoustic decoy was developed, once again by the British, called Foxer. It was towed several hundred yards behind the destroyer, the long cylindrical body having large parallel gaps to let water rush through. This generated cavitation noise about ten to one hundred times that of a ship's propellers. Since the acoustic system on the torpedo was set to home in on the loudest cavitation noises, Foxers were used very successfully to decoy Zaunkönigs on North Atlantic convoys, with only an estimated 77 hits from over 700 Zaunkönigs fired. Foxer came late to the war for some DEs, since production problems initially limited the numbers available for non-convoy escort DE's. USN captains developed their own brute force decoy system, firing off a salvo of charges from their K guns just before firing the Hedgehogs. This provided enough noise to decoy off any Zaunkönigs fired their way. Hunter killer groups centered around an escort carrier and three to five DE's were especially at risk from the Zaunkönig torpedoes since most of their attacks were on subs diving after being caught on the surface, and the DE's had to race in and fire off a Hedgehog salvo before the sub could escape. The K-gun diversion mostly stopped those "down the throat" attacks that sank about 14 DE's during the War. Interestingly, no US destroyer class carried Hedgehog during the war. In USN doctrine, the destroyer was a fleet unit whose main role was protecting the battle fleet. This required a much larger torpedo loadout than a DE, generally two quintuple tube mounts compared to the single triple tube mount on a Buckley class DE. A Hedgehog mount required about the same space and weight as another triple launcher, and US destroyers were already at their weight limits. DE's were able to handle the weight because they less overloaded to begin with, so they could usually retain their triple tube launcher while mounting a Hedgehog. During the late war period, threats from aircraft were greater than subs, so most US destroyers lost at least one set of tubes, and sometimes both if they were assigned radar picket duty. It's not hard to see the weight problem when the average Fletcher went from an AA armament of seven 20 mm cannon and a single 1.1 quad mount to ten 40mm and 10-12 20mm cannon. This increased on the Sumner and Gearing classes to 12-14 40mm guns and as many as 17 20mm cannon, some in twin mounts. The destroyers did finally receive Hedgehogs after the war, generally at the expense of the B mount 5" guns and a much reduced antiaircraft suite, usually six 3"/50 guns in twin mounts. Hedgehogs survived several attempts at "improving" them, lasting until the early 60's, with the advent of ASROC, finally ending a long service life.
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  24. The Komoran had a year's experience at sea, sinking ten merchant ships and capturing another. Captain Detmers drove his crew mercilessly in gunnery practice, fast unmasking of the guns, and torpedo drills. Detmers was satisfied her could take on any British merchant cruiser he might run across. In addition to her heavy guns and torpedoes, he had what was probably the deciding advantage in having five 20mm guns to rake the superstructure of the Sydney while the Sydney's three quad .50 machine gun mounts, of which only two could be trained on either beam, weren't manned before the Kormoran opened fire. The interrogation of surviving Kormoran crew revealed that Australian sailors running to man the light guns were cut down "by the hundreds" according to one 20mm gunner. It's possible that was correct, and that many of the Sydney's crew lay dead or wounded as a result of the raking fire, the damage to the turrets and superstructure from the 5.9" hits and then from the torpedo hit. It's likely that a large percentage of her 650 crew were dead or dying before the engagement was broken off and the Sydney, ablaze from stem to stern, drifted away. At some point, the fires got to one of the magazines and caused the explosion dimly seen on the horizon by the Germans from their lifeboats. The ship probably sank within minutes. Given everything that happened before the ship began to sink, it's not difficult to believe the few surviving crew, having no lifeboats, since all had been destroyed in the fighting, got in the water and quickly succumbed to sharks and hypothermia since there were no attempts being made to rescue them. [Edit: I misspoke about a magazine explosion. It was more likely a boiler explosion, but even that is debatable. The most likely cause of her sinking was the heavily damaged bow finally detached from the rest of the hull allowing enough water in to sink her. As Chris Richards pointed out in his comment below, it's inaccurate to describe the Sydney as drifting away. She wasn't under control, but was still making some headway. That probably helped to eventually detach the damaged bow from the hull and increase the amount of water getting in the hull so she sank faster.]
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  25. The Atlanta class antiaircraft escorts really came into their own when the quad 1.1 guns and .50 machine guns were replaced with the more capable 40mm and 20mm guns in late 1942. The introduction of the proximity fused round, or "VT" round, for the 5" guns made the Atlanta class the most useful antiaircraft escort in any navy. What the Atlanta class wasn't was a light cruiser, even though they were classed as such initially. They were really very large destroyers, and the original group of ships with te 5" rear wing turrets were very unstable in rough weather as too much armament was attempted on an enlarged destroyer hull. Their lack of ability to fight in a antisurface role was tragically shown by the loss of the Atlanta and Juneau during the Guadalcanal Campaign. The Oakland subclass removed the wing 5" turrets and replaced them with additional 40mm mounts, which improved stability and added much needed close-in fire. The designers of the class back in 1936 could hardly have foreseen the massive growth in electronics, directors, and radars that, while they increased the effectiveness of the ships, also exacerbated their topweight and stability issues. This was mostly solved with the introduction of the Juneau class, but they commissioned just too late for service in WWII. In belated recognition of their true role, all the surviving Atlanta/Oakland/Juneau class ships were reclassified as CLAA, Anti Aircraft Surface Escorts. Most never saw action again after WWII with only the Juneau in commision during the Korean War. The time of the gun based escort ship had passed, and all the survivors were decommissioned from the reserve fleet in 1965 and scrapped during the following two years. The Falklands War of 1982 caused a renewed interest in guns for antiaircraft protection of the fleet.
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  27. The French gave it the old college try with dual purpose armament, weighing down this class with nine six inch guns that were designed to be dual purpose. The weight saved by removing these and replacing them with either more 100 mm guns or, as the Americans proposed, the standard 5"/38 guns in twin mounts, would be an obvious benefit to the Richelieu class. The British understood that value and proposed replacing the Nelson class mixed armament with ether six or eight such twin mounts, although the limited availability of such guns saw WWII run out before this could happen. The French, however, still wanted their supposed dual purpose 6" guns, even though they never worked as intended before the war. They would spend even more money after the war trying to make these guns work in the AA role without any more success. The French wanted French weapons, working or not. The USN, not learning from the French example, went ahead and built the Worcesters, the heaviest class of "light" cruisers in any navy, armed with 12 of the supposed 6"/47 DP guns, and expended large amounts of scarce resources trying to make these work in the AA and surface roles, having little more success than the French. The class lasted only ten years in service and had guns that were not effective in the surface or AA role compared to the reliable 5"/38. The only two times she fired her 6" guns in anger in the AA role were both off Korea. The first was at an unidentified aircraft headed toward the ship. After three rounds of 6" fire that missed, the target was identified as a British Short Sunderland flying boat, and fire was checked. The second was the "Battle of the Geese", when Worcester, Helena and four destroyers opened up on an unidentified radar target that was later determined to be two large flocks of geese. It's unknown the number of geese casualties, but more than 300 rounds of 5" and 6" were fired at the poor creatures.
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  28. The biggest difference between RN and USN rations was the amount of refrigerator (cold room) and freezer space available. The USN built almost all ships from about 1934 forwards with enough cold room and freezer space available that the crew could have mostly fresh food available for the first 8-12 days (depending on climate) at sea and frozen meats and vegetables for about 20-23 days. By 1942, it was the goal of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (later Bureau of Logistics) to retrofit every ship with enough cold room and freezer space to have enough room for food based on the above plan. Each ship also needed to have about twice that cubic footage available for dry stores like flour, rice, and potatoes. The USN prepared a tremendous amount of dry store products. Loaf bread was the most popular, but men from the South wanted biscuits and grits while men from the North generally wanted oatmeal and toast or sliced bread. They all wanted cakes, pies, doughnuts, and coffee cakes. On destroyer size ships and up, one night was usually steak night, and every meal had some kind of meat product, with bacon, chicken, turkey, and some types of fish being common. The main meal in the Navy was called dinner, and that meal had the most food. Supper was served in the evening and was generally the lightest meal of the day, even lighter than breakfast. Breakfast was often eggs, bacon or sausage, griddle cakes, French toast, dry cereal, grits, or oatmeal along with fruit, fresh or canned. A pot of soup with bread, butter, and coffee as almost always available in the galley for men who missed a regular meal or were just hungry. Men out on the gun line during regular meal hours were brought out trays of sandwiches along with coffee, milk (if available), and fruitaides. Surprisingly, peanut butter and jelly was the most popular sandwich, followed by the aforementioned spam slathered with mustard and ketchup, and sometimes cheese. The fleet train could generally resupply ships with dry and frozen foods at sea, but they obviously couldn't do so when the ships were under constant threat of attack from kamikazes, and that's when the cook's talents (or lack of the same) would come to the fore. A good cook knew twenty ways to prepare food men would grow to hate, like spam or Australian lamb, and make it tasty enough the men would eat it. He could make dry eggs and dry milk taste like the fresh products, and knew how to substitute one ingredient for another and still make food that mostly tasted good. It's said that ships with the happiest crews had good cooks, and captains often horse traded with other captains for cooks and kinds of foods. Bad cooks could find themselves reassigned from a cruiser to something like a minesweeper just so a captain could get a good cook assigned to his ship. There are numerous stories of good "cookies" given anything they wanted by officers and crews, from women to vodka, as long as they could keep them on their ship. I'm sure being an admiral was good, but it seems like being the most popular cook in a fleet was even better. Well, rats, I've done another "War and Peace", but I now realize I have no idea how things went in the RN. From everything I heard and read, British and Commonwealth (especially Australian) ships didn't fare as well in the food department. Anyone here who knows how food service went in the RN?
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  35. As shown by the Hopkins , the US 4"/50 was a hard hitting and deadly gun in the hands of a well trained Crew. The naval armed guard was led by Lt. (j.g.) Kenneth Martin Willett, and he drilled his crew constantly in loading and firing. He also trained volunteer merchant mariners in ammunition passing and as backup loaders. The standard rate of fire for a well trained crew was nine rounds a minute. According to one of the gunnery officers on Steir who was directing fire from the forward 5.9" guns thought its rangefinder, and was closely observing return fire from Hopkins , that ship fired 16 rounds in the first minute, an astounding rate of fire for a hand loaded weapon. Even as more and more men were being mowed down by the 20mm cannon aboard Steir , others ran to take their place, most of them being killed after getting off a few rounds. Finally, after the intense six minute battle, there were no more left to man the still intact gun, with the few survivors taking to a single lifeboat. The German ship moved in closer to asses the situation, sure that resistance had ceased. They didn't count on Merchant Marine Cadet Edwin Joseph O'Hara. The survivors in the lifeboat watched in amazement as the mortally wounded O'Hara somehow dragged himself to the gun. There were still three shells in the ready rack. O'Hara dragged all three shells over to the gun, hiding behind remnants of the shot up gun tub. He must have been in great pain as he lifted the first round and rammed it home. He was able to reach down to the firing pedal and pressed it home with his hand. The first round was on its way before the Germans knew what hit them. OHara repeated the feat with the second round in about nine seconds. He had the last round loaded and either fired the gun and it exploded, or the gun emplacement was hit by a 5.9" round from Steir . Either way, when the smoke had cleared, neither O'Hara nor the gun were to be seen. Although this is disputed, it's possible O'Hara's last round may have severed the steering controls of the Stier . Drifting and unable to respond to the helm, the captain realized his ship was doomed. With the supply ship standing by, the crew was moved to the supply ship in lifeboats, then Stier was sunk with scuttling charges. Merchant Marine Academy Cadet O'Hara, only along for a training cruise, was awarded the Merchant Marine Distinguished Service Medal while Lt. (j.g.) Kenneth Martin Willett, USNR, was awarded the Navy Cross for this action. Very few ships, naval or merchant marine, have ever fought such a gallant battle in the finest naval tradition of sink the enemy or be sunk trying.
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  36. The USN officially received nine Flower class corvettes from Canadian dockyards and ten directly from RN service in 1942 and early 1943, all to fill in dire shortages of convoy escorts across the Atlantic and from the Caribbean to New York and Canada. The British built ships served as transatlantic convoy escorts through early 1944. Eight Canadian built vessels actually served in the USN while one, USS Beacon, assigned to the USN and commissioned as a USN ship, never actively serving. She was transferred the RN as the HMS Dittany in May, 1943. These modified Flowers were classed as patrol gunboats in USN service, a role the Canadian built ships actually performed. All eight vessels escorted coastal convoys up and down the US coast, to and from the Caribbean and sometimes as far north as Newfoundland. The British built ships were taken in hand as soon as they could get to a US dockyard. The British 4" was replaced with US 4"/50 and the aft Vickers 2 pdr pom pom or twin Lewis guns replaced with a 3"/50. The other Lewis guns were either replaced or augmented with 20mm Oerlikons. The Canadian built ships came with a standard armament of two 3"/50 and 2-4 20mm guns. The USS Pert, maintaining the USN tradition of placing a gun everywhere there was an empty space, had, in addition to the 3" guns, at least seven 20mm, three twin Lewis gun, and a single Browning M2 .50 caliber machine gun mounted on top of the bridge. There was a good reason for all these gun, beyond the enjoyment US sailors took firing guns. Coastal convoys were often attacked by U-boats running on the surface. Because the PGs retained their British Type 271 radar, the rest of the war up to about 1944, they were able to detect submarines up to 3,500 yards, or about 2 miles. This was often more than the U-boat lookouts could see in the typical haze and fog of the coast, especially at night. Once detected, the PG would call for flank speed and charge the U-boat with guns blazing, the hail of fire forcing the U-boat to dive with alacrity. Once it was down, the PG would track the sub with its ASDIC (also British) and hold it down until faster escorts could arrive to attack it. The PG would then sprint back to the convoy and take up the escort role again. U-boats attacked East Coast convoys in wolf packs, and each PG would often have to perform their cavalry charge attacks five or six times during a single escort voyage. The little PG/Flower class corvettes were roundly hated by US sailors for the rolling Drach mentioned, lack of berthing accommodations, and the constant wetness of the ship. Since the ships were built with North Atlantic duty in mind, one can only imagine the torture of being below decks in tropical waters. Nevertheless, the plucky little ships plugged a hole in US escort capabilities during the first two years of the US war, and their presence saved many a merchant ship and the lives of many merchant sailors.
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  38. My cousin served aboard the New Jersey from 1986 to 1989. The two "resort pools" on the New Jersey were retrofitted to the former 40 mm gun tubs because of rulings from the brass. Back before they got involved, swimming in tropical waters was a way to cool off during long deployments to the Pacific. Given the freeboard of the New Jersey, some sailors got injured diving from her decks. It was mostly things like a few broken arms, but those in charge of fleet safety weren't having it. No more swimming, and morale plummeted. Even though living spaces were air conditioned, working space weren't, and place like workshops and the engine rooms could get over 110 degrees in the tropics. Captain Katz solved this by having his engineering staff rig up a portable swimming platform that was only about five feet about the sea surface. Morale returned to normal as the guys could once again get in some swimming. This worked until the medical staff in Washington got involved. With reports that some men were picking up various tropical parasites from swimming in the Persian Gulf, swimming was banned completely to save the three cases that had ever showed up from the New Jersey, all easily cured. For those that have ever sailed in tropical waters, not being able to swim so you could cool off from the oppressive tropical heat just seemed impossible, and crew morale immediately suffered. Captain Katz once again called on his engineering staff for a solution. Once of the Machinist Mates was a swimming pool installer in civilian life. He came up with a vinyl over foam covering that could be used to line the two forward abandoned 40 mm gun tubs. They were filled from portable pumps that ran through a filtering system devised by engineering to make sure those nasty parasites couldn't get on board. The crew was able to at least paddle around and cool off, and morale soared. Thus, the New Jersey came to be the only USN combat ship to ever have two swimming pools.
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  39. The original 37mm/C30 gun was a pretty terrible antiaircraft weapon. It was the only weapon of its size that was single shot and hand loaded. The practical ROF was no more than 30 RPM, totally inadequate for antiaircraft fire. The mounting was hand operated and very slow to train and elevate. The M42 was a far superior gun, fully automatic and fed from a five round clip, much like the 20mm, but it wasn't available until 1944. The M43 gun was the first with the option of a power twin mounting but changed the clip to an inferior 8 round strip loading, lowering the practical ROF to 180 RPM compared to 250 RPM for the M42. Unfortunately for the Germans, the development of single and double wet mounts of the 37mm M42 and quad mount 20mm guns gave Doenitz false hope that U Boats so armed could successfully fight it out on the surface against allied aircraft and transit the Bay of Biscay safely. The first couple boats armed with these weapons did have some success as at least five Coastal Command aircraft were lost flying into this unexpected wall of flak. Coastal Command was quickly able to work out the types and locations of the weapons through photo reconnaissance flights. The countermeasure was to always attack in groups of three and from the bow if possible, since no boat had more than a single 20 mm mounted forward. Even the few U-Flak boats armed with two quad 20's and two twin M42's mounted fore and aft were not able to fight off the swarms of Coastal Command aircraft that set upon surfaced U-Boats from mid-1943 on. The real answer was a Dutch invention, the schnorkel, so the boats never had to come to the surface at all.
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  42. Fantastic! I've been waiting for a PT boat guide. My dad was in Ron 10 on PT-124 from January 4, 1943 until it was disbanded in November, 1945. The Lewis guns and turrets were long gone when he arrived. They only carried two torpedoes by mid-1943, and they spent the vast majority of their time shooting up those barges, by then being used for attempted resupply of isolated islands. The Japanese barges kept adding bigger guns, and the squadron kept scrounging bigger guns of their own. It was an arms race in tropics, and the Navy, with the exception of the 40mm Bofors, never approved any of it. Dad's boat did have some ad-hoc armor. One of the guys was a metal worker, and he crafted a pair of 3/8" sheet steel plates from a scrapped P-39, and the crew installed them around the refrigerator/freezer. It used ammonia for refrigerant, and a stray round going through the refrigerant line filled the boat with ammonia fumes. Even worse, it meant the refrigerator was out of commission, and that meant no cold milk or ice cream, things they got from their monthly visit to the USS Mobjack, the squadron's tender. No one much cared about armor for the crew, but they wanted their ice cream and milk! Oh, I forgot to mention that no one in the squadron thought very highly of Cdr. Bulkeley. He got to be a big celebrity because of the daring rescue of McArthur, and pretty soon he became the Navy's version of him. He was apparently an intrepid sailor, and the guys felt like he wanted to make sure everyone knew it. His book "At Close Quarters", written in 1962, got an even frostier reception, since most of the guys felt like it was a self promotion book, but also a promotion for JFK and the PT-109. A lot of other heroic actions by PT boats got short shrift in the book.
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  48. The only really effective role of US PT boats in the Pacific was preventing Japanese resupply of isolated island garrisons. It was all gun battles between the PTs and Japanese barges to starve out these garrisons. The torpedos had no aiming system except point the boat in the right direction, fire, and hope for the best. Even with the improved Mark 8 torpedoes, the firing mechanisms weren't built for the exposed position of the torpedoes on a PT in the tropics. The electric firing black powder charge often leaked water and the firing mechanism shorted out. Most boats actually engaged in a torpedo attacks had men standing by with a large sledgehammer to hit the exposed trigger and fire the torpedo. The boat had to slow down to an even keel before firing or the gyro wouldn't be able to get a good position and the torpedo would run off in surprising directions, including circling back on your boat. The tubes were packed with grease and oil to ensure the torpedo didn't get stuck in the tube. The black powder charge would sometimes ignite all this grease, causing a huge cloud black smoke that immediately gave away the position of the boat. My dad was on PT boats from late 1942 until May, 1945. By mid 1943, the tube were landed and the torpedoes were carried in simple shackle mounts. To fire the torpedo, one man popped the shackles while another yanked a lanyard to start the torpedo motor. Both guys then pushed to torpedo overboard to start the attack. As you might imagine, this was even more inaccurate then firing them from tubes, but at least the torpedoes would run once they got in the water. My dad's boat made eight torpedo attacks. Seven missed, and the one that hit was a dud. The boat went from carrying four torpedoes to two and, by early 1944, none, with the weight and space saved devoted to more 20mm and 40mm guns. Most boats after 1943 functioned as motor gunboats. They were successful in that role, but some of the romantic stories about the PTs charging in on torpedo attacks and sinking a major surface vessel were more propaganda than reality.
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  55. The reason why the electric razor trick could have worked was razors of that time only had shielding so they didn't interfere (much) with the medium wave AM broadcast band from about 550 KHz to 1550 KHz. This was the only band used for commercial broadcasting at the time, FM and higher frequencies still being in the future. An unshielded electric motor emits tons of spurious RF signals, and that's why the razors (may) have worked. As it turned out, the Fritz-X and HS-293 receivers operated at a frequency of about 50 MHz, quite high for 1943. The Americans and British spent a lot of time trying to discover the guidance frequencies so they could develop transmitters to jam those frequencies. They sent a total of 40 radios to sea on two DE's off Italy in hopes of being able to pick up the frequencies of glide bombs actually in use. Through a combination of faulty intelligence and bad luck, the frequency pairs chosen were in the 17 MHz to 20 MHz range. After deploying some hastily built jamming transmitters, the results were...nothing, since the jammers were nowhere near the correct frequencies. Through one bit of luck, a single guidance transmission at 50 MHz was picked up, opening up the possibility that all the previous work had been for naught. A twenty-three year old US second lieutenant was part of the team trying to decode this knotty problem. He was also an amateur radio operator and had built a number of his own ham radio transmitters. He calculated that a 50 MHz receiver would ideally operate with a 3 KHz intermediate frequency in a single conversion circuit. Without getting into all the complexities of an IF circuit, the main advantage is the IF, operating below the transmitting frequency of signals the operator wanted hear, made it far easier to design band pass filters. These were then able to filter out frequencies outside the desired range. A frequency of 3 KHz was ideal because there were no commercial broadcasters operating in that range. Anything being received above or below the IF could be removed with high or low band pass filters. A 3 KHz signal couldn't be removed as it was needed for the IF to work. A number of Hallicrafters ham transmitters were modified to operate at 100 watts at 3 MHz, a powerful signal that would swamp an IF in that range. They were tested off Florida and then sent to Italy. No ship with the jamming transmitter was successfully attacked, and glide bombs could be seen going wildly off course as soon as the jammer was turned on. The project to modify the radios received an AAA1 priority since D-Day was less than four months away. Between British and American radio manufacturers, over 500 jammers were built in about a month. It didn't take long for the Germans to figure out we had come up with some kind of radio jammer, but it took them until after D-Day to come up with their answer, a wire guided missile that couldn't be jammed Now, about the electric razors. In theory, an unshielded electric razor motor is one of the dirtiest electric devices around. It will put out spurious emissions on almost any HF frequency, including 3 KHz. However, the RF energy has to be tiny, like in the tenths of a watt. Because the path from a shaver to the glide bomb is line of sight, the power output isn't quite as important, but I'd need to be convinced that the electric razor defense ever really worked. The HS 123 and Fritz-X bombs only had about 1 hit for every 20 launched, and having them just go out of control through a guidance failure wasn't uncommon. Having a guidance failure for reasons other than guys waving around electric razors seems a lot more likely to me. I've scoured all the books I have and and online resources and, although I've found numerous instances of the electric razor story, I've yet to find evidence of any kind of controlled test to show it would work IRL. Unless I can find something, I remain skeptical.
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  57. The initial 3"/50 was also capable of antiaircraft fire, but it was a terrible gun for surface action, with a shell weight barely adequate to penetrate the hulls of larger merchantmen, let alone a warship. They were armed with this inadequate gun specifically to discourage surface action. The Pacific war changed from mostly using torpedoes to actually needing an effective deck gun by late 1943. The remaining Japanese shipping was mostly shallow draft sampans and coasters that couldn't be sunk with a torpedo. The 3"/50 was generally swapped out with a 4"/50, a very effective gun for surface action. Many skippers wanted to retain their 4"/50s when the official armament became the 5"/25. They avoided enough yard time to allow the gun to be changed and generally did whatever subterfuge they could to avoid losing the 4"/50. A few managed to retain the 4"/50 right up to the end of the war. Most skippers did come to recognize the hitting power of the 5"/25 gun, especially when a director was mounted in the last year of the war. The 5"/25 needed no preparation for diving, unlike the 4"/50, which needed a muzzle plug and the telescopic sight removed. Although the 5"/25 was theoretically capable of antiaircraft fire, the Mark 40 mount only allowed a maximum elevation of 40 degrees rather than the other marks of 5"/25 gun mounts that allowed an elevation of 85 degrees. This made the wet mount submarine gun a single purpose antiship piece. Even if it had been capable of antiaircraft fire, it's doubtful a submarine would have chosen to fight it out with an aircraft 10 miles away flying at 15,000 feet rather than diving to avoid the fight. The 40mm gun(s) was an effective antiaircraft weapon at the 3 to 5 miles range a sub might have to fight off an aircraft that jumped them at the surface. It was also found the gun did a good job of shooting up and sinking many of the lightly built Japanese merchant shipping remaining toward the end of the war.
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  58. Admiral King was an alcoholic, womanizing, and constantly pissed off desk sailor. He seems to have developed his Anglophobia sometime during WWI when he was a staff officer assigned as liaison to the British Home Fleet. He apparently got into several battles with British officer over antisubmarine tactics, and is rumored to have only just escaped sacking when discovered in the bed of a British admiral's wife, although I have never been able to learn the name of the admiral or his wife, so that's really hearsay at this juncture. After that, he seems to have developed a loathing of all things British, and the RN in particular. He refused to allow convoys off the US coast for the first six months of the WWII. While his stated reason was we didn't have enough escort ships, others suspect it's because the convoy was a British invention. He also fought the Army's plan to fly B-24's to fly from Greenland and Iceland to close the Iceland gap to German subs. He felt the Navy's next flying boat, the Coronado, could handle the task, even though the Coronado turned out to be a failure as a long range patrol bomber.  On the plus side, King was the main advocate for the invasion of Guadalcanal in the face of fierce Army opposition. While it was a long and bloody campaign, history has proven King's strategic thinking correct. Guadalcanal was the first retaking of conquered Japanese territory in the war, and it proved the Army and Navy together could use amphibious operations to take islands from the Japanese. He was also instrumental in seeing that enough naval strength was available in the Pacific in 1942 to protect supply lines to Australia and prevent the Japanese actually invading the country. By far his most egregious decision was his role in the court-martial of Charles B McVay III, captain of the USS Indianapolis. He overturned Admiral Nimitz's letter of reprimand as a result of the sinking of the Indianapolis and instead demanded a court-martial, and carried his demands all the way to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal. Forestall gave in because he didn't want to start an open battle between him and King so soon after the end of the war. The court-martial eventually convicted Captain McVay in November, 1945 of failing to zigzag as an antisubmarine measure. Even though Forrestal overturned the sentence, and McVay had an essentially honorary promotion to rear admiral just before his retirement in 1949, the court-martial was the end of the career for a promising and honorable Navy officer. Indianapolis's survivors came together and tried for many years to have the court-martial removed from what they consider "their skipper's" record. McVay spent many years in self recrimination over the deaths of so many of his men, even though most (but not all) the survivors tried to rally around him. His family stated he received hate mail and telephone calls from some survivor's families for many years after the court-martial, particularly as each anniversary of the sinking approached. McVay suffered from mental health problems for years after the court-martial. His family reported he would wake up screaming from nightmares he was back in the water with his shipmates, trying to fight off attacking sharks. Finally, he lost the battle and, in 1968, committed suicide using his Navy service pistol on the back steps of his Litchfield, Connecticut home. After all the attempts to clear McVay's name, it was a 12 year old schoolboy's class project in 1998 that finally bought the miscarriage of justice to national attention. Hunter Scott testified before Congress and turned over the voluminous notes he took from interviews with almost 150 Indianapolis survivors. Congress passed a resolution in 2000 asking the Navy to exonerate Captain McVay. President Clinton, to his credit, signed the resolution the same year. The Navy finally, after fighting tooth and nail not to, exonerated Captain McVay in July, 2001, with Secretary of the Navy England ordered McVay's Navy record purged of the court-martial and of all implication of wrongdoing on his part. Why was King so intent on seeing McVay convicted? The evidence implicates King carrying a grudge all those years because McVay's father, Admiral Charles B McVay Jr, had ordered a letter of reprimand be placed in King's file in 1922 because he and others were caught sneaking women onto a Navy ship. He apparently decided his best revenge was seeing the career of his son destroyed, and this is exactly what Admiral Charles McVay Jr thought was the reason. King has been accused of the death of many US Navy sailors and merchant sailors because of his refusal to initiate convoys. That can be argued, but one death can be laid squarely on King's shoulders, and that was the death of Captain McVay.  I'm sorry for the length of this, but I couldn't let the mention of Admiral King pass by without telling this story. Like Hunter Scott, I was a 16 year old schoolboy in 1963, and my junior history project was the sinking of the Indianapolis. Captain (then Rear Admiral) McVay paid me the honor of speaking to me for almost three hours over two days about him, his ship, and the sinking. He told me of the heroism of not only his own crew but what survivors would call the Angel of the Sky and the two Angels of the Water. Many more of the crew wouldn't have survived without them. The rescue was more a result of them and their amazing efforts than the Navy. Look them up to find out what they did or this will become more of War and Peace than it already has.  Even in 1963, McVay still bore the full responsibility for the sinking if his ship. My school project didn't stir anything but one newspaper story, but it left me carrying Charles McVay in my heart. My heart sank on that terrible day of November 6, 1968 when I heard of Admiral McVay's death, and not a November 6 goes by that I don't think of him.  There are only two villains in this story. The first are the unknown naval bureaucrats that denied the Indianapolis a destroyer escort and then delayed rescue for days because they didn't have a system to alert them when a single ship was overdue. The other is Admiral Ernest King.
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  60. Vought produced two world beating fighters and two dogs. You mentioned one dog, the Cutlass, that actually made it to squadron service. At least one could argue the Cutlass failed because it used too many new features at once with and underdeveloped engine, but it did have potential. The other Vought dog was the F6U Pirate. It used a thoroughly conventional layout of straight wings and various aerodynamic bits and pieces in an attempt to wring out maximum performance from the largest turbojet available at the time, the Westinghouse J34 with an afterburner, a first for carrier aircraft. Unfortunately, US engine designers were still working out how to make powerful turbojets that would fit in small naval fighters, and the J34 wasn't the engine designers hoped for. It was seriously underpowered for sea level use, although the Pirate did have a top speed of nearly 600 mph at 20,000 feet. At sea level, however, it could be outrun by the speedy F8F Bearcat prop fighter, leading to the nickname "Groundhog". Given the straight wind design, it had no real development potential, so only 33 were built. On the plus side, it was a docile aircraft to fly and never killed any pilots, something that couldn't be said for the Cutlass, with 320 produced, in which 25 pilots died and 28% of the airframes were destroyed in accidents. Amazingly, in an attempt to win public favor for an aircraft already being being denigrated as a widowmaker, the Cutlass was ordered into use by the Blue Angels. I've never been able to find out what admiral made that decision, which is probably just as well for him. While trying to make full power take offs, the aircrafts experienced multiple serious flameouts, total hydraulic failures, engine fires on the ground and in the air, and a landing gear door falling off into a crowd of spectators, miraculously not killing or injuring anyone. The last straw was Lt. Lewis "Whitey" Feightner experiencing a total hydraulic failure in the first Cutlass Blue Angels flight while attempting to make a full afterburner takeoff. After clipping some trees at the end of the runway and losing one of the two engines, Feightner contemplated ejecting but was afraid of the risks to the people on the ground. He stayed with the plane long enough to get the backup hydraulic system on line so he could make a hard left turn, get the gear down, and safely get back on the runway, all the while a huge blue flame of hydraulic fluid trailed behind him. The crowd cheered, assuming it was part of the show. During a straight and level flight on the way to an airshow in Chicago,, the other Cutlass in use also experienced a flameout, forcing Feightner's wingman, Lt Harding MacKnight, to make an emergency landing at Naval Air Station Glenview. Being short on fuel, Feightner had to make an emergency landing at what was then Orchard Airpark, plowing through rows of peach baskets place on the new runway to keep vehicles off, thereby landing on what became the first runway of what we now know as Chicago O'Hare Airport. The Blue Angels brass, deciding discretion was the better part of valor, had the two aircraft dismantled and trucked to NAS Memphis, where they served for many years a maintenance instructional airframes. Ironically, both were eventually destroyed while being used for firefighting training.
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  61. One of the potential advantages of the Montana class postwar was for midshipmen cruises. The term "midshipmen" In this regard is a little misleading, since the postwar Navy had summer cruises for not only Annapolis midshipmen but for naval cadets from the various colleges and university, midshipmen from the Coast Guard and Merchant marine academy, plus quite a large number of petty officers being trained for specialized roles like electronics and engineering. While a Montana required a large (2,400 crewmen) manning in war, she could get by with about half that number in peacetime, especially with the trainees filling in some roles. That left a lot of berthing space for midshipmen of all types, something that was lacking in the cruisers normally used in that role. Not only could they have accommodated between 500-600 midshipmen, their 15,000 mile range at 15 knots would have allowed them to visit any part of the world with one fueling, an expensive proposition for smaller ships with less range. The class also had expansive flag accommodations, useful for training command staff, as well as the largest Combat Information Center afloat, allowing more training opportunities. The fact the flag accommodations would have also been the most comfortable in the Navy for admirals tagging along on training voyages wouldn't hurt, since their recommendations were important for deciding what ships remained in active service. They would have been carrying modern 5"/54 guns, and probably would have had their 40 mm guns replaced with the 3"/50 guns that became standard postwar, allowing trainees experience on a wide range of modern weapon types. Of course, all this assumes that at least a couple of the class would have been built and commissioned by war's end. If they had been, their best postwar use may have been as the world's largest training ships.
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  69. While the evidence of dazzle or disruptive camouflage being effective against submarines is still controversial, what's not controversial is the effects of painting ships when it came to keeping convoys together and handling them in port. The same disruptive effects that made it hard for a sub to estimate range and heading did the same when escorts had to try to keep such ships on station in convoys. Many escorts had a hard time telling which ship was which and if it was on or off station. Books of dazzle painting schemes were issued to escorts and convoy commanders to help identify ships, and the use of semaphore signals was often needed to confirm a ship's speed and heading. Even so, there are reports of collisions between dazzle painted ships because of these issues. Since dazzle painting was expensive to apply and maintain, it was generally only applied to ships of 3,000 or more. German submarine commanders reported they didn't bother with non-dazzle painted ships, assuming they were too small and less valuable targets, so dazzle painting was a signal to a submarine of which ships to attack firsFt. The same problems were even worse while ships were in port, since the ships were packed in together under conditions of poor visibility made it hard for tugs to know what ship they were trying to maneuver and where they should go. This too led to confusion and some collisions. There have been humourous reports of sailors returning from a hard night of of drinking while on liberty. They'd climb onto the wrong ship because they all kind of looked alike through bleary eyes. Sometimes a tottering sailor would sneak past the officer of the deck and just crawl into an available bunk to sleep it off. The realization they were on the wrong ship didn't happen until morning muster. :-)
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  72. It also depends on the type of antiaircraft guns mounted on a sub. The quad 20 mm mounts on U Boats did a good job of sending enough metal downrange that attacking aircraft, if not shot down, were at least thrown off the accuracy of their bomb runs. As you say, once Coastal Command figured out the limitations of those mounts and changed their routes of attack, being attacked by three or more aircraft was almost always a death sentence for the sub, even if they shot down one or two of the attacking aircraft. In addition to bombs and depth charges strafing was a killer for surfaced subs. Since the AA guns had very little in the way of splinter protection, strafing would disable or kill many of the members of the gun crews, and they couldn't be replaced fast enough to drive off all the attackers. The idea of the Flak U Boat (U-flak) was only tested on four boats. While there was some limited success by the first two U-flaks (U-256 and U-441), they and the other two that were actually converted suffered heavy damage and lost 10-20 crew during the attacks by the RAF. Once the U-flaks were repaired, they were returned to service as normal VIIC boats when it was obvious that the idea was a failure. The US experience in the Pacific was quite different. All the fleet boats had at least one 40 mm Bofors, and many had two. The most heavily armed boat I've been able to find was USS Balao a boat whose captain seemed to delight in collecting guns. It had two 5"/25 guns, two 40 mm, at least two and sometimes three 20 mm cannon, four .50 Browning machine guns, and, although I don't know how many times this loadout was used, stanchion mounts for another four or five .30 Browning machine guns. In the case of the USN, this wasn't really in response to Japanese air attacks (although somewhere around 100 aircraft were shot down during the war) but to strafe Japanese armored barges that were resupplying stranded Japanese troops. Their draft was too shallow to sink with a torpedo, so subs often teamed up with PT boats to use their radars to locate and attack these barges. All the boats would use their smaller guns to keep Japanese gun crews away from their heavy armament until the sub could bring it's 5" guns to bear. It was the only weapon in the absence of a destroyer that could sink a barge, and most barges kept to shoal waters where the destroyer couldn't follow them. My dad served on a PT boat, and his boat was involved in these "combined operations". Being a much braver guy than me. he said it was the most fun he'd ever had during his service while he was still vertical. :-)
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  78. The USS Narwhal and Nautilus with their pair of 6" (152mm) guns proved to be surprisingly useful in the Pacific once their difficult and unreliable MAN diesels were replaced with the slightly less powerful but infinitely more reliable GM engines. Their great size, large fuel tanks, and great interior volume allowed both boats to conduct war patrols of 70 days. They were the first submarines to have "cold rooms" (refrigerators) and freezers, so fresh vegetables and fruits were available during the first two weeks or so of a patrol and frozen meats available for almost the entire time, something only dreamt of by earlier submariners. Both boats received partial air conditioning to make things less onerous for passengers and crew for their new roles of being a general workhorse for many special operations, carrying everything from commandos to evacuees from occupied islands, including women, children, and at least one infant. They carried ammunition and other supplies to island outposts and the occupied Philippines, did shore bombardment everywhere from the Aleutians to the Japanese mainland, and landed various Army personnel as liaisons and advisors to local guerilla groups in the Philippines. In between, both boats sank a surprising number of enemy vessels with deck guns and torpedoes while withstanding a several severe and prolonged depth charge attacks. They were really more successful than the Navy ever expected them to be. Both boats were completely worn out from hard service at the beginning of 1945 and were decommissioned in April and May of 1945, stricken days later, and unceremoniously sold off for scrap before VJ Day. The only remnants are the two 6" guns of the Narwhal functioning as the Navy equivalent of gate guards at the submarine base in New London, CT.
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  84.  Alexander Challis  Indeed, and even worse for the Germans, it was an offhand remark from a captured British airman that stopped them from using Metox on submarines. He pulled a prank of his interrogators by telling them British planes were able to home in on the incredibly weak RF radiation from the Metox receiver's local oscillator. Since the Germans couldn't believe that the Enigma code had been broken, they had long believed the British had some kind of submarine detector that allowed Coastal Command planes to attack a surfaced sub without warning. As a result of this prank, Doenitz ordered all Metox units turned off on July 31, 1943. In addition to Enigma intercepts, the British had developed airborne centimetric radar, something the Germans believed impossible. It was this higher frequency radar that was the cause of more attacks, not planes detecting a Metox receiver. The USN wasn't immune to this silliness. A single experiment at Princeton "discovered" the signals from local oscillators of shipborne receivers could be picked up by a German sub 20 miles away. The Navy spent millions developing "radiation safe" radios and ordering all non-safe radios to be turned off when out of port. After the war it was discovered that the scientists involved had cooked the books and stretched the distance this signal could be received by using exceptionally poorly tuned radios with leaky LOs and huge antennas to pick up the LO signals. The distance using an average radio and average antenna was really about 75 feet. The test was paid for by a radio company named EH Scott, a name familiar to modern stereo buffs. I'll bet you can't guess which company was ready with compliant radios. :-)
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  86. By 1941 it was clear that the 1.1" AA guns were not going to be the standard armament for the USN. Many of the early bugs with the mounts and feed system had been worked out by Pearl Harbor and they were considered to be reliable guns. The problem was testing and the results of battles in the Med showed a 1.1" (28mm) was just too light to reliably bring down more modern planes, the Zero being a prime example. Consequently, planners revised the armament plan for DE's to have 8-10 40mm and DD to mount 10-14 of the same guns. Because of the space and weight available on the Fletchers, the final loadout on Fletchers by the end of 1942 was a minimum of 10 guns, with a quad mount in place of the previous quad 1.1" between mounts 53 and 54, and twin mounts on either side of the aft stack. A way was found, by adding a pair of gun platforms, to add another pair of twin mounts on either side of the forward bridge level. That was a total of 12 barrels and was the most common package by mid-1943 when there were finally enough Bofors guns to go around. The 16 gun ships landed turret 53 and added a platform for another quad that was superfiring over the existing quad mount, giving a total of 16 guns. 20mm guns carried for 7 to 18 depending on build date and the number of twin mounts available. The 40mm and 5"/38 guns were all radar directed, and the 20mm sights were constantly upgraded during the war. There really was no other platform with the speed, maneuverability, firepower, and electronics of a Fletcher. The Japanese recognized the danger of the radar equipped early warning Fletchers and concentrated their attacks on such ships, especially off Okinawa. It was only their heavy AA armament that allowed most of them to survive in that role, with several having downed five or more Japanese aircraft unassisted in a single day.
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  91. Surcouf could have been a fairly successful cruiser submarine if she had survived long enough to actually reach the Pacific. Her nominal diving depth wasn't exceeded until the much later nuclear attack submarines of the USN. She would have been useful for attacking merchant shipping while operating as a normal sub and warships on the surface using her main battery. She was relatively immune to depth charge attack since her great diving depth of almost 600 feet (183 meters) exceeded the capability of Japanese depth charges in early 1942, and she probably could have gone to 900-1000 feet (274-305 meters) without serious risk to the hull, making her effectively immune to underwater attack, at least from the surface. With the addition of some radars and additional night fighting equipment, she could have done a good job of shore bombardment on the many small Japanese outposts in the Pacific, as well as landing raiding and reconnaissance parties using her small boats. All that potential came to nought on the night of February 18 or early morning of the 19th, 1942, while enroute from Halifax to transit the Panama Canal and on to the Pacific. About all we know for sure is the last thing heard of her was a routine position message sent at 1600 on the 18th. The SS Thompson Lykes reported colliding with and running over an underwater object. Unfortunately, this was very early in the war for the US, and there was an unreasonable fear of U-Boats infesting the Caribbean. The crew of the Lykes reported men in the water yelling for help, some in English. Assuming she had hit a U-Boat and not wanting to fall prey to the other German subs assumed to be in the area, she continued on, sending a signal to the Panama Defense Frontier base at Panama City on the night of the 18th. The actual time of the message is still a little murky, but it seems to have been at about 2200. What the Lykes actually hit is still a point of much debate. The damage to the Lykes was described as being not serious enough to have hit a sub the size of Surcouf, and the crew described the object as much smaller than the Surcouf. Postwar records proved no German sub was within hundreds of miles of the point of the collision. Merchant ship crews had virtually no training in warship recognition at that time, and how accurately the crew could have estimated the size of what she hit on a moonless night is open to considerable doubt. Even if Surcouf's main radio antenna had been damaged by the collision, she would have only been about 80 miles (130 km) north of Cristobal, Panama at the time of the collision. Assuming she could remain on the surface, the crew could have rigged up an emergency antenna carried for just such a purpose. She was plenty close enough to Panama that a mayday sent on any of the several longwave and HF emergency channels of the time should have been picked up by someone. In particular, the HF emergency frequencies at night could have been picked up hundreds if not thousands of miles away. Hams and shortwave buffs on the East and Gulf Coasts avidly monitored these bands at night, yet not one reported receiving a mayday that night. Theories abound as to what happened to the Surcouf, and they are easily found on the net. They range from the possible to completely fanciful. I won't get into them here or another book will result. The most likely fate of the boat was she was jumped by a PBY Catalina on routine patrol over the Gulf of Panama. Tropical waters are noted for ships leaving bright luminous wakes, the result of the billions of photo flash plankton that abound in the warm waters. A boat the size of the Surcouf would have left a long, bright, and attractive wake to any patrolling bomber. The crew of the Surcouf was probably maintaining an active surface watch, but there were no enemy aircraft reported anywhere in the Caribbean, so an aerial watch was either not maintained or was very relaxed. The PBY, seeing the wake from many miles off, came in low to attack what it believed to be a large Japanese sub. Stories were current at the time of Japanese subs that exceeded 400 feet (122 meters) and 5,000 tons. While the I-400 class was indeed in this size range, construction didn't even begin until 1943, so none were in the Caribbean. Some ideas of what the Japanese had then came more from "Popular Science" than any official naval briefings. The huge wingspan of the PBY allowed it to cut back power and approach a sub at 100 feet (30 meters) above the surface. The crew of the Surcouf probably never saw or heard the Catalina until is was on its attack run. There were no internationally agreed to recognition signals at the time, and IFF systems were still in the future. The boat's only hope was to dive quickly enough that the PBY would lose it. Diving time for the Surcouf was about three minutes, actually quite fast for a boat of her size and top hamper, but nowhere near fast enough to escape the incoming attack. The PBY was probably carrying four 500 pound (227 kilogram) depth charges and several 100 pound (45 kilogram) bombs. The usual method of attack was to drop the depth charges set to 25 feet (8 meters) first to keep the sub on the surface. If the depth charges didn't sink the boat, the plane would return to attack with bombs. The depth charges would have been devastating to the Surcouf if the attack was accurate, exploding just below the hull of the boat as she attempted to dive. Many German and Japanese subs were sunk during just such attacks. and my guess is the PBY crew, with the Surcouf not taking evasive action on the surface and not having the time to fight back with antiaircraft fire, was the victim of just such an accurate attack, and sank quickly as she was attempting a dive. Many such attacks were reported in the early months of 1942. The PBY, seeing nothing on the surface after she circled back, and seeing no wreckage, probably patrolled the area for a short while, then resumed her patrol after reporting the attack by radio. The vast majority of such attacks in the Caribbean turned out to be schools of dolphins, a whale basking on the surface, and even vast schools of anchovies being herded by predators. I imagine the report was written off to just such an occurrence, one of many logged but never further investigated. The Surcouf was never heard from again, even after a fairly extensive sea and aerial search. The wreck site has never been identified, so all we have left is the theories and the lost souls of about 120 sailors. The wreck would lie below about 9,000 feet (2743 meters). Perhaps, as our underwater detection and exploration improves, we may yet have answers as to what happened to the Surcouf.
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  93. PT Boats got more standardized armament as the war progressed, but they were pushed out ASAP from 1940-1942 as a force in being. Since the assumption was their four torpedoes would be the main offensive weapons, a pair of dual .50 caliber machine guns was included, mostly to keep the heads of enemy gunners down. By early 1943, it was clear the role of the PT was going to be to stop small vessels from resupplying Japanese islands as we hopped over them. These Japanese boats were mostly very shallow draft barges, and torpedoes were useless against them. Many were quite heavily armored against PT boat attack. This started an arms race between Japanese and USN crews about which would have the most effective armament. PTs never returned to anything larger than forward floating dry docks or small shipyards established by the SeaBees on conquered islands. There wasn't much formality when it came to adding or deleting equipment from boats. It was pretty much up to each skipper what he could scrounge. The arguably best Japanese barge buster was the Pontiac M4 37 mm cannon taken from crashed or salvaged P-39 fighters. P-39s were plentiful in the Pacific, and more M4s became available as the P-39 was taken out of service for replacement by more modern aircraft. Every boat in my dad's squadron was eventually equipped with a bow mounted 37 mm gun, and most of them were installed by the crews with the help of the few shipfitters available. They next started scrounging every 20 mm oerlikon they could find and nailing them down anywhere there was deck space. One of the few authorized additions was a stern mounted 40 mm from mid 1943 as the kamikaze threat increased. By end of the war, my dad's boat had three 20 mm cannon, one astern of the 37 and one each on the deck next to the charthouse, and the Bofors gun at the stern. Two more twin 50s were installed athwartships of the charthouse, and eight 5" rocket launchers were bolted on just ahead of the charthouse. My dad said the rockets, that were supposed to be used for shore bombardment, were usually fired at barges as the boat first ran into attack. They weren't accurate at all, and dad doesn't remembered any barges sunk with them. They were pretty terrifying coming at the Japanese at night with all the flames, smoke, and noise each rocket created. Many of the barges were manned by Japanese fishermen, and he says several barges just ran up the while flag rather than enduring any more of those things headed at them.
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  99. This is a great idea for a WWII naval series. I'm looking forward to the late entering allied naves and neutral navies. One small correction however. The introduction to the British of the Hazemeyer stabilized 40 mm Bofors mount was when the Dutch minelayer Willem van der Zaan arrived in Portsmouth after the fall of the Netherlands. She was newly commissioned at the time, and the Hazemeyer mounts weren't yet fully developed. In particular, the Dutch version of the later British Type 282 radar wasn't mounted at the time of her escape, and the Dutch crew had to do the mounting and integration of the radar to the mounts with no written specifications, those having been left behind at the Dutch dockyard that was going to do the work just before the country was overrun by the Nazis. The cruiser De Ruyter did have a fully developed battery of five twin Hazemeyer mounts, certainly one of the most effective light antiaircraft systems of 1940. The RN was duly impressed with the performance of the guns during practice with the Dutch navy in the prewar period, and the plan was to have her system fully documented while De Ruyter was in refit at Singapore in February, 1942. We now know the fate of both De Ruyter and Singapore during that disastrous month. Some of the details of the Hazemeyer mounts still weren't known to the RN even postwar, since the plans of both the Hazemeyer company and its German parent, Siemens-Halske, were destroyed in the ensuing fighting. Hazemeyer had planned to move the radar and the optical sights to an off mount director somewhat similar to the US Mark 51 director, but the war was over for the Dutch before that advanced beyond the planning stages. The RN struggled for years with the STAAG and Buster systems, but by the time the mounts themselves would operate reliably, the 40 mm gun was considered obsolete. A few were hastily repossessed from museums for use aboard British landing ships during the Falklands war. Several Argentine aircraft were claimed damaged or destroyed by these guns, but I've yet to find confirmation of this. The gun crews used the weapons enthusiastically, firing off hundreds of rounds during the air attacks, so it's certainly possible at least one aircraft was hit by one of them.
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  103.  @michaelsanderson6968  I can make a more or less reasonable defense of most of King's actions, even though some of those turned out to be clearly wrong. What we knew about U-Boats attacking an area as large as the whole Atlantic coast and into the Caribbean all the way to he Panama Canal was quite different in early 1942 compared to mid-1944. The technology, number of escorts, and indeed the whole strategy of coastal convoys had yet to be worked out. His idea of single ships traveling at speed being less exposed to attack by individual U-Boats, compared to large, slow convoys with inadequate escorts along the coast may have seemed like it had some merit in early 1942. Contrary to what has been written about King, he gladly accepted a group of ten Flower class corvettes from the RN in early 1942 under reverse lend-lease, followed by another ten built for the USN in Canadian yards. Once King felt he had enough escorts from the USN, RCN, and RN, he started convoys with alacrity. As it turned out, any convoys, even lightly escorted, incurred less losses than lone ships, but we didn't know that in January, 1942. What I can't forgive him for was the court martial of Captain Charles B. McVay III, commander of the USS Indianapolis . He was the driving force behind the trial, even as his other senior officers urged him not to go ahead with it for the good of the service. It now seems pretty clear he was so insistent on a court martial that would essentially drum McVay out of the service to get back at McVay's father, Admiral Charles McVay II, for a reprimand given to him and two other officers in 1921 for sneaking women onboard a ship. This only resulted in a letter of reprimand being placed in King's file that would have zero effect on the rest of his career, but King was known as never forgetting a grudge, and now he had his chance for revenge on McVay's father through his son. He never admitted he was wrong and never apologized. Captain McVay never got over the shame and humiliation of being court martialed nor some relatives blaming him for the deaths of their loved ones. The depression after his wife died of cancer and constant harassment from relatives finally drove Captain McVay to step out onto his back porch on the chilly morning on November 6, 1968 and shoot himself with his Navy issued .45 pistol, ironically while clutching a toy sailor he had received as a child from his father, a toy sailor he used as his good luck charm. No, there is no forgiveness for King for such an evil and despicable act. It showed more about his character than any other act in his career. If there were such a thing as a posthumous court martial for murder of a fellow officer, I'd be all in favor of it.
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  106. The Germans would have done much better relying on merchant raiders, as they had during WWI. The Merchant Raiders used in WWII were cheap to put in service since it was just a matter of adding equipment to existing ships. They had the advantage of surprise since they were merchant vessels to begin with, not warships, and became masters of disguising their ships as neutral vessels. They had the ability to far outrange warship like the Graf Spee dueto their very large bunkerage, and a major warship would attract the attention of a large part of the RN. Merchant cruiser only attracted a major fleet effort as individual ships became too successful. The Germans were able to put 13 merchant raiders in service over the first three years of the war compared to two ships of the Graf Spee class. If the Graf Spee's had a role at all, it was as part of the fleet as large cruisers. Sailing the seas alone in such a large and distinctive vessel just made it that much more likely they would be tracked down and destroyed. The raider Atlantis, for example, sank more than 162,000 long tons in her 602 days at sea while the Kormoran sank over 100,000 tons of enemy shipping before sinking the cruiser HMAS Sydney in a mutually destructive battle. Merchant raiders were often commanded by officers who enjoyed the role of legal pirates operating far from the formal oversight of the Kriegsmarine. These raiders tied down far more RN forces that the two ships of the Graf Spee class ever could, and sunk far more tonnage. If the Germans had 20 merchant raiders in service at the outbreak of war, they would, along with the U-boats, have put Britain's survival in serious doubt. [Edited for typos]
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  147. Of the 2,710 Liberty ships produced, only 10 sank due to brittle cracking propagating enough to cause the hull to break in two, or nearly so, typically in hogging seas, as the maximum stresses were being experienced amidships. A major cause of the propagating cracks was the decision to use square hatches to speed production, and make welding easier for the army of inexperienced welders swarming the Kaiser shipyards. Cracks formed right at the junction of each hatch corner, and there were enough hatches on a Liberty that it didn't take many cracks to cause catastrophic damage. The answer in later Liberties and subsequent Victories was the use of rounded hatch corners. Ten years later, the catastrophic failures of Comet airliners tragically taught the lesson again. My dad, who used the GI Bill after he mustered out of the Navy to later become a mechanical engineer, drilled into my head that only four professions can kill you as a result of their normal duties. Those are doctors, police officers, architects, and the various permutations of engineers, and all four needed to keep that awesome responsibility foremost in their minds while doing their work. He became one of the leads on the design team for the main landing gears for the Boeing 747. I vividly recall as a kid seeing a light coming from the den late into the night . I would peek in to see him hunched over his desk with his slide rule and stacks of specs, checking and rechecking the calcs. Things like that taught me ot practice what I preach. I was a lucky kid to have a dad like him.
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  151. In addition to the problems preserving warships, the process for storing auxiliary ships was even more troublesome. Firstly, there were about four times more of them than there were warships. As WWII showed, vessels like amphibious warfare and fleet transports had a far longer useful life than a warship as technology made warships become obsolescent even more quickly. In addition, auxiliary craft had many of the same electronic systems as a warship during and after WWII, and they also needed to be stored or maintained. Many of these auxiliary craft became obsolete not because of any basic material problems like we saw between WWI and WWII but because their electronics were not only obsolete, they just didn't work with the modern fleet. As an example, every piece of electronic equipment, from the lowly morale receiver to the most sophisticated radars and analog computers were powered by tubes, or valves, as they were know to our British cousins. They not only had a very limited lifespan without constant maintenance and replacement, the manpower with the expertise to do those things was slowly being drained away from the Navy. Tube powered equipment was being replaced by solid state electronics, so an entire new set of skills was needed compared to even a few years previously. Radios and radars operated on progressively narrower and narrower bandwidths and higher frequencies, something tube types just weren't capable of doing. Analog electronics of all types were being replaced with digital, and more and more of that equipment needed to be updated, replaced, or more pieces of equipment need to be added. Older ships either ran out of space or just weren't worth the expenditure. Fleet type auxiliaries now needed to cruise at 20 knots, beyond even the top speed of older units. The need for space and facilities to operate helicopters for vertical replenishment and just transport between ships while underway was also beyond the abilities of ships that were only ten to fifteen years old. Probably at no time since the Civil War did the Navy scrap as many ships as it has since the decade after WWII, and that process just accelerated as the 2010's drew to a close. While active fleet numbers declined rapidly from about 1300 to 900 after WWII, numbers stabilized between 800-900 due to Korea and the Cold War between 1951 to 1970. The active fleet further declined once again with the fall of the Soviet Union to about 600. As scrapings began to increase again at the close of the 20th century, numbers fell to about 400. By 2017, the active fleet was down to 270. The USN has now fallen to number two numerically behind China. If things continue as they have, and there's no reason to think they won't, we willm fallen to number three, behind...India How things change.
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  156.  @jamesnickell5908  Yes. He was Commander Mochitsura Hashimoto. Hashimoto, captain of the submarine I-58, testified at the court-martial that it wouldn't have mattered if McVay was zigzagging. It was a clear night with a calm sea and the moon was behind the Indianapolis. It was perfect attack conditions, and Hashimoto felt he would have sunk her regardless of any evasive action. He was found and brought to Oakland at the behest of Admiral King, and Admiral Nimitz and many other naval officers felt this was an attempt to rile up the public against McVay, Even though Hashimoto was testifying for the prosecution, his testimony not only didn't help to convict McVay, but many observers felt it exonerated him. It didn't matter. It was either the Navy admit the errors it were made that led to the sinking and then the long delayed rescue, or they needed a fall guy. McVay was the fall guy. Hashimoto shared with McVay some of the burden of guilt over the loss of so many men. He later became a Shinto priest, and actively assisted the survivor groups trying to get McVay's conviction overturned. He wrote a letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1999, at age 90, when the committee was hearing testimony about the case. He repeated what he told the court-martial in 1945. He wrote that Captain McVay was not responsible for the sinking of his ship, he was, and he asked forgiveness for himself and forgiveness for Captain McVay by our own navy. He passed away on October 25, 2000, just five days before the congressional resolution exonerating Captain McVay was signed by President Clinton.
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  159. By 1945, the Japanese spoofing of allied IFF systems no longer worked. The Mark III IFF was then in use. It operated on three different bands, and the interrogator and responder would only return a radar signature if it was matched by a coded signal, and those codes were changed on a regular basis. The Japanese couldn't even receive a signal from the Mark III because they were operating in the gigahertz range, a frequency band Japanese radars were incapable of using or monitoring. Even though Japanese radars were generally considered something of a joke, it's only because the IJN considered radar would take too long to develop for a war expected to last two years at the most. All the early victories of Japan over the allies just reinforced that idea. The Japanese had done some important work on radar in the 30's, and they may very well have been at least able to keep up with allied radars if they were given a higher priority. By the time they realized their lack of radar was giving the allies a gift in terms of sinking Japanese ships, they started an all out program to develop and produce effective radars, but it was just too late. Bizarrely, the Japanese army did their own work on radar, didn't share any of the information with the navy, and actually treated the navy as the enemy in terms of stopping espionage by navy operatives. If all branches of the Japanese armed forces pooled their work on radar, there's no reason to think they wouldn't match the allies tit for tat in new radars. Their postwar work in electronics showed that they had the talent, but the interservice rivalry is right up there with the top reasons for Japan's defeat.
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  171.  @melwinge9154  RDF was far from new in 1923. It had been used on the longwave frequencies in common use since 1913. The problem in the Honda Point Disaster was Lt. Cmdr Donald T. Hunter, the captain of Delphy, and the acting navigator for the entire squadron. His disdain for anything electronic when it came to navigation was well known. He believed all the electronic aids to navigation made navigators "soft", and he welcomed the chance to show dead reckoning worked just fine, even in the terrible weather conditions of that night. He ordered his own navigator to ignore the RDF readings. At the same time, Commander Walter G. Roper, in charge of Division 32, relied on the RDF, and could see the squadron was making a serious navigation error, ordering the four ships in his division to slow and then stop to avoid running up on the rocks. RDF was plenty reliable in 1923, it was the humans in charge that weren't. Radar wasn't the problem for the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. It was Admiral Callahan's defective understanding of radar. Five of his ships that night were equipped with the excellent SG radar. It was Callahan's decision not to use any of them for his flagship, and not to have any of the SG equipped ships in the van of his formation, that caused radar not be as effective as it otherwise could have been. He didn't provide any kind of preliminary written plans to the rest of his fleet, and the difficulties of reliable radio communications, when that's all there was for the fleet, doomed his own ship and caused his death, in addition to a lot of other deaths that night. Radar wasn't the problem. SG radar was good enough that it was in use all the way to the end of the war and beyond. Poor human planning and intership communications were the problem.
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  179. The difference in habitability is well illustrated by conditions on US subs at the beginning and end of the war. The S Class was the most numerous class of subs available at the start of the war. They were small, noisy, had unreliable diesel engines that blew a fine film of oil over the whole interior, insufficient electrical capacity to run more than very small refrigerators, and the distilling plants were subject to frequent breakdowns and only large enough to allow a bucket of freshwater a week for a sponge bath. Canned food was the order of the day after a week or so at sea. They were nearly uninhabitable for more than a few hours submerged in the Pacific due to the heat and humidity of tropical waters. The ventilation system was undersized and subject to frequent breakdowns. Temperatures in engine rooms reached 110 F, and even 100 F in the conning tower wasn't uncommon. The humidity was near 100% and condensation caused dripping water from every horizontal surface, with short circuits and damage to radios and other electronic equipment as a result. The crew had to hot bunk since there were only enough for about half the wartime crew. Some of the most unlucky had to use hammocks strung in the torpedo rooms. Fast forward to 1945 and the Gato class. They were positively spacious compared to the S class. Almost the whole crew had their own bunks, The entire boat was air conditioned, keeping temperatures at no higher than 80 F and humidity below 65%. Electrical capacity was large enough to not only recharge a battery bank over twice the size of the S boats, but it was enough to run meat freezers, fresh food refrigerators, and a distilling plant that provided each man with an actual shower every three or four days. They even had crew washing machines, a few had ironing machines, and boats with the most clever engineering section even rigged up ice cream freezers! Frozen meat rather than canned was available for the duration of most patrols, and refrigerated fresh food would be available for the first three weeks of a patrol. Some captains allowed enough refrigerator space that the crew could have two cold six ounce bottles Coke a week. According to some crew memoirs, this was the greatest boost to morale during even difficult patrols. Some veteran admirals viewed all this as making the crews soft, but there's no doubt Gato crews were more alert, better fed, in better health, and had better morale than any other sub crews in the war.
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  181. Warning! This is going to be another of my "War and Peace" type posts. :) The plan, as I understand it, for covering landings on the Japanese mainland from air attack would have mainly been assigned to massed squadrons of Fletcher, Sumner, and Gearing class destroyers. There was a rushed refit of most of these units from mid-1944 to right up to August 1945 for every ship of these classes to have at least twelve 40mm Bofors guns with fourteen and even sixteen on the Gearings. This was done by landing all the torpedo tubes and, in typical USN fashion, covering the available deck space with twin and quad mount Bofors, supplemented by 20mm mounts wherever they would fit. Another goal of these refits was to install completely up to date radars and fire control equipment to allow every vessel to use VT rounds in their 5"/38 guns. Magazine spaces previously used to store torpedoes were given over to gun round storage. Many of the Sumner and Gearing class ships would also have been radar pickets, much like we saw in the earlier campaigns. The destroyers would have been backed up by the various permutations of Atlanta class cruisers, any of the three British Dido class that could have been spared from carrier screens, and masses of Cleveland and Baltimore cruisers. Most of these ships had increased AA guns fitted along with the requisite radars and fire controls systems. The Canadian Prince Robert, a former passenger vessel converted to a merchant cruiser and later as an auxiliary antiaircraft cruiser, had performed well in the Mediterranean. It was expected her main role in the planned invasion of Japan would be covering landings and escorting supply ships. Many British, Australian, and New Zealand destroyers, corvettes, sloops, and frigates would have been assigned to cover landings of British and Commonwealth troops. The major push with the British ships, in addition to increased AA defense, was adding air conditioning and stores refrigeration equipment. Ships built for the North Atlantic would have been much reduced in combat effectiveness in the tropics without these additions. The accounts of men serving on some unconverted warships serving in the Pacific are quite harrowing in terms of below decks temperatures and humidity. The 31 RN submarines were expected to play a major role in patrol and reconnaissance offshore from Japanese naval bases, rescuing downed carrier pilots, and attacking any remaining Japanese warships foolish enough to sortie from port. A little remembered ship was the HMS Ariadne, an Abdiel class fast minelayer, and one of the first RN vessels of the later Pacific Fleet, joining the US Seventh Fleet in January, 1944. Her very high speed was put to good use landing many US Army raiding forces on various islands as well as laying over 1,000 mines. The other two Abdiel class minelayers assigned to the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) would have been equally useful if they had been ready for BPF use before the war ended. In addition to the better known roles of the battleships and carriers of both navies, a major role for the British was the Fleet Train (BFT). The BFT had 54 large ships, from oilers to ammunition ships, and well over 100 smaller ships assigned. The RN had extensive experience supplying their ships while underway. Many of the ships were Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) vessels, and some were mostly manned by merchant seamen. It was expected the British Pacific Fleet would be sustained by their own Fleet Train with enough excess capacity to also supply some USN ships. It didn't quite work out as planned, with some USN supply ships needing to be added to the BFT. Nevertheless, the ships and crews performed magnificently under sometimes horrendous condition, since many BFT vessels didn't have a/c or refrigeration. The high intensity work of underway replenishment and island supply without the help of even one air cooled space onboard tested the mettle of the crews, and they stood up better than could be expected. A humorous sidelight described by one of the RFA crewmen was when a special alarm sounded, and the men rushed up on deck. The men weren't carrying helmets and life vests that you might expect with most alarms. This alarm had men carrying soap and towels, since the alarm let men below decks know of a passing rain squall so they could cool off and get in a shower, both rare experiences on most RFA ships. As usual, a combined British/American operation couldn't go off without politics getting in the way. It started with Churchill want to use British forces to recapture lost British territory like Burma and Hong Kong and leave the Pacific islands to the Americans. Strong protestations from the Chiefs of Staff eventually overcame Churchill's objections. The RN chiefs rightly believed that not participating in the eventual conquest of the Home Islands of Japan would decrease British influence in the Pacific and rob the RN of valuable experience participating in fleet operations and amphibious landings larger than any they had done in the past. BPF experience was part of the planning for the Suez operation and, indirectly, gave the RN confidence they could support amphibious landings in the far off Falklands. Things on the American side were no better. The Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations was Admiral Ernest King. He was a well known Anglophobe who saw the British as coming in after most of the battles were over and then claiming part of the prestige of helping to defeat Japan. He raised so many objections to the offers of help from the British that Roosevelt himself had to intervene and essentially order that King accept the offer of a BPF. It appeared to the public that allies were cooperating in the defeat of Japan when the reality was the USN was dragged kicking and screaming into accepting the offer. King, after grudgingly accepting, set down a requirement that the BPF be totally self-sufficient. Try as they would, the BPF wasn't capable of that, and later USN aid was freely given, sometimes over the objections of Adm. King, and some BPF supply ships aided USN ships. Admiral Nimitz had more pragmatic objections based on the differences in British aircraft, carrier operations, and a myriad of logistical problems, from incompatible radios to completely different guns and ammunition between the two navies. To the credit of both navy's operational staffs, most of these problems were overcome in a matter of six months. Adm. Nimitz became an enthusiastic supporter of the BPF carrier forces after seeing their performance at Okinawa, when the armoured decks of the fleet carriers and well trained damage control teams allowed RN carriers to absorb Kamikaze attacks and continue to operate. All in all, and ignoring the political interference, it was quite a performance from two fleets that had to learn to work with each other in a matter of months.
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  183. Ranger was always considered kind of developmental carrier, a step between Langley and the Yorktowns. US wargames of the 30's showed flush deck carriers presented few advantages compared to the operational efficiency of having an island, and stacks exhausting through the top of the island were far superior to the side mounted exhausts of Ranger. She could have been a better carrier if the stacks could have been changed when the island was added but, this still being in the depths of the Great Depression, the money wasn't available for that drastic of a redesign. Nothing could be done to improve her low (for a fleet carrier) top speed, and the flight deck and hangers all required strengthening to cope with the demise of the biplane. For the rest of the war, other than a few relatively low intensity periods of combat, Ranger worked out what was to become an increasingly important carrier task - transportation of and flying off fighters to reinforce AAF aircraft and crews in Africa and Europe. After a disastrous start to this task that caused the loss of ten aircraft on her first mission, she was able to fly off more AAF P-40s from the deck to supply badly needed replacements in North Africa. As far as I know, these are the only instances of P-40's flying off from a carrier. She settled down to her transport task until 1944 when she returned to the East Coast to operate as a training carrier. Given the flood of new carriers and pilots coming online, this was probably her most important role. Her role as a training carrier continued until October, 1946 when, being well and truly worn out, she was struck off the naval register and sold for scrap in January, 1947.
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  187. The 2 pdr pom poms gave endless jamming problems in the tropics as gun crews didn't realize how heavily they'd have to oil the ammo and belts to prevent jamming. Tracer ammunition had just started to be issued by the end of 1942 ad it;s not likely the ship would have been carrying more that a few hundred round in the magazines. Most of the tracers would have come from the 20mm Oerlikons hurriedly mounted on November 20-21, 1941 in Cape Town. The crews had very little practice before the attacks and no experience in handling the early versions of the Oerlikons. They'd jam easily if charging the gun was done too briskly when a new magazine was mounted. It wasn't hard to clear the jam, but the PoW didn't have the time to spare as fire slowed down due to jams in the 20 and 40 mm guns. The 5.25" guns were almost useless without their directors since crews hadn't been adequately trained in how to use them under local control. The gunhouse were cramped to begin with, and having to hand pass and load shells after the dynamos failed made ROF no more the four rounds a minute, and that's when they didn't jam. The PoW just wasn't ready to provide adequate AA fire. The Repulse had adequate AA guns and better trained crews but wasn't able to fight off the air attacks without the full support of PoW. PoW's dynamo failures made the 5.25" guns and octuple 2 pdr mounts unuseable. Even if both ships had been operating at top efficiency it's unlikely they could have escaped the attacks. It was a sobering moment for the battleship admirals.
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  188. Radford was one of only three Fletchers to receive a FRAM II overhaul. This was a more austere overhaul than the complete reconstruction of the FRAM I ships. The original intention was reconstruction almost all the surviving Fletchers. However, the experience with the three that did get the modernization was they were far overbudget as the inevitable feature creep added more and more electronics and other equipment, and the increased crewing demanded by all the new equipment made the Fletchers intolerably crowded. The main reason for the FRAM II upgrade was so the ships could handle the DASH drone helicopter. While derisively known as the Down At Sea Helicopter by some captains and crews, those that operated the drones in strict accordance with the Gyrodyne (makers of the QH-50C drone) procedures found the drones to be both controllable and effective. The Radford was one such ship, making more than 500 flights, including launching two torpedos while being fed dummy targeting information while the drone was over the horizon. The DASH helicopters developed a generally poor reputation in the USN due to the lack of command support, general laziness of the crews in not making enough practice flights, and poor adherence to maintenance procedures. In contrast, the Japanese Marine Self Defense Force, with I will call the Japanese Navy to save my fingers, operated sixteen DASH drones from the decks of seven destroyers. The Japanese Navy, known for their adherence to both command instructions and maintaining their equipment, operated the QH-50D drones with nearly complete success, losing only three drones from 1969 to 1977. This is compared to losing well over half the drone fleet in the USN. The Japanese were well satisfied with the DASH drones, and only decommissioned them in 1977, due to the USN abandoning the program the previous year, leading to fears of parts and spares shortages after that date. The Japanese Navy flew their Dash helicopters every single day, at sea or in port. The program had a command officer assigned that stayed with the ship and the program from the date the drone was introduced until he retired or the DASH drones were taken out of service. Compare this to the USN, which had some ships flying the drone only twice a month, the absolute minimum demanded by regulations, and some ships having only a Petty Officer Third Class being in charge of the drones on his ship. The program, while being chronically underfunded and undermanned, did lead directly to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) now carried by by many USN combat ships. Believe it or not, the UAV program of today is underfunded and undermanned, and naval aviators don't like the current crop of UAVs any more than they liked the Gyrodyne DASH helicopters.
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  200.  @HighlanderNorth1  The Navy had the advantage of being able to prepare food for their men most of the time rather than resorting to prepared rations. Submariners did get the best of foods available, and the skipper was generally able to modify some of the standard Navy menus if he was able to find things like fresh beef or frozen chickens in the stocks ashore. PT boats had some of the same advantages, as each boat was able to use pretty much any food they could find or scrounge. The Navy realized early in in WWII that their procurement was a hopeless mess of different bureaus. The Secretary of the Navy established a new department, the Office of Procurement and Material, and put Admiral Samuel Robinson in charge. He became the czar for all procurement and ruled with an iron hand. Decisions came through is office instead of seven different bureaus. He was one of the primary reasons for the fleet train, and was vitally interested in procuring the best food the budget would bear. He standardized the Navy cookbook and how galleys were set up on new and refurbished ships. For the first time, cooks became an occupational specialty rather than just the newest guys in the crew. Every ship had an officer designated as in charge of the mess budget and food quality, and the medical officer was in charge of mess inspections for cleanliness. The best food combined with standard menus and trained cooks is why the Navy got (and has kept) the reputation as best fed of the services. Robinson ordered that all officers had to eat only the food that came for the enlisted mess. They could eat in their own wardrooms, but they were eating the same food as the rest of the sailors. As you might imagine, the captain and other officers gained a rapid appreciation for serving the best prepared food the ship could provide.
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  203.  @AtomicBabel  You're welcome. The IJN did develop some Ward-Leonard electrical power controls systems for the triple mounts late in the war. This enabled the mount to follow the much faster attack aircraft than the Japanese had encountered early in the war, but there were still problems matching up the pointers to the target before it moved out of the telescopic range finder field of view. The Ward Leonard remote power control was certainly better than manual traversing, but the lack of any kind of radar fire control meant they were still dependent on the Mark 1 eyeball looking through telescopic sights on a heavily vibrating mount while being wreathed in smoke from the gunfire. The USN found out how difficult this was while developing the much more advanced Mark 14 gunsight on the 20mm Oerlikon mount. The same vibration issues affected them until better shock mountings were devised. Once the Mark 14 was integrated into the Mark 51 director, there was a marked increase in the accuracy of 20mm fire, to the point that the 20mm was the AA gun that shot down the most Japanese planes in the last year of the war. Even if the 25mm gun had a faster rate of fire and wasn't so prone to jamming when used at elevations over 60 degrees, the whole system was hopeless without some kind of radar directed and RPC fire control. The Japanese had been working such a system but, as usual, squabbling between the Army and Navy over funding and what system was best meant no system was put in use before war's end.
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  239.  @HighlanderNorth1  That sums it up. I don't think the war in the Pacific would have gone so well without Admiral Robinson in charge. When it comes to fishing, that worked on ships with relatively low freeboard and ones that spent a lot of time dead in the water. It was hard to catch much from a cruiser making way at 25 knots. :-) PT boats were ideal for fishermen since they had the freeboard of a cabin cruiser and spent a lot of time at idle waiting to jump Japanese resupply barges. My dad said they even fish on moonlit nights when they could see their lines and the fish swimming by made luminescent wakes. The skipper was an inveterate fisherman. He'd spend time at the stern tending a couple lines while the XO kept an eye on the radar and yelled for him if there were any hits. By late 1943, there were only the occasional Japanese floatplane around so they didn't much have to worry about air attack. The old man was a motor machinist mate, so he spent a lot of his time with the engines. The heat was suffocating in the engine room so he'd come up on deck to spell gunner's mates so they could get some chow. He was manning the stern 20mm one time when one of those floatplanes came right up over the hill at them with no radar warning. He just happned to be watching that part of the sky when it happened, and he had it in his sights in a heartbeat. He opened up on it and tracked it right across the boat, the safety rails saving him from shooting up the bridge. The plane burst into flames and splashed a couple hundred feet off the bow. One of the other guys had to light his cigarette afterwards because he was shaking too much to hold the match. It was the one and only time he ever fired a weapon in anger during the war. It was also one of two planes the boat was credited with during the war. I still have the picture of him standing behind a piece of the vertical stabilizer they had fished out to make sure they got credit for the kill.
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  242. They were also lacking in good quality anti aircraft batteries. The original C/30 20 mm guns were very poor guns with a small magazine of just 20 rounds. That made them have a practical rate of fire of only about 120 rounds a minute. The C/38 models was a much improved gun, especially when used with the sophisticated quad mounting. It had a 40 round magazine and doubled the rate of fire per barrel compared to the C/30. Allied airmen soon learned to give German vessels used to escort submarines in and out of the Bay of Biscay a wide berth to avoid the fire of these guns. However, it was only when the German Navy started manufacturing Oerlikon 20 mm guns reverse engineered from army models that they had a truly effective single barrel hand swung model. It had a rate of fire of 450 rounds a minute, twice as fast as any German designed gun. As usual,, there were too few produced too late to make much difference. The 37 mm SK C/30 guns were hand loaded with very slow rates of fire and a poor mounting with a failed triaxial mount. The later KM 42 and KM 43 37 mm FLAK versions were much improved but came very late in the war when most of the surface fleet had been lost or decommissioned. The 105 mm guns had the potential to be excellent antiaircraft gun but, once again, they were in a triaxial mount that was too difficult to manufacture and just didn't work well in practice. The gun housing was poorly designed, being open at one end and allowing water to get in and ruin the electrical systems. Too few were manufactured to replace war losses as the war wound down for improvements in the 105 mm gun housing and fire control system to make any difference. In addition to luck, the Prinz Eugen survived as the only large surface vessel of the German navy by continuing improvements in her anti aircraft batteries. All the 37 mm guns were replaced with the German version of the Bofors 40 mm gun and the earlier C/30 and C/38 20 mm with the FLAK 28 and 29 models covering any empty spaces on the deck. While operating in the Baltic in the closing moths of the war, she was able to do impressive shore bombardment missions against the advancing Russian army while fighting off hordes of Russian aircraft due to her much improved anti aircraft batteries and radars.
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  256.  @fortusvictus8297  Firstly, thanks for your service. The US has always been the best fed country in the world, in war or peace. One hand, it's a matter of luck that we can grow about any kind of food the exists on the face of the earth, but is also something that many successive governments have understood - that a well fed people are also generally contented people. A full belly tends to quench a lot of revolutionary thoughts. When my dad's squadron was in New Guinea, many of the advance bases were run by the Australian Navy. I don't know if it was a matter of wartime shortages or just the need to ship as much food as they could to the mother country, but Australian rations tended to be less in quantity and calories than what the Americans got. The rations were also less diverse and more monotonous, with many of the Aussie complaining they were right sick of a constant diet of canned lamb, bully beef, and biscuits. The K rations generally had some small cans of fruit, usually peaches or pears. By 1943, it had been years since the average Aussie had seen canned fruit except maybe for the holidays. Tobacco of any kind, and cigarettes in particular, were not only had to get, but Australian sailors had to buy their own at the canteen, when there was one at a base. They were eating dinner with sailors from an Australian minesweeper, and they refused to believe American sailors got free cigarettes withe every meal until one of our guys opened up a K ration and showed them. Now, one thing the Aussies tended to get in abundance was beer, something US sailors were only rarely allowed to get in the war zone. As you might imagine, that set up some pretty active bartering for cigarettes, canned fruit, and beer. The Aussies did have two other things Americans wanted - tea and blackcurrant jam. US rations never had tea, amd Australian rations almost never had coffee. Those that favored the non-available drink on either side set up a pretty active bartering market. Some sailors seem to develop an almost unnatural craving for Australian blackcurrant jam. I've never had it, but my dad described as the best thing on a biscuit he ever had. He didn't smoke much, so he bartered away many a pack of smokes for some of that jam.
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  258. Although the USN has officially been "dry" from 1914 to 1980, sailors are still sailors. Even ignoring the proliferation of "torpedo juice" stills, some skippers were very creative about sneaking beer and wine onboard and using the medicinal alcohol supply for purposes other than those intended. Eugene Fluckey, captain of the USS Barb, was famous for finding places in the limited confines of his sub for 30 or so cases of beer, with each man getting one beer after a significant sinking and two beers for Christmas and Fourth of July. Even though Fluckey was the subject of several investigations for his violation of Navy alcohol rules, it was a tribute to the love of his men for their skipper that not one officially admitted to ever having alcohol onboard until after the retirement of Admiral Fluckey in 1972. The USN did allow alcohol after the end of Federal prohibition in 1933, but only on shore. This was originally at the navy clubs on base. The Pacific war was such that many ships didn't see a proper Navy base of periods of a year or more. The rules were bent by having "recreation days" on various semi-deserted tropical islands, and one of the main attractions, in addition to swimming and baseball, was two warm beers per visit. Navy Secretary Edward Hidalgo finally allowed crews in 1980 to have two beers on board after 45 continuous days at sea. This decision was supposedly prompted by Hidalgo's experience as a young officer on the USS Enterprise. A kamikaze attack on May 14, 1945 destroyed the whole task force's supply of beer. While the attack itself was a blow to morale, that only increased when word of the destruction of the beer supply began to spread. Only an emergency run by a Navy transport put things to right before the next recreation day.
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  261. While the crews of British submarines suffered greatly from heat of the Indian and Pacific oceans, the biggest issue was the buildup of humidity and consequent buildup of condensation on the hull interior. This caused drips and streams of water to run down the surface of every space while the boats were submerged. This had a disastrous effect on the electrical and electronic equipment onboard in the days of everything being tube (valve) operated, especially in the later stage of the was as things like radar, radios, jammers, and sonars. The moisture even got into periscopes, making them almost useless until they could be dried out with time on the surface. The Amphion class finally solved the problem with effective air conditioning, but only two were completed in time for Pacific service. The time and expense put into the design of the boats served the RN well postwar, with the Amphions being the equivalent of the USN Gato class in long service, some being modernized rather like the GUPPY program, and the last not being decommissioned until 1974. The importance of air conditioning in tropical waters was well demonstrated by the experience of the HMS Turbulent in the Indian Ocean in 2011. The boat was running on the surface in 120 degree air temperatures when the air conditioning failed due to the intakes being clogged with large numbers of crabs and barnacles. Repair crews were unable to clear the intakes because the hull was too hot to touch. The only fresh air ventilation possible was the two hull hatches since nuclear subs are almost completely sealed vessels. The crew was progressively getting sicker due to heat exhaustion when the captain decided the only answer was to dive into cooler waters at 200 feet until the hull and interior cooled to manageable levels, allowing the intakes to be cleared.
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  269. Typhoon Cobra was actually quite accurately located and forecast about ten hours before it got to the Third Fleet. The problem with the reports of the storm were twofold. The first was the reports came from the Army Air Force forecasting center in Saipan. There was the usual interservice rivalry that tended to downgrade AAF forecasts compared to that from USN forecasters. The USN didn't have a forecast center like the AAF. Observation were reported ship to ship, and aerographer's mates were expected to create their own weather map. That meant that each ship or squadron depended on the reports and forecasts of other ships without ever getting an overview of all the reports. The second problem was AAF reports and warnings were issued using different codes and radio frequencies than USN weather reports. That meant USN radio operators had to monitor these "foreign" frequencies and then had to accurately transcribe details like the long/lat of the storm, That of course didn't happen, so there were multiple reports of the location of the storm, and no one knew which one was accurate. All of this was bad enough, but the size and speed of Cobra made things even worse. Cobra was only about 65 miles across compared to the usual several hundred for a Pacific typhoon. It was also moving at 25 to 30 mph compared to a more typical 10-15 mph, and had peak winds of 170-180 mph compared to the usual 100-110 mph. This meant that the usual "seaman's weather eye" only recognized that a typhoon was bearing down on them about four hours before the storm hit. Halsey's orders about what ships were to do were also inconsistent. He'd issue one order that ships should scatter and then another one ordering the destroyers to stay close to the oilers so they could refuel as soon as the weather calmed down. Halsey was totally out of the loop when it came to Cobra. The first US ship to sink was USS Spruance at 1110. Halsey had no idea any ships had been sunk until about 0215 the next morning. To be fair, no one knew how violent and fast moving Cobra was, and Halsey assumed that ti was just a garden variety typhoon. So many ships had their radio equipment or antennas destroyed that it was many hours before surviving ships with equipment that still worked could string emergency antennas and report the situation. The upside from all this carnage was the Navy finally recognizing how poor their forecasting system was for Pacific typhoons. This led to the establishment of what today is the USN's Joint Typhoon Warning Center, generally recognized as the premier tropical storm warning center today.
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  275.  tamenga88  It was only the propellant charges that were hand carried from the lift. The projectiles were loaded and rammed automatically. The problem with the Worcester's guns was the dual lifts for AP AA rounds. The plan was the turret crew could quickly switch from on type to another as the situation demanded. The design of the loading machinery placed the two so close together that a call for one type of projectile could sometimes cause the other to roll into the loading tray, thereby causing a jam and stoppage. These jams weren't easy to clear since the automatic rammer would jam on both projectiles, and the turret had to be shut down until the jam was cleared. Only having one loading machine with projectiles solved that issue as a workaround, but Worcester off Korea faced an air threat while doing shore bombardment. Then both type of projectiles had to be kept loaded in the trays so the jamming problem came back. Any other light cruiser, British or American, would have performed better than Worcester fore shore bombardment because they didn't have DP guns. Worcester's guns were accurate, but the jamming with two loaders in use dropped her actual ROF to about half of cruisers like Belfast. Even with the great size of Worcester (larger than a Baltimore class heavy cruiser), there still wasn't room to accommodate automatic loaders without interference. The British ran into the same problem with their Mark N5 gun on the Blake and Tiger, even though the largest turret with widest gun separation possible was installed. It seems the six inch gun was one size too much for a reliable automatic DP mounting. These problems could have been worked out, as seen with the excellent 8"/55 automatic guns on the Des Moines class, but they were too expensive and required too much manpower for a role that was seen as obsolete.
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  285.  @neniAAinen  The infrastructure problem in the French navy was constant design revisions that put them far behind the curve even before new ships were launched. There was nothing more restrictive about Normandie than there was about USS Nevada . Both were designed and laid down at about the same time. BOth were almost identical in dimensions and tonnage. Normandie was the last battleship to have submerged torpedo tubes, and would have been the only battleships that had the odd combination of turbines and triple expansion power plants. In service, it's doubtful this maintenance nightmare of a power plant would have given Normandie more range than _Nevada_, and her top speed was theoretically identical. They had 13.4" guns at the time other navies had already switched to 14". They went back and forth constantly between twin, quads, and twin over quad turrets at the same time Nevada had only two less guns but in five turrets, twin over triples. They didn't have to worry about blowing off half the superstructure if they actually fired a full broadside, a distinct possibility when firing on any targets slightly abeam of broadside. There's no reason the French couldn't have also produced 14" guns if they made the decision while she was still in design stage. Her armor scheme was a generation behind when she would have been commissioned, in particular her deck armor. On top of that, she was launched at almost the same time as Nevada but would have taken about two years longer to complete, assuming the schedule was actually adhered to, something not common with French warships. There was nothing incredible about Normandie compared to Nevada . She wasn't any faster, had poorer armor, and poorly distributed main armament. She was defeated by the French navy taking way too long to come up with a final design (and stick to it once they did) and sluggish construction. This only got worse in the interwar period.
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  305.  @bkjeong4302  I just showed you that two light cruisers are barely, if all, equal in antiaircraft firepower to one Iowa with just plain statistics, yet now you seem to have ignored that to go back to your narrative. What does the South Dakota's record at Santa Cruz in October, 1942, when she was still armed with primitive communications and fire control compared to 1945 ships, 1.1" guns, and before VT fuses, have to do with the performance of an Iowa in the antiaircraft role? South Dakota was still an effective escort for Enterprise, shot down at least seven attacking aircraft, and protected the Enterprise from the fate of the Hornet. An Iowa would have required less stores than two Clevelands per man and gun simply because of economies of scale. Rations alone would have required less because there's less wastage on one ship that two. It's one of the reasons cruise ships have become so gigantic. The Iowas were always built as fast carrier escorts, hence their high speeds. The assumption was their main role would be antiaircraft protection and shore bombardment with antisurface being secondary by late 1943. The 40mm gun was a very effective gun, shooting down about 35% of total planes downed in the Pacific. The 20mm gun was even more effective, shooting down about 39% of all planes and 42 of all suicide planes downed when the planes were in range. Rather than continuing to debate with a person who has his own notions about what happened, I'll quote something from a postwar Navy report about the effectiveness of antiaircraft guns and fire from a report you've clearly never read. "Thus, in suicide actions, battleships appear to have shot down twice as many planes as would have been expected on the basis of their opening ranges, the amount of ammunition they fired, and the average success attained by all ships under similar conditions." http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Kamikaze/AAA-Summary-1045/index.html#V Read the report and others like it before you come back again.
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  313. You've got the FRAM upgrades a bit wrong. The FRAM I upgrade was the most comprehensive and involved stripping most of the superstructure down to the main deck level, completely rebuilding the engines, adding all the modern radars and sonars, mostly removing the "B" forward 5" mount, although some kept two mounts forward and none aft, and then rebuilding the superstructure with a new and roomier bridge, an ASROC deck and launcher, and the DASH hanger and landing deck. Automation helped reduce crew size, habitability was improved, and they were given full air conditioning and NBC protection. This upgrade was performed exclusively to Gearing class ships. The FRAM II was a more austere upgrade, with the original superstructure forward of the stacks kept, engines rebuilt but only to the extent need to extend service life by seven years, no ASROC, although deck space was reserved for a later installation, and some ships having te B mount replaced by a pair of trainable Hedgehogs. Not all ships received full NBC protection. Some kept all three 5" mounts while some had one fore and aft like the FRAM I ships. Almost all the FRAM II ships were Sumner class, but sixteen were Gearing class deemed to have less service life available than other Gearings. Four Fletcher class ships were involved with FRAM II upgrades, but only three were part of the official program. One, USS Hazelwood, had the DASH landing deck and hanger added in 1957, and she served as a trials ship for the DASH program. She never received any other FRAM upgrades but had the largest DASH landing deck of all the FRAM type destroyers. She was decommissioned in 1965. The bottom line is every FRAM ship got a DASH deck and hanger. Other than that, there was wide variability in retained guns, superstructure, ASROC, torpedo tubes, and Hedgehogs.
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  315. To be fair, one of the reason why almost all scouting and scout bomber aircraft were two place is so the observer could use a pretty good set of optics to give them more details than the Mark I Eyeball. As Drach pointed out, in less than ideal conditions, accuracy of identification deteriorated rapidly. The RN not only recognized this problem earlier than other major navies, they treated finding a solution as an emergency. Consequently, they used Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) systems on their ship and aircraft earlier than other countries. As usual, you can identify the pioneers by the arrows in their back. The original IFF system depended on a passive system using a vertical dipole, and the only receiver sensitive and wide banded enough was a superregenerative type. I won't get into all the technical detail since I'm sure most you don't really care about them, but the super regen receiver was extremely difficult to tune sitting at a desk on dry land. Doing so in a Swordfish, while being buffeted by rough air and rapid changes in altitude, required an observer that was both skilled and lucky. The passive dipole system was unreliable even if the receiver was working correctly. Yet another British invention allowed the radar signal itself to actively interrogate a receiver on a ship or another aircraft. The IFF was then transmitted as a coded part of the radar return. That meant no fiddling with receivers on an aircraft, and it was also more difficult for the enemy to compromise the system. By the second half of 1944, about 75% of RN ship and aircraft and nearly 100% of US ships and aircraft were equipped with IFF. The extremely time consuming teaching of ship and aircraft recognition from models, photos, and drawings became much less important. A pilot merely had to interrogate the IFF receiver on a ship. If it was one of ours, a spike on the radar screen would show a positive return. In later iterations, the return could even tell a pilot the name and type of a ship or the type of aircraft being interrogated. While this greatly reduced blue on blue attacks for a time, it didn't eliminate them. Imagine seeing an unidentified ship, interrogating on the correct IFF channel, and getting no return. Enemy ship, attack away...except what happens if the IFF on the ship was broken and not working? With pilots given less recognition training and early electronics subject to frequent failures, the number of mistaken attacks on friendly ships actually increased for a short period of time in late 1944. A crash program to make IFF more reliable and getting pilots trained in better visual recognition reduced the blue on blue attacks to much lower levels by early 1945 than those seen earlier in the war. IFF systems in use today, although much more sophisticated and reliable, are still based on the same principles as used in the late WWII systems.
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  316. Thanks, Drach. The Battle class were very pleasant looking ships, and I liked them at first sight when I first saw them as a kid. Of course, this was long before the internet, and ship pictures were only found after many a Saturday afternoon poring through every book with pictures I could find. I assumed that, much like the USN Allen M Sumner class, these had another twin turret aft, and all the pictures were of such poor quality they just didn't show the aft turret, hidden among the top hamper of all the Bofors guns. I must have been about 15 before I found a really good book about WWII British destroyers, something not easy to find in small town Ohio in what must have been 1959-1960. It was then I found out this class really didn't have any aft main battery turrets, but it had a single open 4" mount instead. Since the Sumner and Battle classes were of roughly equal size and displacement, it really didn't make much sense to limit the heavy DP guns to forward mountings only. To this day, I'm still somewhat baffled by that design decision on the part of the Admiralty. Maybe someone who knows more about British destroyers than I do can explain it for me. Admiral Cunningham hated these ships. He rather famously said, after his first voyage on HMS Solebay that the ship was too big and "had every damned weapon and gadget except guns". Cunningham was an old-time destroyerman and believed newer destroyers should match the "Greyhound of the Seas" design philosophy of older destroyers. Cunningham, as great an admiral that he was, just didn't have much appreciation for the need to accommodate all the new electronics and weapons of modern naval warfare. He wasn't wrong about the Hazemeyer mounts though. At six tons for a twin mount, and even heavier as more on-mount radars were added, they really were the first of what we now call a close in weapons system. The design and requirements were just too advanced for the times they were built. They were excellent mounts when they worked but, with the vacuum tube technology of the day, that wasn't very often. Combined with the mass of gears and valves needed to maintain the triaxial stabilization, it would have been a good mount if it was introduced in 1950 instead of 1940. Unfortunately, the RN decided the way forward was the STAAG mount, an even heavier and more unreliable mount, but that's a story for another day.
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  354.  @Ron52G  LOL. The RN could have used that concept when it came to arming the Tribals. They believed the original quad pom pom and two quad .50 Vickers mounts would be enough. This was actually a fairly heavy close in armament for the late 30's. It was let down by the slow practical rate of fire of the Vickers guns of only 150 to 200 rpm compared to the significantly more powerful water cooled Browning M2 at 450-500 rpm. Both were found to be near useless against the faster aircraft of 1942 and rapidly replaced by 20mm Oerlikon guns.. The quad 2 pdrs turned out to be not very effective as well. The original mounting only fired low velocity shells and there was never any tracer ammunition produced for the low velocity guns. The quad mountings required one crewmember to constantly turn a crank to fire the guns, somewhat like a Gatling gun. The British called this "controlled fire" as the crank mechanism only allowed one barrel at a time to fire. The RN was concerned that allowing the guns to fire freely would lead to them all firing simultaneously, causing mutual interference in flight and an unacceptable amount of vibration on the mount. The crank firing was their answer to this perceived problem, but it caused a rate of fire of only about 95 rpm per barrel. A quad 40mm Bofors firing automatically had a practical rate of fire of about 120 rpm per barrel while firing a heavier round at higher velocities. Some of the issues with the 2 pdr pom pom were more or less solved by 1942, but it was obvious the Bofors was a superior weapon by then. The RN would have replaced the 2 pdrs with Bofors guns but the rate of production in Britain was too low, and the US didn't have excess production capability until early 1944.
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  366.  @kemarisite  The US did a great job of propagandizing not only the B-17, which actually was in service at the outbreak of the war, but also the B-19, the Global Bomber. It too existed, but only one of them, and it was on show all over the country in the fall of 1941. We made quite a show of the Norden Bombsight as well, mostly by making sure there were many photos of B-17's guarded by heavily armed troops, and showing bombardiers taking the bombsights off the plane in heavy locked bags while being armed with .45's. There were even special bombproof magazines to store the bombsight when it was off the plane. The Norden Company itself engaged in intense self promotion while attempting to keep the bombsight itself secret. The US certainly believed its own hype. On December 2, 1941, the acting chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics enthusiastically wrote to the secretary of the Navy, “The Norden bombsight is considered to be the principal single factor of superiority which the air forces of this country possess over those of potential enemy countries.” By 1944, enough had fallen into German and Japanese hands from shot down wrecks that it was finally shown to the American public while still blurring out certain features. Most level bombing of moving ships was conducted from 12,000 to 15,000 feet since few Japanese antiaircraft weapons had accurate effective ceilings above about 12,000 feet. When the bombsight was working right and with a well trained bombardier, the Norden was no slouch. Out of a dozen bombs dropped in practice, ten could be placed with 50 feet of the center of the aim point. This may not have been accurate enough to always put a bomb on the deck, but it was close enough to cause damaging and sometimes fatal near misses. The problem was the Norden was so complex that, in the days of vacuum electronics, it needed constant maintenance and adjustment. It was just as difficult to train comptent bombsight maintainers as it was bombardiers, both requiring eighteen weeks to learn the trade. As the war intensified, those training periods went from 18 to 14 to 12 and finally to 10 weeks. Consequently, bombers were flying with improperly maintained bombsights and poorly trained bombardiers. It was that situation that contributed the poor reputation of the Norden at the end of the war. After the war, with improvements to the Norden and time to properly train maintainers and bombardiers, the Norden was able to achieve that 50 foot CEP again. It was still our standard bombsight in the B-47 and b-52, not being retired until 1967, when radar bombsights that were more accurate and easier to use had been developed. The Norden was neither magic or junk, and the Japanese did indeed fear the combination of the B-17 and the Norden, right up until the aluminum storm of B-29's, each dropping nearly the weight of an empty B-17 worth of bombs, over the homeland.
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  374. The wholesale scraping of useful RN WWII ships hadn't even begun in 1956. You weren't betrayed by the US. You were betrayed by Anthony Eden and Louis Mountbatten. You were betrayed by vacillation about how to seize the canal that lasted for over three months, thus putting the invasion at the same time as the Soviet invasion of Hungary. You were betrayed with the appointment of Stockwell as task force commander. You were betrayed by an operation with insufficient amphibious craft to quickly seize the canal and carry forward Operation Musketeer before any other protests mattered. The US warned Britain and France that they didn't support military force in regaining control of the canal. Regardless, the British, French, and Israelis secretly planned to do just that. After not supporting the operation to begin with, and being put in the position of supporting an operation to reimpose British and French colonialism on one hand and oppose Soviet colonialism on the other, the US had no other choice to oppose both. The British didn't "stand" with the US in Korea. It was an operation of the United Nations, and they were required to assist in Korea. The combined numbers of troops from the much smaller Commonwealth countries of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand equaled the number of British troops that served in the conflict. The number of US troops committed was 326,000 compared to the British contribution of about 40,000. The only aircraft on the ground from the Commonwealth came from Australia and South Africa. The RAF didn't contribute any aircraft except for a single Sunderland unit. The RN was the only service that had a major British commitment of aircraft. Your understanding of history seems to be colored by your vitriolic hatred of the United States. Given the fact you could write unironically that the US only gave Britain a "little help" from 1939 to 1942 suggests your hatred of the US runs deeper than the just the Suez incident.
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  382. What a great video history! An interesting side story with USN destroyers were the experiments with mounting seaplanes. The first attempt was with the USS Charles Ausburn (DD-294) mounting a TS-1 floatplane in 1923. The fixed platform was inconveniently mounted directly in front of the bridge. This not only obstructed vision from the bridge but also greatly interfered from the field of fire from the forward 4" gun. Several successful flights were conducted, but the inadequate crane capacity, being needed to lower the plane and retrieve it, and the fragile nature of these early seaplanes, made the experiment generally a failure. The seaplane and platform were removed in early 1924 with the Ausburn being restored to the configuration of other Clemson class vessels. The next attempt was aboard the US Noa (DD-343), yet another Clemson class. I realize this is slightly outside the 1939 limit of the discussion, but the plans for the seaplane mount were started in 1938, and Noa was originally scheduled for recommissioning in 1939, so close enough. Frank Knox, then Secretary of the Navy, was a great believer in the idea of using destroyers as seaplane carriers to extend their range for fleet protection and commerce raiding. To test this concept again, the Noa was taken in hand when she was recommissioned in April, 1940. She had an XSOC-1 seaplane mounted this time on a rotating platform, displacing the aft bank of torpedoes. She also had a boom with a much greater lifting capacity, and the XSOC-1 was a much more robust aircraft than her predecessors. This time the experiment was more successful, with many flights, and the ability to retrieve the plane while underway, a difficult task for a relatively small Clemson class ship. Noa retained her seaplane until November, 1941, and the generally successful experience with Noa led to Knox mandating the construction of six Fletcher class destroyers with seaplane capability, this time with catapults (!). However, as Drach would say, that's a story for another day.
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  384. I hope everyone is tolerating their time in prison as well as can be expected. I'm looking forward to a gradual opening up of at least the US economy over the next month. The high here in S Alabama reached 90 yesterday, so maybe the heat will at least make life difficult for the virus. The big issue in using the so-called "Persian Corridor" was expanding the marshalling yard capabilities and then constructing hundreds of miles of double tracks and increased length sidings to haul enough freight to come close to Arctic convoy tonnage, even with all the sinkings. When the British first took over operations of the Trans-Iranian Railway in 1941, the entire line had the capability of moving one 60 car freight train a day. Due to mostly the superhuman efforts of the Royal Engineers, the line was expanded to the point where it was handling up to 10 80 car freights a day. The most important problem once the line itself had sufficient capacity was where were the locomotives and freight cars (wagons) going to come from to move all the freight. Between the British and Americans, over 15,000 freight cars were built, 310 steam engines were constructed or diverted from British and American sources, and over 100 diesel-electric locomotives from the US were supplied for use on the difficult northern division. It was an engineering wonder, going over three mountain ranges, through 100 tunnels, with blasting heatmost of the year, and very little water. Diesel operations on the Trans-Iranian proved the efficiency and economy of the internal combustion engine. While this was great for the war effort, it was also the beginning of the end for our beloved steam engines.
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  385. The US navy's goal by mid-1944 was to have all destroyers assigned the Pacific theater that retained their twin quad torpedo launchers to be be fitted with at least ten 40mm barrels, those with a single quad launcher to have at 12 barrels, and the complete anti-kamikaze ships with no torpedo launchers were fitted with between 14 and 16 barrels. The most heavily armed were some Gearing class ships with a pair of quad 40mm mounts amidships in the same positions as the landed torpedo launchers, a pair of twin mounts opposite the bridge, and another pair of twin mounts aft ahead of the depth charge tracks replacing the previous three to five single 20mm mounts at the same location. This was a total of 20 barrels. At the same time, all the remaining single 20mm mounts were replaced with twin mounts. Most of these ships were used as radar pickets that were heavily attacked by Japanese aircraft once they realized ot importance of their early warning role. The ability of these ships to send up a hail of antiaircraft fire was a surprise to Japanese pilots and caused many suicide attacks to be broken up, especially when there were enough destroyers available to assign pairs to a radar picket station. The problems with this kind of heavy armament was not the stability issues that have been written about, it was where to berth and feed all the extra crew. Each quad mount required a crew of 8-10 and twins 4-5. that was a total additional crew just to man the mounts of 32-35 men compared to the original three twin mounts. This doesn't count the additional crew needed for ammunition handling, magazine manning, and machinist and gunners mates to repair and maintain the mounts. The additional electronics and Combat Information Centers already required an additional ten to fourteen men before the armament changes, so even the Grearings were hard pressed to find space for these crew, and it was even worse for the converted Fletchers and Sumners. Even the amount of extra provisions required was estimated to add some thirty tons to the displacement, not to mention the additional cooks and stewards needed. The USN before the kamikaze threat prided itself on every crew member having their own berth. By April, 1945, hot bunking, hammocks, and even deck sleeping was the norm. Many more complaints by the men centered more around the difficulties of getting a hot meal than the rough berthing. Letters home from Pacific theater destroyer crews told of waiting for up to two hours to get through the mess line, only to have that disrupted by general quarters for another air attack. Some gun and CIC crews ate nothing but sandwiches and coffee for days on end. If you want to start sailors to bitching, don't feed them hot meals, and the bitching from crews extended from letters to their families all the way to letters to their Congressmen and Senators.
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  390. Of the eight preserved US battleships, all but one (Texas) is a "modern" era ship. The Iowas were always considered ready reserve ships up until the mid-2000's. They were in excellent material condition when they were finally retired. The Navy knew that any plan to scrap the ships was unthinkable so they actively worked with the states and ultimate museum anchorages to preserve the ships, even to the point that the agreements with the museums was the ships had to be maintained in "as-delivered" condition and were subject to repossession by the Navy at a time of national need. Even though only one of the four was the namesake of a coastal state, the value of preservation as tourist attractions was already well in place by the 1990's Of the four South Dakotas, the two preserved ships (Alabama and Massachusetts) are named for coastal states that fought for their preservation. The two that were scrapped (South Dakota and Indiana) are inland states with nowhere to display the ships. Both states preserved many pieces of the ships before scrapping, and they are now displayed in suitable monuments in their respective states. The name ship of the North Carolina class is displayed at Wilmington NC. Starting from 1960, when the donation fo $331,000 collected by schoolchildren to purchase the ship, to being a self-supporting museum today, North Carolina has done a remarkable job of preserving her "Showboat". North Carolina was a donor ship for parts needed to renovate the Iowas when they were being refurbished in the 1980's. Unfortunately, many of her mechanical systems were removed at the time, along with the barbette of turret #1, but the parts live on in the Iowas. North Carolina is still a cosmetically beautiful ship and well worth the visit. This brings me to the shame of the state of Washington. While other states were already preserving or taking steps to preserve their ships, Washington simply didn't seem to care. At the same time that NC school kids were collecting pennies to buy their ship, the Washington legislature seemed to think the same $330,000 was an outrageous price and refused to fund the purchase. Vets attempted to get the same kind of schoolkids campaign going but, once again, no one seemed to care. The ship was decommissioned in June, 1960 and towed away for scrapping in May, 1961, probably a modern record between the two events. The ship's bell and a few other mementos are on display in the Bremerton Naval Museum, and that's only because of the efforts of the late Helen Devine, museum curator, digging through crates and boxes in a dusty warehouse in Olympia to find them and bring them to the museum. Other than this one corner of the museum, there's no real memorial to the ship, and certainly no memorial commensurate with the ship's historical value. Another move is underway to construct a proper memorial, but most of the ship's crew have passed on, and only some lonely naval historians and buffs have taken up the cudgel. The last Ship's Reunion was in 2005, and even the ship's website (http://www.usswashington.com/) is now mostly a mass of broken links. As you may be able to tell, I'm more than a little ill with the state of Washington and the shameful way they have treated "their" ship and the veterans who sailed on her. I've visited all the other battleships, and just thinking about the fate of Washington sets my teeth on edge.
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  400. I had a very old DOS computer naval gunfire simulator called Action Stations! that I ran on an original PC-XT running under DOS 3.3, as vaguely recall now. It was one of the better naval warfare game that used the mathematics from the USN Maneuver and Fire Rules papers from the interwar period right up until the end of WWII. You could thus use fire control protocols from right after then end of WWI onward. I think the game was published in 1989 or 1990 and was loaded on a grand total of three double density floppy disks. It was fiendishly difficult, but you could simulate the results of something like a Texas class battleship engaging the IJN Kirishima using the fire control tools from 1925 right up to the Iowas fighting the Yamato in 1945. One of the criticisms of the game was the hit percentage was too high but the author (whose name I've completely forgotten) stated he had to "fudge" the results for a typical eight hour engagement or a single ship wasn't likely to ever achieve a hit probability of more than 5% during an interwar game. Thus, you always attacked with every ship you could lay your hands on or engagements would always end with both sides breaking off the engagement due to battle damage and each expending all their ammunition. It wasn't until the advent of radar GFCS and mechanical firing computers that the 5% hit probability ever got substantially higher. It was a great game that allowed you and other players to fight each other in a much more sophisticated form of the old Battleship board game. My friends and I wasted many a man month playing that game.
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  401. Both of these cruisers belied their Italian origins in their turret designs. They suffered the same excessive shot dispersion problems as the Italians due to the barrels being mounted too closely together. Swedish 6" ammunition was better quality, and some changes were made to how a salvo was fired. One barrel fired a few hundredths of a second sooner than its opposite barrel. That helped, but it never totally solved the problem. I'm not aware of any Swedish results of using the main armament as dual purpose, but I suspect it wouldn't have been any more successful than what was seen in the USN Worcester class DP cruisers. The Tre Kronor class were constructed to a budget rather than to maximize their lethality. The goal was for a 33 knot vessel, with the same SHP as a Brooklyn but only powering two shafts rather than the Brooklyn's four. Even though the length of the Tre Kronor was virtually identical to the Brooklyn, the hull was more finely designed, with a beam seven feet narrower than a Brooklyn. While that meant the goal of a 33 knot top speed was accomplished on two shafts, it had other undesirable effects. The narrower beam meant the Tre Kronor could carry less armor per foot of length as any more armor would have reduced top speed. Some of the weight of what was available for armor had to be allocated to the ice strengthened bow. Consequently, she only had a 2.8" belt and a total of 1.2" of deck armor. This compares to the 3 1⁄4–5" of belt armor and 2" of deck armor of the Brooklyn. Turrets were even worse, with Brooklyn having a 6" turret roof and not more than about 4.5" on the Tre Kronor. Conning tower armor was the one place the two ships were more or less equal. It's probably a good thing that the ex-Tre Kronor never met the ex-Brooklyn in combat. The armor disadvantages combined with a weak seven gun broadside compared to the ex-Brooklyn's fifteen guns wouldn't have contributed to a good outcome for the ex-Tre Kronor.
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  403.  @tomriley5790  The RN knew as soon as they tested it the Oerlikon was far superior to the Vickers machine guns. To their credit, they adopted it in 1939, as soon as the Swiss made changes to simplify the gun and raise the muzzle velocity. Only about 150 guns had been obtained from Switzerland before the fall of France cut off the supply routes from Switzerland. These Mark 1 guns were parceled out among aircraft carriers and capital ships so none were left for any smaller vessels. It took until late 1941 before British industry was able to ramp production enough that 20 mm guns started being installed on ships in the shipyards. They were able to produce about 55,000 guns by the end of the war, and this gun followed the USN plan of installing the gun on any empty space on a ship. The Bofors gun was a different story. The RN recognized the superiority of the gun over the 2 pdr gun. It took the British being able to test the Hazemeyer 40 mm gun mounts aboard the Dutch minesweeper Willem van der Zaan that arrived in Britain in May, 1940, after the fall of the Netherlands. The Dutch guns were water cooled were much better in the sustained fire role than the air cooled Bofors guns produced in Britain. As usual, Britain's war industries were overwhelmed, and only about 800 guns were produced by the end of the war. It was US lend lease of 768 mounts in 1944 that allowed the British Pacific fleet to have a creditable air defense against kamikazes. The Bofors gun was incredibly difficult to produce in quantity due to Sweden's use of the metric system and hundreds of hand fitted parts. It was only Chrysler's all out efforts by hundreds of engineers and designers, and sharing the techniques with Britain, that enabled a gun to go from taking about 125 hours to produce in 1942 to about 10 hours in 1944. It wasn't really that Britain dropped the ball. They kept up with AAA developments. They just didn't have the industrial capacity. Producing more AA ships just wasn't possible until very late in the war.
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  409. The captain (and naval commanders in general) had two big problems with the design. The worst was the ship carried 30 shells composed of "desensitized blasting gelatin", a combination of nitrocellulose and nitroglycerin. The were only desensitized to the extent this volatile mixture was somewhat protected by their brass or steel shells and fired using compressed air. The ammunition was carried in a magazine with about an inch of "armor" which was really just sheet iron. Estimates from amorers were even a near miss by a large shell like one of eleven or twelve inch shells Drach talked about would be enough to set off the nitro in at least one or two shells. Once that happened, the propagating shock effect would have set off the entire magazine. As was said at the the time, the upside to this was neither rescue efforts nor funeral expenses would be involved for the crew, since the resulting explosion would have been rather like a miniature HMS Hood blast. In addition to the dangers of sailing a ship filled with poorly protected and only marginally stable explosives into action, it doesn't take many measurements of the hull and freeboard compared to average wave heights, even in the Caribbean, to realized this vessel was much more like a coastal yacht than an ocean going warship. The vessel took green water over the bow in even moderate seas due to the low freeboard, and much of that water would go directly down the gun tubes if the barrel plugs weren't in place. This is a pretty obvious issue for a ship that would need to be pointed toward a target with the barrels unplugged during combat. The very fine curve to the stern was needed to achieve the relatively high speed of 20 knots in a 252 long vessel with only 3,200 horsepower worth of engines The stern shape caused large waves to backfill over the stern in a following sea, This made the stern 3 pounder gun unusable and flooded the below decks spaces through the large ventilators on the stern section of the main deck. While it wasn't the worst naval vessel ever built, it's usually on top ten lists for these and other faults.
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  411. It's not just the radar top hamper we can see that contributes to the weight devoted to radars. In those days of vacuum tubes (valves), even a surface search radar display could run to a ton. Once larger plan position indicators (those sweeping oscilloscope type screens) and associated electronics could add another 4-8 tons. In order to coordinate all those radars and fire control systems, something like the USN combat information center (CIC) was now required, with hundreds to tens of thousands of pounds of electronics, radios, phone systems, plus the people to man all of those gadgets. That meant about ten officers and NCOs and another 20 or so enlisted in a cruiser sized vessel, and about half that requirement for a destroyer. Once fighter direction was added to the CIC, another five to seven people had to be crowded into an already inadequate space. The only good thing about being crammed into a small space like a CIC is they were generally one of the first spaces to be air conditioned. Lest you think the Navy had gone soft on the crew, the a/c manual made it clear that it existed mainly to decrease the humidity in the CIC, since all that moisture caused the electronics to break down. Even the so-call plotting tables were in reality large primitive vacuum tube powered analogue computers, each weighing another 3 to 6 tons each. Space also had to be found to accomodate all these men and equipment. The next problem was all the additional bunk and messing space, plus stores for the extra crew, and that could easily add up to another several thousand tons per mission just for stores. But we're not done yet. Something had to make all those all power hungry vacuum tubes light up, and that meant larger steam and diesel generators along with things like dynamotors and sundry other things needed to keep all those screens lit and radar antennas turning, such as additional miles of very heavy electrical cabling, and coaxial cables for the radars themselves. it's hard to find estimates for all the weight added to ships for all these electronics and ancillary things like the CIC. The only seemingly accurate one I've read was in the July (or maybe August) 1945 issue of Combat Information Center magazine, a Navy publication that attempted pull together the best practices from men all over the fleet about how to makes a CIC run efficiently. That estimate included the weight all the electronics and mechanical equipment needed to run all the radars and the CIC itself, plus the CIC staff, but not including some of the engine room generators or radar antennas. That estimate was about 78 tons for a cruiser, 107 tons for a battleship, and an astounding 138 tons for an aircraft carrier, and that didn't include the weight of all the radar antennas. A cruiser size CIC required a minimum of 480 sq ft, a battleship 740, and an aircraft carrier about 950 sq ft. All of this gives some indication that radar was a lot more than slapping a radar antenna on a mast. The next time you look at a late war picture of a USN or RN vessel with those antennas everywhere, just remember that, like an iceberg, a lot of what was required to make them useful was below decks.
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  439. Dang! I must have gone to bed about five minutes before the Drydock came out. Outstanding content as usual. As to the the Japanese naval defeat, I'd add a few additional reasons; 1. Lack of effective radar actually getting into service. The Japanese did develop reasonably effective radars between the Army and Navy. The problem was the Japanese military realized the pivotal role of radar for fire control, in particular, much too late. By the time they did, the homeland was being reduced to rubble by air attack, so newer radar was only being produced in small numbers, and the number of ships that could use them was being reduced to a smaller and smaller number, 2. Lack of understanding of centralized fighter control and combat air patrols. The IJN never developed an effective equivalent to the Combat Information Center, and the lack of effective radar and poor understanding of how to conduct a CAP caused Japanese ships to be constantly jumped by allied aircraft. 3. Never developing a decent light AA gun. The 25 mm gun was, by far, the worst light AA weapon of any navy in the Pacific, and it was never significantly improved over the course of the war. The IJN knew of and had samples of the Oerlikon and Bofors guns quite early on in the war. Japanese industry never had the machine tools capable of sufficient tolerances to develop the Bofors gun into a reliable weapon. The IJN believed, quite wrongly, that their 25 mm gun was equal to the Oerlikon gun, and they had the manufacturing of the 25 mm gun down pat. It was a classic example of fighting a war with what you have, not what you wished you have. The lack of radar gunfire control and off-mount directors just made things even worse. 4. Rapidly improving quality of allied air carrier aircraft. The development of the F6F gave the USN at least a comparable aircraft to the IJN and, once the Marines finally proved to the USN the F4U was a good carrier aircraft, had a plane far superior to anything available to the IJN. If the war had gone on for another six months, the IJN would have faced the F8F Bearcat, a truly fearsome aircraft compared ot anything the IJN had. Add in the Seafire once the British Pacific Fleet got involved and the IJN lost any chance of being able to overcome allied air attacks. 5. Never having an understanding of the problems if supplying all their many island outposts, and assuming the allies would attack every one of them. That caused large amounts of soldiers and sailors dedicated to maintain these non-strategic islands, combined with the US adoption of island hopping, maent large numbers of Japanese just slowly starved to death as their fortified islands were bypassed and eventually were left far behind enemy lines. 6. Never understanding why attacking merchant shipping was of prime importance, and never understanding convoy warfare. Right up until the end of the war, Japanese subs continued to allow merchant ships to pass so they could conserve torpedoes for warship attacks. Most Japanese shipping was still unescorted single ships until late in the war, and by the time the Japanese did start convoying merchant ships. most of their large merchant ships had been sunk. They were then stuck trying to use large numbers of coastal freighters as oceangoing vessels, making convoys that much more difficult. On top of that, the IJN never developed very good escort ships, and never had enough of them in any case. These are just the issues I could think of off the top of my head. I'm sure there are many more.
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  440. The modification of the standard USN periscope to use a miniaturized ST radar completely enclosed in the periscope was a real advance in terms of torpedo aiming. The ST periscope could detect a BB size target up to 5 miles away while it could "see" a DD size vessel up to 3 miles. This was enough to give much more accurate bearing, distance, and speed data to the torpedo data computer (TDC). Before the radar periscope, most of those numbers were estimates from the captain or XO, depending on which officer was the better estimator. The ST radar could almost instantaneously feed original estimates into the TDC, and the ST could update any changes before firing as the target vessel took evasive action. The combination of the ST periscope and TDC meant that, by late 1944, almost every torpedo fired would hit the target. This accuracy, along with torpedos that actually worked, allowed US subs longer patrol times by not having to fire as many salvos. The ST was one of the primary sensors that led to the USN sinking nearly all the larger Japanese merchantmen and most IJN warships still able to leave port by June, 1945. Even more formidable to the Japanese were seven US subs fitted out as gunboats, armed with two 5"/25 guns and two 40 mm guns. The big advance was the addition of the Mark 6 fire control system and plotting room, along with SJ surface/air search radar, all feeding data to the guns, meant the Japanese small, sampan type freighters were no longer able to escape sinking due to their draft being so shallow that torpedoes went under them rather than hitting them. The estimate was that these gunboats, which were going to be converted from about 30 additional Balao class subs, would have swept the seas clear of any remaining Japanese merchant shipping by January, 1946, just in time for the main invasion to begin.
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  441. Nova Topaz  I think the part where the guns were used against the aircraft must have been some type of barrage fire. Large caliber guns using HC ammunition have been used in that role before. The RN were actually great believers in using barrage fire for their battleships to break up torpedo plane attacks. As a concept, it worked, but it almost never did in real life. Because of the rapid fire of the 8"/55, they may have had a better chance than most other cruisers but there were never any antiaircraft rounds produced for that gun, so my guess is that segment was for propaganda values rather than showing any real use for a gun that big against aircraft. What was a waste of money was the postwar idea of the navy that next war would be fought with high level bombers using nuclear weapons against the fleet. In order to engage them further from the fleet so they couldn't get close enough that a blast from an atomic bomb would sidable or sink ships, they wanted a larger caliber gun that could reach out to 15 miles at 30,000 feet. If the 6" guns of the Worcester class could have reached their planned ROF of 25 rounds a minute, the 12 guns of the ship may have been able to put up a sufficient volume of fire to accomplish the task. Close in aircraft would have been dealt with by the 24 barrels of the semi-automatic 3"/50 guns firing at 50 rounds per minute per barrel. By the time the navy realized the 6"/47 was never going to be a reliable weapon, they realized that missiles fired from other ships were the main menace, not high flying bombers. I'd argue the dual hoist system was a complete dead end and was a total waste of money, except possibly to show what didn't work. It was only when the single hoist system with ammunition changed out before it got the hoist that we developed the superb 5"/54 in all its marks. Then we started down the road of extended range ammunition to make the destroyer into a battleship, but that's another whole story of failure.
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  451.  @chanman819  Generally true, especially on ships from cruiser size up. The captain didn't have a lot of time to get involved with the food selected, although the good ones still did regular food inspections just to make sure nothing was moving in the food that shouldn't have been and it was all the right color. On smaller vessels, a lot of of the skippers were reservists, and many of them had civilian jobs that were at least as important to them as their Navy training, Some came from the food service business before the war, and they used that experience to select the best food from that available for the ships. They could buy local meat and produce when none was available from the normal fleet supplies, and they'd also swap items back and forth with other skippers for food their crews liked better. The classic is American smokes and RAN ships. Apparently, the RAN didn't supply cigarettes at all to their ships, just loose tobacco, and that was reputed to be not very good. When a US ship was in port, they could trade almost any local or Australian food for smokes. My Dad's PT boat had a skipper that ran his own restaurant before the war, and he was a past master at horse trading. One of their favorites was lobster, something the Aussie guys knew how to catch when they were in port, with the going price being a pack of cigs for one lobster. He'd also swap Australian mutton, which everyone hated but the Aussies liked, for sides of beef. The skipper knew how to trim those to get some pretty tasty steaks, with the leftovers used as stew meat. Every couple weeks, the crew would set up a charcoal grill on the fantail and cook up a meal of surf and turf. The smell brought Aussie forces from the army to navy to air force down to the dock, and the price of a meal was two bottles of beer. The skipper was able to keep the squadron pretty well supplied with things that made life in the South Pacific a lot more tolerable. Everything he did was, of course, contrary to regulations, but he made sure any visiting brass was well fed and had some cold beer from the tiny fridges on the PT's. He never got in any trouble for his "creativeness", and my Dad said that, except for the fact the Japanese kept trying to kill them, serving in New Guinea and the Solomon's wasn't half bad.
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  457.  @kemarisite  The USN used Cordite N flashless propellant during WWII for cruiser and battleship main guns. The US didn't manufacture flashless propellant at the time because it required huge amounts of electricity to make, and the power plants on the Canadian side of Niagara Falls was the only place in North America with the required power while still being reasonably close to shipping ports and ammunition factories. The Bureau of Ordinance considered it dangerous because it was brittle and contained unstable nitroglycerin, the cause of many RN magazine explosions. Because it deteriorated and became even more unstable in the presence of heat or moisture, the first uses of shipboard refrigeration plants was for magazines. They had to be inspected at least once per watch for any temperature or humidity variations outside regulations. If conditions got too far out of spec, the propellant case had to be dumped overboard, something that could cost a ship's captain a promotion, so magazine inspections were quite rigorous. For night fighting use, we had nothing better than Cordite N, so we imported about 250,000 tons a year from 1943 until late 1944. The BuOrd developed their own smokeless charge, Alabanite, which contained no nitroglycerin and produced even less flash than Cordite N. The only downside was shells using Albanite were about 10% heavier than those using Cordite N. The USN was willing to accept this tradeoff for a more stable and less flammable propellant. Albanite started being used in 1945, but it didn't really get into mass production until the very end of the war. So, the short answer is, even though we didn't make Cordite N, we imported large quantities of it until it could be replaced by Albanite.
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  458.  @MasterOfDickery  Naval gun salutes go back to the earliest days of sail. In those early days a salute was fired as a means to let ships of another navy know that you weren't a threat since you were firing just black powder charges with no shot. All naval vessels of cruiser or above size carried specially made or converted saluting guns up until WWII. The most popular was the French Hotchkiss 3 pounder (47mm), a gun that was an operational piece in some small boats right up until the end of WWII. On larger ship, the gun was too small for anti-surface work and too slow for antiaircaft use against fast planes. The 3 pounder was made in the tens of thousands so there were many left in storage in the US, Britain, and France. A lot of them were remounted for use as saluting guns. Almost all of them were made before 1910 so they were getting worn out, even from just saluting use. We didn't mount 3 pounders on the Iowa class when they were recommissioned. There were no small artillery pieces onboard so we were forced to fire salutes required by custom using the five inch guns. That was obviously not a very good alternative. We had tons of 40mm guns as surplus, so a number (I don't know the exact amount) were remanufactured as single pieces to mount on, of all things, the original 3 pounder mounts. They fire black powder charges so they make a lot of smoke and noise. The mounts never wear out. I don't know what happens next with saluting guns. The Ticonderogas will be our last class of cruisers as that force winds down. I believe at least two of them that normally ae equipped as flagships have two or more 40mm saluting guns, since the salutes are given and returned for high officers. Those crazy Zumwalts are the same size as the postwar Fargo class light cruisers in length and are actually about a thousand tons more displacement. The Zumwalts, even with their massive size, are officially classed as guided missile destroyers, and destroyers are normally not required to give salutes except for a president or former president. With the US and Russian navies being the only ones with designated cruisers, the use of fixed saluting guns has been declining. Will their places be taken by ships like the ROK Sejong the Great-class destroyers and Chinese Type 055 Destroyers, both the length and tonnage of WWII light cruisers? Stay tuned...
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  524. Gensoul, Somerville, and Churchill all bore varying responsibility for the attack. Gensoul because he was possibly the most stupid and intransigent admiral ever in command of a fleet. He must have been aware that his ships could not fight off the British, and not complying with one of the clauses of the memorandum could only lead to the sinking of his ships and the needless death of his sailors. Somerville because he knew Gensoul was a haughty officer who wouldn't take kindly to having to negotiate with a mere captain, even if he was a French speaker. He should have at least sent his XO along with Captain Holland as translator. There was no point in continuing to sent Holland back for negotiations since Gensoul took each visit as an even great affront. Churchill because the war had reached a critical point, with the US not certain Britain would or could continue to fight Germany and Italy. Given that uncertainty, there were moves within the War and State departments to stop supplying Britain with any more war material since it was just a lost cause, and those materials would be needed in the very likely event of a Japanese attack and, sometime in the indeterminate future, Germany. Churchill knew this, and felt a strong show of force against the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir was his only hope to convince the US that Britain was indeed in the fight until the end. In fact, the attack did result in a stiffening of US resolve to help Britain stay in the fight regardless of the outcome.
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  527.  @WildBillCox13  You're welcome. Weather, particularly tropical weather, has been one of my hobbies for almost 60 years. Ironically, Halsey sailed his task force directly into another typhoon (now known as Typhoon Connie) in June, 1945. Connie was actually a worse storm than Cobra, but some of the lessons learned in the earlier storm helped Task Force 38 survive in a battered condition but with no ships lost. Only 8 sailors lost their lives compared to 760 from Cobra. There was even more accurate forecasting about Connie, but many of those forecasts were held up awaiting decoding and didn't reach Halsey and Admiral McCain. the task force commander until it was too late. Many of the ships hove to and put out their sea anchors before being hit, others ballasted their near empty fuel tanks with salt water. That stopped the fatal yawing and heaving that caused the loss of many ships during Cobra. Halsey wouldn't allow either action during Cobra since it would take his ships out of action for too long. Halsey was once more subject to a court of inquiry about his orders for the task force. The blame for sailing into Connie was placed, somewhat unfairly, on the shoulders of Halsey and McCain. If not for Halsey's heroic status among the American people, he probably would have been relieved of command. McCain, who was also Halsey's chief of staff during Cobra, received no such consideration, and was relieved of command on July 15. A worn out sailor with many medical problems, McCain passed away from a heart attack on September 6, 1945, just four days after the surrender ceremony in Tokyo Ba,y at the age of 61.
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  530.  @paulboy9101  Subs from the early 30's generally had two .30 caliber Lewis guns. Immediate prewar classes like Sargo usually had two water cooled .50 machine guns carried in pressure proof cases on the cigarette deck. There were mounts in the sail and generally one on the deck once the guns were switched to PT boat type short barrel air cooled Brownings. The .50 guns had to be unlimbered from their cases, heaved onto a mount in tossing seas by three crewmen, and at least two more were required to go below to get more belts, since the ready use belts were only 100 rounds each. As you might imagine, this was not a popular activity. Many boats still carried a pair of .30 guns until the end of the war. The standard gun was an air cooled M1919 Browning, but some skippers prefered their Lewis guns. They both fired the same ammo and the Lewis gun had the advantage of not having a belt flopping around the deck, a definite plus in the tight quarters of a sub. They used simple pipe mounts, and at least four were welding onto the sail and various rails around the deck. The Lewis and M1919 guns were relatively light and handy, easy to sling onto their pipe mounts. Their main use was for covering boarding parties late in the war and keeping Japanese heads down before the main battery came into firing. The boat's armory also include at least two Thompson submachine guns. six 1911 pistols, and maybe a dozen M1903 Springfield rifles to be used by landing parties. That didn't happen often, but aggressive skippers like Commander Fluckey and the crew of the Barb could and did empty out the armory for shore operations. I'm pretty sure the Barb had the only sub armory that also included hand grenades and plastic explosives Once they became available and mounts were designed, boats rapidly switched over to 20 mm and 40 mm cannon for antiaircraft defense,.but most boats retained at least some of their smaller caliber machine guns. Like the rest of the USN, their philosophy was any empty space should be filled with a gun. :-)
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  531. I'll follow along again - 1. HMS Hood - If nothing else, the greatest "show the flag" ship ever built. 2 - USS Omaha - Destroyer leaders classed as cruisers. Nevertheless, they were were useful ships in WWII and, as Drach pointed out, none of them were lost in the early days of the war, and that wasn't bad for US cruisers. 3 - HSwMS Gotland - Her conversion to an antiaircraft ship in 1944 was really what the ship should have always been. 4 - French cruiser Duquesne - Not a good ship except for speed. It was lucky to be interred for the war. 5 - Deutschland class - Designed as commerce raiders but were too lightly built and too expensive for the role. 6 - Condottieri class - Too many ships to all be "worst warships". By the time the Italians got to the Duca degli Abruzzi class they had a very good light cruiser design. 7 - Japanese carrier Ryujo - She was carrying far too many aircraft for her displacement which played a large role in her loss. Other than that, she wasn't a "worst" warship. 8 - Mogami cruiser class - Would have been more useful as light cruisers. 9 - Yamato class battleships - World's most expensive floating artillery barge. If she had been built and put in service by 1942, the class would have been much more effective. 10 - Bismarck class battleships - The Tirpitz became the most important ship to the RN and RAF for almost four years. She tied down more resources than any single ship I can think of. Should not be in this group of worst warships. 11 - Implacable class aircraft carriers - Once they got effective fighters and attack aircraft, these were quite effective ships. I don't understand why Preston included this class. 12 - Hydrogen peroxide subs - They were a dead end, but gave some experience with high underwater speeds. 13 - Alpha class Russian subs - Main advantage of this class was scaring the RN and USN and getting both navies to concentrate on better streamlining and more powerful nuclear power plants. 14 - Type 21 frigates - Compared to the Leanders, these were a poor design. For getting 8 ships into service at a time of strained budgets, they were about the best the RN could produce in numbers. 15 - La Combante class - Dumbest inclusion in the book. There was nothing particularly outstanding about the class, but they were excellent offensive ships for smaller navies and gave those navies at least a credible deterrent to other smaller navies, or even larger navies. They also made huge amounts of money for France.
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  535.  @neniAAinen  The Nevada , like all warships, had faults, but it was overall a better balanced warship. We'll never know how Normandie might have done in combat, but most naval architects and engineers expected substantial damage to the superstructure if she ever fired a full broadside, That's a pretty substantial difference between the two ships. Depending on where the target was, Normandie could only fire four or eight guns compared to five or ten for Nevada . All twelve guns would only have been useful in firing at a target plus or minus ten degrees from a straight on broadside. The 13.4" was a fair bit less powerful than the 14". The French AP shell weighed about 1200 pounds compared to about 1500 with US shells. That's a 20% increase, so nothing to sneeze at. It was the same with range, with the French gun having a range of about 18,000 yards and the US model went out 23,000 yards, about a 22% increase. We'll never know what the 13.4" range would have been if the planned elevation to 30 degrees had occured, but it boosted the range for Nevada to 32,000 yards. I'm going from memory here but I believe Normandie was going to complete with at least one bow TT while Nevada had either two or four (no one seems to agree) submerged beam TT's. I should have been clearer that I meant bow TT's. That's an interesting question though. Was there ever a confirmed case of a dreadnought battleship sinking another warship using submerged TT's? I've never heard of it, but I don't know much about battleship torpedoes. I assume they weren't considered of much value in the USN since they were all removed during the 20's. Normandie with a twin/triple turret arrangement fore and after would have been a much more useful ship. She still would have had a twelve gun armament so she could throw as much weight as a 14" ship with ten like Nevada but could have used her full broadside without the same kind of damage the amidships turret would have caused. That, and the snail-like pace of French ship building, are her biggest faults.
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  549.  @spookyshadowhawk6776  Yes, my dad's boat had the torpedos landed shortly after he arrived in March, 1943. The navy was having 37mm cannon made new for PT boats by about mid-1943 with a standardized mount since each boat's crew was making their own when using the the onew from crashed P-39's. His boat got a new manufacture gun on a reworked 3 pounder mount. His boat didn't have an aft 40mm until sometime in late 1943 so the 37mm gun added some real firepower to the boat. The combination of the new 40mm firing AP and HE for the 37mm was enough to start sinking barges (which were really motorized landing craft) by late 1943. The Japanese responded by uparmoring the barges with 5/8" sheet steel on both sides of the hull and with cofferdams filled with concrete. The ends had the least armour, and that's where the boats attacked. They'd go out in three boat flotillas at dusk and spend the night searching for the barges. The addition of radar to his boat shortly after he arrived made that easier and more efficient. They'd lie off from the shore along likely routes with one engine at idle while the radar operator searched. They could pick up the group of barges at about seven miles. They'd wait until the barges had just passed their location and then dash out to shoot them up. Some had 37mm guns of their own along with 25mm AA guns and machine guns so it was quite a fight. The Japanese started using heavily armoured and armed barges as escorts in 1944, some armed with 75mm field guns and multiple 25mm and 37mm guns. His boat got a pair Mark 50 eight cell rocket launchers at the end of 1944. They fired a 5" spin stabilized rocket that could sink a barge - if they could hit it. The launchers could only be aimed by pointing the boat at the target using a sight on the bridge. The XO was supposed to turn the boat into the sight until both were lined up with a barge and then fire the rocket. He said they hit one barge for maybe every 25 rockets expended, but they made a huge flash and plenty of noise, so they kept the heads of the Japanese gunners down. This went on night after night off New Guinea and then the Solomons until, between them and Army fighters, the Japanese had no barges left by 1945. They were ordered to the Philippines in March 1945, and his boat spent most its time doing the same kinds of patrols but without as much excitement. He got 30 days leave in May, 1945 because he was due to be married, his first leave of the war. He came down with malaria shortly after the ceremony and didn't get back to his boat until July, with VJ Day coming shortly after. He was in the Philippines until October, and watched his boat being burned in Milne Bay. I asked him how he felt watching it burn. He said he felt great since it meant he'd soon be mustered out and be able to get back to his pregnant wife. Malaria don't slow the old man down! I was born in February, 1946, the first of seven. Dad went off to that big squadron in the sky in 2005.
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  562.  @grumpyoldman-21  From the official RAN reports and later location of the wrecks, it seems impossible that Sidney could have made 12 knots after the battle. She sank only 11.4 nm from Komoran and was probably making way at more like 1-1.5 knots using the remaining steam in possibly one boiler. Sailors on Komoran reported seeing the glow of Sydney on the horizon until about 2000, nearly four hours after the end of the battle. If she was making way at even 10 knots, she would have been far below the horizon by 2200, and some of the Komoran crew reported seeing flareups from the fires until nearly midnight. It's a lot more likely that propulsion stopped maybe a half hour to forty-five minutes after Sydney moved off, and she just drifted until the final explosion that sent her to the bottom. The crew remaining alive were either trapped below decks or were mortally wounded, and the chances of any crew functioning well enough to raise steam and get the ship under control are vanishingly small. This remains such a compelling story of naval warfare because what should have been the superior combatant was lost with all hands against a supposedly much weaker opponent. The suppositions about the battle have swirled for decades, generating books, movies, supposed documentaries, and conspiracy theories almost from the day of her loss. To Australians. The sinking just couldn't have happened in a "fair" fight, there fore some darker explanation of Sydney being ambushed by Nazi and/or Japanese perfidy and war crimes were the only acceptable explanations. The idea that lack of experience, foolishness, incompetence, and just plain bad luck were dismissed out of hand. In particular, it was assumed that Komaran survivors constantly lied about what really happened to cover up their won crimes and throw the Australians off the true story. Given what we now know, the survivors, after some initial attempts to falsify accounts, generally gave in during interrogation and were usually truthful. Using their accounts is what allowed the wreck hunters to find the wreck of Sydney so rapidly once Komoran's wreckage was located. I don't know how many books, official reports, survivor accounts, and papers I've read about this, but it has been a lot. If another one comes out, I'll read that one too. This is such a classic mystery of the sea that it has held my interest for almost 60 years, and it will continue to do so until I shuffle off this mortal coil.
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  566.  @oceanhome2023  The K gun was an explosively fired smooth bore launcher for a standard depth charge. It was a way to have more depth charges fired simultaneously and at a greater distance from the ship. This allowed the ship to make a slower attack without the fear of damaging the stern of the vessel. The depth charge itself was no different than the standard over the stern model. The pictures you see with two circles of Hedgehogs entering the water were postwar, when standard destroyers were converted to escort destroyers. This involved reducing gun armament to one or two turrets and replacing the guns with Hedgehogs. Some got two ahead launchers and others were tested with a forward launcher and another mounted in place of one of the stern gun turrets. Testing showed the two ahead launchers gave the best results, and that's what ended up on postwar escort destroyers. Because of the relatively small warhead of the Hedgehog (40 pounds of torpex by about 1943) compared to the much larger charge of a standard depth charge (500 to 1000 pounds of TNT or torpex), even a hit on a sub might not sink it as long as nothing vital was hit. The double hull of the larger German U-boats wasn't easily penetrated by an individual Hedgehog warhead, so it took a lucky single hit, or multiple hits over time, to disable or sink the sub. That was the driver for the development of the Mousetrap and Weapon Alpha systems - to put larger warheads into the water that would virtually guarantee one-hit destruction of the sub. The 180 degree switch was generally used for torpedoes with propeller rev counter. The torpedo wouldn't arm itself until enough prop revs had occured that the torpedo should have been safely away from the sub. As you say, that system gave the sub a chance to try to get a hot run launched or under control before the warhead was armed and a catastrophic explosion occured. POnce the torpedo was far enough away from the sub, and the sub should have had enough time to dive to a safe depth, the skipper wanted the torpedo to freely circle so it could chase down an attacking escort that was itself using a series of violent maneuvers to escape the homing torpedo. This still left the sub at risk if it had to make a surface attack or couldn't get deep enough fast enough, but that was usually because the sub was somehow disabled, and a "down the throat" attack was a last ditch attempt to save itself from almost certain destruction anyway. My understanding of the Kursk disaster was an in-tube failure of a Type 65 torpedo. The Soviets had decided the only way to get the high speeds desired for such a large torpedo was through the use of a hi-test hydrogen peroxide (HTP) engine. These work well as long there is no way for seawater to come in contact with the HTP. Since a torpedo is a cylinder held together with a series of welds, and HTP is corrosive, even a tiny leak will eventually enlarge enough to allow the ingress of seawater. When that happens, a massive explosion is inevitable. This means the torpedo has to be constantly xray inspected between mission and while underway for a typical months long deployment. Even now, allied intelligence isn't 100% sure the HTP was the fuel used for the torpedo the day the Kursk sank. It seems to be the only explanation for the sinking, since there was no actual torpedo firing, and the explosion was contained inside the boat. Both the UK and US experimented with the first air independent sub using the Walther HTP system, but constant problems with leask and small explosions doomed the projects. HTP is dangerous stuff to be using underwater.
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  586. Rats! I went to bed like a half hour before this was posted and then I decided to finish paining the guest room when I got up. I only started that six months ago, but no one can call me a procrastinator. One good thing about the Wu Flu is you start looking around the house for things to do so you keep occupied. One of the biggest contributions to winning the war in the Pacific was a command hardly anyone has h=ever heard of. It was officially call the At Sea Logistics Service Group (ASLSG)., commonly know as the Fleet Train. It was a complete self contained command with everything from floating drydocks to escort carriers to destroyers, all to support the hundreds of oilers, supply ships, ammunition ships, and fleet tugs, along with refrigerator ships, frozen store ships, and even the famous ice cream barges. It came about due to a study in the 20's that sowed ships lost 10% of the combat efficiency for every thousand miles traveled as supplies of everything ran low and they were faced with a port call. There were no ports in the Pacific, so the supply train ended up replacing the fleet's stocks with everything from those floating drydocks, aircrew and aircrew replacements, fuel, oil, ammunition, food, almost 80,000 cartons of cigarettes, and over 40,000 bags of mail. There were 10-12 trains in operation at all times, some of which only existed to resupply the supply ships. It was really an amazing operation, and planning for it started back in the mid-20's. If you have an interest in fleet training and logistics, read HM 18: To Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923-1940 . It can be downloaded at https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/historical-monographs/18/. It's 424 pages, some of which can be a little dry, but it's a good read overall.
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  592. I don't know how I missed this. I guess I'll follow along and give my thoughts. 1. US monitors - The only ones I'd class as really bad were the later ocean going types like the Amphitrite-class monitor. 2. The Captain - Well, who can disagree with this one? 3. Russian Circular Warships - They weren't great ships since they were basically just weird looking monitors, but they weren't terrible. 4. USS Katahdin - Kind of non-submerging submarine that never reached her design speed of 17 knots, had no torpedoes, only four small guns, and was a pure ram. She lasted less two two years before she was decommissioned when the USN realized the rams were a dead end technology. She's definitely up there in the list for me. 5. Rurik - Don't know enough about this ships for an opinion 6. USS Vesuvius - A completely nonsensical ship, although the few times she fired her air guns in anger, she did scare the crap out of Spanish. 7. Powerful Class - I don't understand this one. She was a bit too large but would have made good commerce raiders if they had been designed a few years later. 8. - Borodino Class - They had very good directors, a reasonable armament, and decent turn of speed. They would have performed much better if not for their poor leadership and poor material condition at the Battle of Tsushima. 9. HMS Swift. This one we can lay at the doorstep of Jackie Fisher. Other than top speed, she had nothing to recommend her. 10. Viribus Unitis class - Well armed but her almost complete lack of underwater protection does put her on the list. 11. Normandie-class battleship - Designed too slow, built too slow, hybrid power plant would never have been reliable, but it's hard to put these on the list since they never entered service. 12 - AA-1 Class Submarines - First and acknowledged experimental attempt at a fleet sub. The lessons learned were well used in later fleet subs. I don't buy this one. 13. Flush Deckers - Many as modified remained in service until 1946 and served as everything from minelayers to command ships to fast transports. This was a really poor choice on the part of Preston. 14. - RN K Class subs - Submarines with destroyer power plants, destroyer speed, destroyer size, and destroyer armament. Not a good destroyer or a good submarine. 15 - Courageous Class - Other than representing Jackie Fisher at his most crazed, not much to recommend about these as actual battlecruisers.
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  600.  @neurofiedyamato8763  I was responding to your post when you said "Now the US military spend the most on its military." My response was that, sure, the US spends the most in absolute dollars because we have the world's biggest economy. Unless Canada suddenly finds a way to be the defender of the West, how could it be otherwise. Very few military economists would agree with your assertion % of GDP doesn't really matter. We're looking at developed economies where the total spent as % of GDP is both a big number and totally flexible, spending on the political and military will of the government. The smaller the economy, the less in % of GDP a country can spend because things like infrastructure and social programs will demand a larger percentage of GDP. That will always limit the spending by % of GDP compared to absolute dollar total. Another reasonable way to look at military spending is amount per capita. Saudi Arabia leads again, with the US second. First place is because of massive government revenue available for a relatively small population. The second is because of a much larger population but still a very large revenue stream. Next on the list are Singapore, Kuwait, Oman, and Norway. Kuwait and Oman are also because of large revenue streams vice a smaller population while Singapore and Norway have made conscious decisions to spend more money per capita than other countries with similar populations and GDP. What I'm suggesting is there is no one "best" way to have an informed read of military spending. Spending in absolute dollars is certainly not one of the best. Your last paragraph is a strawman I often see in terms of US military spending. Simply because we have some failed programs doesn't mean that military spending in general is spend on failed programs. Two things can be true at once. We can spend money on poor systems like the LCS while also being world leaders in other systems. China doesn't "have way better priorities" simply because that's what you believe based on flimsy evidence. It has taken them over 30 years and the expenditures of huge amounts of money to finally commision a class of SSBNs that are at least one, and more likely, two generations behind USN SSBNs, and the Chinese only have seven in service. It has taken the PRC well over 30 years and huge amounts of money to develop its first domestically produced carrier of a size and capability roughly similar to a US Midway class carrier of the Vietnam era. It has taken the PRC 50 years and huge amounts of money to finally develop a cruiser size ship just entering service, and it's still not as capable as a USN Ticonderoga class ship that first entered service in 1978. None of this even takes into consideration the massive logistical capabilities and experience of the US compared to the PRC. The Chinese are now developing a creditable blue water navy, something the USN has had for over seventy years. "Way better priorities"? I'd have to strongly disagree with that.
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  614. The Iowa turret explosion is a good example of why the Navy, and in particular the NIS, should never be permitted to perform a major investigation that involves the death of crewmen. The Navy abandoned the homosexual murder/suicide explanation by 1991, but that wouldn't have happened without the involvement of the Senate, especially Senator Sam Nunn, and Sandia National Labs. It was only the involvement of Sandia that showed the Navy's explanation couldn't be true, and that some combination of overram and powder defects was the only reasonable explanation for the disaster. However, the Navy fell back on a "cause unknown" finding when it was clear their preferred explanation was no longer tenable. The Navy did everything they could to obstruct and discredit the Sandia investigation when it became clear that it was going to find unauthorized powder experiments by Master Chief Skelley was the most likely cause of the explosion. Under the command of Captain Moosally, Iowa was a ship with very poor command and control, very poor morale, and a marked tendency for sailors like Skelley to convince Moosally he could do something that would bring positive publicity to Iowa and Moosally. In Skelley's case, it was to have Iowa go down in the record books with the longest range conventional shot ever fired. It was Skelley's "experiments" that most likely led to the premature open breach detonation that killed the 47 members of Turret 2. The ship's command staff allowed evidence in the investigation to be contaminated and destroyed right from day one. The NIS, rather than operating as an independent investigation force, did as they were told by the command staff of the ship and of the Navy. There have been changes in the NIS to allow it to be more independent of pressure by those in command, but it's not possible that any unit that's part of the Navy to do a truly independent investigation when the results of the investigation could reflect poorly on the Navy. Any investigation of a serious incident in any service should be conducted by a new criminal investigation agency not in the line of command and not beholden to that branch of the service for promotion or retention.
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  624.  @bkjeong4302  Yes, I wrote the White Plains never actually scored a hit on the torpedoes. You're right that the landings and already taken place, but some ships continued to offload supplies until October 25 and were just beginning to disengage when the Japanese fleet approached. Kuritas task was to sink as many supply and troop ships he could find and then shell the American positions, some of which were still only a few miles inland. Of course Kurita had no chance of success even if he had pushed past Taffy 3, but he could have sowed enough confusion to at least split the Seventh Fleet. While attack by aircraft did the most damage to Kurita's ships, he said in a 1954 interview that it was the savagery of attacks by what he believed to be some US cruisers and destroyers, plus the number of aircraft attacking, that helped make his decision to withdraw. He believed the attacks were a way to draw him into combat with the entire Seventh Fleet. He thought they were setting a trap for him further up the strait. Hearing of the destruction of the Northern Fleet, he knew his attack couldn't succeed. He knew the war was lost for Japan, and he wanted to return as many ships to Japan for what he assumed would be the last stand of the navy. He was sick of fighting battles that only turned into defeats for Japan, and didn't want to see any more sailors killed for nothing. He had lost all of his cruisers and many of his destroyers and knew he'd be lucky to retreat and not lose the whole fleet. Just my feeling, but I think it was a combination of ship attacks, air attacks, and Kurita's own war weariness that caused him to retreat.
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  629.  @spatsky  C'mon. He received a war warning on November 27, 1941. Rather than disperse his aircraft, order constant air patrols, and order his large fleet of submarines out to perform reconnaissance patrols, most were still in port or on the ground on December 8. MacArthur's decision not to send out reconnaissance flights toward Formosa at dawn, as advised his air force commander, was disastrous. If he had sent out flights at dawn he would have had at least six hours to disperse his aircraft and mount an attack from safety. Even though he was warned, he seemed to have no understanding that Clark Field was within range of Japanese aircraft from Fornosa. By the time he did order reconnaissance aircraft aloft, they were met by incoming Japanese aircraft. The bombers and aircraft at Clark Field were fueled and armed up for an attack on Formosa that came too late. Japanese fighters and bombers destroyed half the combat aircraft and most of their fuel in the Far East air force in less than an hour. He did a terrible job preparing and stocking a redoubt in Corregidor and Batten. There were only half the supplies in the tunnels as there were supposed to be, and it was the Navy that extended the tunnels when MacArthur had decided not to use Army troops to do so. MacArthur had decided by July of 1941 that the Philippines could be defended with his B-17's, and that Japan would be deterred from attack because the B-17, which had never been used in combat, was such a formidable aircraft. Nothing MacArthur did would have staved off the eventual defeat in the Philippines, but better planning and tactics could have extended the time of resistance and not had his troops in near starvation at the end. You seem to have a rather starry eyed admiration for MacArthur. You really need to read "MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines" to understand some of the blunders and mistakes MacArthur made in the defense of the Philippines. If not for the flowery and self-serving dispatches he sent after the attack and his effective public relations team in the US he would have been sacked. American needed a hero in the dark days of early 1942, and MacArthur made sure he was primed to fill that role.
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  636. It's unfortunate, but I doubt this will calm down in the next 30 days. Your airline will cancel the trip within the next several days so just sit on the tickets. Most airlines here are allowing people to reschedule with no penalty for up to a year, so maybe that will be an option. This will pass. It will take several months before new cases start going down enough to end some of the travel restrictions. And better a cheery announcement until you had more information than adding any more doom and gloom to an already tough situation for us all. We will all make it through this. Hell, I'm 74 with other health problems, so I'm theoretically one of the most at risk, and I'm just staying home except for weekly food shopping I can't avoid with things from Amazon. I wash my hands whenever I can and keep my hands away from my face. I'm confident that's enough to keep me from getting the virus. I lived through the Hong Kong Flu of 1968, back when I was a respiratory therapist actively treating patients hacking and coughing in my face. That flu killed one million people worldwide and about 600,000 in the US. We had patients lining the hallways on cots and had to rent a refrigerated truck to hold all the dead bodies because the county morgue was full and we had run out of coffins to bury people. I never even got a sniffle. Until I see something that starts rivaling the 1968 outbreak, I'm pretty sure that vast majority of us, now that we are taking the same precautions we should take every flu season, will not only not die, we won't even get it.
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  647.  @alecblunden8615  The high freeboard issue makes sense given the normal RN operations in the Atlantic and North Sea. Interwar SN ships were expected to operate in the Atlantic as well so they had had the same need for freeboard. Starting with the Fletchers and then really being carried forward with the Sumner and Gearing classes, USN destroyers were more optimized for Pacific conditions where the need for high freeboard isn't as constant. A hull with more volume was also needed to carry what weight of additional weapons and equipment. The combination of the Manchuria and wider China campaign by the Japanese was the reason the US applied pressure to Japan for withdrawal from 1936 forward. However, the Japanese note of December 7 was no more a declaration of war than the Hull note to Japan of November 26. Both can be viewed as ultimatums with the next step being war, but the Japanese were hoping to use their note as a reason why a state of war existed between Japan and the US just before Pearl Harbor. The Hull note did not mention war as the next step nor give any time period before war would commence. The Japanese didn't break off diplomatic relations in their December 7 note nor did they give a time period before hostilities would commence. Both countries were bound by the Hague Convention of 1907, and the Japanese note didn't meet the requirements of formal declaration of war. I understand the military reasons why Japan militarily felt the need for surprise attacks against not only the US but Britain as well was their only chance of securing resources. Still, the decoding of the December 7 note would not have met the requirements of international law as a declaration of war regardless of when it was completed.
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  674.  @MrTScolaro  OI'm not confusing anything. The Japanese radar, even though it was the most advanced in the fleet, was still no match for the SJ and ST radar on the Sealion. However, the Japanese radar was capable of seeing Sealion running on the surface. the problem was the IJN had long ago run out of experience radar operators, and picking out the tiny pip of the Sealion, running with her decks mostly awash, would have been difficult for an experienced man, and impossible for the hastily trained operators on the Nagato. The radar on the Kongo had broken down before the sinkings so she was basically blind, only realizing and attack wa suderway because of the explosions heard from the Nagato. the attack was successful mainly because the Japanese ships weren't zigzagging. If they had been, it's doubtful that any, or more than one, torpedo would have hit Nagato. The second salvo at Kongo missed because her lookouts saw the torpedoes and turned hard away. The sinking of the Urakaze was a lucky accident as the salve aimed at Kongo ran on and hit Urakaze. So, to be clear, I was never claiming that Japanese radars were superior to those carried by the latest US subs like the Sealion. They would have been good enough in the hands of experienced operators, something the Japanese didn't have by late 1944. Japanese radars were also fragile and constantly breaking down, not unlike our own. The difference was Japanese operators didn't know how to fix them when it happened. We did, and they had plenty of spare parts to work with. Japanese ships had almost no spares. One bad tube with no replacement and the radar was out of service until they could reach port, assuming there were any of that tube available at all. Late war US subs not only had superior radar with the best operators in any navy, and had also developed superior attack tactics. Combine that with a Japanese fleet sailing at just 16 knots and not zigzagging and the stage was set for a Japanese disaster.
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  675. I won't get into Trudeau the First since, as an American, nothing good will come of it. However, I really doubt the validity of the rumor. Taiwan had no jets capable of carrier work in 1971. The first helicopters really capable of being safely operated from a carrier were the Blackhawks received in 1986. Given that the US was really Taiwan's only source of military equipment, it seems unlikely we would have seen some evidence of it, and we wouldn't have been pleased if Taiwan had tried to pull a stunt like that. Finally, most of the steam catapult equipment was removed before Bonaventure was towed off to help repair the catapults on HMAS Melbourne. Canada does need to make some decisions about her airpower soon. As you say, the Cormorants are about worn out, the Cyclone deliveries are much slower than forecast. The Aurora fleet is being nursed along with reduced flying hours until the structural rebuild program is completed, and even that program is unlikely to extend the out of service date for more than six years or so. My understanding is the Arcturus fleet has already been retired. The Hornet fleet has suffered a fairly high attrition rate, and the total is now down to about 85 aircraft, and some of them are already over 30 years old. Compare this to the Royal Norwegian Air Force, a country with about 20% the population of Canada, and a GDP only about 22% that of Canada. They have an air force with 46 much more modern F-16's and 19 F-35A's, soon to increase to a total of 33. Canada does have NATO obligations, and it's starting to fall behind on those due to the shrinking size and general aging of the air fleet. I hope you finally get a government that pays more attention to defense than the current one. On the plus size, however, Canada does have two of the last Hawker Hunters still in service, albeit being flown by a contractor.
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  688. A lot of splash distinguishing was done using a "scotch tape" range scale on the PPI scope, or the typical radar display we've all seen. The CIC crew knew how far their shells would travel within a range of about 30 meters. They also knew how far the target was from their ship, also within about 30 meters for a cruiser and above size target. They literally used a piece of scotch tape with that data in pencil on a piece of tape and paste it on the screen. That served as a visual marker between the range of a splash and range of the target, and a new tape was made fr each salvo Since no other ship could have been firing at exactly the same time at the same target, shell splashes for your ship could be pretty accurately determined by watching the flight of your shells as pips on the PPI along the scotch tape scale. A range difference between a splash and the target that didn't match your scotch tape scale couldn't be yours, only the ones that matched your scale. It's really quite a simple concept once you understand it, but one that wasn't part of the normal radar features at the time. The Navy crewman who first came up with the scotch tape scale is lost in the sands of time, but the scale was in wide use in the Pacific by the middle of 1944. These innovations were distributed to the fleet and the Allies using the Combat Information Center Magazine starting in July, 1944. These are mostly available online at https://maritime.org/doc/cic/ and make fascinating reading for electronics nerd types like me. From reading the magazines, it seems the scotch tape scale was already known by July 1944, so some early electronics nerd sailor had already worked out the general concept by then. The scale was added electronically to postwar radars, so the the vast supply of scotch tape needed in a CIC faded by then.
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  712.  @Nuke89345  Indeed, no large naval vessel is cheap today. See the Zumwalts as prime examples. However, it's an unfair comparison to add up all the non-capital and long term costs for an Iowa and not do the same for an OHP frigate. Even if we accept that the all in cost of an Iowa recommissioning was equal to four OHP frigates, and we pretend you were going to make an amphibious landing against a defended target, would you rather have four OHPs or an Iowa at your disposal? They were reactivated primarily because the the USN had run down its entire fleet of 152mm and 203mm gun cruisers, so the shore bombardment capability was limited to 127mm guns or, in the case of an OHP, a single 76mm gun. The Iowas represented the only ships, no matter how old and crotchety they may have been, that could provide any meaningful shore bombardment from the mid-80's through the 90's. I'll have to dig up the article, but the bombardment of Iraqi troops in the first Gulf War probably represents the only time entire bodies of dug in troops surrendered solely due to those 2,000 pound shells hitting their positions. Don't hold me the numbers now, but a 10 man SEAL unit was put ashore before bombardment began. After a couple hours of that, hundreds of soldiers emerged waving anything white they could find. This was observed by a UAV doing spotting, and the SEALS moved up to take about 1,000 thoroughly demoralized soldiers prisoner. I rather doubt that four OHPs popping off 76mm rounds would have had the same effect.
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  719.  @frederickmiles327  The April 1968 deck logs at https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6596074 show the New Jersey's full power runs fully loaded with standard ammunition, crew, and provisions at 31.09 knots. This was when the turbines had defective parts replaced but the engines and turbines had otherwise only received an austere rebuild from her WWII condition. I haven't had any luck finding WWII deck logs for New Jersey or the other Iowas but I'll keep hunting. The iowa class could certainly steam all day at 30 knots in appropriate sea state conditions with flank speed in combat with a reasonably clean bottom of about 32 knots. The Iowas were the only US battleship that ever claimed a sustained speed of 30 knots. They and the Alaska's were the only two large ships with hull forms that could comfortable cruise at whatever speed a carrier task force maintained. The Des Moines class were undoubtedly the finest heavy cruisers ever built. They were able to cruise at 32 knots, their automatic 8" guns could maintain a 7 round per minute ROF, and her combination of 12 5"/38 and 24 fully automatic 3"/50 guns, all capable of firing VT rounds, provided a level of surface fire and gun antiaircraft fire never equaled. The downside was the large hull (714 ft long) and tonnage (over 20,000 tons full load) needed for the large magazines needed to supply all the automatic guns and space for the proliferation of electronics and crew needed to man them. This made them very expensive ships, with costs running at 80-85% of an Iowa, and crew size only about 200 less than an Iowa. With four Iowa's and two Alaska's already available or in reserve, building more than three of them wasn't seen as economically feasible in the 1950's. By contrast, the Worcester class was a total failure. Their 6" automatic guns never functioned reliably, the ROF was at best 8 rpm, barely better that Des Moines 8" guns. The ship was built as an antiaircraft cruiser, and the hull was designed around the guns. The large loads of ammunition required a "light" cruiser longer and heavier than any WWII heavy cruiser. All her electronic systems and barely functional "automatic" main armament required 330 more crew than any previous heavy cruiser. The 6" guns were ineffective AA weapons because of the slow ROF and constant jamming when attempting to increase the ROF. Because the ships were optimized for the AA role. the correct directors and GFCS were never fitted, and she was shown to have poor accuracy and range when used in the GFS role off Korea. It was an expensive ship that couldn't perform anything well, and both were decommissioned in the late-50's. It's hard to judge the Sverdlov class cruisers. They were large and impressive ships, and the main role they performed during lifetime was showing the flag to demonstrate the USSR had a bluewater navy. She would have been a carrier escort had the Soviets built any during their lifetime. The Soviet Navy tried a couple missile ship conversions that were not successful. The Soviets judged their main role to be gunfire support platform, a role they never got the chance to demonstrate in combat. They were well liked by their crews for the relatively spacious quarters and, for the first time in any Soviet surface ship, air conditioning. The downside was the turbines and other mechanical systems were based on German practices, and the high tolerances required were difficult for the Soviets to achieve. Consequently, they required a highly trained engineering crews to maintain the engines. The lack of such training was shown by the sad experience of the Ordzhonikidze, sold to Indonesia in 1962 and renamed Irian. Irian lasted only three years in service before being returned to Vladivostok for a complete rebuilding of the turbines. Irian returned to Indonesia in late 1966..The ship lasted only another three years until 1969, when the ship's turbines were out of service and she was being used as an accommodations hulk, finally being towed to Taiwan for scrapping, slipping her tow enroute and sinking.
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  732. According to my dad's diary, the crews of his PT squadron got a full day's instruction on damage control on May 14 or 15 (the ink has run so I'm not sure of the exact date), 1944 at Mios Woendi , the largest PT base in New Guinea, and the only one with full repair facilities. The Navy flew in damage controlmen instructors and displays on damage control on two C-47s (actually, R4D's in Navy parlance). Attendance was brisk since every guy who completed the course got two beers after supper. Most of the guys, although they paid attention, didn't really think they'd use much of the training since PTs that were hit generally either rapidly sank or were able to limp back to base. The training turned out to be more valuable than the Navy could have imagined. The USS Kalk (DD-611) was attacked by Japanese aircraft on June 12 directly offshore from and in full view from Mois Wendi. It was hit by one bomb that damage the torpedoes, causing a major explosion with many casualties. Every crew at base ran to their boats and roared out to the Kalk to assist, including my dad's boat. The base CO organized a train of boats to remove the wounded from Kalk while other guys clambered on board and set to work, grabbing everything available to start plugging holes. Two of the boats sped back to base to load several portable fire pumps, and those boats off loaded some pumps and used the others to fight the fires onboard Kalk from their decks. The explosion scattered torpedoes around the deck, and who better than PT Boat men to know how to detach the warheads and make them safe. After several hours, the fires were out, Kalk was no longer listing, and she was able to retire to Hollandia for emergency repairs. Some PT boats crews remained on board to fill in for her wounded crew, and she was escorted to Hollandia by four more PTs. Sometimes trainings work out even better than planned!
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  744. Yes, all that noise and static on the HF (2 MHz to 29.995 MHz) led to the British developing, with the assistance of ham radio operators, VHF (30 MHz to 40 MHz) radios. These were smaller, lighter, and more immune for manmade and atmospheric noise. The US Signal Corps then improved the British radios, because that's what we always did. The British has their VHF radios in operation by mid-1940, but it took the USN until early 1943 to equip most of their planes with VHF radios because we certainly couldn't just copy a British radio. To be fair, the Signal Corps did make some significant improvements in miniaturization and tube (valve) longevity, as well as a single unit transceiver control panel with only two dials for the pilot. One was for the channel, of which there were four, and all crystal controlled, the other being for volume. By contrast, Japanese pilots had a separate HF receiver and transmitter. They had to find the right frequency on the receiver while tuning up the transmitter on the same frequency, something that took two hands and a trained monkey on the ground. It's not surprising that some Japanese pilots pitched their radios. Things were going swimmingly for the RN and USN with their VHF radios, since pilots could have a better chance of hearing each other and their carrier. The radios had an added benefit of only having a range of about 20 miles, so that meant the Japanese couldn't hear our transmissions...or at least that's what we thought. All the VHF test were conducted at labs located inland. The concept of thermal ducting of VHF signals over water was unknown until the invasion of the Philippines. Because there were so many carriers and carrier aircraft scattered all across the islands, there was a lot of VHF traffic, mostly pilots jawjacking. It was soon discovered that, when conditions were right, pilots in North Luzon were able to talk to each other and to carriers located off the southern tip of Mindanao, a distance of nearly 500 miles! Panic soon spread across the fleet. Since VHF traffic was unencoded, it now looked like the Japanese could be monitoring our transmissions. There was an immediate clampdown on chatter between pilots, and the Signal Corps rushed to design UHF radios, since those signals really didn't travel further than 10-20 miles. The first UHF radios weren't completed until after the end of the war. To our relief, postwar interviews with Japanese radio officers revealed that the Japanese never monitored our traffic. They didn't develop reliable and sufficiently sensitive VHF radios until just before the end of the war. They too believed their planes or ships wouldn't get close enough to our fleet to monitor our VHF traffic, so they didn't put any effort into doing so. Now, did those new UHF radios solve all our airborne communications issues? Well, that's something for another post. I'll just leave you with a teaser that the answer involved a beautiful move star and a Prussian xylophone player. :-)
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  748. The main issue with Japanese AAA fire was really the available guns. Even if more effective radar was available, the Type 89 12.7 cm (5"), the best heavy DP gun of the war, had a very low rate of fire, slow rates of train, and low muzzle velocity, which limited range and usefulness in the AAA role. The Type 5 12.7 cm (5") was about the equal of the USN 5"/38 in terms of ROF and power training and elevation, but only one experimental mount had been produced by war's end. Even assuming an effective heavy AAA gun had been available, the Japanese were the only major power to not deploy an intermediate caliber AAA machine gun during the war. The 25 mm Type 96 gun was based on the French Hotchkiss 13 mm machine gun, and it retained the smaller caliber's 15 round magazine reduced the effective ROF by half due to the stoppages need to change magazines and jamming at the elevations needed for effective AAA fire. Even if it was able to maintain the theoretical ROF of 220-260 RPM, the range was low and shell weight just too light to be effective destroying allied aircraft as the war went forward. The Japanese knew of the 40 mm Bofors since they had captured a number of specimens from the British at Singapore. The IJN had to do a reverse change from the inch measurement of the British to the metric used by Japan, and the Japanese discovered the very close tolerances needed to make the Bofors gun work reliably. Japanese machine tools weren't capable of these tolerances on a production basis although the Japanese did experiment with them until war's end. The biggest problem was resistance by the admirals of the IJN to any changes to the light/intermediate battery since they believed the 25 mm gun was quite good and effective, and they knew what rate of production Japanese industry could turn out. That was actually a reasonable decision in 1940, but it showed the inability of the Japanese high command to assume they were in for a long war and what that would mean for the abilities of enemy aircraft to attack their ships. There was no need for any new AAA guns if the war was going to end in victory, or at least negotiated peace, in a year or less.
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  750.  @Wolfeson28  Let this serve as answer to several posts in the same vein. This is the text of a top secret message sent to Admiral Kimmel by the chief of naval operations on November 27, 1941, with a similar message sent by the Army to General Stark: This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward the stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46. This was the last general warning sent before Pearl Harbor. Neither Kmmel nor Short had sufficient clearance to see any of the fragmentary decrypts from the Japanese Purple code, so this is all the ind=formation they had in terms of a war warning. Both Kimmel and Short recognized the seriousness of the message. Neither had ever seen a message for their chiefs of staff labeled a war warning before. Now, I defy anyone to read that war warning and pretend they see any indication that Pearl Harbor was at proximate risk of being the first attacked. Almost no one in the US military even thought an attack against Pearl from the home islands was even possible. The assumption was Manila and Guam would need ot be taken first to provide a springboard for an attack on Hawaii. The common assumption in the Navy was ships inside Pearl were safe from torpedo attack because the anchorage waters, at 45 feet, were too shallow. Sure, the British had staged a similar attack at Taranto the previous year, but they were the British, not the Japanese. We "knew" the Japanese had inferior aircraft, inferior flying skills, and just weren't skilled enough to carry off a Taranto style attack. We were guilty of going into war assuming the enemy was what we had dreamed up rather than seeing how the Japanese fought from the point of view of Japan. There is plenty of blame to go around for the attack on Pearl, from FDR down to the lieutenant that told the two radar operators on top of wind swept Opana that had actually spotted the incoming attack to shut off their radar and go get breakfast. To put all the blame on the two commanders of Pearl Harbor that day is ludicrous.
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  751.  @kemarisite  The problem was it was Short that was responsible for the air defense of Hawaii, not Kimmel. The two didn't particularly like each other, and their staffs had no liaisons serving on the opposite staff. The "60 or so" PBY's is a misleading number. Two squadrons had only arrived on November 23 for training before being assigned to outlying areas. Almost none of those crews had training beyond basic aircraft operation. The real number of PBY's with regular crews was 15, and only 10 or 11 were available at any one time because of maintenance and breakdowns. Those crews had been flying several patrols daily six days a week since October, when the first warnings of impending war were issued. The tactical error was almost no patrols extended north of the island, since that was considered the most unlikely route of attack and, with so few aircraft available, they were concentrated west and south of the island, the routes an attack was expected. Short had 12 B-17's, 33 B-18's and 12 A-20's available, all appropriate for patrol work. The B-17's were the longest range aircraft on the island. They were used in the patrol role, but their pilots were also worn out due to the constant flying schedules. The squadron commander just happned to choose December 7 as their one rest day in the past 10, so all were caught on the ground with only four undamaged. The B-18's were almost never used for patrol work, the same as the A-20's. Short thought the B-17's were sufficient, and Kimmel never asked for more Army patrols. The failure to plan and communicate falls equally on both commanders. Both commancer received a message on November 26 reading, in part"...Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken…" From this message, and the November 27 message, it was pretty clear that Pearl wasn't considered the likely place of first attack. Whatever methods of detecting an attack were left strictly to the judgement of the two commanders. Sabotage by Japanese living on the island was considered the most likely threat, so protection of the island's aircraft on the ground was a top priority. Whatever alert measures that were taken had the top priority on not alarming the civilians and not tipping our hand that we were able to read parts of the Japanese code. This is not the kind of message that would be sent if war affecting Hawaii was actually considered imminent. There were certainly steps that might have been taken to detect the attack before it was underway. Was there any realistic assortment of steps that would have actually stopped the attack? Doubtful at best. There's an excellent article of the military domestic steps leading up to the attack at https://www.americanheritage.com/pearl-harbor-who-blundered. I suggest you read it to get a good overall view of what things were actually like at Pearl before the attack.
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  752.  @Wolfeson28  Let's not start by poisoning the well. What I actually wrote was "Now, I defy anyone to read that war warning and pretend they see any indication that Pearl Harbor was at proximate risk of being the first attacked." It was always possible, even likely, that Pearl Harbor would be attacked by the Japanese. My point was no one thought the first strike in the war would be against Pearl. If you read the article in my link you'd see the final order of November 27 was the fourth in a little more than a month that an attack was just around the corner. Everyone knew the contents of the letters and general orders. As each warning period passed, a certain sense that this just another drill set in. Kimmel and Short were taking reasonable actions for how they perceived the threat. The Navy PBY's and Army B-17's were being stretched to the limits looking for the fleet. 10 or PBY's and 10-11 B-17's just weren't enough aircraft effectively patrol even the areas where the command staff believed a strike would originate. There were no extra planes to patrol north of the island, an area that those in charge thought was an unlikely route of attack, but it was the route the Japanese ultimately took. The Chief of Naval Operations didn't believe the Japanese could effectively refuel at sea, something they'd have to do to get to Pearl. That's why the assumption that Pearl was safe until the Japanese took Guam or Manila to use a refueling base. Naval intelligence had been spoofed by radio traffic from the home islands that indicated the North Pacific fleet was at base. The South Seas fleet was enroute to attack Thailand. That led to the belief the Japanese were not enroute to Pearl for an attack. Almost everything, from scattering aircraft to putting a carrier task force to sea would have been done if the belief was Pearl was at imminent risk of attack. Let me ask you a question, Without the value of hindsight, would you have believed Pearl was the imminent target of attack? That's what I meant. It's not that Pearl wouldn't or couldn't be attacked, it's that probability that it was going to be attacked on December 7 seemed exceedingly low. Both Kimmel and Short took defensive actions with the idea that the Japanese would come, but not for a couple weeks, but also to prevent enemy sabotage, something that was believed to be a real threat. While those fears were overblown, the Niihau Incident did show there were disloyal Japanese on the islands willing to assist the Japanese if they could. Kimmel and Short's judgement tuned out to be wrong, but I suspect almost any commander in charge would have made the same errors in judgement.
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  756. The strange thing about the IJN and its use of AA guns was they had one of the best heavy AA guns, the Type 98 100 mm gun from 1940 onwards, but they armed only a few classes ships by 1945, the majority being diverted to land AA use. Prewar, they had purchased British 2 pdr pom pom guns in several batches, with at least 500 examples being on hand by 1935. These were used in single and twin mounts. The Japanese considered them only useful in smaller ships like subchasers and minesweepers after 1935, judging their 25 mm Hotchkiss design to be superior. They had also purchased examples of German 20 mm and 37 mm guns as well as Oerlikon 20 mm types. They captured at least one hundred fifty 40 mm Bofors guns after the Fall of Singapore. Even more of a windfall, they had captured another sixteen examples of the Dutch 40 mm, the most fully developed Bofors guns in the world in 1940. It's not a matter of the Japanese only having 25 mm guns, it was a matter of the IJNs laser focus on torpedoes and torpedo warfare. The Japanese economy had been shattered by the Great Depression and the military spending required by the war in China. Given their limited resources, the IJN rightly decided that having the world's best torpedo, among the best torpedo mounts, and large destroyers and cruisers carrying lots of the Type 93 torpedoes was a war winning strategy. The results of such thinking in 1942 through early 1943 showed that they weren't wrong, especially combined with the IJN's almost obsessive training in night fighting. However, that was only true for surface warfare. Even though the Japanese had been among the first navies to understand the theory and use of aircraft carrier, they developed very little understanding of how to defend against the enemy's aircraft. Their limited resources didn't allow them to develop three or four different types of AA weapons, so the decision was made to mass produce the type they already had and understood how to produce. After 1942, they knew the 25 mm gun was marginal at best and started working on reverse engineering the Bofors and Oerlikon guns. By 1944, their industrial infrastructure was being cut to ribbons by US bombardments, the merchant fleet they needed to bring in steel and other critical materials was increasingly on the bottom of the sea, and they were running out of time. From postwar US reports, they had working prototypes of Bofors and Oerlikon guns ready for production, but not until June, 1945, and they didn't have the material needed for mass production in any case. It was the IJN's narrow vision of how naval warfare would develop in what became WWII that left them without an effective AA gun, not they couldn't have developed one.
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  760. They did indeed, but each escort carrier had only one stern mounted 5"/38 DP gun. USS White Plains claimed six hits on the Japanese cruiser Chōkai, disabling her because her Long Lance torpedoes exploded and cause fatal damage. The claim of the first hit from the 5"/38 on the cruiser was verified by other ships and later the Japanese. That hit was at about 17,000 yards, nearly the maximum range for the gun. The Japanese postwar claimed the torpedo damage was the result of a bomb, but a hit by White Plains, given her excellent gunnery, is still possible. The USS St Lo kept up a torrent of fire from her gun, claiming at least three hits on a Tone cruiser. She kept firing until a Zero crashed on the flight deck, inflicting fatal damage and causing the ship to be abandoned. USS Kalinin Bay scored a direct hit on the No. 2 turret of a Nachi-class heavy cruiser at 16,000 yards, and that may be longest confirmed hit by a 5"/38 gun. She continued to fight a gun duel with Japanese destroyers for the next hour while occasionally shifting fire to straddle Japanese cruisers to keep them at bay. She claimed shifting an incoming torpedo off course with a 5" round while one of her Avengers exploded two other torpedoes by strafing gunfire. Whatever the truth of all these claims, the hail of gunfire from the escort carriers and escorting destroyers convinced Admiral Takeo Kurita he had run into the Halsey's main battle fleet and carriers. The fear of being outgunned by such a large fleet caused Kurita to withdraw just at the point Taffy 3 was nearly destroyed and the way would have been open to attack the troop and supply ships moving toward Leyte Gulf. It was a truly epic last naval last stand by ships who's only thought was attack.
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  773. I don't really understand the question about the Avengers at Midway. Is he asking about the Avengers that flew from Midway somehow alerting Hornet about the location of the Japanese carrier of the Striking Force? This would have been in violation of the rules of radio silence unless the aircraft was specifically tasked with finding the carriers and reporting to the fleet of their location. Hornet was holding at a point about 325 miles from Midway. Midway Avengers would have had to find the Japanese carrier and then been able to radio Hornet. Avengers had two radio sets, one VHF and one HF. VHF sets were uncommon in other aircraft simply because there wasn't room or weight available for them in smaller planes like the Dauntless. They were also in short supply at the time of Midway, so Avengers were about the only single engine aircraft that had them. Regardless, a VHF set at 325 miles wouldn't have had the range to reach Hornet. They were good for about 125 miles at 15,000 feet, with maybe 200 miles on a good day with some kind of atmospheric ducting going on. That leaves HF radio. It would have had the range under ideal conditions. but transmissions were in Morse code. The radio operator had to first convert a message from plain language to Morse, then to the security code of the day, then transmit the message. Receiving was the same thing in reverse. It was a slow and tedious process, and one prone to errors as individual characters were covered by atmospheric noise, and HF was very prone to that kind of noise. If the receiving operator noticed the error, the snder would have to repeat the whole message. Sometimes errors weren't noticed because a vital piece of something like the lat/long got copied wrong, and that error just got passed along. That's how the Hornet's air group ended u in the wrong place to begin with. Even if everything went perfectly, Hornet would have had to rebroadcast the location and hope all the planes got it, a highly unlikely happenstance. In mid-1942, pilots relied a lot mor on the wingman and what the squadron commander was doing rather than worrying about the radio.
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  780. The Indianapolis was Roosevelt's favorite "yacht". When ever he had to travel by sea, hoe chose the Indianapolis when he could. Consequently, Indianapolis was given the best and most modern of refits and upgrades of any prewar cruiser class. She had undergone at least three major radar refits. the Indy, as she was known to her crew, had about twice the usual numbers of radio, including one of the first radio teletypes installed on a USN ship. this allowed Roosevelt and his staff to keep up with the news and issue directives while at sea. She had eight addition barrels of 40mm guns over other prewar cruisers and many more 20mm, including a number of twins. There were plans on her next refit to replace her 5"/25 DP guns with eight 5"/38 DP guns in four twin turrets. She was also due to have sonar installed but, alas, the one thing that might have saved her was still one refit away on that fateful morning of July 30, 1945. The rest of her story is too well known for me to repeat it here, but at least Roosevelt had already passed away by then so he didn't have to hear of the loss of his favorite ship. I've often wondered if the outcome for the survivors would have been different if the USN was still treating her as a VIP ship. Perhaps she would have gotten the destroyer escort Captain McVay requested, and maybe the Navy would have noticed her missing earlier and launched rescue operations before so many of her survivors died in the sea. All conjecture at this late date, of course, but history is full of these "what ifs". When rescue finally started, it was quite a heroic story in its own right. Drach, I don;t recall if you've done a video on the USS Cecil J. Doyle and her later quite famous captain, along with the PBY-5A Catalina that was the first "vessel" to engage in rescue operations. If not, it's a story well worth telling of bravery in the finest traditions of the Navy.
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  793. The Gato/Balao classes were by far the best tropical submarines of WWII. There were just no other class of submarines that had amenities like air conditioning, food freezers and refrigerators, access to adequate medical care onboard, individual bunks for each crewman, heads that generally worked, and enough water making capability that each crewmember could get a five minute weekly shower. Most had galleys and mess decks where sailors could eat in shifts at real tables rather than at their bunks. Those spaces also used for recreation, and late war additions were a refrigerated scuttlebutt, or water fountain, and a miniature gedunk, or ship's store, that even had an ice cream machine. A few admirals even worried that all this gold plating would make submariners too soft. Still, it's hard to argue with the fact that USN submariners were healthier than their opposite numbers in other navies, better fed, better rested, and more alert. All of this contributed to USN subs being the primary force that swept the Japanese naval and merchant fleet from the seas, sinking 540,192 tons of Japanese naval vessels, and 4,779,902 tons of merchant shipping during the course of the war, the total accounting for 54.6% of all Japanese vessel losses. Just to add another indicator of what some of these fleet submarines could become, six were converted to "gunboats" in 1945. The number surface targets worth a torpedo was nearly zero. Japan was carrying troops and supplies in sampans and junks, and their draft was so shallow they couldn't be torpedoed. These six boats, including Ronquil (SS-396), had their torpedo load reduced from 24 to 10, and the space freed up was used for deck gun ammunition. Two 5"/25 guns were mounted fore and aft, and a Mark 51 fire control director was added to a stub mast on the sail. The Japanese small craft did carry 25 mm and 37 mm guns for self defense, and the addition of the director and a small plotting table in the conning tower enabled the submarine to shell a sampan or shore facility from a safe range and have a better chance of scoring hits. She also carried two 40 mm guns and, depending on the skipper, two 20 mm guns and between two and four .30 caliber machine guns. They were used to finish off a ship already damaged by the main battery since the boat only carried 150 5" rounds. One sub even mounted a 12 cell 5" rocket launcher for use in shore bombardment. There are reports of using abandoned and derelict sampans for target practice, with each member of the crew that could be spared getting their chance to get familiar with the 40's and 20's and just generally having fun with the .30 machine guns. Some of the crew were trained for boarding and got the chance to try out their Thompsons, .45 pistols, and M-1 carbines. While it does sound like a good time was had by all, these boats would have been fearsome opponents for what remained of Japanese surface vessels if not for the events of August, 1945.
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  795.  @thefilthycasual516  I can't see how anyone can complain about Midway when Fletcher has never commanded a carrier task force before the battle and was just thrown into the fray. Where Fletcher fell down was at Guadalcanal. His job was to protect the transports until they had all the Marines and their material ashore. The Japanese only had ot sink the transport while offloading at the beach for the invasion to fail. is overcautious decision to withdraw his carriers, even when intelligence reports said most of te Japanese fleet was back at Rabaul refueling and reprovisioning. He also withdrew each night further offshore than was prudent for being in a position to oppose Japanese planes coming in to attack the Marines each day. The Marines were especially pissed off because they were Navy too and felt like the brothers in arms abandoned them. This was a period in the war where we needed a commander willing to take risks so an invasion force of Marines could get ashore and capture what became Henderson Field, thus reducing the treat to the marines and Fletchers own ships from air attack. Fletcher wasn't an incompetent commander by any means, but he didn't understand carrier or amphibious warfare. He didn't understand the risks of the invasion failing, tactically, strategically, and to the national morale, was greater then the risks to losing some of his ships. Fletcher was a fine commander overall, but he just wasn't the right commander to have at Guadalcanal. In his defense, at that early stage of the war, I'm not sure there was a "right" commander, and there certainly was no one that understood both carrier operations and amphibious landings. The fact he has spent most of the interwar period in mostly staff positions ashore made it easier for other Navy and Marine officers to snipe at him.
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  796.  @Nuke89345  It was to Halsey's credit that he was not only able to work with Browning but the pair seemed to have a genuine fondness for each other. It was also a highlight of Halsey's own personality defects that they were able to work so well as a team. The were both able to use each other's weaknesses to best advantage because Halsey had many of the same antisocial tendencies as Browning. My biggest beef with Halsey was his overly aggressive style of leadership and combat. Early in the war, he was exactly what was needed to prosecute a war with limited resources. He was willing to take a punch to the jaw as long as he could hit the other fighter first. His style as a fullback at the Academy was trying to injure as many players on the opposing side while still running the ball in. Even though the other players were able to exact their revenge on Halsey, he was tough enough to take it and still keep running. That's how he ran the early campaigns of the war too. He was willing to lose ships, even carriers, as long as he could knock out more Japanese carriers at the same time. Japanese doctrine was almost the exact opposite of Halsey so it took them a full year to get a handle on how Halsey thought. His weakness in 1943 on was he wasn't able to curb his aggressiveness. Even though he could tolerate Browning's insubordination, he didn't brook it with other subordinates. He'd ask their opinion and then, more often than not, just ignore it. His intelligence officers at Leyte told him the threat was coming down San Bernardino Strait, but he thought he understood the Japanese mind well enough to know center force was really a decoy. That's why he went sailing north. The other team was going in for a touchdown, and he had to stop them. We had to sink the carriers, but it didn't have to be done today. We had the ships and fleet train to pick a time of our choosing, not get into an all out brawl like he had to in 1942. He just couldn't stop himself, even to the point of ignoring the calls for help off Samar. It's why he ignored his own weather forecasters of the perils of Typhoon Cobra. Those damn Japs weren't going to sneak in for a touchdown, and the boys would just have to take one for the team. He was lucky not to get relieved of command after "Halsey's Typhoon". Then, to make matters worse, he did the same thing again with Typhoon Connie. There was no reticence this time on the part of the Court of Inquiry. They wanted him relieved, and it was only the personal decision of Nimitz not to follow their recommendations that he he kept his command into Tokyo Bay. Halsey really fought two wars, the one in 1942 and the one in the following years. He was superb in the first and dangerously awful in the second. Where he places on a list depends on what war we're talking about.
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  804.  @rogerwilco2  I'm not sure I buy that. It's not like the US doesn't have a long Atlantic coastline. I think the seas off Nantucket are about as rough as anything you'll find in the North Sea, as most fishermen can attest to. I sailed extensively in the Atlantic and Caribbean sides of the Windwards, and the passage between Barbados and St. Lucia had some of the roughest seas I've ever been in. I think the USN's plethora of casemate guns were just a design consideration, a crossover between the old ship of the line days and modern battleships. The more guns coming out the hull, the more powerful the ship. The USN before WWI didn't really expect to be fighting any European navy. Their designs were, to a certain extent, meant to impress South American countries, some of which were in a naval arms race with each other and the USN. The USN also had zero experience with fighting at battlecruiser speeds. Look at how quickly the RN abandoned hull mounted casemates once they had battlecruisers that could fight at speeds above 25 knots. It's also not like the USN was the only navy that had all the low and extreme mounted casemate guns. All the major navies before WWI had them, again because the more 5" to 6" guns in the hull, the better. It was only the combat experience in WWI, with trying to fight these guns at the higher speeds of modern dreadnoughts, that showed them to be largely a waste of space and displacement. As Drach said, fighting these mounts at 15-17 knots was a much different proposition than at 21-23 knots, or even higher, in the cases of RN and German battlecruisers. Casemates in general, and low and extreme mounted casemates in particular, were just leftovers from a previous warship era.
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  822. ​ @Drachinifel  Well, it figures that's a book I don't have. I'll have to see if I can get a copy at reasonable cost. I generally use the two volume Hitler's U-Boat War by Clay Blair as a reasonably reliable source for details of the war. I was flabbergasted to find both volumes in hard cover and in good condition for $5 at a yard sale! I wish I could find deals like that every day. :-) Blair, in volume 2, pages 64-66, states it was not only a B-24, but it was the same B-24, again flown by Harden, that attacked U-506 the day after the attack on U-156. However, take a look at http://www.uboatarchive.net/U-506A/U-506INT.htm, the interrogation of survivors by the RN after the sinking of U-506 on July 12, 1943 by yet another B-24. Oberleutnant Hans Schult not only survived the sinking, he was on the bridge during the Laconia incident. Confusingly, Schult reported the first attack had British and US aircraft involved. The timeline given by Schult, or at least as recorded by the unnamed interrogator(s), doesn't help matters, as it appears the attack on U-506 may have occured later on the same day. Schult reported the order came after the first attack to take as many survivors on the U-boat below as wouldn't interfere with the combat capabilities of the boat, put the rest in the lifeboats, and cast them off. It was apparently hoped the lifeboats would attract the attention of the planes away from the U-boat. When an aircraft did return some three hours after the lifeboats were cast off, no one was on deck, and the lifeboats were some distance away. All the attacking aircraft saw was a surfaced sub so it attacked. It dropped two bombs after U-506 was already at 130 feet after a crash dive. The bombs (which may have actually been depth charges) exploded but were not close enough to cause damage. U-506 apparently continued toward a rendezvous with French warships and never saw the lifeboats again. She met up with the French "a few days" later and handed over her survivors. Schult never actually mentions the type of aircraft involved in the attacks, so I suppose it's possible one was a B-25. In general, the B-25's were conducting patrols closer to Ascension Island, then a top secret base, in an attempt to keep U-boats away from the island. The B-24's were used for patrol further offshore due to their greater range and ordnance load. At this late date, I don't think we'll ever be able to say for certain. What does seem to be certain is there were no survivors on the deck of the U-506, and no lifeboats visible to the pilots of the attacking aircraft. At this point, I have a splitting headache from trying to figure all this out. Time for another cup of coffee and some ibuprofen.
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  843. Klobi, USN ships mostly made their own freshwater from distilling units on board the ships. Most of the water was used for boiler feedwater with the crew needs getting what was left. Ship logs from WWII had constant exhortations for the crew to decrease water use with a running report of number of gallons used each day. These early distilling units were limited in capacity, so it was always battle between the boilers and crews getting the occasional showers and enough water for cooking needs. Almost all oilers also carried freshwater to top up the tanks of larger ships and transfer water for the tanks of smaller ships that didn't have distilling units. Ships would also top off their tanks when they were in ports with approved water supplies. The USN Medical Corps were aware of the diseases spread by impure water, and they trained hundreds of doctors and technicians in testing and treating water supplies. Some ports, particularly in the Mediterranean, never developed potable water supplies that met the Navy standards so crews on liberty were forbidden to drink unboiled water or shower with the native water. This wasn't always obeyed, and sailors did get sick from breaking the rules. When it comes to kitchen and human waste, well, they had the whole ocean, so over the side it went. Human waste was collected in tanks and then emptied when they were in a location away from the shore and the enemy since floating waste was a pretty good indication of enemy vessels in the area. Kitchen waste was collected in standard garbage cans and dumped over the side under the same restrictions as emptying human waste tanks. Ocean life generally made short work of kitchen waste.
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  855.  @canuckled  That story would require a major bend in the space-time continuum. Vikrant was tied up at dock from June, 1970 until March, 1971, her boilers cold as the Indians waited for replacement parts for the water jackets to arrive from Britain. She was then towed to Anchorage at the Naval Dockyards at Bombay for the sole purpose of lighting off the boilers at reduced pressure to exercise ship systems like the catapults since the ship had been cold for over seven months. While doing so, the Indian Navy considered that war with Pakistan was becoming more likely. The order was given to repair the boilers the best that could be done. This was complete by mid-June. After further testing and sea trials, she was declared able to participate in operations in mid-July, and the next two months were spent working up her Seak King and Sea Hawk squadrons, along with her Alizé strike/AS aircraft. She needed further work on her radars and communications before she was deemed fit for fleet operations in September. All this was happening while the Bonaventure was being towed to Taiwan in June, 1971. Taiwan s a long way from Bombay. I'm assuming that Vikrant somehow sailed to Taiwan at the same time as the Bonaventure was being towed there. How they could have met in mid-Pacific is beyond me and, if they could have, did the story propose that the Vikrant was somehow refit using Bonaventure parts while both vessels sailed (or were towed) around in circles in the middle of the Pacific or, more geographically likely, the Indian Ocean? Even more damning to this rather fanciful tale is the Vikrant was still restricted to 14 knots for the three weeks of the war and returned to port in even worse shape than when she left. It took almost another year to get the parts from Britain and complete repairs. I think we can pretty firmly plant this one in the tinfoil hat section of naval stories.
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  858. I was lucky enough to find a 1957-58 edition of "Jane's" at a reasonable price. This was the peak of WWII ships still in commission or reserve and the new build ships like the first nuclear cruiser and submarines, while the change to guided missiles from guns as heavy armaments was starting. Just the shear numbers of US Navy ships at the time was quite overwhelming. Vessels like the Brooklyn's, the pinnacle of immediate prewar design, as Drach said, were now considerd to be of such lowly worth that their main value was selling them to South American navies on the cheap to head off another Latin American arms race. Just the idea the US had hundreds of cruisers of various types and classes, most of which were less than 15 years old, that were now considered obsolescent at best showed how rapidly naval technology was changing. "Jane's" is, of course, a British publication, and this was probably the best edition to show just how Anglophilic it was. The advertising pages were still filled with the names of British shipbuilders makers of naval gear, most of which have now vanished. The Royal Navy had already discarded or were in the processing of discarding all her battleships except Vanguard, and it was rather shockingly revealed that, even after an extensive refit in 1955, that she was about to be placed in reserve rather than remaining the fleet flagship. The cruiser fleet was being rapidly run down, and many of the destroyer fleet used in the war were worn out and needed extensive refits. With Anthony Eden as PM and Lord Mountbatten as First Sea Lord. it was clear that the Labour government had neither the money nor desire to rebuild the Royal Navy at a time when the Empire was running down, perhaps even more quickly than the RN. I write all this only as a prelude to the amount of space given to the RN in "Jane's". I haven't counted the relevant pages yet, but my guess is there were at least twice as many pages devoted to the details of the RN compared to the USN. In some cases, as many pages were used to cover a single RN warship as for a large class of USN ships. Even minor ships like net tenders had at least a couple paragraphs whilst several USN ships of the same classes were little more than footnotes. Just by page count alone, the uninitiated might assume the RN was still the world's largest navy. I write all this not as a swipe at "Jane's" or the RN, only to show that "Rule Britannia" was still a thing in 1957 and in contrast to how different things would look in not more than ten years or so later. As a long time Anglophile myself, it was a sad thing to see, but 1957 was nearly the last stand of the RN as the premiere navy of the world, as the sun has begun to set on the British Empire.
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  913.  @Nuke89345  Yes, if you're soldier undergoing bombardment 14 miles inland where you thought you were safe, the ability to inspire fear while having VW Bugs flying overhead is quite real. I don't think any of those Iraqis knew or cared if the big guns were supposedly obsolescence. Cruise missiles are effective weapons for striking 600 to 1000 miles inland. Firing them 15 miles inland is not only ineffective, since it GPS guidance system doesn't know the location of a bunker, it's also hugely expensive. I think, between Missouri and Wisconsin, about 600 16" rounds were fired. If we want to look at costs, multiply the costs of firing 600 cruise missiles (or any missile, really) with much less destructive power to the cost of those 600 16" rounds, and that doesn't count about 1600 127mm rounds fired. By now, the USN should have been in tall cotton when it came to gunfire support. We have 50 or so Arleigh Burkes firing those amazing ERGM rounds...no? Okay, then, we have BTERM...no? Well, we still have those 152mm LRLAP guns on the Zumwalts...no? My somewhat snarky point is the USN has shown no, and I mean zero, ability to design a working guided long range artillery round. They have now been at it since about 1955 and have wasted hundreds of millions, maybe billions, by now with nothing but scrap metal to show for it. I don't share your optimism that amphibious landings against defended beaches are a thing of the past. It will happen again. What the Navy needs is a multipurpose warship that can escort carriers, provide protection against attacking aircraft and ships, and provide gunfire support to amphibious landings. You know, kind of like a battleship, but not like an Iowa. A smaller, cheaper ship with say, four or six 203mm guns. Just haul out the blueprints for the Baltimore's main guns and start building and, for the love of all that's holy, no more Star Wars ammunition.
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  916.  @theswordguy5269  Please provide me with any links that support the following assertions - 1. The Atlanta's main armament was only designed for surface warfare 2. Admiral Callahan "blundered" into Japanese forces as compared to his confusing order of "column left". 3. Evidence that the Atlanta was steaming under her own power after the torpedo hit and before San Francisco opened fire on a ship that was beyond the planned van of the destroyers. 4. Evidence that fear of Japanese surface attack caused Atlanta to be scuttled rather than the inability to get underway with the main power plant and the ship was drifting out of control toward Japanese held Cape Esperance. 5. Evidence a ship with only backup generator power, under tow by a fleet tug, with power only to a single turret could be considered "combat effective". 6. Any evidence the gunfire of the San Francisco caused the fatal damage to Atlanta. Not asking about crew casualties, but actual damage to the ship that later caused her to sink. 7. Any evidence that Juneau's first torpedo hit "broke her back", and how a ship with a broken back could maintain 13 knots on one screw for 10 hours after the first torpedo attack. 8. Any evidence the second torpedo attack, with the hit occuring in about the same place as the first, wasn't the one that actually broke her back, considering she broke in two and sank in 20 seconds. 9. Any evidence of an Atlanta class ship ever engaging in surface warfare after the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal that would prove how durable they were in that role.
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  942.  @paulhinds4840  They were originally designed as flotilla leaders but the role was changed to an antiaircraft cruiser. They were designated as scout cruisers in the early part of the design work because there was no USN classification for a flotilla leader or antiaircraft ship. However, antiaircraft was seen as their main role from before they were laid down. You don't need eight turrets and sixteen 5" guns to be a flotilla leader. In 1949, the ships were finally given their correct designation as CLAAs. At no time was the class given any type of destroyer designation. The CL designation already set them apart from destroyers. The issue was not the number of 5"guns, apart from stability issues. It was that that the directors were just coming into series production and were behind schedule. The Atlanta and Juneau were scheduled to get the Mark 37 and Mark 51 directors as well as replacement of the 1.1" machine gun batteries with 40mm Bofors on their next overhaul in January, 1943. Regardless of that, the armament of the Atlanta and Juneau played no role in their sinking. Once all the Atlanta, modified Atlanta, Oakland, and Juneau classes got their 40 mm guns along with their Mark 51 directors, and all the ships had the Mark 51 and, by mid-1943, the proximity fused 5" rounds, they proved to be excellent antiaircraft ships. Admiral Mitscher remarked that, other than an Iowa class battleship, he'd rather have a couple of Atlanta class ships protecting his carriers than any other ships.
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  946.  @VintageCarHistory  I obviously never met Skelley either, so all I know is what I've read about him. He was apparently a brilliant gunnery chief, but he was also a battleship advocate and obsessed with extending the range of the main battery as a reason for the Navy to retain the battleships in commission. Safety was merely a secondary concern, and he was involved in several other near accidents. The powder was all from WWII, and some it was caked in the bag. I haven't been able to find an independent evidence for the beating of the bags to loosen up the powder, but I don't doubt it was part of Skelley's plan. He had no authorization for his experiments. and instructions to the gun crews was mostly word of mouth. The plan for the day of the explosion was a 1900 pound shell and five powder bags rather than the normal six. This was another experiment in extending the range of the gun. Almost no one in the turret crew that day was experienced with 16" guns. Hartwig had been brought in as part of last minute assignment to supervise the less experienced men. The rammerman had never fired a live shot before then. The power rammer had issues in the past with running out of control and going too far up the breach into the gun barrel. We'll never know if it was human error on the part of the rammerman or the rammer running out of control again, but there's no doubt the powder bags were forced too far up the breach under about 2,000 pounds of pressure. That was enough to cause the black powder that was at the end of the last of the five bags to ignite, and the ignition jumped from bag to bag until there was a massive explosion. Even though the gun had reported ready 14 seconds before the blast, the breachlock was still open. If that had been closed, it would have caused a premature firing of the gun, but the explosion wouldn't have happened. As usual with any accident, it takes a number of factors happening in the right order for the accident to happen. In this case, almost all those factors go back to lack of training and mechanical issues. At least on that day, there's no evidence the bags contained additional detonators. It was the pure physics of too much pressure meeting explosive materials. Coming up with the crazy story about a gay love affair gone wrong was just the easy out for the Navy.
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  952.  @TraditionalAnglican  You have to remember that at least 320 Mark 14s were lost in a series of spectacular explosions at the Cavite Naval Yard on Dec. 10, 1941 as a result of Japanese air attack. This was 10% of our entire stock of torpedoes in inventory in the entire Navy. It was well over 60% of the torpedoes in the Pacific. MacArthur had demanded an increase in the paltry numbers of torpedoes available in the Philippines in early-1940, and Gen. Marshall and the USN pulled out all the stops to do so. There were 48 torpedoes at Cavite in March 1940 and well over 380 by December 10, 1941. This far exceeded the amount of torpedo magazine space available so torpedo were dispersed in ordinary warehouses in an attempt to limit losses in a sneak attack or sabotage, the latter being expected by MacArthur. In a stroke of bad luck for us and good luck for the Japanese, Self-Propelled Lighter YF-181 was hit by a single bomb dropped from a level bomber flying at 20,000 feet. The YF-11 was loaded with over 200 torpedoes due to be transported to Corregidor for storage in one of the many tunnels there. She never made it, nor did her load of torpedoes. Another 100 or so torpedoes were destroyed in fires that consumed much of the Navy Yard that fateful day. Given the magnitude of this disaster, about the only torpedoes left in the Philippines were those in the tubes of those subs on patrol, PT boats being loaded for patrols, and few scattered torpedo aircraft supply depots. Any other craft other than destroyers that had torpedos were stripped for use on the subs, of which we had twenty-seven at Manila, and PT boats, of which we had six. Orders were sent back to the US and Europe to ship every available torpedo to the Pacific double quick, since the large force of subs, destroyers, and PT boats originally available was expected to be able to hold the line against the Japanese for nearly six months, by which time help from the Pacific fleet would arrive. The plan may have had some hope of success if the torpedoes had actually arrived and they actually worked. Neither happened, so it's no wonder orders were sent out to husband the existing supply of torpedoes. The "wasting of torpedoes" you may have read about came from memos about not using them against low value targets when a surface gun action would succeed just as well. All sub commanders were aware of the acute shortage of torpedoes in the various Pacific bases. There was no prohibition against launching spreads of torpedoes against high value targets, and that were a number of times in the first few weeks of the war when that happened. Some subs launched half their torpedo loadout at one ship before a single torpedo exploded. This made skippers wary of firing so many torpedoes when it only revealed their position and didn't cause the sinking of the warship they were fired at. This became a big enough problem that some skippers were relieved of command for being insufficiently aggressive.
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  962.  @bkjeong4302  YOu're right that the Japanese were focused on the "decisive attack". I don't think that was ever their exclusive plan for dealing with enemy air attacks. If it ever was, that plan was dashed after Midway. Nevertheless, the Army and Navy continued to fight about who'd develop things like radar first. There was no serious attempt to reverse engineer the Bofors gun until 1944. Rather than evacuating men from isolated islands for use in strategically more defensive areas, they continued fruitless attempts to resupply those troops, apparently believing that the US would somehow double back and attack them. By the time a decision had been made to withdraw them, it was too late, and many of those poor guys slowly starved to death. They didn't put serious efforts into developing more powerful aero motors for fighters than the one that already existed in the Zero because of the "decisive battle" delusion. With the appearance of the Hellcat and, worse, the Corvair, it was a mad scramble to develop in 1943/44 what should have been done in 1940, when they still had resources and manpower to do it. The Japanese plan for the "decisive battle" was not the destruction of the US fleet, just to cause enough damage and deaths that US would sue for an armistice. Yamamoto knew the only hope for such an event was a series of bold strikes early on. If the damage to the US fleet in 1942 wasn't enough to bring America to its knees, he knew only a long, protracted war would have an chance for the US suing for peace. He had been advocating for a defensive plan since before Pearl Harbor but he was generally ignored. The IJN never seemed to understand that unrestricted submarine warfare against US merchant shipping was the only hope for weakening the fleet and the troops ashore. By the time even the Army and General Staff were convinced that no "decisive battle", or at least not one in favor of the IJN, was going to happen and defense was the only option, it was far too late for any defensive plan to work.
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  984.  @spatsky  First, I don't despise MacArthur, but accuracy in history is more important than who anyone likes or dislikes. Hong Kong was never a fortress. Churchill and the general staff consider Hong Kong a mere outpost and actually reduced the size of the garrison on 1940. It wasn't until September of 1940 that a token Canadian force of 1975 troops were dispatched to Hong Kong, not arriving until November 16. Singapore and Malaysia were part of the same campaign. It was a failure of British planning that assumed now army could traverse the whole of Malaysia on the ground, assuming the Royal Navy could sink any troop convoys that were close enough to threaten Singapore. The Malay Command never received the equipment it needed to defend the Peninsula and Singapore, with the British not having a since tank in the whole command. Percival didn't do a good job in defending Singapore, never allowing his large force of engineer troops to set up roadblock and defenses that would have slowed the Japanese advance. His battlefield intelligence was defective, and he believed an entire Japanese corps was attacking rather then the 38,000 troops under Yamashita's command. Percival surrendered an army of 138,000 men to a much smaller force, and better planning and execution should have allowed the British to hold out for far longer than they did. The Phillipines lasted longer because we had the redoubt of Corregidor, something the British didn't have. We were able to fight a retreating action on Bataan that lasted until April only because the Japanese had foolishly assumed the battle had been won by early January. They had withdrawn their best troops and almost all their airpower to fight in the Dutch East Indies, leaving second line troops to mop things up. It's doubtful we would have lasted a month in Bataan if we had still been facing the Japanese 48th Division. The 10,000 remaining troops lasted until May 8 only because the tunnels provided shelter from the bombings and artillery fire. If the tunnels had been properly provisioned with food, ammunition, and medical supplies, the defender may have been able to hold out for another month or 45 days.
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  1004. Well, she did serve a long time, but really never as an aircraft carrier. She did more as a gold transport, then aircraft transport, than acting as a carrier. Her refit in the US, after getting rid of her pro-Vichy crew, modernized her enough to serve as an aircraft transport. While in her first convoy loaded with aircraft for Britain, she collided with a US troop transport and had to stop off at the Azores for temporary repairs. Limping back to France, she received enough repairs to make her seaworthy again, but she missed the rest of the war. She departed in October, 1945 for Indochina, once again loaded with US Lend Lease aircraft and supplies, reaching Saigon in late October. She did useful service there, repairing aircraft and converting ex-US landing craft into river patrol boats. Almost all her systems were worn out by June, 1946. She was able to make it back to Toulon on her own power, but only by sailing at 10 knots, since her engines couldn't produce enough power for a higher speed. It was to be her last voyage. There was some thought given to doing a complete refit, but France was in the midst of yet another postwar financial crisis, so she was only given enough repairs to her systems to make her liveable for the 600 or so sailors that would use the berths installed in the former hanger decks. She served from 1948 to 1966 as a barracks ship because there were no shore facilities to house sub crews while their ships were under repairs or refit. She did that job well since the sailors had what was considered to be spacious accommodations at the time. There was even enough room for a cinema and ship's store, so sailors who lived in her hull considered the Bearn as pretty good duty. By 1966, she was well and truly worn out, and land based accommodations had finally been constructed. Not trusting that the Bearn's engines were still serviceable after her sale to an Italian scraper in 1967, she was towed to Italy and cut up for her metal value, an ignominious end to a ship that, while never serving in her intended role, did good service for the French at a time when there were no other alternatives .
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  1030. @Mark Robinson That's an interesting idea I've read a fair bit about. Roosevelt questioned the Any about if we could drop the bomb on Germany after the Battle of the Bulge so that kind of offensive didn't happen again. Of course, it wasn't ready in early 1945, but there's no doubt Roosevelt would have used it if it was. The biggest problems were logistical. The B-29 was the only aircraft capable of carrying the bomb, and even that large of a plane had to be specially modified to make it fit. All the work on the bomb pits and storage had been done in the Pacific, and it would have taken at least a month to duplicate it. There were no B-29's in Europe, and getting ones modified for the bomb from the Pacific to Europe would have also taken some time, as would the infrastructure and manpower needed to support such an unfamiliar place The Army's fear was the bomb wouldn't detonate, and Germany could recover it. There was an assumption that Germany was close to developing the bomb as well, and the Germans getting an undetonated bomb may have given them the technology needed to finish their own and use it against us. We now know Germany was nowhere near close to finishing their own bomb, but we didn't know that then, so it wasn't an unreasonable fear. The biggest issue was getting the bomb to the target. The modifications to the B-29 made the B-29 a slow, lumbering beast, and Germany's highly developed antiaircraft systems would have been able to pick it off. Its ceiling wouldn't have been more than 25,000 feet, and German interceptors could have shot it down. By contrast, Japan had almost no antiaircraft system, and Japanese interceptors had been mostly swept from the sky. Finally, German weather was frequently overcast, and the bomb had to be dropped through mostly clear skies. Japanese weather in summer was generally clear, and just right for dropping a big bomb on target.
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  1032.  @timclaus8313  Sorry, I just saw this now. Pennsylvania did get off quite a number of rounds at Pearl. according to the action report at https://www.history.navy.mil/research/archives/digital-exhibits-highlights/action-reports/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack/ships-m-r/uss-pennsylvania-bb-38-action-report.html. she fired 650 rounds of 5"/25, 350 rounds of 3"/50, and about 60,000 rounds (!) of .50 caliber. The ship was only getting power and steam from shore connections and, although the machine guns were manned, none had anything more than some ready rounds available. In a typical example of Yankee ingenuity, the sailors proceeded to knock the locks off ammo lockers and magazines and set up ammo passing lines. It's likely that most of what was shot off was ineffective, especially machine guns shot at high altitude bombers, but I imagine it was at least a boost to morale. All the relatively undamaged or completely undamaged battleships were hastily given some additional 20mm and some 1.1" quads and sent back out to patrol , escort convoys, or actively try to hunt down the Japanese fleet. Pennsylvania had her bomb damage mostly repaired, she escorted convoys from the West Coast to Hawaii. She was given a refit in late 1942/early 1943 that added eight 5"/38 turrets and a number of quad 40mm guns while landing all her casemate and .50 cal guns. She was also equipped with CXAM-1 radar, state of the art at the time, but she did fall behind on electronic updates, as it was decided to concentrate those on the 16" ships. She served a useful life doing shore bombardment, but she was kept away from engagements that might lead to a real fleet battle.
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  1034.  @timclaus8313  The Tennessee had some work done at PH and Puget Sound to to rpeair her plating and wiring plus some 1.1" and 20mm AA guns were added. She did have a CXAM radar added as well. She worked betwwen the West Coast and Hawaii doing some escort work and training, being held there on the chances the Japanese mu=ight attempt and incursion, she wasn't sent on with the3 other task forces due to her well known problems of excess fuel oil consumption, and not enough tankers to service the aircraft carrier task forces and the old battleships. Once California had been raised, she and Tennessee were sent to Puget Sound for a complete reconstruction, the Navy feeling it was faster and less expensive to have both class members done at the sane time. That took more than a year, from October, 1942. The Colorado class had a different path As the only 16" gun existing battleships, it was feared they would be our only units that could fight the Japanese Nagato class on an even footing. Because of this, neither the Colorado nor the Maryland could be spared for enough yard time for the type of reconstruction seen on California, and both ships received piecemeal upgrades until 1944, by which time it was clear that a complete reconstruction like that done for California was not needed and not cost effective. Both ships had improved AA protection and radar, but Maryland didn't finally get her eight 5"/38 dual turrets until early 1945 after a kamikaze hit, and Colorado never got them, being the only USN frontline battleship to finish the war with her original eight single 5"/25 AA guns. As I said, reconstruction of the old battleships was much more complicated than you have made it out to be.
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  1035.  @alecblunden8615  I agree that the Japanese were warning war was the next step, but generally that doesn't mean an hour from now, even if the note was delivered on time. The US knew war was imminent, just not how imminent and where. They also knew that cutting Japan off from scrap metal supplies would also lead to war. Roosevelt recognized the risk of attack on British and Dutch colonies by the Japanese. He was trying to get the Japanese out of China to make it less likely they would need to immediately attack Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. As you say, the US didn't seem to understand there was no way the Japanese could lose face by pulling out of China, and they continued to push them closer to the edge. However, once the Japanese signed the Tripartite Pact, the Japanese became a belligerent rather than a neutral. If we were to support Britain and the Netherlands, we had to slowly tighten the noose on supplies to Japan. The Roosevelt administration foolishly believed, even with warnings to the contrary, that the Japanese didn't have enough oil to mount a major offensive campaign outside SE Asia. We felt that restricting their oil supply further would make them pull out of China in return for relaxing the embargoes. We lurched our way to war rather than planned for it, something we've seen in recent history as well The language of the December 7 note was deliberately written so those who saw it as the opening0 of war would and those that thought it was just another negotiating tactic would. Japanese diplomats after the war wrote that they didn't make a clear declaration of war because they foolishly believed the implied threat would be enough to make the US pull back.We would no more do that than the Japanese would make any plans to leave China. Both sides had national prestige on the line, and neither one was going to blink. Yamamoto was the one who birthed and pushed through the plan to attack Pearl Harbor, and his greatest fear was there would be a last minute diplomatic breakthrough and the attack would be called off. He didn't need to worry about that as it turned out.
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  1039.  @alganhar1  There's a difference between the material (pykrete) being a feasible solution and Habakkuk being a feasible ship. The amount of spruce pulp required for the ship would have seriously disrupted Canadian paper supplies and required at least a thousand additional lumberjacks and other trades to produce. manpower the Canadians couldn't spare from other war production. Dissipating the heat generated by the steam plant required to operate the turbogenerators for the 26 power modules mounted in external nacelles along the sides of the hull was never solved. The mounting and operation of the 100 foot tall rudder was never solved. Internal volume for berthing and messing facilities for the estimated 8,000-11,000 crew and air personnel was never sufficient. Armoring and reinforcing the flight deck alone would have required as much steel as three escort carriers. There was never a workable to plan to power pumps required to evacuate the inevitable leakage that would result in such a large vessel. The problem of creep causing deformation of the hull was turning out to be more serious than originally thought, and the amount of steel and insulation needed was going to be about 30% more than original estimates. Even if Habakkuk was built and launched, the problem of a vessel this large only able to travel at six knots and being incapable of manueving in more than wide, easy turns would have presented an irresistible target to German aircraft and submarines. Even with such a thick hull and deck, any holes large enough to admit even a relatively small amount of water would have affected list of the vessel. There was no way to provide workable watertight compartments so enough torpedo and bomb attacks would e=n=inevitable hole the ship. The vessel was already somewhat unstable, and admitting more water to the hull would have exacerbated the problem. HA control of the 20 4.5" twin turrets was also not worked out since the guns would be mounted up to 2,000 feet apart and directors at the time couldn't handle that many guns that distance from each other. No accurate studies had been done on the effects of human heat and the heat generated by the vast amounts of vacuum tubes needed for the ship's electronics had ever been done. Since Habakkuk would have been far too large for any existing harbor, supply logistics had never been worked out, but were expected to be severe. All of these issues are just some of the problems never worked out since the plan was abandoned before the need arose. The Habakkuk and Pyke himself have become the Nikola Tesla of the shipbuilding world. Somehow, pykrete was going to be this miracle material that would have solved many of the world's problems, and it was stopped by evil governments and corporations. No objective study of the ship or the material would show that to be true. Pyke and Perutz, both fellow communists, were able to gain Mountbatten's ear though the efforts of yet another communist, JD Bernal. It was Mountbatten's almost shooting Admiral King in the leg during his impromptu demonstration of pykrete that started the whole project in motion. Without this network of communists and communist sympathizers, Habakkuk would never even have had a name.
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  1051. Not only did the no. 1 Vickers 2 pounder (40 mm) guns have problems with failure to fee stoppages at high elevations, they also only had low velocity ammunition, and no tracer ammunition had ever been developed by Vickers or the RN. The guns were fed by a fabric belt of 25 rounds each, and the whole gun was essentially a scaled up Vickers .05/62 machine gun. Unfortunately, the fabric belts deteriorated rapidly in the tropical heat of the Netherlands East Indies, causing rounds to fall out of the belts at high elevations. Combined with the failure to feed issues, the 2 pounder guns on the second group of Admiralen class ship were never reliable guns. A fix was found by 1939, but events overtook the ability to supply the stiffer mounts and feed pathways before any of the Admiralen class ships could be refitted. More seriously in terms of effectiveness was the lack of tracers. There were no directors for the guns so sighting was done through spider sights mounted on the guns. Even with smokeless powder, the guns gave off a tremendous amount of smoke, so seeing which direction the rounds were going was difficult without being able to follow them due to the lack of brightly glowing tracers. What was difficult during daylight was impossible after dark or in gloomy weather. The second group of ships were equipped more as minesweepers than traditional destroyers, since the Dutch assumed war against the NEI would be a protracted one of blockade and mining, so the small number of torpedo tubes and anti aircraft guns was considered acceptable. The Japanese, however, had different plans.
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  1080.  @eplekake3870  No, they had treaty limits to worry about, even though they did routinely cheat on them. The Deutschland class large cruisers/"pocket battleships" were supposed to be built to the 10,000 ton limit of the Versailles Treaty. Even here, they waisted both space and tonnage on eight 15cm (5.9") guns. They were really too heavy for most commerce raiding purposes. If the Germans had developed the 105mm triaxially stabilized twin mount into a properly weatherproofed turret they would have had the space and weight on the Deutschlands for a balanced DP armament of 12-16 105mm guns with more than sufficient weight of shell and range for commerce raiding while having a far superior armament for antiaircraft use. As it was, they had to rearm the surviving units with six 88mm guns to replace to inadequate original three, and then six 105mm guns to replace the 88's. As the war progressed, they had to mount 20mm, 37mm, and 40mm antiaircraft guns where space was available while still carrying around the now useless 5.9" guns. It just seems to me the Germans never appreciated the value of dual purpose armament. They didn't just demonstrate this on their capital ships. They were the only country to arm destroyers with a gun as large as the 5.9" as well. They had excellent medium caliber dual purpose weapons in the 88mm and 105mm weapons so it's not as if they just didn't have the guns they needed. They just didn't understand why dual purpose guns were a better compromise than taking up space and weight for both SP and DP guns.
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  1089.  @bkjeong4302  Take a look at the US Naval Technical Mission to Japan report O-47(N)-2, available online at the Navy Historical Center. They interviewed some Japanese gunnery officers in this report or another of the Mission reports about the effectiveness of the 25mm gun. I don't have the exact link, but it's all there in the Mission reports. The Japanese compared the triple 25mm mount to the twin Bofors, the only multiple mount they had access to at that time. Although there were things about the Bofors that were superior, particularly weight of fire and better ammunition supply, the conclusion was it wasn't enough better to interrupt production of the 25mm, and the Japanese just didn't have the industrial capacity produce both. Except for some experimental attempts to reverse engineer the Bofors gun, the Japanese didn't put any serious effort into making it into a standard weapon. The best they managed was 5-10 guns a month by the end of 1944 for evaluation purposes, and then only single air cooled guns and single mounts. In addition to industrial capacity, they found they didn't have the machine tools to meet the fine tolerances demanded by the gun, so a lot of hand fitting was required. Given the heroic efforts of the US to convert the Bofors plan to inch measure and then get the guns into mostly automated production in a little less than a year, it's doubtful Japan could have ever produced an workable gun. The samples examined by the Mission postwar showed many flaws in machining and quality control, causing numerous instances of jamming and failure to feed. It's not like the USN couldn't have followed Japan's path with the 1.1" gun. It was broadly similar to the 25mm, already in production in quad mounts, and was slated to become the main AA armament on US ships by 1938. Take a look at the armament of the Erie class gunboats. They were one of the first USN vessels designed with at least the space and weight for the 1.1" quad, four of which were to serve as the AA armament of the ships when they was commissioned in 1936. While the USN was fully invested in the 1.1" gun, tests against the Bofors showed it was such a superior gun that work on correcting the initial problems with the 1.1" was ordered halted in 1940, with all efforts put to the design and production of the Bofors. The Japanese could have done the same but chose not to.
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  1132.  @kemarisite  My mistake. The original plan was to have 203mm guns but they couldn't make it work with the guided munitions because of blast effect. They went down to 155mm and found out firing guided missiles from big rifles still didn't work. My understanding is the barrels are only nominally 155mm. They are something like 147mm at the muzzle because the barrel was pinched to increase muzzle velocity and range, so standard 155mm rounds won't work. I don't know if the Navy even has any 155mm rounds left in storage considering the last ship with that gun was the Oklahoma City, and that was decommissioned in 1979. 40 year old shells would probably have some serious ballistics issues if they were used. The Army 6" guns would be 6"/45 in Navy parlance compared to the Cleveland class having 6"/47 guns. My understanding is there were enough differences in the projectiles and bagged charges between the two guns that ammunition was not interchangeable. Since the Navy no longer has any 6"/47 guns, the easiest way to give the Zumwalts some kind of offensive gun would be to use the Army 155mm "Long Tom". The problem is...well, it's from the Army. The Navy had enough heartburn over using single mount air cooled Army 40mm Bofors guns when there were no Navy Bofors guns available. The idea of a main battery coming directly from the Army is just unthinkable to the admirals. Have you ever seen the Army mule and Navy goat go at it before the Army/Navy game? No, an Army gun is logical, but not possible.
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  1139.  @alexsis1778 Half a dozen is really too high. They had three major flaws not found in most other torpedoes. The first was a conceptually advanced but poorly designed and tested magnetic influence exploder. If it had worked correctly, having a torpedo explode while under maximum magnetic influence of the hull would have caused a lot of broken backs and ship sinkings. There were just a host of problems with the exploder, some of which were related to the depth problem discussed next. Once the crews started disabling the magnetic exploders, the torpedo started to perform as expected. The second major issue was running too deep. It took testing in the field that should have been done in preproduction to discover and correct a hydrostatic vent problem. The third big issue was the contact exploder was never updated for the much high speeds of the Mark 14 compared to the Mark 10. The same perpendicular trigger and spring was used with no testing at all. It took almost a year to discover that the high impact forces of the Mark 14 hitting a target was causing the firing pin springs to bind on the the firing pin, only making a light strike on the primer. The existing trigger was replaced by assembly was replaced with aluminum parts to decrease mass, ultimately replacing it all together with a ball switch and electric detonator rather than a mechanical firing pin. There were some problems with circular runs, but those weren't uncommon with any nation's tornadoes. The basic cause for all of this was a depression era lack of money to do much more than just produce torpedoes (and painfully slow at that), most of the testing being down is shallow static pools. If there had been enough money for some real live fire testing, the problems would have been discovered and corrected before the war. The Mark 14 torpedo ultimately turned out to be a fine weapon, responsible for sweeping the seas nearly clean of Japanese shipping. The Mark 14 continued in service in many subs until the early 1960's, and much longer in some allied navies. It's just unfortunate that the frugality brought on by the depression of the 30's combined with a stubborn and incompetent submarine fleet admiral just made a bad situation worse.
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  1143.  @AdamMGTF  Ah, a good kip. I'd like that too if my cat would stop biting my toes and waking me up. :-) Things being "a long way away" mean different things to a Brit than a Yank. We think of a long way as maybe a couple days drive or a four hour flight. We don't even have the option of a train trip to many places and, if we do. Amtrak manages it by the most roundabout way imaginable. I'm a railfan or, as you might say, a train spotter, so some train travel would be part of the experience for me. There are so many places I want to see, and Portsmouth is number one. Bovington and the IWM are tied for second. As you say, the number of places of historic interest is almost overwhelming. Id love to see some of the historic homes and castles as well. I live in a home on the National Register of Historic Homes, and my house is noteworthy for its age. I was built in 1895. Just as we have a different idea about distance, we also have a different idea about age. :-) It sounds like you have a lot of interests for your age, and at least most it has nothing to with playing GTA 5! I'm sorry to hear about your being unwell as a child, but it sounds like the upside to it was your love of history and reading. Those are two things that will carry you a long way as an adult. Sounds like we could have a wonderful time traipsing about the countryside. I was thinking about how Drach's channel has brought together a number of like minded people. I'd sure like to live closer to a lot of the viewers of the channel so I could attend some of the meet-ups. that may be an idea when I'm over there. Thanks again for your extremely kind offer. I'm also on FB under the nom de plume of Jorge Wilson, just to maintain my man of mystery subterfuge. :-)
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  1160.  @kemarisite  The late 1939 Brooklyns had no radar. The March 34 FCS was strictly a fair weather optical rangefinder that didn't get radar added until late 1941. As such, their chance of scoring long range hits were no better than the Graf Spee. It could be argued that the Graf Spee, with its superior German optics, had a better chance to score those low probability hits. The Graf Spee straddled the Exeter on her third salvo from over 18,000 yards. Exeter was struck seven times, destroying most of her guns and upperworks. Luckily, none of the shells penetrated the engine room so she was still able to make way, but only with one 8" gun and one 4" fun available in local control. Graf Spee turned her guns on the two light cruisers and caused considerable damage. Graf Spee retired in good order to Montevideo with the most critical damage being a single hit on the oil purification system. Without that being operative, she one had about 16 hours of fuel left, so Captain Langsdorff was hoping the system could be repaired in time ot resume the battle and break out back toward Germany. The two light cruiser were pretty much helpless against a properly functioning Graf Spee. Even Captain Parry of Achilles later remarked that, not knowing the fuel situation of Graf Spee, he didn't know why she didn't finish off Achilles and Ajax. There was a lot of luck on both sides in the battle, particularly the use of torpedoes by the British, helped to break up the Graf Spee's attack on Exeter long enough for her to escape. The US cruisers had no torpedoes, no radar, and no better rangefinding than Graf Spee. The had a lot more six inches guns, but the matter of range would still have to be overcome. It's all speculation how ships that never meant in battle would have fared, but my guess is three Brooklyns would have needed a lot of luck to survive.
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  1162.  @kemarisite  Good point about the training. The British weren't any better at defeating the Japanese in the early stages of the war, and they had plenty of combat experience. The chief advantage of torpedoes was it that it's a "fire and forget" weapon. In a fight like the one at the River Plate, you rush into range of the enemy guns, fire the torpedoes, and rush out again, hoping for at least one lucky hit from a salvo, and that enemy gunners aren't good enough or fast enough before you get out of range. Even when torpedoes do not material damage, lookouts spend more time looking at the sea surface than they do at enemy surface ships. To some extent, a torpedo is also a "terror" weapon like the V-1 rocket. You create enough fear in the crew, from the command staff down, that things won't run as well as they would about a silent killer stalking you. I have no doubt that at least having torpedoes on USN cruisers would have created fear that the enemy would have to change tactics compared to a straight up gun dual. When the Booklyns were built, the Navy wasn't even away of the many problems of US torpedos. There were torpedoes on our "scout" cruisers, so it's not like they didn't understand the value of them. I think the USN felt that the Brooklyns would operate with fleet, screened by the scout cruisers and destroyers. It was just faulty intelligence,. more than anything else, that lead to the losses at Tassafaronga. We had no idea the Type 93 even existed, and the ships getting back on base courses was because it was assumed enough time had passed and range opened that torpedoes were no longer a risk. We had no clue that a torpedo could be fired from 25 miles away and be in the water for 40 minutes while still being on track. The oxygen enriched engine, leaving almost no telltale track, even at night in the tropics, when almost anything moving through water created a phosphorescent wake, was a complete shock. It was such a shock that the force at Tassafaronga assumed at first they had blundered into a minefield or were being attacked by submarines. It wasn't a matter of poor training. If the captains of those cruisers knew of the existence of the Type 93, they would have used much different tactics.
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  1177.  @MrTScolaro  The West Virginia was the only old battleship to mount the Mk 8 fire control system, a more accurate main battery radar than the Mk 1 used by the other battleships. She got this most advanced radar because she was the last battleship to be completely reconstructed after Pearl Harbor. While California and Tennessee also received the Mk 8, her crews were still undergoing training. the Wee Vee crew having been trained ashore while the reconstruction was carried out. I guess the more accurate way to have made my point was no only did they have the most advanced FC radar, they had a crew that knew how to use it, particularly at night, while the other two ships were still working up with it at the time of the battle. The Wee Vee was essentially a brand new battleship except for machinery when she was put back in service. California was similarly rebuilt (although with slightly less advanced GFCS radars), and I'd make the same point about her. It was a huge aniubt of money to spend on a ship that, with the exception of one engagement, was used only for shore bombardment and fire support. With the large numbers of Baltimore and Cleveland class cruisers available, not to mention the cheaper and more austere rebuilds of Wee Vee's sisters, that we just didn't get much return on investment from her. There were also the ten modern battleships available at the time. Did we really need West Virginia ? I'll let you be the judge of that, but my two cents is no, we didn't, and the money could have been better spent on aircraft carriers.
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  1191.  @MagnusVictor2015  You lost me a bit on this one. There was no reason to expect that ships wouldn't have been subjected to the same kinds of strafing and bombing attacks that happened during the war. The biggest change was adding air to surface missiles to the mix. I think you misunderstood Drach. Adding armor shields or turrets to exposed gun positions was never because falling remnants of AA rounds was a huge problem, although they did kill and injure crew on occasion, especially in the closing stages of the Pacific campaign. The splinters we're both talking about are from the remnants of those larger shells and falling bombs. As they hit decks and superstructures, they broke the steel into hundreds and sometimes thousand of small pieces ranging from several hundred pounds to little bits the size of a sewing needle. These were the big risks to gun crews. The splinter shield were not just the thin sheets of steel you apparently think they were. They had to be capable of defeating these sometimes large and heavy "splinters", something of a misnomer, since most of us think of splinters as something you get from a piece wood. The name does originate from the days of sail, when cannon balls shot the superstructure to pieces, sending wood splinters flying.The wraparound shield used on late war 40 mm quad mounts weighed about 4 tons, nearly half the weight of the actual guns themselves. Even the front shield on a 20 mm gun was half inch thick steel that weighed nearly 200 pounds. It was even thicker and covered more of the mount once power operated twin mountings were introduced, since shield weight on the single guns was limited by the need to make them free swinging due to their manual operation. The goal of the combination of gun tubs and shields was to keep those splinters from getting into the mount and injuring and killing crews. Many of the injuries to exposed crew wasn't from direct hits from bombs or shells, it was those splinters flying around. If you could protect gun crews from those, it was more likely they'd continue operating their guns rather than being flat on the deck avoiding splinters. If it's apparent to you I really didn't understand your question, please restate it and I'll give it another try.
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  1216. ​ @BB.61  CXAM is a good example of both the promise and limitations of radar in general, but early radars in particular. The CXAM radio frequency operated at 1.5 meters, or 200 MHz, a very high wavelength in 1938, when CXAM was being tested. The antenna resembled a very large inner spring mattress - very large. The CXAM was 15 feet wide and 16 feet tall, and just the antenna weighed 5,000 pounds. At the time, the most sensitive receiver type was a superheterodyne (superhet), but 200 MHz was such a high frequency that only a superregenerative (regen) receiver was the only type that could provide enough signal amplification to make the return signal visible on a horizontal oscilloscope. It was hard enough to tune in a regen signal sitting in the radio shack on dry land let alone doing so on a rocking, pitching ship. It also required a powerful transmitter on the order of 1,000 watts, something that just didn't exist before 1938. When the radar was on, about 10% of the 10% of the ships power had to be diverted to the CXAM to obtain full transmitting power. Mounted at the very top of a battleship mast, it had a range about 14 miles on a large ship target and 50 miles on a bomber size target. Even with these rather primitive sets, the range was well beyond human lookouts, especially in poor visibility. Luckily for the USN, Admiral Nimitz was something of an electronics tinkerer, and he put himself through a three week radar instruction course in 1938. When he became C in C, Pacific Fleet, he speeded up the number of trainees being sent through radar schools, and he ordered his captains to provide a weekly report of radar usage and issues. He knew too many of his hidebound captains didn't trust radar, and he needed to find a way to make sure it was in use at all time. After a shaky start, it didn't take long for radar to start proving itself, and British and US researchers kept turning out better sets. Radar is generally credited with being among the top three weapons of WWII in the Pacific.
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  1218. There were only two important considerations for a battleship - speed and fire control. Speed because escorting fast carriers was going to be their main role and fire control, because accurate shooting with the main and secondary batteries was the most important job they had. Whether they had 16", 18", or 20" guns was relatively unimportant. Superior radar fire control that allowed the first salvo to be on target was the most important. If your opponent had bigger guns but took five or six salvos to get your rain. the 16" gun battleships would have already destroyed all your upper works and fire control equipment and put some pretty big holes in your hull. As an example, the Japanese battleship Kirishima was reduced to a flaming wreck by the USS Washington in seven minutes because of superior radar and fire control. Accurate main battery fire control allowed you to destroy shore targets with a single salvo. There were many occasions when onshore fire control teams called in targets like gun emplacements that were totally destroyed with a single salvo. Our battleships and cruisers were able to offer accurate suppressive fir only 300 to 400 yards ahead of advancing Marines, and were able walk that fire ahead the same distance and they advanced. Lastly, and most importantly, it was the battleship's ability to put a huge volume of controlled antiaircraft fire that saved many battleships and the ships they were escorting from aerial destruction. Your armor doesn't matter unless you can fight off enemy bombers and torpedo planes. Radar and director control of the 5" and 40mm batteries was the difference between shooting down those aircraft or being sunk yourself. Of course, designers in 1913 would have no idea about radar, fire control, or any kind of antiaircraft battery beyond a couple of uncontrolled 3" guns. Instead of turret mounted dual purpose secondary guns, we would have been stuck with yet more battleships with the secondary battery being single purpose and in casemates.Thank goodness none of those ships were built. It would have taken money away from the construction of the fast battleships and carriers that actually won the war for the US.
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  1222.  @neniAAinen  The 5"/54 did have a theoretically higher A/A ceiling at about 50,00 feet compared to the about 38,000 feet of the earlier gun, but both had ranges far higher than and reasonable attack altitude of aircraft attacking the fleet. The main reason for the development of the 5"/54 was for two sided automatic feed. However, that requirement plus the larger size of the gun itself made the weight of a dingle 5"/54 about as heavy as a dual 5"/38. The complex nature of the feed system required a,manning of 12-20 men depending on mission, also about the same as a dual 5"/38 mount, so the original 5"/54 turned out to be a disappointment. That improved somewhat with the Mark 42, but it wasn't until the Much different Mark 45 that the gun finally came into its own. There wasn't time in WWII to develop some new AA gun. It's a good thing that the 5"/54 wasn't on any ship that served in the war as it wasn't a good gun compared to the 5"/38, with constant jamming problems until the ROF was lowered. The thing with the Alaska class was the keel was already laid by early 942. There was stalk of converting them to carriers, and it was only the very fast building program of the Essex class and all the escort carriers available that caused that plan to be abandoned. Her 12" guns would only be useful for shore bombardment, and we had a multiplicity of BB's and CA" already available for that. They would never have been laid down if the Navy knew in 1941 what 1945 would look like. The 12" guns had already been built and in inventory when the class was under construction. If they hadn't been, a conversion to a carrier or a large CAA may have happened, but the Navy still liked ships with big guns, even if they had no apparent reason to exist. They were not needed to tear apart anything still floating by August 1945. They did serve as de facto CCA's anyway, but they would not have been built in any form if not for the naval panic of 1942. Things change fast in a war.
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  1245. Admiral Horton's concept of a convoy rescue vessel was the seed planted in the USN for and escort vessel converted for rescue work. The PCE was a hull previously used in minesweepers,but enlarged in length and beam. The tonnage rose from a standard minesweeper of 650 tons to nearly 1,000 tons for the PCE, with a beam of about 33.1 feet. The ship had nothing but square corners, and the interior volume was much greater than almost any other ship of just 185 feet long. They had two operating rooms and recovery suites, and could care for 55-60 patients, depending on causality type and layout. They were capable of carrying 800 rescued personnel, and there were reports of South Vietnamese PCE(R)'s carrying over 1,000 people to safety in the Philippines while fleeing the fall of Saigon. They had a complete electronics fit of radars, sonars, and communications gear. . Each had two depth charge tracks and two depth charge throwers. Ships were capable of providing antiaircraft protection for a convoy with a 3"/50 DP gun, two to four 40 mm guns and four to six 20 mm guns. Unfortunately, because of their roles as both rescue and command ships during the invasions of the Philippines through Okinawa, they became prime targets for kamikaze attacks. Even though several were heavily damaged, not one was sunk, and they showed a remarkable ability to resist battle damage. The only PCE that was sunk in combat was the South Korean Danpo_, ex _PCE-842 ,sunk by a North Korean shore battery on January 19, 1967. Ironically enough, she was the "name" vessel for the entire 68 strong PCE-842 fleet.
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  1252.  @bkjeong4302  The last fleet problem before the Pearl Harbor attack was one that assumed all the battleships of the Pacific fleet had been sunk or were too far away to be of any use and only two carriers were available. The centralized command and control facilities at Pearl and Manila were also assumed to be out of action. Any actions would have to be fought with a small number of cruisers, a larger force of destroyers and subs, and PT boats. The entire purpose of the problem wa sot make each commander do his own plan of attack attack while being able to also communicate with other fleet units, including aircraft. By the time of Samar, many USN aircraft had IFF units, and aircraft flying CAP over the fleet during kamikaze attacks got good at avoiding antiaircraft fire, while the fleet got good at prohibited zones that aircraft were supposed to avoid as free fire zones from the ships, and communicating those zones to the aircraft. The continuing perfection of CIC's did a lot to allow the fleet to control fighters and bring them into the attack when needed. Not saying that a lot of lucky circumstances, some due to the training from that last fleet problem, didn't combined to make Samar an unusual battle, but I also think you're not giving the Navy enough credit for being able to combine aircraft and surface action, sometimes on an ad hoc basis, when it was needed. We would have lost many more ships to kamikaze and conventional attacks to Japanese aircraft of all types if that hadn't happened.
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  1270. I can remember my 11 year old self devouring the latest Popular Mechanics , Popular Science and magazines like that at the local library. There were multiple articles about the latest in naval technology, and one of them was the quest for fully automatic 6" and 8" guns that would really be dual purpose. Even though this was in 1957, it was clear that the problem being solved was the Invasion of Japan, 1946. If the Japanese would have been able to continue, or worse, increase, their rate of kamikaze attacks, the USN would have had a loss of vessels and crews rising to near catastrophic levels during the invasion. Even more alarming were the results of the survey of Japanese air power still available directly before the surrender. Rather than the assumed 3,000 to 4,000 aircraft still airworthy, the Japanese had been husbanding virtually every kind of aircraft produced since the start of the war. These ranged from biplane trainers to the hundreds of Yokosuka MXY-7 Ohka human guided rockets, commonly known to the USN as the "Baka" (Fool) flying warhead. It was a name that demonstrated the US misunderstanding of why Japanese pilots were willing to sacrifice their lives to forestall an invasion of the home islands. It turned out there were nearly 50,000 aircraft that the Japanese were willing to lose in kamikaze attacks, and the number was a real shock to USN planners. With this background, it's easier to understand why the concept of large caliber guns under radar direction and firing proximity fused shells was important. The concept was to put up a nearly impenetrable wall of flak that would splash even the most determined attacker. The Navy went back and forth on the best way to defend the fleet would in the next war, with the gun admirals battling the missile admirals. AA missiles were still in their infancy in 1957, and a dual path of guns and missiles was generally considered the right concept. Work on the 6" and 8" automatic guns went forward together, but the 6" gun turned out to be the hardest to bring to service. The basic problem was not the gun, which was the same 6"/47 gun that had been in use by the USN since the Brooklyn class cruisers of the 1930's. The main stumbling point was the size and weight needed for the automatic loaders, as well as the need to be able to use dual loaders for switching from surface fire to AA rounds, and to load the separate powder charges and cartridges at any angle. Even though the resulting Worcester class was the largest "light" cruiser ever built, with the length and tonnage of a Baltimore class heavy Cruiser, but using dual mount turrets. Even this immense size didn't provide enough room in the turrets for the dual feed system to operate properly, with the initial tests showing many jams and failures to feed. In keeping with the quest to provide the heaviest AA gun armament possible, the ships were also to mount the new dual 3"/50 automatic AA guns to replace the quad 40mm guns then in use. The development of the 3"/50 automatic guns was taking place at the same time as the 6" automatic gun, and it had its own teething problems. As a result, the Worcester class came into service with advanced guns, but none of them worked reliably. Work continued on and off to correct the problems of both types of guns. The 3"/50 gun's problems were mostly corrected by about 1950, but the feed system 6" guns, while experimentally showing success as the feed problems were more or less corrected by 1956, would need to have a completely new turret and feed system built on a hull that was already carrying more weight than designed. New sketch designs showed the follow on to the Worcester class would need to be about 700' in length and about 18,000 tons standard displacement. This was going to cost too much in money and time compared to the guided missile cruisers already under design, and it becoming increasingly clear that the guided missile would be the new AA defense going forward, not the gun. Both ships of the class, USS Worcester and USS Roanoke were retained on active duty until late 1958 since they were the last all-gun light cruisers in the Navy, but the role of light cruisers was thought to be over with by then. They were decommissioned to reserve and finally sold for scrapping in 1972. The technology used for the automatic guns of the Worcester class was used much more successfully for the 8"/55 armament of the Des Moines class cruisers, with the USS Newport News being the last of the proud line of US gun cruisers, decommissioned in 1975, stricken in 1978, and finally scrapped in 1993.
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  1274. @Jurassic Aviator The line between destroyer and cruiser have blurred so much as to become meaningless. Technically, only the USN and Russia operate cruisers, although the Chinese Type 055 "destroyers" would be classed as cruisers in most other navies, as would the Sejong the Great class "destroyers" of the South Korean Navy. Ironically, the only modern what should be cruisers are the Type 055 and Sejong the Great classes, since the Russian and US ships all date from the late 70's to the 80's. The Burkes are close to what used to be called cruisers, with the Flight III ships approaching 10,000 tons. They carry a missile loadout only slightly inferior to the Ticonderoga's, and they have room to grow, so the Burke's are going to be what the USN spends its money on over the next 15 years at least. When it comes the Zumwalt's, the USN was trying to build a class that was comparable to a cruiser in size and seaworthiness while reducing the manning to the complement of a typical destroyer. It was never supposed to have all the armament of a typical cruiser because its stealthiness was supposed to compensate for the lack of other weapons systems. Unfortunately, the planners tried too many new systems on an unproven hull design so they got the worst off all worlds. The main battery was probably the worst example, with a new 6" gun and new ammunition, and the gun could only fire the new ammunition, even though the USN had tens of thousands of earlier 6" ammunition still in storage. Even though the LRLAP ammunition performed mostly up to specs, there were so many other issues with the rest of the ship's systems that the class was cut from 32 to 3. This increased the cost of each round from about $40,000 to nearly $1 million. With a requirement of 350 rounds per ship per mission, and another 2,500 ready rounds per ship in depots, each ship would have required ammunition that cost $2 billion, even assuming they could have kept procurement cost at $800,000. That was the cost of one complete Burke, so the whole contract was cancelled, and the ships have two decorative main battery guns with no ammunition. In essence, they have become the world's largest, fastest, and most expensive offshore patrol vessels, with the only functioning gun armament being two 30mm chain guns and four .50 caliber machine guns.
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  1277. On the question of the Japanese invading Hawaii, the main question is define Hawaii. If it really means Oahu, the island with Pearl Harbor, that's one thing. However, the Hawaiian island chain is about 300 miles across, and trying to occupy and hold all of the seven main islands would have been impossible without the Japanese moving something on the order of 45,000 to 60,000 troops and all their equipment and supplies while conducting amphibious landings on all the islands pretty much at once. The Japanese tried this with the Aleutians and succeeded, but only for a relatively short period of time. They had to dig in and hope they could repel the invasion they knew was coming. Their best hope with Hawaii was to occupy the largest mostly undefended islands of Maui, Hawaii, and Kauai. Once they had established air bases by using the existing civil airports, and naval bases using the existing harbors, they could bomb and starve the Americans into submission, the same tactics they used in the Philippines. The Japanese also would have needed a victory at Midway instead of losing four carriers. They would have had to wiped out the American carrier fleet and then occupied Midway to protect their flanks. The estimates I've read is that it would have taken until August of 1942 to replace the aircraft and crews needed for an attack on Hawaii. Oahu wouldn't have been a walkover either, with 100,000 regular Army troops and the ability of American convoys with more aircraft, man, and equipment to reach Oahu for the almost seven months after Pearl Harbor, largely hindered by the Japanese. Even if all this would have succeeded, the problem of logistics remains unsolvable. Just as in the Aleutians, the Japanese may have succeeded for a short period of time, but the idea of foreign troops occupying American territory would have galvanized the American public and American production. The Japanese Navy and Army would have been destroyed even faster if they had attempted an invasion of Hawaii.
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  1289.  @neniAAinen  Ah, I get it now. From a pre-1916 perspective, then both ships are more equal, although Normandie being finished and in commision by even 1916 was pretty unlikely. I'm curious why you think Normandie- couldn't have had a _Gastogne type layout. Nevada was nearly identical in length and tonnage with a superfiring pair of somewhat heaver guns aft and those didn't overstress her stern. Surely that arrangement must have been at least as heavy as a quad, but I haven't calc'ed that out. The navy's own Technical Board was against any amidship turrets due to blast damage from the fire of earlier pre-dreadnoughts. Normandie had about as good a layout for the amidship turret to be able to fire nearly astearn, but doing so probably would have caused damage to what little superstructure she was forced to have astern. The requirement for nothing but a small stump mast on the after section of the superstructure would have had a very negative effect on her radio antennas. The single mainmast would have had to be much taller than on most battleships to try to overcome the inability to string longwire antennas between the usual fore and main masts, and her one longwave antenna would have had to be immensely strong to support itself between the mainmast and all the way down to the bow and stern ends of the ship. I haven't seen any details on the they proposed to do that, but it's highly unlikely the aft section would survived the repeated blast of eight main battery guns, and it's even less likely the whole thing would have made it through a really bad storm. Thanks for the stimulating discussion as well. It's nice to essentially agree to disagree without a bunch of the name calling I so often see on here.
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  1291. The Balao (SS-285) through the Crevalle (SS-291) were that last seven US subs with the 4"/50 gun as standard equipment. Later boats had the newer Mk 17 Wet mount 5"/25 guns at commissioning. The first seven boats were supposed to be armed with the 5"/25 but they weren't ready when those boats went into service. Most of them received a 5"/25 during upkeep periods from tenders at forward baes. Most, that is, except for Balao . Her skipper, Captain Marion Frederic Ramirez de Arellano, and gun crews felt the 4"/50 was a better gun for sinking the sampans and sea trucks that Japan still had left by 1944. The shell were lighter, and the smaller size of each shell allowed more rounds to be carried and allow a higher rate of fire on the often pitching deck of a sub. The range of the 4"/50 was almost the same as the 5"/25, and armor penetration was no longer an issue. The Balao somehow evaded the addition of a 5"/25 until sometime in early 1945, when word came down that all the Balao class would be uniformly armed with the 5"/25 gun, like it or not. Captain Ramirez de Arellano still continued to be something of maverick when it came to deck armament. Balao was the first to be armed with two 40mm guns on the sail as Ramirez de Arellano thought the twin 20mm gun was useless for attacking surface shipping. The 40mm guns were used to lay down covering fire as the 4"/50 came into action. As the Balao moved in closer to finish off her prey, she used her four .30 caliber machine guns on non-standard stanchion mounts attached just aft of the sail plus two more .30's on the bridge to respond with a hail of lead to last ditch resistance, particularly from sea trucks. She may have also had yet another 40mm gun mounted on the former strong point for the 4"/50 aft of the sail as the new 5"/25 gun was mounted forward of the sail. That appears to have lasted less than three months. I assume a desk skipper somewhere up the line started questioning the excessive amounts of 40mm ammo being taken aboard Balao . Captain Ramirez de Arellano was born in Puerto Rico and was the first Hispanic submarine captain in the USN. How much this may have deflected problems with the brass is unknown to me, but he was detached from Balao in February, 1945 for some well deserved shore duty after spending all of the war up until then in combat aboard submarines. He had been awarded an impressive number of decorations until that point, so he may have had a bit more leeway than some other captains in designing his own weapons fit. Whatever the case, it was apparent that the good times for Balao being the most heavily armed submersible gunboat in the Navy were over, as an April, 1945 photo shows her restored to the then standard armament of a single 20mm, a single 40mm, and a single 5"/25. Those non-standard .30 caliber mounts were still just barely visible in the photo but, alas, no longer carrying machine guns.
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  1294.  @KB4QAA  There's a very detailed report of Japanese research into improving their late war avgas at http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/USNTMJ-X-38_N-2.pdf. It was conducted by the immediate postwar Naval Technical Mission to Japan, with the report submitted on February 18, 1946. It just struck me that not only is that my birthday, it was my actual date of birth. Kind of a strange crossing of dates for me. I don't have anywhere near the technical knowledge you have so you may get more out of the report than I can. My understanding is it was more than just poor quality fuel. A plane will fly with 85 octane gas, but it will never perform up to specs, the pilot had better be well trained in watching manifold pressure and when to use water injection to boost speed, and there better be good mechanics and repair depots to take care of engines that were constantly being slogged to the point of burning up. By the start of 1945, a plane like the Nakajima Ki-84, arguably as good a plane as anything possessed by the allies, could rarely attain the altitude needed to attack B-29s due to the poor quality of the fuel, some of which was being stretched using pine root aromatics. They couldn't fly fast enough to attack the speedy P-47N, partly due to fuel and partly due to poor engine manufacturing skills. They were flown by pilots with minimal training who often damaged engines trying to wring the maximum speed out them. The ground crews were sparse and ill trained, and spare parts often didn't reach the airfields which needed them. There was almost no operable heavy equipment to repair damaged runways, so planes were often damaged just taking off or landing. Poor quality fuel, to my understanding, didn't keep planes on the ground, but they didn't allow the aircraft to perform up to specs, and there just wasn't enough of it. The Japanese, especially the Navy, had so many possible points of failure when it came ot aviation that it's remarkable they were able to keep fighting as long as they did.
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  1346. Dang, missed this one when it came out. Another issue for big gun (6" and up) accuracy is dispersion caused by mutual interference from guns in multiple gun mounts. The Italians were big believes in the idea that speed was paramount over all other considerations for cruisers. The Italians insisted on a trial speed of 35 knots, a speed many destroyers couldn't hope for. The only way to achieve high speeds was to install a massive power plant or have a long, narrow hull. The Washington naval treaty limiting heavy cruisers ot 10,000 made it impossible to install a large enough power plant so the only option was a finely detailed narrow hull. This meant the main battery guns had to be installed in narrow turrets with single cradles and the guns mounted closely together. Eight inch mounts had barrels a mere meter apart. The single cradle meant a turret couldn't engage more than one target, and the closely mounted guns, combined with the poor quality control of Italian ammunition, caused shot dispersion of over 50 meters at 9,000 yards. All sorts of tricks were tried to reduce dispersion including reducing muzzle velocity, especially in 6" guns. None of the tricks worked very well, and shot dispersion remained a problem right up to the Zara class. In addition to the Washington naval treaties leading to conversions of battle cruiser hulls to aircraft carriers, it also directly led to advances in submarine technology. Since the numbers and size of submarines wasn't limited under the treaties, all the major powers diverted funds from building major warships to larger ocean going submarines. The technology needed for these vessels led directly the fleet type submarines of WWII. German research into submarine technology led to higher underwater speeds and the Walthers hydrogen peroxide power plants.
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  1365.  @chrism7969  What? The US embargo on oil and steel was before Pearl Harbor. If the Japanese didn't leave China, the embargo would have continued. This was an embargo on US oil, and we were the biggest oil producers in the world in 1941. The Japanese had to seize Dutch and British oil fields to offset the loss of American product. Do you think the Japanese could have done that without a response by the British? The British declared war after the attack on Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Do you think they wouldn't have done so regardless of what was happening Europe? Send a bomb to Australia on a cruiser because there was little risk? Are you aware of how the gun type mechanism that contained half the US supply of enriched uranium for Little Boy got to Tinian? How about what happened on the return trip? You seem to be stretching for some way the bomb could have been built in the Empire. Even with the determined push of the Manhattan Project, it was clear early on no bombs would have been ready before mid-1945 at the earliest. Once Germany surrendered, the only reason for the British to continue to push for the bomb is that they were at war with Japan. There's no way to untangle the allies in this war. Britain would have had to respond to the Japanese attacks, and they barely had the resources at that time to challenge Germany. Roosevelt could not have stood by and watched Britain try to fight a war in the Atlantic and Pacific alone. Once Japan decided to attack US, British, and Dutch territories, that was it. The World War was underway, and Germany and Japan would both be destroyed.
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  1412. Habitability has proven to be one of the main factors in an efficient ship, but it took the world's navies a long time to recognize that and cater for it in design. For example, it took until late in WWII before air conditioning was added to USN subs in the Pacific, something technically possible by the early 30's, and then only because al the new electronics kept shorting out due to the overwhelming humidity and resultant moisture buildup. What was found in postwar studies was air conditioning not only improved the performance and longevity of the electronic gear, it eliminated many of the minor sick calls seen in non-air conditioned units, improved the men's appetites so they lost less weight out on patrol, improved alertness, especially while having to stand lookout and man deck guns in the heat, and even decreased the number of captain's mast hearings for fighting and insubordination. The results of the studies changed the design of new surface ships as well as subs, and ships already under construction had air conditioning added. USS Newport News was modified just after the start of construction in 1946 and emeged in 1948 as the first fully air conditioned ship in the USN. Every frigate size up ship has had air conditioning built in ever since. I don't know when the RN started adding air conditioning. I know a few submarines had US Carrier self contained units added before they were transferred to the Pacific fleet, but I don't know when air conditioning was added to surface ships other than it was sometime in the 50's. I'm hoping someone with more RN knowledge than me can fill in the blanks. Interestingly, some senior officers were totally against adding a/c, feeling it would make the men "soft". It was to the point in at least one case where a captain ordered the air conditioning turned off except for equipment spaces while on patrol in the Persian Gulf, or possibly the Indian Ocean. I forget the exact location now. Wherever it was, the air temperatures during the day rose to 110F, the sea surface temperature was in the mid 90's, and crew space temperatures rose to over 100. Men were passing out from the heat at their stations and the sick bay was swamped with cases of heat exhaustion. It was only the strenuous objections from the medical staff and senior CPO's that got the a/c turned back on.
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  1419.  @troopertrooper8925  There times I don't think people are actually reading what I wrote. As I wrote, the Japanese did the minimum the British requested in terms of complying with the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. They searched for German raiders but, even with a substantial number of ships, never managed to find or sink one. The Japanese were hoping to learn British convoy and antisubmarine techniques, so assisting in the Mediterranean was beneficial to them. Even with two divisions of modern destroyers, they didn't sink a single sub, but they almost lost one of their own to a torpedo attack. Who cares if the British thought Japanese sailors were good seamen? That had nothing to do with bigger picture. Most of their effort in hunting down German vessels in the Pacific Ocean was to make sure the Germans couldn't interfere with their seizures of German held islands. The Japanese, far from helping Britain, devoted nearly all their naval assets to the seizures of these islands. They seized every German held island in the Pacific north of the equator in only two months. Many of those islands, like the Marianas and Gilberts, would become familiar names only 20 years later. The British knew what was going, but they thought exchanging some insignificant German possessions was a small price to pay to stop Japan's expansion in China. They knew Japan was an expansionist empire and wanted to see the latest in British warships. The British made sure the Japanese fleet wasn't invited to naval bases in Britain and that the Japanese assignments in the Med didn't bring them into contact with any of the main fleets. The Japanese had just started building their own battleships and were looking for any ideas they could get their hands on. The Japanese were formal and polite, as were the British, much like boxers before the fight sizing up the opposition. Understand the "jittery allies" comment now?
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