Comments by "Sar Jim" (@sarjim4381) on "USS San Juan - Guide 126" video.

The Atlanta class antiaircraft escorts really came into their own when the quad 1.1 guns and .50 machine guns were replaced with the more capable 40mm and 20mm guns in late 1942. The introduction of the proximity fused round, or "VT" round, for the 5" guns made the Atlanta class the most useful antiaircraft escort in any navy. What the Atlanta class wasn't was a light cruiser, even though they were classed as such initially. They were really very large destroyers, and the original group of ships with te 5" rear wing turrets were very unstable in rough weather as too much armament was attempted on an enlarged destroyer hull. Their lack of ability to fight in a antisurface role was tragically shown by the loss of the Atlanta and Juneau during the Guadalcanal Campaign. The Oakland subclass removed the wing 5" turrets and replaced them with additional 40mm mounts, which improved stability and added much needed close-in fire. The designers of the class back in 1936 could hardly have foreseen the massive growth in electronics, directors, and radars that, while they increased the effectiveness of the ships, also exacerbated their topweight and stability issues. This was mostly solved with the introduction of the Juneau class, but they commissioned just too late for service in WWII. In belated recognition of their true role, all the surviving Atlanta/Oakland/Juneau class ships were reclassified as CLAA, Anti Aircraft Surface Escorts. Most never saw action again after WWII with only the Juneau in commision during the Korean War. The time of the gun based escort ship had passed, and all the survivors were decommissioned from the reserve fleet in 1965 and scrapped during the following two years. The Falklands War of 1982 caused a renewed interest in guns for antiaircraft protection of the fleet.
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@Charles Yuditsky Yes, the RN strapped a bunch of L1A1 LMGs to ship rails and pipe mounts during the war in an attempt to throw up some kind of fire since most RN ships had very little in the way of AA guns at the beginning. Even if some of the ships had the original Block 1 guns in 1982, they wouldn't have been very effective against the low flying Argentine attackers since the Phalanx was only optimized for sea skimming missiles at the time. The introduction of the Block 1A and particularly the Block 1B models have allowed the Phalanx to respond to everything from small fast boats, low flying aircraft not using radar, to supersonic missiles. The Dutch Goalkeeper system has many of the same abilities, and both are installed on RN ships today. Perhaps in recognition of the Falklands problems, even the most modern RN ships, like the Type 45 "destroyers", in reality the size and displacement of a light cruiser, go to sea with a pair of Oerlikon 30 mm guns, a pair of 7.62mm miniguns, and mounts for six of the ubiquitous 7.62mm GPMGs, in addition to a Block 1B Phalanx. If another shooting war develops, you can be sure RN sailors will be on deck throwing up all the lead they can, in addition to the Phalanx.
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@bkjeong4302 I don't know that facts would agree with your premise. Two Cleveland class light cruisers combined had 24 5" barrels compared to 20 on an Iowa. That's a slight win for the Cleveland's but only about the same number of combined barrels could be unmasked for either combination when used for antiaircraft fire. The combined Clevelands don't even come close when it's light fire being counted. Two Cleveland's by the end of the war were carrying 56 40mm barrels while an Iowa had at least 80 and, in a few ships, 96. Conomed 20mm guns on the Cleveland's was between 20 and 30 barrels compared the 49 carried by an Iowa, rising to 62 when twin mounts were added. Combined crews for the pair of Clevelands was 2510 while it was around 2700 for a single Iowa. That relatively small difference was pretty much negated when you look at the extra manpower and shipping needed to replenish two smaller vessels at sea compared to one large one. One Iowa was able to concentrate a truly horrifying stream of fire toward aerial attackers. When escorting a carrier, and there are many stories about a single Iowa breaking up an attack by 20-30 Japanese planes on a carrier. I think it was Admiral Nimitz who said the only ship he wanted ot see next to his carriers was an Iowa.
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@bkjeong4302 I see you didn't take the time to read the report. All battleships were built to take on other battleships if need be. The high speeds of the Iowas were planned, even in 1939, with the idea the fleet carriers would need protection from surface and aircraft threats. It wasn't an either/or proposition. At any rate, I'm not going to waste my time. Read the report and then tell me where and why, in your expert opinion, the Navy was wrong in their conclusions.
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@bkjeong4302 I just showed you that two light cruisers are barely, if all, equal in antiaircraft firepower to one Iowa with just plain statistics, yet now you seem to have ignored that to go back to your narrative. What does the South Dakota's record at Santa Cruz in October, 1942, when she was still armed with primitive communications and fire control compared to 1945 ships, 1.1" guns, and before VT fuses, have to do with the performance of an Iowa in the antiaircraft role? South Dakota was still an effective escort for Enterprise, shot down at least seven attacking aircraft, and protected the Enterprise from the fate of the Hornet. An Iowa would have required less stores than two Clevelands per man and gun simply because of economies of scale. Rations alone would have required less because there's less wastage on one ship that two. It's one of the reasons cruise ships have become so gigantic. The Iowas were always built as fast carrier escorts, hence their high speeds. The assumption was their main role would be antiaircraft protection and shore bombardment with antisurface being secondary by late 1943. The 40mm gun was a very effective gun, shooting down about 35% of total planes downed in the Pacific. The 20mm gun was even more effective, shooting down about 39% of all planes and 42 of all suicide planes downed when the planes were in range. Rather than continuing to debate with a person who has his own notions about what happened, I'll quote something from a postwar Navy report about the effectiveness of antiaircraft guns and fire from a report you've clearly never read. "Thus, in suicide actions, battleships appear to have shot down twice as many planes as would have been expected on the basis of their opening ranges, the amount of ammunition they fired, and the average success attained by all ships under similar conditions." http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Kamikaze/AAA-Summary-1045/index.html#V Read the report and others like it before you come back again.
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@johngregory4801 Indeed, plus constant improvement in radars and fire control systems. One of the big advantages of a battleship compared to a light cruiser is the the length, space, and displacement to add new weapons and sensors without having stability problems. The battleship as a floating artillery platform saved tens of thousands of allied lives during the war, not to mention its role as a floating antiaircraft fortress as well. The Ibiblio site has hundreds of battle reports, after action details, and authoritative narratives of what happened during the war. I've read a bunch over the years and have a bunch more to go. It's a gold mine for anyone with an interest in naval history.
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@bkjeong4302 Carrier battle groups are used for power projection. A carrier by itself is just an airplane transport. There is no other ship or combination of ships that could fulfill the three roles of a single Iowa, e.g., surface warfare, antiaircraft protection, and shore bombardment as effectively as an Iowa. Of course a country, even the US, can't build unlimited Iowas. That's why it built 14 Baltimore class heavy cruisers and 29 Cleveland/Fargo class light cruisers. None of that has anything to do with the strategic value of a battleship. Only one Cleveland class ship was reactivated for Korea. Not a single Baltimore class lasted in all-gun configuration for more the 18 years after commissioning. At least one Iowa has either remained in commision or been recommissioned for every conflict since WWII. The four Iowa's were commissioned in the 80's specifically for their strategic (power projection) value. Assuming any were still around in 1984, what do you think the value of recommissioning four Cleveland's or Baltimore's would have been by comparison? And you should reread your definition of strategic value. All you did was restate the definition of tactical value and tack strategic value on the front of it.
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@Raptor747 Correct, and that's why they should never have been classified as light cruisers to begin with. Flotilla leader or antiaircraft escort is how they should have been classed but the USN didn't have such classifications in 1941. It took until 1949, when most were already paid off to reserve, before they got classed as AA ships. If something says CL on your task force plan it's inevitable they will get used as a CL, and that was the problem.
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@mitchelloates9406 A lot of AAA fire is to disrupt attacks rather than shoot down planes. All the 5" bursts and tracer fire was enough to scare off even kamikaze pilots. Even 40mm rounds were filled with just enough black powder in the TNT to make a nice black puff when it reached its self destruct range. Didn't help shooting anything down but, the more black puffs in the air, the more pilots, especially inexperienced pilots that were the norm in the last year of the war with Japan, would be thrown off course trying to avoid them.
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@bkjeong4302 Still haven't read the report, eh?
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@Nuke89345 Let me make a reply to you and B.K. here since my fingers are being worn to nubs with all the typing. There seems to be some confusion about my position on battleships. From mid-WWII onwards, the carrier was the capital ship of the fleet with most other major units having the role of trying ot prevent the massive numbers of light and fleet carriers coming down the way from being sunk. I'm not arguing that the Iowas play any kind of pivotal role with the exception of helping to protect some of those carriers. As B.K. brought up, Spruance going off the rails during Operation Hailstorm and taking over tactical command of a battleship task force while preserving some damaged Japanese ships for sinking by the two Iowas in the task force was the literal end of the line for battleships in a surface action role. Spruance was old battleship admiral, and the Truk attack was 8is last chance to get back in the saddle and charge. The requirement to hold two Iowa's ready for reactivation ended in 2005, and all four have been stricken from the Navy register. They will never again be reactivated. However, the assertion that the reactivation expenses were too high compared to the value of the ship is absolutely untrue. The cost to reactivate a single Iowa was about the same as building and commissioning an Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate. I leave to both of you to decide which ships provided greater value to the Navy.
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@bkjeong4302 Okay, so now that you've read the report, you understand your basic concept of one BB vs two CL was wrong. That's not enough, however, because you now advance the specious argument about baskets when no Iowa or Cleveland was lost during the war. The Iowas were simply superior antiaircraft ships. That's not open to question. Now we're going to move the goalposts by coming up with something about the strategic vs tactical value of antiaircraft battleships. There never was such a thing, of course, but is that even supposed ot mean? The only strategic value any ship has is power projection. It's hard to imagine any class of surface ships as effective at that as the Iowas. Do you think the Argentines might have thought twice about invading the Falklands if they knew a couple of Iowas would e coming? That's why they were reactivated, as strategic assets. That never negated the tactical value. Once a ship is in the water, it's tactical value that matters when the guns start firing. You'll have to explain your concept of strategic vs tactical.
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@Nuke89345 Indeed, no large naval vessel is cheap today. See the Zumwalts as prime examples. However, it's an unfair comparison to add up all the non-capital and long term costs for an Iowa and not do the same for an OHP frigate. Even if we accept that the all in cost of an Iowa recommissioning was equal to four OHP frigates, and we pretend you were going to make an amphibious landing against a defended target, would you rather have four OHPs or an Iowa at your disposal? They were reactivated primarily because the the USN had run down its entire fleet of 152mm and 203mm gun cruisers, so the shore bombardment capability was limited to 127mm guns or, in the case of an OHP, a single 76mm gun. The Iowas represented the only ships, no matter how old and crotchety they may have been, that could provide any meaningful shore bombardment from the mid-80's through the 90's. I'll have to dig up the article, but the bombardment of Iraqi troops in the first Gulf War probably represents the only time entire bodies of dug in troops surrendered solely due to those 2,000 pound shells hitting their positions. Don't hold me the numbers now, but a 10 man SEAL unit was put ashore before bombardment began. After a couple hours of that, hundreds of soldiers emerged waving anything white they could find. This was observed by a UAV doing spotting, and the SEALS moved up to take about 1,000 thoroughly demoralized soldiers prisoner. I rather doubt that four OHPs popping off 76mm rounds would have had the same effect.
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@Nuke89345 I have no argument with missiles being effective against known targets far inland. Even assuming they could get input from UAVs flying over the battlefield in time to reprogram the onboard targeting systems for shore bombardment use, how many missiles equal the destructive power as a single 8" round? By my calculations, two' rounds equals the destructive power of a single Harpoon. A Harpoon class missile comes in at $1.2 million each. A standard 5"/54 round is about $1200 each, so I'll double and round it up to $2500 for an 8" round. That's 480 8" rounds for the cost of one Harpoon. It's not for lack of trying by the Navy, especially since it's OPM they're spending. They have been working on a ~50 mile range guided missile fired from a Harpoon launcher with a suitable warhead for shore bombardment since...oh, about 1980 now. I can't find any information about development costs, but, before this project, like so many others, was shelved, was coming in at about $75,000 to $100,000 per missile. I expect that Raytheon or McDonnell Douglas will soon be trotting out another proposal that will develop a really cheap missile that will work this time. This incestual relationship between defense contractors that need Navy money to be profitable and admirals who need defense contractors to save their careers when yet another design by their department goes down the crapper is why our defense costs so much money for so little in return.
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@jamesricker3997 The Atlanta was fatally damaged by a torpedo from either the Inazuma or Ikazuchi, not by the mistaken gunfire of the San Francisco. If her forward engine room wasn't knocked out by the torpedo, her pumps may have kept up with the flooding and she could have continued underway. The torpedo sunk her, not the San Francisco, whose shells passed through the superstructure without detonating.
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@keptinkaos6384 Loss of a bridge crew does not lead to the sinking of a ship. Getting torpedoed and losing all engine power leads to the loss of ship.
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@keptinkaos6384 In the case of Atlanta, the XO was a competent officer who took over command. Losing the bridge crew can affect a ship's fighting ability for sure, but a well trained crew can still take over command, and it didn't cause the Atlanta to sink.
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@theswordguy5269 Uh huh. I asked for responses to my questions for evidence of your assertions, not arguments from authority. I've read Friedman and many more sources. I know all about DANFS and have read many of the damage reports from NARA, including those for the Atlanta and Juneau. I've been doing naval research of over 50 years. My reading of the damage and battle reports doesn't support your assertions of the cause of either ship's sinking. Please answer my questions rather than making another ad hominem attack. I'm not looking for a fight. I'm looking for evidence of your assertions.
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@theswordguy5269 It's only nitpicky when your assertions are challenged, I guess. Telling me to Google all your assertions provides no evidence they are true. Once again, arguments from authority while making yet more assertions with no evidence. You are the one that claimed Juneau had a broken back from the first torpedo hit, not me. Now you modify that assertion with "maybe" she had a broken back. Now you make the assertion that "other ships have survived stressed or shattered keels" Stressed wasn't the issue. A broken back was the issue. I asked you to name me one making 13 knots on one screw for 10 hours with a broken back. Surely you can provide one example to support your assertion. It was nine simple questions to provide evidence.based on your assertions. "Google it" is not evidence. It is a good way to pick a fight by inferring I'm an idiot.
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@frederickmiles327 The April 1968 deck logs at https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6596074 show the New Jersey's full power runs fully loaded with standard ammunition, crew, and provisions at 31.09 knots. This was when the turbines had defective parts replaced but the engines and turbines had otherwise only received an austere rebuild from her WWII condition. I haven't had any luck finding WWII deck logs for New Jersey or the other Iowas but I'll keep hunting. The iowa class could certainly steam all day at 30 knots in appropriate sea state conditions with flank speed in combat with a reasonably clean bottom of about 32 knots. The Iowas were the only US battleship that ever claimed a sustained speed of 30 knots. They and the Alaska's were the only two large ships with hull forms that could comfortable cruise at whatever speed a carrier task force maintained. The Des Moines class were undoubtedly the finest heavy cruisers ever built. They were able to cruise at 32 knots, their automatic 8" guns could maintain a 7 round per minute ROF, and her combination of 12 5"/38 and 24 fully automatic 3"/50 guns, all capable of firing VT rounds, provided a level of surface fire and gun antiaircraft fire never equaled. The downside was the large hull (714 ft long) and tonnage (over 20,000 tons full load) needed for the large magazines needed to supply all the automatic guns and space for the proliferation of electronics and crew needed to man them. This made them very expensive ships, with costs running at 80-85% of an Iowa, and crew size only about 200 less than an Iowa. With four Iowa's and two Alaska's already available or in reserve, building more than three of them wasn't seen as economically feasible in the 1950's. By contrast, the Worcester class was a total failure. Their 6" automatic guns never functioned reliably, the ROF was at best 8 rpm, barely better that Des Moines 8" guns. The ship was built as an antiaircraft cruiser, and the hull was designed around the guns. The large loads of ammunition required a "light" cruiser longer and heavier than any WWII heavy cruiser. All her electronic systems and barely functional "automatic" main armament required 330 more crew than any previous heavy cruiser. The 6" guns were ineffective AA weapons because of the slow ROF and constant jamming when attempting to increase the ROF. Because the ships were optimized for the AA role. the correct directors and GFCS were never fitted, and she was shown to have poor accuracy and range when used in the GFS role off Korea. It was an expensive ship that couldn't perform anything well, and both were decommissioned in the late-50's. It's hard to judge the Sverdlov class cruisers. They were large and impressive ships, and the main role they performed during lifetime was showing the flag to demonstrate the USSR had a bluewater navy. She would have been a carrier escort had the Soviets built any during their lifetime. The Soviet Navy tried a couple missile ship conversions that were not successful. The Soviets judged their main role to be gunfire support platform, a role they never got the chance to demonstrate in combat. They were well liked by their crews for the relatively spacious quarters and, for the first time in any Soviet surface ship, air conditioning. The downside was the turbines and other mechanical systems were based on German practices, and the high tolerances required were difficult for the Soviets to achieve. Consequently, they required a highly trained engineering crews to maintain the engines. The lack of such training was shown by the sad experience of the Ordzhonikidze, sold to Indonesia in 1962 and renamed Irian. Irian lasted only three years in service before being returned to Vladivostok for a complete rebuilding of the turbines. Irian returned to Indonesia in late 1966..The ship lasted only another three years until 1969, when the ship's turbines were out of service and she was being used as an accommodations hulk, finally being towed to Taiwan for scrapping, slipping her tow enroute and sinking.
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@Nuke89345 Yes, if you're soldier undergoing bombardment 14 miles inland where you thought you were safe, the ability to inspire fear while having VW Bugs flying overhead is quite real. I don't think any of those Iraqis knew or cared if the big guns were supposedly obsolescence. Cruise missiles are effective weapons for striking 600 to 1000 miles inland. Firing them 15 miles inland is not only ineffective, since it GPS guidance system doesn't know the location of a bunker, it's also hugely expensive. I think, between Missouri and Wisconsin, about 600 16" rounds were fired. If we want to look at costs, multiply the costs of firing 600 cruise missiles (or any missile, really) with much less destructive power to the cost of those 600 16" rounds, and that doesn't count about 1600 127mm rounds fired. By now, the USN should have been in tall cotton when it came to gunfire support. We have 50 or so Arleigh Burkes firing those amazing ERGM rounds...no? Okay, then, we have BTERM...no? Well, we still have those 152mm LRLAP guns on the Zumwalts...no? My somewhat snarky point is the USN has shown no, and I mean zero, ability to design a working guided long range artillery round. They have now been at it since about 1955 and have wasted hundreds of millions, maybe billions, by now with nothing but scrap metal to show for it. I don't share your optimism that amphibious landings against defended beaches are a thing of the past. It will happen again. What the Navy needs is a multipurpose warship that can escort carriers, provide protection against attacking aircraft and ships, and provide gunfire support to amphibious landings. You know, kind of like a battleship, but not like an Iowa. A smaller, cheaper ship with say, four or six 203mm guns. Just haul out the blueprints for the Baltimore's main guns and start building and, for the love of all that's holy, no more Star Wars ammunition.
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@Nuke89345 Do you really think a hail of missiles against those Iraqi bunkers and trench lines would be anywhere near as effective, either operationally or cost wise, as artillery shells? There's a reason why the Army has many more artillery pieces than missile launchers. Nothing is as cheap or effective at moving dirt as an artillery round. The challenge for the Navy is to produce an enlarged Burke with 203mm lightweight guns, just like the Major Caliber Lightweight Gun (MCLWG) trialed way back in 1975 on the USS Hull, before we got so deeply into the guided munitions silliness. The tests were reportedly successful in meeting all the specs with the exception of some accuracy issues at extreme ranges out to 17 miles. However, the Navy decided this throwback was no longer needed because we'd soon have 5"/54 guns firing RAPs with way more range...and that failed too. The challenge for the Navy is not producing another version of the 8"/55 firing convention munitions. That part's easy. The hard part is to admit that artillery shells just don't lend themselves to delicate electronic things or other parts hung on them as they explode out of a big rifle. Admirals generally don't like to go before Congress to explain the, at least for now, they've decided for the good of the service to revert to a tried and true gun solution and, BTW, sorry about all that money. -)
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@keptinkaos6384 You are an idiot. BTW, stay in school and learn the difference between "there", "their", "were" and "we're". Learn how to write complete sentences with correct punctuation. Once you stop being an idiot, people might take you more seriously if you write above a sixth grade level.
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@theswordguy5269 Please provide me with any links that support the following assertions - 1. The Atlanta's main armament was only designed for surface warfare 2. Admiral Callahan "blundered" into Japanese forces as compared to his confusing order of "column left". 3. Evidence that the Atlanta was steaming under her own power after the torpedo hit and before San Francisco opened fire on a ship that was beyond the planned van of the destroyers. 4. Evidence that fear of Japanese surface attack caused Atlanta to be scuttled rather than the inability to get underway with the main power plant and the ship was drifting out of control toward Japanese held Cape Esperance. 5. Evidence a ship with only backup generator power, under tow by a fleet tug, with power only to a single turret could be considered "combat effective". 6. Any evidence the gunfire of the San Francisco caused the fatal damage to Atlanta. Not asking about crew casualties, but actual damage to the ship that later caused her to sink. 7. Any evidence that Juneau's first torpedo hit "broke her back", and how a ship with a broken back could maintain 13 knots on one screw for 10 hours after the first torpedo attack. 8. Any evidence the second torpedo attack, with the hit occuring in about the same place as the first, wasn't the one that actually broke her back, considering she broke in two and sank in 20 seconds. 9. Any evidence of an Atlanta class ship ever engaging in surface warfare after the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal that would prove how durable they were in that role.
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@theswordguy5269 " The Chief Engineer was quoted as having said that in his opinion the keel had been broken by the torpedo hit." This from the one of the ship's doctors. The Chief Engineer was quoted by whom? On what basis did he say this, if in fact he said it? The doctor's report is replete with errors about courses and speeds for the Juneau. This is all pretty flimsy evidence for asserting the ship was operating for 10 hours with a broken back. And you can stop with the continued attempts to make it look like I haven't read any of this before. I've read essentially everything at the Atlanta site years ago. The recently declassified action report of the USS Helena at https://bloximages.chicago2.vip.townnews.com/wcfcourier.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/8/72/872c634b-7920-5702-9d2e-6a5dd310feb2/59f73a3d0a4fd.pdf.pdf contains many more details of what happened ot Atlanta and Juneau.
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@josephvalvano829 Thanks for the kind words.
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@Nuke89345 No, I read they were "permissible", different to me than "more effective". We will certainly be using combinations of aircraft and missiles to take out deep targets. Once they have been suppressed, aircraft and the fleet will soften up the immediate landing area. At least not since the debacle at Dieppe, no nation will attempt an opposed landing without air and naval superiority. Last I looked, McDonnell Douglas was still a named subsidiary of Boeing for some defense work, especially naval missiles. It's been a couple years now, so Boeing may be the corporate name now. A small, cheap guided missile for shore bombardment use as been the Holy Grail of developers since WWII. As usual, you can have small, cheap or effective, but you can only chose two, and one can't be effective.
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@Nuke89345 The fact that the Missouri was nearly hit by two Silkworms and really only saved from being hit by one because it was intercepted by a Sea Dart from HMS Gloucester shows the missile threat wasn't zero. I don't think being hit by a Silkworm would have been considered minor. Shoulder fired MANPADS fired at any ship not over the horizon was a very real threat. Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin pretty much own the defense business for the Navy. This is part of our problem. We used to have about 20 big companies doing defense work for the Navy but they's all been swallowed by the Big Four. I don't know what happened ot antitrust laws. Swarm missiles are still mostly the thing of space movies. The sole exception are Block IV Tomahawks. They can be programmed in flight so they all arrive on target at almost the same time. 50 Tomahawks arriving at once is sure to get your attention.
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@jaspergood2091 Yes, it is. Drach so states during the video.
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