Comments by "Sar Jim" (@sarjim4381) on "The Drydock - Episode 062" video.

Modernized Fletchers also had two dual 3"/50 mounts, and those could have joined in if the Fletcher could have closed to within the effective range of all her guns. Very few modernized Fletchers kept all five 5", but a combination of the 5" and 3" would have been devastating to an Independence LCS. Even with just four 5" guns, each mount could maintain a ROF of 20 RPM, so that's 80 rounds per minute. Each 3" mount could maintain a ROF of 50 RPM. That adds another 100 rounds per minute, for a total of 180 RPM compared to the much smaller 57 mm gun's ROF of 200 RPM. We have good evidence of a Fletcher's ability to withstand battle damage by having had a lot of them tested to destruction. We really have no idea of the survivability of an Independence class. My guess in the end result would have the Fletcher sustaining a fair amount of non-fatal damage while the Independence class vessel would have been sinking or sunk.
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I think some ships do have either an unlucky name or events surrounding it, or were involved in an action where the ship had leadership problems that led to its sinking. The Indianapolis is one example. Given that it suffered the greatest loss of life on any single USN ship, one would expect that another cruiser would have taken her name in short order. Given the high level command bungling that was responsible for her sinking, the scapegoating and court martial of Captain McVay, and his subsequent suicide, it seems her name was best forgotten by Navy brass. It has only been the constant publicity and pressure on Indianapolis survivors and relatives that finally forced the Navy into commissioning another Indianapolis. The Navy then spat in the eye of these groups for a final time by bestowing the name of the Indianapolis on a Freedom class LCS, a relatively small and insignificant warship.
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General Short rightly bears more responsibility for the success of the Japanese attack than Kimmel because he was in charge of the defense of Hawaii, including the ships of the fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor. He didn't use the patrol aircraft he had available, didn't send the ones he did use in the right directions, had most antiaircraft batteries unmanned with ammunition in secured lockers, and made almost no attempt to integrate his radars into the air defense system. However, no one expected the Japanese to make an attack on Pearl Harbor with the Japanese fleet apparently fully committed to the attack on Thailand. The assumption was that there was insufficient Japanese intelligence before the date of the attack. That's why the war warnings issued during November emphasized securing the territory from spies and protecting military installations from sabotage. Those warnings also emphasized the overriding importance of not causing panic among civilians or interfered in normal commerce, so that limited how high of an alert Short could have declared without causing those problems he was warned against. It was considered that an attack against the Philippines or Panama Canal would be the first, and Pearl Harbor would only come after the initial operation (s) were successful. While we always look for scapegoats after a disaster like Pearl Harbor, putting the entire blame on the shoulders of Short and Kimmel isn't in concert with the facts.
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It's very early here so I thought my ears were playing tricks on me.
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@bluemarlin8138 I generally agree, although an Independence class ship was designed to fight other ships, only ships from the fast attack category up to mid-size offshore patrol vessels. The Navy now recognizes the Independence class has no role other than that of an expensive and overgrown speedboat. The Navy will try to get it right with next class rated as frigates with armament that might be able to defeat a Fletcher.
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@Wolfeson28 Let this serve as answer to several posts in the same vein. This is the text of a top secret message sent to Admiral Kimmel by the chief of naval operations on November 27, 1941, with a similar message sent by the Army to General Stark: This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward the stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46. This was the last general warning sent before Pearl Harbor. Neither Kmmel nor Short had sufficient clearance to see any of the fragmentary decrypts from the Japanese Purple code, so this is all the ind=formation they had in terms of a war warning. Both Kimmel and Short recognized the seriousness of the message. Neither had ever seen a message for their chiefs of staff labeled a war warning before. Now, I defy anyone to read that war warning and pretend they see any indication that Pearl Harbor was at proximate risk of being the first attacked. Almost no one in the US military even thought an attack against Pearl from the home islands was even possible. The assumption was Manila and Guam would need ot be taken first to provide a springboard for an attack on Hawaii. The common assumption in the Navy was ships inside Pearl were safe from torpedo attack because the anchorage waters, at 45 feet, were too shallow. Sure, the British had staged a similar attack at Taranto the previous year, but they were the British, not the Japanese. We "knew" the Japanese had inferior aircraft, inferior flying skills, and just weren't skilled enough to carry off a Taranto style attack. We were guilty of going into war assuming the enemy was what we had dreamed up rather than seeing how the Japanese fought from the point of view of Japan. There is plenty of blame to go around for the attack on Pearl, from FDR down to the lieutenant that told the two radar operators on top of wind swept Opana that had actually spotted the incoming attack to shut off their radar and go get breakfast. To put all the blame on the two commanders of Pearl Harbor that day is ludicrous.
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@kemarisite The problem was it was Short that was responsible for the air defense of Hawaii, not Kimmel. The two didn't particularly like each other, and their staffs had no liaisons serving on the opposite staff. The "60 or so" PBY's is a misleading number. Two squadrons had only arrived on November 23 for training before being assigned to outlying areas. Almost none of those crews had training beyond basic aircraft operation. The real number of PBY's with regular crews was 15, and only 10 or 11 were available at any one time because of maintenance and breakdowns. Those crews had been flying several patrols daily six days a week since October, when the first warnings of impending war were issued. The tactical error was almost no patrols extended north of the island, since that was considered the most unlikely route of attack and, with so few aircraft available, they were concentrated west and south of the island, the routes an attack was expected. Short had 12 B-17's, 33 B-18's and 12 A-20's available, all appropriate for patrol work. The B-17's were the longest range aircraft on the island. They were used in the patrol role, but their pilots were also worn out due to the constant flying schedules. The squadron commander just happned to choose December 7 as their one rest day in the past 10, so all were caught on the ground with only four undamaged. The B-18's were almost never used for patrol work, the same as the A-20's. Short thought the B-17's were sufficient, and Kimmel never asked for more Army patrols. The failure to plan and communicate falls equally on both commanders. Both commancer received a message on November 26 reading, in part"...Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken…" From this message, and the November 27 message, it was pretty clear that Pearl wasn't considered the likely place of first attack. Whatever methods of detecting an attack were left strictly to the judgement of the two commanders. Sabotage by Japanese living on the island was considered the most likely threat, so protection of the island's aircraft on the ground was a top priority. Whatever alert measures that were taken had the top priority on not alarming the civilians and not tipping our hand that we were able to read parts of the Japanese code. This is not the kind of message that would be sent if war affecting Hawaii was actually considered imminent. There were certainly steps that might have been taken to detect the attack before it was underway. Was there any realistic assortment of steps that would have actually stopped the attack? Doubtful at best. There's an excellent article of the military domestic steps leading up to the attack at https://www.americanheritage.com/pearl-harbor-who-blundered. I suggest you read it to get a good overall view of what things were actually like at Pearl before the attack.
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@Wolfeson28 Let's not start by poisoning the well. What I actually wrote was "Now, I defy anyone to read that war warning and pretend they see any indication that Pearl Harbor was at proximate risk of being the first attacked." It was always possible, even likely, that Pearl Harbor would be attacked by the Japanese. My point was no one thought the first strike in the war would be against Pearl. If you read the article in my link you'd see the final order of November 27 was the fourth in a little more than a month that an attack was just around the corner. Everyone knew the contents of the letters and general orders. As each warning period passed, a certain sense that this just another drill set in. Kimmel and Short were taking reasonable actions for how they perceived the threat. The Navy PBY's and Army B-17's were being stretched to the limits looking for the fleet. 10 or PBY's and 10-11 B-17's just weren't enough aircraft effectively patrol even the areas where the command staff believed a strike would originate. There were no extra planes to patrol north of the island, an area that those in charge thought was an unlikely route of attack, but it was the route the Japanese ultimately took. The Chief of Naval Operations didn't believe the Japanese could effectively refuel at sea, something they'd have to do to get to Pearl. That's why the assumption that Pearl was safe until the Japanese took Guam or Manila to use a refueling base. Naval intelligence had been spoofed by radio traffic from the home islands that indicated the North Pacific fleet was at base. The South Seas fleet was enroute to attack Thailand. That led to the belief the Japanese were not enroute to Pearl for an attack. Almost everything, from scattering aircraft to putting a carrier task force to sea would have been done if the belief was Pearl was at imminent risk of attack. Let me ask you a question, Without the value of hindsight, would you have believed Pearl was the imminent target of attack? That's what I meant. It's not that Pearl wouldn't or couldn't be attacked, it's that probability that it was going to be attacked on December 7 seemed exceedingly low. Both Kimmel and Short took defensive actions with the idea that the Japanese would come, but not for a couple weeks, but also to prevent enemy sabotage, something that was believed to be a real threat. While those fears were overblown, the Niihau Incident did show there were disloyal Japanese on the islands willing to assist the Japanese if they could. Kimmel and Short's judgement tuned out to be wrong, but I suspect almost any commander in charge would have made the same errors in judgement.
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@RedXlV At long as it can't use missiles, that is it's only chance for survival. The 57mm can't outrange a 5"/38, so the LCS has to turn tail and beat feet out of there. However, a Fletcher with a rebuilt power plant and using maximum steam is capable of 37-38 knots. The Independence has had trouble with leaky turbines and hull corrosion, and it's not likely her aluminum hull would hold up well in pounding seas at maximum speed. It would really come down to which ship sees the other first. In theory, Independence should be harder to spot on radar while a Fletcher sticks out like a sore thumb. Still, if a Fletcher manages to sneak up on Independence before it's able to open the distance beyond gun range, things won't end well for Independence. Just ask the Japanese at the the Battle Off Samar.
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@AtomicBabel Bull Halsey couldn't stand Hoover and made sure he was court martialed. However, he was exonerated at court martial because his force had only badly damaged cruisers remaining, the captains of those ships felt there couldn't have been survivors given the complete destruction of the Juneau by a massive explosion from a torpedo that caused her to sink in 20 seconds, and there was not even a single destroyer to hunt the Japanese sub that had just fired two torpedos, one of which sank Juneau. Gilbert rightly feared another attack and did his best to get the rest of the fleet out of danger. It was a tragic event, but war has many tragic events. He retired honorably in 1947, and was awarded three Navy Crosses. There was only one officer that should have been brought up on charges, and it wasn't Gilbert.
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@armchairwarlord A dozen modernized Fletchers? Yes, well, we "expired old salts" do enjoy this kind of speculation. If you don't, I suggest you pass these kinds of threads by.
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@lizardb8694 Bode was indeed a perfect scapegoat, since his leadership had already been called into question, and his rather haughty character had made him intensely disliked by his officers and crew. His accusation that his entire command staff was drunk when Chicago opened fire on a Japanese midget sub while in Sydney Harbor was a good example of his arrogance and constant problem of jumping to conclusions. Nevertheless, he had fought his ship well in the Battle of Savo Island, and there's no evidence that any of his command decisions led the the loss of Chicago. Bode is a sobering example of what happens when you crank off enough people that can make decisions about your future. McVay was almost a prototype naval officer, yet it still took over 40 years to get his name cleared. I expect it will take another couple generations of naval command staff before Bode gets his name cleared.
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@AtomicBabel Gib? Why don't you let us know what YOU think of it?
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@AtomicBabel It's over the top to say Halsey didn't care about the lives of destroyer crews. He had been a destroyer man most of his career and had a genuine care and affection for destroyer crews. However, Halsey was also a gambler. That was an vital attribute until mid-1943. We didn't have the intelligence or resource to take on Japan head on. Halsey was good at taking ijut pieces of their fleet was taking rational risks with his ships. Everything had changed by 1944. We had the material and resources to take the war to the Japanese. Halsey continued to gamble like it was 1942. He was out guessed by Kurita and Center Force, too unnecessary risks to remain on station and got hit by Typhoon Cobra, and then bumbled his way into Typhoon Connie only six months later. He was spared being drummed out of the service by personal intervention of Admiral Nimitz due to his previous war record. When it comes to naming a ship Halsey, the name is for the Halsey of before mid-1943, when he was a brilliant admiral. His later mistakes and bumbling shouldn't make him a nonperson in the Navy.
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@armchairwarlord Watch the video starting at 01:24:30 so you can see the question I (and Drach) was responding to.
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@armchairwarlord LOL. Many of us are. It's all speculation, but it keeps me from getting a worse case of Alzheimer's.
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