Comments by "Sar Jim" (@sarjim4381) on "The Drydock - Episode 122" video.

  1. Typhoon Cobra was actually quite accurately located and forecast about ten hours before it got to the Third Fleet. The problem with the reports of the storm were twofold. The first was the reports came from the Army Air Force forecasting center in Saipan. There was the usual interservice rivalry that tended to downgrade AAF forecasts compared to that from USN forecasters. The USN didn't have a forecast center like the AAF. Observation were reported ship to ship, and aerographer's mates were expected to create their own weather map. That meant that each ship or squadron depended on the reports and forecasts of other ships without ever getting an overview of all the reports. The second problem was AAF reports and warnings were issued using different codes and radio frequencies than USN weather reports. That meant USN radio operators had to monitor these "foreign" frequencies and then had to accurately transcribe details like the long/lat of the storm, That of course didn't happen, so there were multiple reports of the location of the storm, and no one knew which one was accurate. All of this was bad enough, but the size and speed of Cobra made things even worse. Cobra was only about 65 miles across compared to the usual several hundred for a Pacific typhoon. It was also moving at 25 to 30 mph compared to a more typical 10-15 mph, and had peak winds of 170-180 mph compared to the usual 100-110 mph. This meant that the usual "seaman's weather eye" only recognized that a typhoon was bearing down on them about four hours before the storm hit. Halsey's orders about what ships were to do were also inconsistent. He'd issue one order that ships should scatter and then another one ordering the destroyers to stay close to the oilers so they could refuel as soon as the weather calmed down. Halsey was totally out of the loop when it came to Cobra. The first US ship to sink was USS Spruance at 1110. Halsey had no idea any ships had been sunk until about 0215 the next morning. To be fair, no one knew how violent and fast moving Cobra was, and Halsey assumed that ti was just a garden variety typhoon. So many ships had their radio equipment or antennas destroyed that it was many hours before surviving ships with equipment that still worked could string emergency antennas and report the situation. The upside from all this carnage was the Navy finally recognizing how poor their forecasting system was for Pacific typhoons. This led to the establishment of what today is the USN's Joint Typhoon Warning Center, generally recognized as the premier tropical storm warning center today.
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  3.  @WildBillCox13  You're welcome. Weather, particularly tropical weather, has been one of my hobbies for almost 60 years. Ironically, Halsey sailed his task force directly into another typhoon (now known as Typhoon Connie) in June, 1945. Connie was actually a worse storm than Cobra, but some of the lessons learned in the earlier storm helped Task Force 38 survive in a battered condition but with no ships lost. Only 8 sailors lost their lives compared to 760 from Cobra. There was even more accurate forecasting about Connie, but many of those forecasts were held up awaiting decoding and didn't reach Halsey and Admiral McCain. the task force commander until it was too late. Many of the ships hove to and put out their sea anchors before being hit, others ballasted their near empty fuel tanks with salt water. That stopped the fatal yawing and heaving that caused the loss of many ships during Cobra. Halsey wouldn't allow either action during Cobra since it would take his ships out of action for too long. Halsey was once more subject to a court of inquiry about his orders for the task force. The blame for sailing into Connie was placed, somewhat unfairly, on the shoulders of Halsey and McCain. If not for Halsey's heroic status among the American people, he probably would have been relieved of command. McCain, who was also Halsey's chief of staff during Cobra, received no such consideration, and was relieved of command on July 15. A worn out sailor with many medical problems, McCain passed away from a heart attack on September 6, 1945, just four days after the surrender ceremony in Tokyo Ba,y at the age of 61.
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