Comments by "Sar Jim" (@sarjim4381) on "The Drydock - Episode 044" video.
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The US navy's goal by mid-1944 was to have all destroyers assigned the Pacific theater that retained their twin quad torpedo launchers to be be fitted with at least ten 40mm barrels, those with a single quad launcher to have at 12 barrels, and the complete anti-kamikaze ships with no torpedo launchers were fitted with between 14 and 16 barrels. The most heavily armed were some Gearing class ships with a pair of quad 40mm mounts amidships in the same positions as the landed torpedo launchers, a pair of twin mounts opposite the bridge, and another pair of twin mounts aft ahead of the depth charge tracks replacing the previous three to five single 20mm mounts at the same location. This was a total of 20 barrels. At the same time, all the remaining single 20mm mounts were replaced with twin mounts. Most of these ships were used as radar pickets that were heavily attacked by Japanese aircraft once they realized ot importance of their early warning role. The ability of these ships to send up a hail of antiaircraft fire was a surprise to Japanese pilots and caused many suicide attacks to be broken up, especially when there were enough destroyers available to assign pairs to a radar picket station.
The problems with this kind of heavy armament was not the stability issues that have been written about, it was where to berth and feed all the extra crew. Each quad mount required a crew of 8-10 and twins 4-5. that was a total additional crew just to man the mounts of 32-35 men compared to the original three twin mounts. This doesn't count the additional crew needed for ammunition handling, magazine manning, and machinist and gunners mates to repair and maintain the mounts. The additional electronics and Combat Information Centers already required an additional ten to fourteen men before the armament changes, so even the Grearings were hard pressed to find space for these crew, and it was even worse for the converted Fletchers and Sumners. Even the amount of extra provisions required was estimated to add some thirty tons to the displacement, not to mention the additional cooks and stewards needed. The USN before the kamikaze threat prided itself on every crew member having their own berth. By April, 1945, hot bunking, hammocks, and even deck sleeping was the norm.
Many more complaints by the men centered more around the difficulties of getting a hot meal than the rough berthing. Letters home from Pacific theater destroyer crews told of waiting for up to two hours to get through the mess line, only to have that disrupted by general quarters for another air attack. Some gun and CIC crews ate nothing but sandwiches and coffee for days on end. If you want to start sailors to bitching, don't feed them hot meals, and the bitching from crews extended from letters to their families all the way to letters to their Congressmen and Senators.
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A lot of splash distinguishing was done using a "scotch tape" range scale on the PPI scope, or the typical radar display we've all seen. The CIC crew knew how far their shells would travel within a range of about 30 meters. They also knew how far the target was from their ship, also within about 30 meters for a cruiser and above size target. They literally used a piece of scotch tape with that data in pencil on a piece of tape and paste it on the screen. That served as a visual marker between the range of a splash and range of the target, and a new tape was made fr each salvo Since no other ship could have been firing at exactly the same time at the same target, shell splashes for your ship could be pretty accurately determined by watching the flight of your shells as pips on the PPI along the scotch tape scale. A range difference between a splash and the target that didn't match your scotch tape scale couldn't be yours, only the ones that matched your scale. It's really quite a simple concept once you understand it, but one that wasn't part of the normal radar features at the time. The Navy crewman who first came up with the scotch tape scale is lost in the sands of time, but the scale was in wide use in the Pacific by the middle of 1944. These innovations were distributed to the fleet and the Allies using the Combat Information Center Magazine starting in July, 1944. These are mostly available online at https://maritime.org/doc/cic/ and make fascinating reading for electronics nerd types like me. From reading the magazines, it seems the scotch tape scale was already known by July 1944, so some early electronics nerd sailor had already worked out the general concept by then. The scale was added electronically to postwar radars, so the the vast supply of scotch tape needed in a CIC faded by then.
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@stevevalley7835 Indeed, but we at least got mostly functional aircraft with the B-2, F-22, and F-35. Sure, the Independence class LCS (now classed as fast frigates) had massive cost overruns and can't defend themselves in high intensity combat. Sure, the Freedom class ships had massive cost overruns and has an armament more typical of a patrol boat on the displacement and overall size of a Gearing class destroyer, but at least we got vessels that have a working main gun, even if it is a 57mm popgun. The Zumwalts bring all these issues to a whole new level, leaving us with a heavy cruiser size ship unable to defend itself from almost any threat and a flank speed that is 3 knots slower than the 1948 Des Moines class heavy cruisers, a ship with actual offensive and defensive armament that all worked. We ended up three really cool looking admiral's barges. As you say, this should be a scandal of epic proportions if the population wasn't already numbed by other scandals.
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