Comments by "Sar Jim" (@sarjim4381) on "Mark Felton Productions"
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The Mosquito wasn't close in bombload, even on paper. Although the theoretical maximum bomb load was 4,000 pounds, that was for a mission of less than 700 miles round trip. A more typical bombload was 2,500 pounds. The B-17 carried 4,500 pounds over ranges three times as long as the Mosquito, and had an internal bombload of 8,000 pounds over a 1,400 mile radius. A maximum bombload with external racks for a 700 mile mission was over 17,000 pounds. The B-17 was a slow but heavy strategic bomber while the Mosquito was a light but fast bomber, and later one of the first true multirole aircraft.
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The Japanese had used small scale banzai charges as far back as the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 and during the Sino-Japanese war in 1930's, but most of those were against troops armed with slow firing bolt action rifles and only a few machine guns. The first massed banzai charge against well armed modern forces was on Attu in the Aleutians in 1943. After all night repetitive charges by Japanese soldiers mostly using bayonets and swords, 2,600 of them were wiped out by massed machine gun and artillery fire, with only 29 soldiers too badly wounded to commit suicide captured. The US lost 549 killed and wounded, but the ratio demonstrated the futility of such tactics. Still, this last stand was in line with the Japanese bushido code of warfare, and the defense of Attu was romanticized in Japan as each soldier assuming the role of a samurai, something previously limited to officers and nobility. This set the stage for the tremendous waste of soldiers on Saipan.
As the war grew ever closer to the home islands, banzai charges were discouraged, since it was possible to evacuate some surviving troops from doomed islands to others to fight again. There were still some smaller scale banzai charges, particularly on Okinawa, but the Japanese high command came to recognize that Americans weren't going to break and run under massed banzai charges. The bushido code really didn't work in modern warfare.
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The Nazis had collected so much loot, and conditions in immediate postwar Germany and surrounding Axis countries were so chaotic, that it was inevitable that Allied troops would be involved in looting. For accounts I've read from US and British soldiers involved in looting, their view was so much loot was available that a few things stolen here and there would hardly be missed.
That would have been true if looting was confined to troops in direct contact with the loot and they just pilfered a few gold coins or some silverware. That wasn't the case, however, as the US and British commanders in the region did little to stop the looting. The supposed reason was this was all Nazi owned loot, and troops deserved a little of it after risking their lives fighting against the Nazia across Europe. No one took into account that a large portion of the loor was stolen from civilians.That evolved into a full scale theft and racketeering operation, with Army assets being used to transport stolen goods from Germany and Austria to more friendly neutrals like Spain, extending across the Channel to England and Ireland, and then transshipments on to the US. Bribes were being paid all the way from top commanders down to black stevedore troops to keep the operation going. The whole operation lasted almost a year before finally being shut down by special investigators from the Inspector General's Office, although even some of them were later arrested for at least aiding the operation. There are persistent rumors the bribery extended all the way to Eisenhower's staff if not to Eisenhower himself. It was and is a shameful organized crime operation within the Army, and one that still needs further investigation.
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