Comments by "Sar Jim" (@sarjim4381) on "Japanese 'Invasion' of America (Part 2 - Canada & Oregon)" video.
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A stroke of luck it could be, but postwar interviews and Japanese naval records do indicate that I-26 was there at the time and did indeed do the shelling. The idea that a USN submarine was the one doing the shelling and that the entire crew had remained silent all these years is just laughable. Japanese submarines were well known for their poor performance in surface actions. They gun itself was noted for excessive dispersion, and the I-26 didn't carry a director, since the ones in use by the IJN were too heavy to mount on a submarine mast. Aiming was done using telescopic sights on the gun mount, put them too low for reliable long distance shelling. Japanese submarine tactics were to rely on their excellent torpedos, only using their deck gun on vessels judged too small to waste a torpedo on. Since these were generally merchant vessels that were either unarmed or poorly armed, Japanese submarines would come to nearly point blank range to sink the vessel. In at least 50% of the attacks, the shells either missed or hit non-vital parts of the target. The Japanese sub would then dive to escape an attack, assuming her shells did sink the merchantman. Japanese submarines were just not very capable when it came to attacking land targets several miles away, something their gun crews rarely practiced for. Japanese sub commanders felt these attacks put their boats at unnecessary risk for very little benefit, so they rarely pressed home an attack, preferring to mount a mostly symbolic shelling. Cdr Yokota, captain of I-26, was noted as being a particularly unaggressive skipper, as shown by the poor war record of 1-26 while under his command.
By June 26, 1942, US and Canadian antisubmarine forces had been fully aroused. This was particularly true with the attack by I-26, since Cdr Yokota was aware of the invasion of the Aleutian Islands starting on June 3. The main goal of the attack was not the lighthouse, but the radio station, one of the most important on the Pacific coast for both its long range transmitting capabilities and its RDF (radio direction finding) broadcasts used by merchant ships for locating their positions. Japanese intelligence on the exact location of the radio station was only approximate at best, and the radio towers weren't lighted, making them hard to see in the fading light, especially with the reported rough seas and two mile visibility in haze reported that night. The lighthouse keeper put out the light immediately after the first shell was fired, making locating the radio station that much harder. The radioman on the sub monitored the Point Estevan station as it continued to send out SOS signals, and the sub continued to shell, hoping that one would hit the radio station. Instead, the Japanese gunners were using the elevation of the light as their aiming point based on information the radio station was being the lighthouse, so their shell went harmlessly long into the uninhabited area further inland. I-26, fearing an attack by aircraft, moved back out to sea on the surface, using her high top speed of 23 knots to put distance between her and the likely point of of attack by arriving aircraft.
In fact, it took nearly 90 minutes for the first RCN (Royal Canadian Navy) Catalina patrol bomber to arrive over Point Estevan. Four other aircraft showed up in the next half hour, but the first Canadian subchaser took over four hours to arrive. By that time, I-26 was long gone. This was an acute embarrassment to the RCN, which had assured both its citizens and the USN that it was fully able to protect its coastline. The attack was reported as merely a bub firing a few shells and then submerging due to aircraft attack. This false report by the RCN has helped fuel the ridiculous conspiracy theories about an attack by a USN sub or even a Canadian cruiser. All the evidence points to the attack being exactly what it seemed - a Japanese sub shelling a relatively unprotected coastline. This is one of those continuing conspiracy theories second only to the sinking of the Australian cruiser Sydney , but being supported by nearly zero evidence.
Ironically, the attack by I-26 caused far more sinkings than her torpedoes and deck gun. All the Canadian lighthouses went dark and the RDF stations stopped transmitting after the attack. It's estimated that at least 15 merchantman were lost by running up on the many rocks and reefs along the Canadian Pacific coast with no lights or RDF stations to guide them.
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