Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "War Stories" channel.

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  15.  @Heathcoatman  Primary sources (do I know what that term means?) Who can say?. WINSTON S CHURCHILL. THE SECOND WORLD WAR. CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950. VOLUME Vl TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY P174/5 ‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.’ CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P340 'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.' UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN By Charles B. MacDonald CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993 P199 Field Marshal Montgomery has written: "We had undertaken a difficult operation, attended by considerable risks. It was justified because, had good weather obtained, there was no doubt that we should have attained full success." CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P 586 In Gavin's opinion, the performance of Frost's force was " the outstanding independent parachute battalion action of the war." Frost's " tactical handling " was, says Gavin, " a model for parachute unit commanders." P 120. Montgomery says that " Had good weather obtained, there was no doubt that we should have attained full success." (Op. cit., p. 186.) Student, when interrogated by Liddell Hart, did not go quite so far as this, but gave the weather as the main cause of the failure. A DROP TOO MANY MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC PEN & SWORD BOOKS. 1994 P xiii ‘However, by far the worst mistake was the lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen Bridge. The whole essence of the plan was to lay an airborne carpet across the obstacles in southern Holland so that the Army could get motor through, yet the capture of this, perhaps the biggest and most vital bridge in that its destruction would have sounded the death-knell of the troops committed at Arnhem, was not accorded priority. The capture of this bridge would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited. It was thought that the retention of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there courtesy of a rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.
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  26.  @smellygoatacres  ‘Montgomery didn't defeat Rommel. His loss to kill ratio was disastrous vs Rommel.’ Your words. Alamein (23 October – 11 November 1942): 195,000 allied troops, 4,810 Killed (2.5%). 116,000 Axis troops, 2,400 – 9,000 killed (2% -7.8%). Operation OVERLORD (06 June – 30 August 1944): 2,052,299 allied troops, 36,980 killed (1.8%). 640,000 Axis troops, 23,019 (3.6%). ‘You wouldn't follow that man into battle’ Your words From US General Walter Bedell Smith: ‘22 June 1944 Dear General [Montgomery], I have just received from a most reliable and intelligent source a report on attitude and state of mind of American troops in action. The writer is completely unbiased, and his report contains the following paragraph, which I hope will give you as much pleasure as it has given me: Confidence in the high command is absolutely without parallel. Literally dozens of embarking troops talked about General Montgomery with actual hero-worship in every inflection. And unanimously what appealed to them beyond his friendliness, and genuineness, and lack of pomp was the story (or, for all I know, the myth) that the General Visited every one of us outfits going over and told us he was more anxious than any of us to get this thing over and get home/ This left a warm and indelible impression. The above is an exact quotation. Having spent my life with American soldiers, and knowing only too well their innate distrust of everything foreign, I can appreciate far better than you can what a triumph of leadership you accomplished in inspiring such feeling and confidence. Faithfully Bedell’ From US General Omar Bradley: ‘Even Eisenhower with all his engaging ease could never stir American troops to the rapture with which Monty was welcomed by his’ THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS CASSELL, LONDON 1962 P16 ‘Montgomery is a first-class trainer and leader of troops on the battlefield, with a fine tactical sense. He knows how to win the loyalty of his men and has a great flair for raising morale.’ 'You wouldn't follow that man into battle knowing your odds of being killed were 10:1.' Your words. How would a person follow that man into battle know what their odds were of being killed?
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  31.  @dennisweidner288  'A fair assessment' British 2nd army at Caen tied down 6.5 of the 8 German armoured divisions in Normandy, leaving the US 2nd Army free to take the major port that the allies needed - Cherbourg, followed by a break to the south. Capturing Caen, or not capturing Caen made little difference to outcome of the campaign. Montgomery delivered victory in Normandy by D+78, 12 days ahead of schedule, and this with the delays to the allied build up caused by the great storm of 19th -20th June. CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P282 ‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’ P288 ‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.’ 'From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story': ‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’ Any questions?
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