Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "When The British u0026 The Nazis Fought For North Africa | Greatest Tank Battles" video.
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'-Montgomery's victory in El Alamein was nothing to write home about. Rommel was short on fuel and half of his armored force were useless Italian tanks. Of course Monty won the battle, any commander with such an advantage is going to win, isn't he? Your words.
Appointed to command of the ground forces in ‘Torch’, Montgomery was moved across to command Eighth Army after the death of Gott. In his first big command, Montgomery acted quicky and decisively as he reorganized and rejuvenated Eighth Army to make it fit to take on and defeat the Axis forces led by Rommel. There is plenty of evidence of Montgomery’s effect on his new command, here is some:
‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight.’
DE GUINGAND
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
ALANBROOKE
‘Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
CHURCHILL
Montgomery, with four divisions defeated Rommel with his six divisions at Alam-el-Halfa and then defeated Rommel again at the Second Battle of El Alamein.
For Alamein, Montgomery set about re-training the entire Eighth Army, regrouping divisions that had been broken down into smaller units and creating an armoured reserve to exploit a breakthrough in the enemy front. Further, he resisted political pressure to attack before he was satisfied that everything he required for victory was in place – including extensive medical care facilities for his troops.
Alamein ended the war in North Africa as a contest at the cost of 13,500 (6.9%) casualties. Victory in North Africa freed up a million of allied shipping for use elsewhere and led to the campaign in Italy, which together with the allied threat to the Balkans tied down 50 German divisions. Troops that the Germans could not deploy in Normandy or Russia.
Further, Montgomery showed how the allies could beat the Germans in the future: thorough preparation and concentration of resources, which paid off in Normandy and would have paid off in the autumn of 1944 in the advance on Germany if Eisenhower had heeded these lessons instead of allowing political considerations to dictate strategy.
'-Montgomery bungled his pursuit of Rommel - almost any other general, with more fuel, more troops, chasing a defeated foe, could have brought the Afrika Korps to bay. He just herded the enemy along.' Your words.
Cairo to Tripoli by Road is 1600 miles. The same London to Moscow.
Rommel outran his supply lines. Montgomery did not make that mistake.
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'-Montgomery's only objective was to capture the town of Caen. He and his forces were repelled three times and when they finally entered the town the Germans had already left for a higher defense position. He was supposed to drive toward Germany in the left flank of the allies and caused more delays for the Americans to get to Germany.
-Montgomery utterly failed in Market Garden. Lots of things went wrong but ultimately Monty needs to take the blame here. And Monty’s refusal to admit that German panzer divisions were in Arnhem was all on him. Market Garden was Monty’s brainchild. How do you forgive him for that mess?' Your words.
France 1944 (Operation Overlord)
The then existing plan for Overlord that Montgomery saw comprised three invasion beaches with a target date of 1st May 1944 for D-Day. Montgomery immediately urged that the plan be expanded to five beaches by the addition of Utah and Sword beaches. This was agreed to, but the change created a one-month delay to the start of the operation as the additional shipping was gathered for the additional landings.
Montgomery presented his plan for the land campaign to allied leaders at St Paul’s School in West London on 15th May 1944. The plan showed British 2nd Army holding down the bulk of German forces on the allied left while the US 1st Army broke out on the allied right to capture Cherbourg and other ports, leading to the allies reaching the river Seine by D+90. Overlord began on the 6th June (D-Day), with all allied beaches liking up within a week, despite US mistakes at Omaha beach. Montgomery’s plan coped with the delay to the allied build-up caused by the great storm of 19th-20th June which wrecked the US ‘Mulberry Harbour’, the vast concentration of German forces in front of British 2nd Army, the delay to the US 1st Army break-out which led to the need for several operation in the Caen sector to keep Germans off balance, and the constant badgering of glory hungry, greenhorn US generals.
Montgomery inflicted a defeat of the Germans as big as Stalingrad and that ended with 22% fewer than expected allied casualties, and ahead of schedule, on D+78.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P282
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
P288
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.
P333
‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story
Market Garden
With the allied advance at a standstill, with the Germans still reeling from their defeat in France and with V weapons being launched at Britain in sight of British troops. Montgomery sought to depoly the First Allied Airborne Army that Eisenhowert had made available for Montgomery's use, without Montgomery having full control of.
The operation was a risky undertaking, but Eisenhower and Bradley agreed that the possible gains were worth taking the chance. Montgomery had no final say in the airborne (Market) part of the operation, which was under the control of the US General Brereton. Virtually all of the problems with the operation came out the airborne plan. There is a body of opinion that the weather, which defied allied forecasts was the decisive factor in Arnhem not being taken:
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
EISENHOWER
‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.'
CHURCHILL
German General Karl Student gave the weather as the main cause of the failure at Arnhem.
Market Garden did not succeed in reaching Arnhem but it did free up to a fifth of the Dutch population, stretched the German forces another 50 miles, hindered V weapon attacks on Britain and gave the allies a launching point for Operation Veritable in early 1945. The losses incurred (17,000) should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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'Let's stay serious and objective! Montgomery won El Alamein because the German military situation was busy turning around.'
Montgomery won at El Alamein because his previous victory at Alam el Halfa ensured thst the battle be foight where he wished it to be fought. He then reorganized and retrained the Eighth Army to make it fit for battle and then resisted political pressure to attack before everything was in place. for just 13,500 casualties he ended the war in North Africa as a contest.
'The Allied submarines sank the Italian ships responsible for bringing essential supplies to the Afrika Corps while, at the same time, the Allies ensured a predominance in supply and airspace ... these "special" circumstances, everything was in place to obtain victory ...'
So what was Monmtgomery supposed to do? Say stop, let the Africa Corps get all of their supplies so that everything is equal and we can ensure that there are no stupid comments on YouTube 79 years later?
'Let us recall that, during the landing of June 6, Montgomery was stuck for a month in front of Caen while the Americans were progressing elsewhere and the same failed miserably in Arnhem.'
Montgomery drew the overwhelming bulk of German forces onto his front at Caen, including 84% of German armour. Montgomery delivered victory by D+78, instead of the scheduled completed date of D+90, with 22% fewer than expected casualties and delivered in Normandy, a defeat for the Germans as big as Stalingrad.
The failure at Arnhem freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German V2 attacks on Britain, stretched the German defences another 50 miles and gave the allies an excellent starting point for attacking the Rhine in the following months.
Other allied operations have failed more miserably than that.
What was your country doing while all this was going on?
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Yes wimbardi laksono, the Royal Navy performed with distinction throughout the Second World War. British sea power, and the expertise and courage of its men blunted German land victories in Norway, France and Greece by extricating large numbers of troops from those places. The Royal Navy defeated the German surface fleet, almost all of its sub-surface fleet, with 67% of all U-Boats destroyed being accounted for by British forces. It accounted for the Italian Navy, the neutering of the French fleet, and for keeping the Japanese fleet from the western part of the Indian Ocean. Britain supplied the bulk of the naval and merchant shipping for TORCH, HUSKY, AVALANCHE, SHINGLE, OVERLORD, and so on. Even after all this, Britain was still able to put together the British Pacific Fleet. A marvellous effort.
And all this, from a nation of just 46 million, a bit more if you rope in the contribution of the Commonwealth and Empire. From a nation that, in addition to the above, had to escort the shipping for its substantial import needs. The nation that, more than any other, had stuck to international naval treaties, and then had to cope with the consequences as so often, ship for ship, it was up against more modern and more powerful adversaries. A marvellous effort.
A few points of detail:
The loss of the PRINCE OF WALES, and REPULSE took place in the South China Sea, not the Pacific Ocean. The losses took place three days after the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOUR. The idea that lessons from the PEARL HARBOUR attack could be absorbed in three days is absurd. In any case Pearl Harbour was an attack on ships in a sheltered anchorage. The attack on PRINCE OF WALES, and REPULSE to ok place at sea. If anyone should have been learning lessons, it should have the US Navy from the marvellous Royal Navy attack on the Italian Navy at TARANTO. Battleships sunk in a safe anchorage. The Japanese did, as TARANTO led to PEARL HARBOUR.
At the time of the BATTLE OF MIDWAY (June 1942), Britain had the carriers ARGUS, EAGLE, FORMIDABLE, FURIOUS, ILLUSTRIOUS, INDOMITABLE, and VICTORIOUS available. A marvellous effort after nearly three years of war.
As for US in the Pacific…it was sledgehammers to crack walnuts.
Guam (30 miles x 8 miles), 60,000 US troops v 23,000 Japanese troops.
Saipan (14miles x 7 miles), 71,000 US troops v 32,000 Japanese troops.
Iwo Jima (5miles x 4 miles), 110,000 US troops v 21,000 Japanese troops.
Etc, etc.
What is the fuss all about?
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@kniespel6243
Ah...
So you did not see what Montgomery did at Caen and Market Garden.
Let us look st some of the words from people that were around then
Caen:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
‘Now I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen’
From Operation Victory, by Major-General Sir Francis De Guingand.
Market Garden:
‘Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter’
From Montgomery, by Alan Moorehead.
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
From Crusade in Europe by Dwight D Eisenhower.
‘It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland.’
From Operation Victory, by Major-General Sir Francis De Guingand.
‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.’
From The Second World War, by Winston Churchill.
‘those who had planned and inaugurated with complete the first airborne operations of military history, had not now even thought of such a possible action by the enemy…the Allied Airborne action completely surprised us. The operation hit my army nearly in the centre and split it into two parts…In spite of all precautions, all bridges fell intact into the hands of the Allied airborne forces—another proof of the paralysing effect of surprise by airborne forces!’
From a statement by German General Karl Student supplied by Basil Liddell Hart in 1949.
‘Why was Montgomery not given adequate troop and logistic support at least one more division?’
From On to Berlin, by US General James M Gavin.
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@kniespel6243
Oh well, its your funeral...
‘On 21January 1944, we foregathered at Norfolk House under Eisenhower’s chairmanship to compare or impressions. Montgomery, who was to command all the ground forces in the initial stages of ‘Overlord’ said at once that the planned assault by three divisions was insufficient to obtain a quick success. We must take a port at the earliest possible moment. He pressed that the proposed area of assault in Normandy be extended to include an area of the eastern side of the Cotentin Peninsular. The American forces should be placed on the right and he British to the left, the former to capture Cherbourg, and then drive for the Loire ports, while the British and Canadian forces would deal with the enemy’s main strength approaching from the east and south-east.’
Marshall of the Royal Air Force, Arthur Tedder – a ‘vet’
”While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission. For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout.
In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself, and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort.’
US General Omar Bradley – a ‘vet’
The Battle of the Beachead was a period of incessant and heavy fighting and one which, except for the capture of Cherbourg, showed few geographical gains. Yet it was during this period that the stage was set for the later, spectacular liberation of France and Belgium. The struggle in the beachhead was responsible for many developments, both material and doctrinal, that stood us in good stead throughout the remainder of the war.’
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
US General Dwight D Eisenhower – a ‘vet’
My father was a ‘vet’ of the fighting at Caen. He remembered the bitter fighting there against the mass of German forces.
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@nickdanger3802
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377.
‘Sir Brian Horrocks Comments: Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
From Horrocks's, Corps Commander. Page 53.
...And these people were actually there...
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
From Para Dave:
'An Army at Dawn,by Rick Atkinson,p419 .The British attack at el Alamein with more than 1000 tanks cracked the much weaker Axis defenders across a 40 mile front.The sheer weight of British resources made up for all the blunders,one account noted.Montgomery's 8th army hugged the Libyan coast much closer than it hugged the retreating Axis. *Air Marshall Conningham said "once Monty had his reputation he would never risk it again'
Rick Atkinson. Aged 69. Direct experience of the North African campaign, zero.
Alamein:
1,029 allied tanks, 547 axis tanks 1.88 to 1.
Operation Cobra:
2,451 allied tanks to 190 axis tanks. 12.9 to 1.
I caanot see what Para Dave in on about. As far as I am concrned, 1,029 to 547 tanks at Alamein is fine by me. I wish it had been 2,049 to 547.
As for the air war in North Africa:
'Not until 'Maori' or 'Mary' Coningham left and was succeeded by Air Vice-Marshal Broadhurst did RAF techniques improve, but Tedder's policy of applying the heavy bombing effort to the enemy's rear installations and supply lines was brilliantly successful, as Rommel's nightmare at Benghazi was soon to show. 'I punched him on the nose,' Monty afterwards pithily acknowledged; 'Tedder bit his tail.' Yet if the drubbing at Alamein and the vulture-like pursuit had shattered Rommel's nerve and forced him into premature evacuation '
Nigel Hamilton. Aged 69. Direct experience of the North African campaign, zero.
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@nickdanger3802
"First and foremost, they note that they have written off the main body of Lend-Lease"
Too right. The USA made money hand over fist in the war, bleeding Britain, France and Russia white, while they, and other countries made sure that he USA was safe and smug, 3,000 mles from the nearest enemy.
It was cheap foreign policy for the USA.
Then, a few generations later, their descendants have got the bare faced cheek to on here trying to tell others how it was and to demand some sort of thank you for events that took place decades before they were born. The USA should be thanking others for sorthing things out before the USA turned up and elbowed its way to the front at the victoty parades.
Fcuk off.
In any case, Lend-Lease had little effect on the war in the Middle East, as in regard to goods sourced from the USA, goods paid for exceeded Lend-Lease goods until the end of 1942.
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@BunyipToldMe
'So, almost half a million English troops'
Err...
No it was 390,000 British troops.
The Dutch supplied 240,000 troops, the Belgians, 600,000 troops, the French supplied 2.1million troops to the allied cause.
The Germans had 3.35 million troops.
'Why didn't they fight instead of running away or surrendering?'
Err...
The Germans attacked on the 10th May 1940.
In the early morning of the 15th, the French Premier Raynaud, telephoned Churchill to tell that the Germans had broken through French lines and the war was lost.
Churchill flew to Paris on the 16th. During his meeting with French leaders at the Quai d’Orsay he could see French officials burning French government papers in the garden.
The Netherlands capitulated on 17th May.
German forces reached the coast on the 24th May, leaving two French armies, 250,000 British troops and the Belgian army isolated from the rest of the allied armies.
Belgium capitulated on the 28th May, having given France and Britain one hour notice of that surrender.
On the same day, the Germans captured Calais, leaving Dunkirk as the only port in Northern France in allied hands.
The Dunkirk evacuation finished on the 4th June, with 220,000 British troops, and 110,000 French troops evacuated to Britain.
On 10 June, the French government declared Paris an open city. On the same day, Italy declared war on France.
On 13 June, At a meeting a meeting of the Anglo-French Supreme War Council at Tours, Britain offered the French a Franco-British Political Union. The offer was rejected.
On 14 June, Paris fell.
On 16th June, Petain replaced Reynaud as the French Premier having already begun secret negotiations with the Germans for an armistice, whilst still urging Britain to send more forces to France.
On 17th June, Petain sought agreement from Britain to seek a separate armistice with Germany. Britain agreed to that request, with two conditions: that the French fleet be put beyond the reach of the Germans, and that Germans pilots in French custody be transferred to British custody.
General de Gaulle, who no longer in the French government, arrived in London on 17th June and in a BBC broadcast on the 18the June, called on French people to resist German occupation.
On the 22nd June, the French concluded an armistice with Germany, with neither of the British conditions for an agreement to an armistice having been fulfilled.
The last British in France departed on 25th June.
And your service in which major war gives you the right to accuse troops of running away?..
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