Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "The Second Battle of El Alamein | Monty's Masterpiece" video.
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@analystanalyst7652
Get lost.
Part One.
'A hero was needed by the British and there he was.' Your words.
Total rubbish. There was no desire to see heroes in Britain during the war from the upper echelons in all parts of public life. The whole thrust of ‘propaganda’ or government messages based on MPs own anecdotes from their contact with the public, and evidence acquired from ‘mass observation’ was to emphasize the collective effort, particularly the men and women in street. Posters were all about ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘together’. The films people watched: ‘Millions like Us’, ‘The Way Ahead’, ‘Went the Day Well’, The Foreman Went to France’. The BBC with broadcasts such as ‘Workers Playtime’ JB Priestly, and so on, and so on, and so on. Britain mobilized it population more than any other major belligerent, more than Russia, a lot more than the USA . That is what British Propaganda was about.
'When he should have been taking the Scheldt Estuary (as a result of this poor move a great many Canadian troops, once again, paid the price as they did in Dieppe)' Your words.
Total Rubbish. British forces (My own father among them), and Polish forces also took part in the Scheldt campaign. The Canadian government, and the Canadian military leaders then in Britain lobbied hard for Canadian troops to be given the lead role for Dieppe.
Part Two to follow...
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@cliveengel5744
Slow, cautious, won in North Africa, Sicily, Normandy, the Scheldt, the Northern half of the Bulge, and the Rhine.
Britain out of the war in 1940 tied down a million German troops, two thirds of the German air force, forced the Germans into their submarine building programme, stopped the Germans from being able to trade outside of mainland Europe, and by intervening in the Balkans, helped to cause a fatal five week delay to the start of Barbarossa. The Royal Navy dealt with the German, Italian, and French fleets, and it accounted for three quarters of the 785 German and Italian submarines destroyed during the war.
The RAF destroyed German superiority in the air war with victory in the Battle of Britain. Never again would Germany be as strong in real terms in relation to its tasks and its enemies as it had been in the early summer of 1940. From then on its personnel and equipment decreased in quality and numbers.. Germany attacked Russia in 1941 with just 2,400 aircraft, and from 1940 until 1944 , its only new major combat aircraft was the fw-190. Half of the German fighter aces from the entire war fought in the Battle of Britain.
The campaign in the Mediterranean prevented the Germans from reaching the Middle East oilfields, it prevented a East West Axis link up, it prevented Germany from importing from outside of mainland Europe, and it freed up 9one million tons of allied shipping.
Bletchley Park took on initial work by Polish codebreakers and created the most comprehensive codebreaking operation in history.
Missing in action does not apply to the lateUSA. They were never in action, what with their country beimng three thousand miles from the nearest enemy. Americans saw more of Halleys Comet than they saw of German bombers.
That is why their film makers have to steal other countries history.
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Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
'colossal defeat'?..
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@kenmazoch8499
'nearly 14,000 casualties is not rubbish and the troops there most surely did not think so.'
14,000 out of 195,000. You should compare that with the Hurtgen Forest, Aachen, and Metz... amongst others.
'if the attack had been made as an armored assault, with engineer and infantry support, rather than the other way around, the casualties would have been some 20-30 percent less,'
And you know this because?..
'cig alan brooke, saw to it lumsden did not have a job afterward.'
You do of course mean CIGS Alanbrooke.
Not really, Lumsden, had several jobs after he was sacked by Montgomery.
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Chris Wilson.
'Montgomery won the battle only because of the significant contribution of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, something he never acknowledged.' Your words.
EIGHTH ARMY
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE ARMY COMMANDER
To be read to All Troops
1. When we began the Battle of Egypt on 23 October I said hat together we would hit the Germans and Italians for six right out of North Africa.
We have made a very good start and to-day, 12th Nov., there are no German and Italian soldiers on Egyptian territory except prisoners.
In three weeks we have completely smashed the German and Italian Army, and pushed the fleeing remnants out of Egypt, having advanced ourselves nearly 300 miles up to and beyond the frontier.
2. The following enemy formations have ceased to exist as effective fighting formations:
Panzer Army. 15 Panzer Div.
21 Panzer Div.
90 Light Div.
164 Light Div.
10 Italian Corps. Brescia Div.
Pavia Div.
Folgore Div.
20 Italian Corps. Ariete Armd. Div.
Littorio Armd. Div.
Trieste Div .
21 Italian Corps. Trento Div.
Bologna Div.
The prisoners captured number 30,000, including nine Generals.
The amount of tanks, artillery, anti-tank guns, transport, air-craft, etc., destroyed or captured is so great that the enemy is completely crippled.
3. This is a very fine performance and I want, first, to thank you all for the way you responded to my call and rallied to the task. I feel that our great victory was brought about by the good fighting qualities of the soldiers of the Empire rather than by anything I may have been able to do myself.
4. Secondly, I know you will all realise how greatly we were helped in our task by the R.A.F. We could not have done it without their splendid help and co-operation. I have thanked the R.A.F. warmly on your behalf.
5. Our task is not finished yet; the Germans are out of Egypt but there are still some left in North Africa. There is some good hunting to be had further to the West, in Libya; and our leading troops are now in Libya ready to begin. And this time, having reached Bengasi and beyond we shall not come back.
6. On with the task, and good hunting to you all. As in all pursuits some have to remain behind to start with; but we shall all be in it before the finish.
12.11.42 B. L. Montgomery
General, G.O.C.-in-C,
Eighth Army.
His words.
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@kenmazoch8499
'but the canadian, us and french forces, while they did cut down the rear echelon troops in theater, none disbanded any full divisions or brigades/regiments. some units back at home were, as were several british units at home, no combat units in theater were.' Your words.
But 'the canadian, us and french forces', were not in the fighting to the same extent that British forces were. The British Army was in Norway, France, Greece, North Africa, Italy and the Far East, before France - Germany 1944-45.
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@Paravleugel
'for Montgomery to beat Rommel he had to be a genius.' Your words.
As Montgomery beat Rommel at Alam el Halfa, Alamein, and the Mareth Line, that makes him a genius? Auchinleck, who also defeated Rommel was a genius?
'It was Rommel who chased the Allied Forces through the whole of North Africa.' Your words.
Wavell chased the Axis Forces through the whole of North Africa.
Auchinleck chased the Axis Forces through the whole of North Africa.
Rommel 'chased the Allied Forces through the whole of North Africa', outran his supplies, and was manouvered into fighting allied forces with the Mediterranean Sea on his left, and the Qattara Depression on his right.
'Caen and Arnhem were mentioned by me to prove my point that he made lots of mistakes' Your words.
Caen. What sort of mistake was Caen?.. Montgomery undertook to get the Allies to the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78, with 20% fewer than expected casualties, while giving the Germans a defeat as big as Stalingrad.
Arnhem. Montgomery made mistakes, Eisenhower made mistakes, Brereton made mistakes. So too, did their subordinate commanders.
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Rubbish.
Whether or not the Germans were actually interested Persian oil in neither here nor there. The allies could not afford the possibility of that happening, nor could they afford the possibilty of a link up of the East and West members of the Axis.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
CHAPTER 2. GLOBAL WAR
P32
The prospect of the two industrial empires of Japan and Germany drawing freely upon the vast resources of rubber, oil, and the other riches of the Netherlands Indies was too black a picture to contemplate. The Middle East, of course, had to be held; if it should fall and the German U-boats were able to proceed through the Red Sea into the Indian Ocean, it was doubtful that India could be saved. Moreover, Middle East oil was a great prize.
The Mediterranean campaign also prevented the Germans from being able import resources from outside of mainland Europe, and it freed up one million tons of allied shipping. It led to 50 German divisions being tied down in Italy and the Balkans.
Any attempt to invade France before 1944 would have led to disaster without giving any assistance to the USSR.
Imports from the USA amounted to 16.5% of Britain's needs across the war years.
5.5% bought, paid for and collected. 11% Lend-Lease, mainly collected, and reconciled at the end of the war.
All clear now?
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@benbarber2369
'his horrendous Market Garden campaign'
MARKET GARDEN freed a fifth of the Netherlands, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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Auchinleck, who commanded Eighth Army before Montgomery was also able to see intercepted German messages, as did US commanders, when the USA eventually joined the war against Germany.
So allied victories had nothing to Auchinleck, Eisenhower, Bradley, and their subordinate commandders like Hodges, Patch, Patton, Simpson, etc?
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@nickdanger3802
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
Cheer up. I might get bored with this.
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@pip393
Not really…
‘fictional history’
I quoted Patton’s own personal diary. Here it is again, via an American author:
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
PROLOGUE
P 11
“I fear the war will be over before I get loose, but who can say?”
Montgomery, Patton, Sicily, and Messina:
Here is an American view on the advance on Messina…
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
For your convenience, the link below will take you to this review…
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/the-finish-line-was-messina.html
MONTY
MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON. 1983
Pages 319-320
CHAPTER SEVEN
Patton Absconds to Palermo
General Maxwell Taylor later recalled:
I was a Brigadier-General, and Artillery Commander of 82nd US Airborne Division. We took the north-west corner of Sicily [from Agrigento] . . . it was a pleasure march, shaking hands with Italians asking, 'How's my brother Joe in Brooklyn?' Nicest war I've ever been in! Monty—he had a different problem—he was up against Germans.³
General Truscott, commanding the reinforced 3rd US Division (which became the main formation of Patton's Provisional Corps). was later asked by the American Official Historian why 'there was no attempt to try to cut off a part of the Germans' (who were known to be retreating eastwards rather than westwards); moreover, why was `Seventh Army not directed in pursuit of the Germans towards the Catania plain?' Truscott blamed the slowness of Intelligence (`there was a lag of a day or two before the whole picture of the enemy could be assembled'), but primarily Patton's obsession with Palermo: 'I had offered to go on to take Caltanisetta, but Patton wanted to capture Palermo. . . . It is my belief that the glamor of the big city was the chief thing that attracted Gen. Patton.
Notice that Nigel Hamilton has quoted two US Army officers.
All clear now?..
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@karldavidson9767
'wow that is both interesting and 540 degrees opposite of everything that I have ever read about Monty. Are you sure that’s how it happened?'
Sure?.. Who can say? Not me.
North Africa…
Montgomery Rommel at Alam el Halfa with four divisions against Rommel's six divisions. Its all on record.
Montgomery then reorganized and reinvigorated Eighth Army to deliver a victory that ended the war in North Africa.
This, from people who were there:
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS
CASSELL, LONDON 1962
P16
‘Montgomery is a first-class trainer and leader of troops on the battlefield, with a fine tactical sense. He knows how to win the loyalty of his men and has a great flair for raising morale.’
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
P 478
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE
P464
‘Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
GENERALS AT WAR
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DE GUINGAND
K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODDER AND STOUGHTON 1964
P 188
‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight. I accompanied him during the reconnaissances which resulted in decisions as to the way he proposed to dispose his forces for the defensive battles which we all expected. It would be Rommel’s last desperate to reach the Delta, and failure would remove once and for all the threat to our Middle East Base.’
Here is German Generalmajor FW von Mellenthin on Montgomery:
"Montgomery when he arrived in Africa changed the way the 8th army fought, he was a very good army trainer and was ruthless in his desire to win, he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery."
____________________________________________________________________________
Normandy…
Montgomery planned for the campaign in Normandy to reach the Seine by D+90 with SHAEF predicting allied casualties between 250,000 and 270,000. The dates in between were a wish list, with the capture of Caen being on that list, as was Cherbourg, which was much more important to the allies than Caen.
Montgomery laid out his plans to allied leaders at St Paul’s School, West London, on the 15th May, 1944. 21 days before the intended date for D-Day, 5th June.
This from Alanbrook’s diary, which give some context:
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P189-190
" May 15th. Went straight from home to St. Paul's School to attend Eisenhower's final run-over plans for cross-Channel operations. The King, P.M., Smuts and all Chiefs of Staff were present. The main impression I gathered was that Eisenhower was no real director of thought, plans, energy or direction. Just a co-ordinator, a good mixer, a champion of inter-Allied co-operation, and in those respects few can hold the candle to him. But is that enough? Or can we not find all qualities of a commander in one man? May be I am getting too hard to please, but I doubt it."
Monty made excellent speech. Bertie Ramsay in-different and overwhelmed by all his own difficulties. Spaatz2 read every word. Bert Harris told us how well he might have won the war if it had not been for the handicap imposed by the existence of the two other Services. Leigh-Mallory gave very clear description. Sholto Douglas seemed disappointed at the smallness of his task, and so was I. Then Humfrey Gale and Graham on Administration, followed by Grasset on Civil Controls of France. A useful run-through. The King made a few well-chosen remarks. After lunch he presented the C.B. to Bradley and two other decorations." " Back to War Office and finished up with Monty dining quietly with me. He was in very good form and bearing his responsibilities well."
This from an eye witness to the St Paul’s School meeting:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P 393
‘Now I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen’
This from a post-war historians who were NOT at the St Paul’s School meeting, but one assumes have sifted through the available evidence:
MAX HASTINGS
OVERLORD
D-DAY AND THE BATTLE OF NORMANDY
MACMILLAN PUBLISHING 1984
‘At St Paul’s School on 15 May, Montgomery presented the OVERLORD plan for the last time before the senior officers of the Allied armies, crowded on wooden benches behind the single row of chairs at the front for the King, Churchill, Smuts and Brooke.’
‘Montgomery’s presentation on 15 May, like his earlier briefing on 7 April, was acknowledged even by his critics as a brilliant performance: a display of grip, confidence, absolute mastery of the plan.’
MONTY
MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1983
P 588
As in April, Monty ran through the tasks of the four armies, as well as those of the commandos and airborne troops. Turning to the wall maps he gave his strategic intentions for 'the development of Operations up to D + 90', outlining again the manner in which the British and Canadians would 'contain the maximum enemy forces facing the eastern flank of the bridgehead' while the American forces, 'once through the difficult bocage country' were to 'thrust rapidly towards Rennes', seal off the Brittany peninsula, and wheel round towards Paris and the Seine, pivoting on the right flank of the British Second Army.
____________________________________________________________________________
Market Garden:
Montgomery had no final say on the MARKET plan:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
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@Paravleugel
' I am truly sorry for you that you did not understand the irony in 'For Montgomery to beat Rommel he had to be a genius'. Montgomery won, as I mentioned before, because of the help he got from Bletchley Park.
Until the decryption of Enigma the Allied Forces were chased by Rommel through the whole of North Africa. And nobody was able to stop him (except for his supplyline).
Caen was easy according to Montgomery, matter of days, but as you stated it took more than 11 weeks. Imho he stays hugely overrated and a maverick.'
But it is as easy to say that Rommel only had success as long as he was receiving intelligence reports from the US Embassy until that source dried up in the middle of 1942. The reality of war in North Africa was that both sides advanced over enormous distances until, either their supplies ran out, or external factors brought an advance to halt, as with British in 1941. Rommel was stopped by Auchinleck at Alamein and by Montgomery at Alam-el-Halfa.
Montgomery never stated that Caen would be easy, nor did he make any commitments as to when Caen would be captured. The reality was that only major German counter-attack on D-Day took place in front of Caen (as witnessed by my own father), as the German 21st Panzer Division reached the coast between SWORD and JUNO beaches. Thereafter, the Germans ranged almost their entire armoured forces in Normandy on the Caen front, with 6.5 of their 8 Panzer Divisions placed there, including all of their Panzer Vl Tiger tanks.
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