Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "Operation Market Garden | What went wrong?" video.

  1.  @stetomlinson3146  'Read any decent history book about the battle for Normandy, and beyond. Montgomery was totally out of his depth.' CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P282 ‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’ P288 ‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.' ‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’ From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story SIR BRIAN HORROCKS CORPS COMMANDER LONDON 1977 Page 53 ‘Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
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  2.  @stetomlinson3146  'Read any decent history book about the battle for Normandy, and beyond. Montgomery was totally out of his depth. He made so many errors there was a call from not only US but also British senior officers to get him removed from the field.' Errors? Montgomery undertook to get the the allies to the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78, with 22% fewer than expected casualties, and gave the Germans as big a defeat as Stalingrad. As far as getting rid of Montgomery was concerned, they all shut up when they saw enormity of Montgomery’s Normandy victory.
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  3.  @phillipnagle9651  'Beside the already mentioned failure to capture Scheldt Estuary when it was undefended, there was his failure to close the Falaise pocket, there was the Market Garde fiasco, there was his failure to close the "Bulge" pivoting on the northeast corner, there was his inability to break out from the beaches and capture Caen. As a matter of fact, when it came to Europe, his performance went from ordinary to bad. Your words. Its a definite no. The Scheldt Estuary was by no means undefended when Antwerp was liberated. The Germans were in force on the South bank of the Scheldt at the Breskens Pocket. The fortifications at the mouth of the estuary were some of the most formidable in Europe. Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties). The Bulge: ‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’. Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army: “I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St.Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St.Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.” US General Robert W Hasbrouck: Caen: ‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’ From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story If Montgomery's performance went from ordinary to bad, whee did the performance of Bradley, Eisenhower, and Devers go to?..
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  4.  @TheEvertw  Montgomery: Part Two France 1944 (Operation Overlord) The then existing plan for Overlord that Montgomery saw comprised three invasion beaches with a target date of 1st May 1944 for D-Day. Montgomery immediately urged that the plan be expanded to five beaches by the addition of Utah and Sword beaches. This was agreed to, but the change created a one-month delay to the start of the operation as the additional shipping was gathered for the additional landings. Montgomery presented his plan for the land campaign to allied leaders at St Paul’s School in West London on 15th May 1944. The plan showed British 2nd Army holding down the bulk of German forces on the allied left while the US 1st Army broke out on the allied right to capture Cherbourg and other ports, leading to the allies reaching the river Seine by D+90. Overlord began on the 6th June (D-Day), with all allied beaches liking up within a week, despite US mistakes at Omaha beach. Montgomery’s plan coped with the delay to the allied build-up caused by the great storm of 19th-20th June which wrecked the US ‘Mulberry Harbour’, the vast concentration of German forces in front of British 2nd Army, the delay to the US 1st Army break-out which led to the need for several operation in the Caen sector to keep Germans off balance, and the constant badgering of glory hungry, greenhorn US generals. Montgomery inflicted a defeat of the Germans as big as Stalingrad and that ended with 22% fewer than expected allied casualties, and ahead of schedule, on D+78. If a US general had been in charge of the land campaign, American historians and the US media would hail Normandy a one of the greatest victories in military history. Instead, Montgomery’s performance has been subject to a level of hair-slitting scrutiny far, far greater than any attention ever paid to any US commander. Market Garden With the allied advance at a standstill, with the Germans still reeling from their defeat in France and with V weapons being launched at Britain in sight of British troops. Montgomery sought to deploy the First Allied Airborne Army that Eisenhower had made available for Montgomery's use, without Montgomery having full control of. The operation was a risky undertaking, but Eisenhower and Bradley agreed that the possible gains were worth taking the chance. Montgomery had no final say in the airborne (Market) part of the operation, which was under the control of the US General Brereton. Virtually all of the problems with the operation came out the airborne plan. There is a body of opinion that the weather, which defied allied forecasts was the decisive factor in Arnhem not being taken: 'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.' EISENHOWER ‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.' CHURCHILL German General Karl Student gave the weather as the main cause of the failure at Arnhem. Market Garden did not succeed in reaching Arnhem but it did free up to a fifth of the Dutch population, stretched the German forces another 50 miles, hindered V weapon attacks on Britain and gave the allies a launching point for Operation Veritable in early 1945. The losses incurred (17,000) should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties). US historians have sought to airbrush Eisenhower and Brereton from the history of Market Garden to ensure that responsibility is heaped on the British, and on Montgomery in particular. This process culminated with the infamous film, ‘A Bridge Too Far’, which is filled with falsehoods and American cliché images of the British. The Bulge Montgomery had warned Eisenhower about the dangers involved in his broad front strategy of spreading out allied forces too thinly. When the German attack in the Ardennes began, Bradley lost his head and refused Eisenhower’s instruction to move his headquarter s back, Hodges, the US 1st Army commander went AWOL. Montgomery had the only major reinforcements available to the allies (XXX Corps). Montgomery cancelled Operation Veritable and moved quickly to sort out the northern half of the bulge. His actions drew this comment from Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army: ‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’. The German offensive petered out and Montgomery, as he later admitted, unwisely held a press conference about the battle which was seized upon by German propaganda, changed, and re-broadcast with an anti-American slant which but hurt American commanders, looking to take offence, seized on and accepted with bothering to check on its provenance. This is attested to by Chester Wilmot, who actually attended that press conference: ‘My dispatch to the B.B.C. was picked up in Germany, rewritten to give it an anti-American bias and then broadcast by Arnhem Radio, which was then in Goebbels's hands. Monitored at Bradley's H.Q., this broadcast was mistaken for a B.B.C. transmission and it was this twisted text that started the uproar.’ His words. And also, by one of Montgomery’s harshest critics, Tedder: ‘ When de Guingand saw the British reporters in Brussels on 9 January, they were able to prove to him that their articles had given a balanced view of the picture, but that their editors had been responsible for the flaming headlines which told the British public that Montgomery had defeated the Germans in the salient. It was also learned that the radio station at Arnhem, then in German hands, had intercepted some of the despatches and had re-written them with an anti-American slant. They had been put out and mistaken for BBC broadcasts.’ The Rhine Montgomery gave a masterclass in planning and execution of a plan with the crossing of the Rhine at it widest point and against the most formidable opposition that the Germans could still offer. Bradley had already crossed the Rhine at its narrowest point against far weaker opposition That Bradley then crowed about this (as did his his subordinate Patton as well) reflects badly on both of those US officers. This from Eisenhower: ‘Montgomery was always the master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set piece attack. In this case he made the most meticulous preparations because we knew that along the front just north of the Ruhr the enemy had his best remaining troops including portions of the First Paratroop Army.’ ‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’ And a more recent opinion: IKE & MONTY: GENERALS AT WAR NORMAN GELB CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LIMITED 1994 P406 ‘Montgomery wouldn’t hear of it. An early crossing did not fit the plan he had been devising with great thoroughness to meet all contingencies. The resourceful Germans had shown in the Ardennes that they were capable of the unexpected. Bradley, Patton and Hodges might have been willing to gamble and Montgomery was pleased that they had succeeded. But he was not interested in easy victories that might be of limited significance, and he did not believe they fully understood the risks they had taken or the extent of the far greater achievement he was aiming for. Risk-taking was for amateurs. The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties.’
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  5.  @phillipnagle9651  Not really... Falaise, This from the bloke that actually stopped the Falaise Gap from being closed: "In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise". From Omar Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377. His words.
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  6.  @phillipnagle9651  Not really... Caen: ”While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission. For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout." "In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself, and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort." "The containment mission that had been assigned Monty in the OVERLORD plan was not calculated to burnish British pride in the accomplishments of their troops. For in the minds of most people, success in battle is measured in the rate and length of advance. They found it difficult to realize that the more successful Monty was in stirring up German resistance, the less likely he was to advance. For another four weeks it fell to the British to pin down superior enemy forces in that sector while we manoeuvred into position for the US breakout. With the Allied World crying for blitzkrieg the first week after we landed, the British endured their passive role with patience and forebearing.“ US General Omar Bradley.
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  7. ​ @TheEvertw  Montgomery: Part One The First World War. Unlike almost all US commanders, Montgomery had personal combat experience. Montgomery fought on the Western Front in the First World War, where he was wounded twice and was awarded the DSO for his efforts. The citation for this award in the London Gazette stated: "Conspicuous gallant leading on 13th October, when he turned the enemy out of their trenches with the bayonet”. France 1940. Montgomery performed with distinction in trying circumstances in France in 1940 in command of the 3rd Infantry Division. He trained and led his division superbly, closing the gap on the allied left at Dunkirk after the sudden surrender of the Belgian Army and then leading his division back to Britain intact. Alanbrooke noted the outstanding performances of Montgomery and Alexander in France and marked both men down for higher command in the future. However, Montgomery was sidelined for some time afterwards due to his outspoken criticisms of the handling of the campaign in France. North Africa Appointed to command of the ground forces in ‘Torch’, Montgomery was moved across to command Eighth Army after the death of Gott. In his first big command, Montgomery acted quicky and decisively as he reorganized and rejuvenated Eighth Army to make it fit to take on and defeat the Axis forces led by Rommel. There is plenty of evidence of Montgomery’s effect on his new command, here are some: ‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight.’ DE GUINGAND ‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’ ALANBROOKE ‘Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’ CHURCHILL Montgomery, with four divisions defeated Rommel with his six divisions at Alam-el-Halfa and then defeated Rommel again at the Second Battle of El Alamein. For Alamein, Montgomery set about re-training the entire Eighth Army, regrouping divisions that had been broken down into smaller units and creating an armoured reserve to exploit a breakthrough in the enemy front. Further, he resisted political pressure to attack before he was satisfied that everything he required for victory was in place – including extensive medical care facilities for his troops. Alamein ended the war in North Africa as a contest at the cost of 13,500 (7.9%) casualties. Victory in North Africa freed up a million of allied shipping for use elsewhere and led to the campaign in Italy, which together with the allied threat to the Balkans tied down 50 German divisions. Troops that the Germans could not deploy in Normandy or Russia. Montgomery may have been fortunate to benefit from increased resources being available but he made his own good fortune with the thoroughly professional way in which he set about his task. Further, Montgomery showed how the allies could beat the Germans in the future: thorough preparation and concentration of resources, which paid off in Normandy and would have paid off in the autumn of 1944 in the advance on Germany if Eisenhower had heeded these lessons instead of allowing political considerations to dictate strategy. American hacks like Stephen Ambrose claim that Montgomery was over praised because Britain needed heroes at that time. That is total rubbish. The whole thrust of government propaganda, the works of filmmakers and of writers was to emphasize the collective effort and the deeds of the man in the street rather than the deeds of generals or politicians. Posters were all about ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘together’. The films people watched were: ‘Millions like Us’, ‘The Way Ahead’, ‘Went the Day Well’, The Foreman Went to France’. The BBC chipped in with output such as ‘Workers Playtime’ JB Priestly, and so on, and so on, and so on Sicily (Operation Husky) Here, Montgomery’s Eighth Army was alongside the US General Patton’s 7th Army. The was the last occasion that those two generals were of equal status as Patton went on to assault two of his own soldiers and some Sicilian peasants and thus get himself passed over for army group command. Before the operation started, Montgomery strongly recommended to the land forces commander Alexander, that Patton’s lunatic plan to land in small numbers at a several places around the Island should not take place but that landings should be concentrated in the South East of the Island. Montgomery's plan worked. As with Alamein, casualties were low, Patton went AWOL until he was enticed back into the battle by Montgomery by allowing Patton to capture Messina. An event later portrayed by Hollywood as a race between the two generals to be first to reach that place. Italy Allied landings in Italy after Husky comprised Operations Avalanche, Slapstick and Baytown which were widely separated. Montgomery argued that resources should be concentrated on Avalanche and that Baytown would not divert German forces away from anywhere else. Montgomery was proved right and he later stated that he was ‘glad to leave the ‘dog's breakfast’ when he left on the 23rd December 1943 to take up his appointment as allied land forces commander of Operation Overlord.
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  8.  @phillipnagle9651  Not really... The Bulge: "There has been much talk of using Montgomery to 'tidy up in the 'bulge' we would have done the same thing" German Generalmajor FW von Mellenthin. ‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’. Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army.. “I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St.Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St.Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.” US General Robert W Hasbrouck. ‘There was no doubt that the Americans had had a severe shock. Their commanders had chosen to ignore the two most elementary rules of war – concentration and the possession of a reserve to counter the enemy’s moves and keep the initiative.’ From the diary of Field Marshal Alanbrooke. The idea that the 5th Panzer Army was not a main attacking unit in the Bulge is absurd.
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  9.  @phillipnagle9651  Not really... Market Garden. 'It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland.' Major General Sir Francis DeGuingand. MONTY The Field-Marshal 1944-1976 NIGEL HAMILTON HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON1986 P 98 ‘General Student, in a statement after the war, considered the ‘Market Garden’ operation to have ‘proved a great success. At one stroke it brought the British 2nd Army into the possession of vital bridges and valuable territory. The conquest of the Nijmegen area meant that the creation of a good jumping board for the offensive which contributed to the end of war.’ Student was expressing the professional admiration of an airborne commander—‘those who had planned and inaugurated with complete the first airborne operations of military history, had not now even thought of such a possible action by the enemy…the Allied Airborne action completely surprised us. The operation hit my army nearly in the centre and split it into two parts…In spite of all precautions, all bridges fell intact into the hands of the Allied airborne forces—another proof of the paralysing effect of surprise by airborne forces'
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  10. ​ @davidtuttle7556  The combined banks of the Scheldt amounted to 100 miles in length, ALL of which had to be cleared before Antwerp could be used. The fortifications at its mouth were some of the strongest in Europe, the Germans still on the South Bank in force, at the Breskens Pocket. Clearly, the Germans attached great importance to denying Antwerp to the allies, by tenacity with which they fought in the Scheldt, amount of aerial attack they subjected Antwerp to, and the fact that Antwerp was the goal for the German Ardennes offensive at he end of 1944. There was never going to be a 'speeding up the build-up of Allied Units for the assault on Germany' by capturing the Scheldt. Even if the entire 21st Army Group could have been put to that task, it would still have taken a month to capture the estuary, and another three to four weeks to clear the waterway of mines - as actually did happen. Meanwhile, the Germans would have been given even more of what they most wanted, time and space to rebuild their forces, after their defeat by Montgomery in Normandy. CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P 591 ‘When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with little help from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten’ P 592 ‘days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’ MONTY The Field-Marshal 1944-1976 NIGEL HAMILTON HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1986 P126 ‘from Normandy to Holland. In Monty's eyes the true reason for the relative collapse of Allied hostilities was in no measure the absence of a deep-water port other than Cherbourg or Marseilles. It was a combination of the administrative bungle whereby a shortage of artillery ammunition had arisen in the American zone; of the growing lack of infantry reinforcements; and of Eisenhower's failure to take a firm 'grip' on the campaign. These problems were exacerbated by the paucity of ports but the failure to get Antwerp working before November was not the primary reason why the Allied offensive against Germany had ground to a virtual halt,¹ since Antwerp could never have been operational before October, even if all 21st Army Group resources had been assigned to it. Monty's aversion to such administrative and command incompetence has been characterized as ill-bred, even demented. Certainly, to those who did not appreciate Monty's professionalism, his unceasing campaign to get Allied command in North-west Europe on a sound footing seemed at best wearying, at worst egotistical, even megalomaniacal. Eisenhower became, in the eyes of many sympathetic historians, the 'long-suffering', forbearing Supreme Commander arbitrating between prima-donnas. Eisenhower's own view of his task, as spelled out in his 'put-down' of 13 October to Monty, was 'adjusting the larger boundaries to tasks commensurate to the several groups operating in these several areas, assigning additional support by air or reinforcements by ground and airborne troops, when [there is] a general pool, and shifting the emphasis in maintenance arrangements'. St Malo fell on 17 August, Brest on 18 September 1944; neither was used. Monty's own chief of administration, 21st Army Group, Maj-General Miles Graham later considered that 'at the period at which the advance would have taken place we were no longer based on the Normandy beaches. The port of Dieppe was opened on September 5 and by the end of the month was dealing with over 6,000 tons a day. Ostend was captured on September 9 and opened on the 28th of the same month. Boulogne and Calais were captured on September 22 and 30 respectively. Meanwhile the depots on the Normandy beaches were being rapidly cleared by rail and road and the new Advance Base established in central and northern Belgium. An additional 17 General Transport companies with a lift of some 8,000 tons and preloaded with petrol and supplies were borrowed from the War Office and arrived in the latter half of September and early October. ' A summary of Channel and North Sea Ports Liberations: Dieppe. Liberated: 01.09.1944. Operational: 05.09.1944. Le Havre. Liberated: 12.09.1944. Operational: 13.10.1944. Boulogne. Liberated: 22.09.1944. Operational: Mid October 1944 Ostend. Liberated: 09.09.1944. Operational: 28.09.1944.
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  11.  @phillipnagle9651  How ridiculous can this get?.. The very person that decided not close the Falaise Gap (Bradley), confirmed that he did not close the Falaise Gap. "In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise". His words. Americans set themselves up to fall with this, in their haste try to re-write history. And for no really big reason. 40,000 escaped from the Falaise Pocket, with vitually none of their equipment. The Germans lost 440,000 in Normandy, and out of 2,400 tanks, they crossed to Seine with 120 of those machines. Any of those surviving German troops that got sent to the Eastern Front probably that their luck had changed.
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  12.  @lllordllloyd  The Scheldt was by no means undefended at time that Antwrp was liberated. The fortifications at the mouth of the estuary were some of most formidable in Europe. The Germans were still south of Scheldt in force, in the Breskens Pocket. Due to the pace of advance through France and Belgium, many of the assets needed for an assault on the Scheldt were west of the Seine. Every part of both banks of the Scheldt had to be cleared to make Antwero usable. Together, those banks are a hundred miles long. Even if the entire 21st Army Group could have turned on to the Scheldt, it would still have taken a month to clear the estuary, and another three to four weeks to have cleared the mines in the estuary.
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  13.  @phillipnagle9651  Not really... The idea that the Scheldt could be easily taken when Antwerp was liberated is nonsense. The degree to which the German attached importance to the denial of Antwerp to the allies is shown by the amount of resistance their forces put up in the Scheldt, the amount of aerial bombardment that German aimed at Antwerp, and that Antwerp was the prime objective of their Ardennes offensive at the end of 1944. 'A move that cost a lot of Canadians their life.' Your words. Canadians made up less than half of the allied casualties in the Scheldt campaign. The allied forces forces involved included British troops (my own father among them), Polish troops, as well as Canadian troops. With 100 miles of estuary banks to clear, any campaign to liberate the Scheldt would have taken a good month to rid the estuary of German troops, and then three weeks would have been needed to clear German mines from the waterway - as actually did happened.
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  14.  @phillipnagle9651  'If it were a diversionary mission or as you earlier describe a decoy, Montgomery wasted a lot of good men. Pure mythology!' How ridiculous can this this get?.. I actually quoted the US General Bradley. So who is right? You or Bradley? Overlord came in with 22% fewer than expected casualties, and ahead of schedule, by 12 days.
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  15.  @phillipnagle9651  'Yes, he stopped him at the border between two army groups which is exactly what I stated.' Who stopped who at which border between which two army groups? Before you decide to reply, think about what the chances are that you know more about this subject than I do...
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  16.  @phillipnagle9651  How dense am I?... Look: "In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise". From Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377. The bloke who actually did not close the Falaise gap confirming that he was the bloke who actually did not close the Falaise gap.
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  17.  @phillipnagle9651  Why do I have quote anyone's opinion. Actually, I will quote you, "31,000 casualties" on what the martinet Montgomery and his apologists claim was a diversionary exercise. Are you serious or just a bad comedian. 'Montgomery and his apologists claim was a diversionary exercise.' Bradley... or is he an apologist?.. Look!!!: ‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’ From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story His words.
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  18.  @TheEvertw  'That was the great strength of the Germans and the Yanks,' Germans, perhaps. Yanks, definately not.
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  19.  @phillipnagle9651  'I am describing what happened. Montgomery made strong but ineffectual efforts to capture Caen ( a day one objective) that were rebuffed with heavy casualties. You can quote whomever you wish, it doesn't change what happened.' But you cannot quote anyone to back up what you claim. There is no evidence that any firm timing commitment was made in regard to Caen, or any any other Overlord objective, apart from the Seine, which was scheduled for D+90. The allies got there by D+78. Have you evidence in regard to timings? By evidence, I mean testimony from people who were there, or contemporary documents. As for 'heavy casualties'...How do you define heavy casualties? 31,000 in two months, spread among 3 armoured divisions, 11 infantry divisions, 5 armoured brigades, and 3 tank brigades. This against an enemy comprising 7 infantry divisions, 8 panzer divisions, and 3 heavy tank battalions. If you rate this as heavy casualties, what are you comparing it to?
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  20.  @richardthelionheart6924  Yea, America started all this, and its gathered pace since Reagan got elected in 1980. As far as the war is concerned, Ameicans dont seem to be able to feel good about themselves unless they do other countries down. You only have to look at the number of lead comments posted by Americans on YouTube items about Montgomery, or Dunkirk, or Alamein, and so on. There was no Battle of Britain, or Stalingrad for the USA. The war was 3,000 miles from their mainland. So they seem to want to make it about this General, or that General, and so on. As if it somehow levels things up. If anyone looked at American comments on here without knowing anything about the war, I doubt that they would even work out that the USA and Britain were allies. Those comments seem to show more appreciation of Nazi Germany than Britain...or Russia.
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  21.  @richardthelionheart6924  'I wonder if there are any WW2 German forums discussing who was at fault for letting the BEF get away in 1940' If there is, they will be full of Americans blaming the British for everything.
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  22.  @richardthelionheart6924  'Bradley,A Generals Life' was written by one Clay Blair Jr., and purports to be Bradley's autobiography. It was written and published after Bradley died, and therefore anything in it that claims to be Bradley's own words is to be disregarded, unless it is Bradley's own handwriting. William Weidner is at the comic end of Second World War literature. It seems that Weidner has actually claimed that Carentan was a British objective. You have dealt with Beevor most effectively. I knew about the Russians seeing through him. I did not know about the Dutch doing the same. But I do now. Thanks for that.
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  23.  @richardmeo2503  ‘If all of those reports were "true", then why did 1st and 3d Armies loose all of their supplies at the same time.’ Err… Because they did not. 1st and 3rd Armies continued their operations in the lead up to, the duration of, and the aftermath of MARKET GARDEN. Eisenhower actually rejected proposals from Montgomery from the 23rd August onwards for concentration of allied resources in a single thrust into Germany because such a concentration of resources would conflict with his broad front strategy. ‘Did you know that we had to give the Brits hundreds of our trucks because their lorries broke down? That too hurt the supply situations.’ Really?.. It is well documented that 1,400 Austin K5 trucks delivered to the 21st Army Group during the summer of 1944 had faulty pistons. These vehicles could carry 800 tons per day between Normandy and the front (Enough for about 1.75 - 2 divisions). This deficit was made good by improvising transport using vehicles such as tank transporters, and by halting Canadian troops in the channel ports area, and by bringing in transport companies from Britain. Is there EVIDENCE that US trucks were given to 21st Army Group because of this problem? There is evidence that transport units were sent to help US forces in period before Market Garden: CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P589 ‘three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th " for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.’
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  24.  @johnlucas8479  Does any sensible person (obviously not Big Woody/Para Dave) really think that if Brereton had had said stop to MARKET, then Montgomery would have been able to then say no, its go for MARKET GARDEN, and that it would have gone ahead?
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  25. Its a definite no.
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  26. Total rubbish. 'Montgomery didn’t listen to on the ground intel.' And what 'ground intel' was that? The problems with the radios were down to the US General Brereton's FAAA, which Montgomery had no final say over. Btw. FAAA is the First Allied Airborne Army. To save you looking it up.
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  27.  @Idahoguy10157  'That delay in opening Antwerp to shipping lengthened the war by weeks or months. Logistics matter!' Your words. How so? When the 2nd Army liberated Antwerp on the 4th September 1944, the entire Scheldt estuary (100 miles + in total) was still in German hands, and the Germans were still in force at Breskens. Many of the assets that would be needed to assault the estuary were still West of the Seine. The historian Nigel Hamilton stated his opinon that even if the entire 21st Army Group were turned on the Scheldt, clearing the estuary would have taken a month. If that is true, then that would have taken the allies into Ocrober. Then there would have been the three week period of clearing the estuary of mines mines, as identified by Admiral Ramsay at that time. That would have taken the allies to November. Meanwhile, any chance of getting across Rhine in the late Summer/early Autumn has gone. So how did any delay in opening Antwerp to shipping lengthen the war by weeks or months? What could the allies have done in November that they could not have done in December?
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  28. The Germans captured the plans for the operation on the first day, from a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, in a US landing zone.
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  29. Hollywood, there's your problem.
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  30. 'I know I'm late to the party but the allies had late intelligence that 2 SS panzer groups were there and didn't cancel the attack. As a Brit. as far as I'm concerned Monty should have been hung for the disgraceful loss of life to the soldiers plus the German reprisals on the Dutch.' But MARKET GARDEN freed far more people than were killed by the Germans. Btw. You are an American.
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  31.  @nickdanger3802  Lt. Col. J.D. Frost about Operation Market Garden: A DROP TOO MANY MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC PEN & SWORD BOOKS. 1994... 1994 RE-PRINT. Preface P xiii ‘However, by far the worst mistake was the lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen Bridge. The whole essence of the plan was to lay an airborne carpet across the obstacles in southern Holland so that the Army could get motor through, yet the capture of this, perhaps the biggest and most vital bridge in that its destruction would have sounded the death-knell of the troops committed at Arnhem, was not accorded priority. The capture of this bridge would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion'
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  32. Total rubbish.
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  33. Its a definite no.
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  34.  @stetomlinson3146  'Monty wanted saturation bombing of areas before he attacked, killing tens of thousands of French, Belgian and Dutch civilians as he advanced. His ordering of the bombing of Caen, apart from killing civilians, helped turn the city into a defenders dream, especially for the German troops who had experience of fighting in bombed cities from their time on the Eastern Front.' Your words. Not really… Saturation bombing was carried out both the British and US forces. For example, the US bombing of Saint-Lô led to it being called ‘The Capital of Ruins’. As far as Caen was concerned, it was bombed on the 7th July, and fully liberated on the 19th July, 12 days later.
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  35.  @lyndoncmp5751  Yep. Furthermore, turning east at Arnhem would have let the allies bypass the Siegfried Line.
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  36. There is no evidence of any competition on Montgomery's part.
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  37. 'I watched Band of Brothers and wondered what went wrong.' Me too. I had wrongly supposed that it would be a serious TV series about the war?
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  38.  @TheDaverobinson  Arnhem was not an attempt to 'finish things by Christmas'.
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  39.  @stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85  Name a battle that Patton won.
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  40. Alamein was won with just under 8% allied casualties. Did amount to 'huge unnecessary allied casualties'?
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  41. The 'Americans' made a mess of MARKET.
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  42.  @davemac1197  A great post. With a impressive list of sources.
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  43. 'If you note the scene from the PATTON film wherein Patton is playing traffic cop to his lines of armor, then gets shut down by Bradley (and Eisenhower! ) , Patton correctly guesses that it was Montgomery swallowing up all available fuel and supplies.' Your words. Its a definite no. No fuel supplies were diverted to Montgomery from Patton. 'Montgomery had persuaded Churchill to use the "V2 missile sites" as an excuse and persuade Roosevelt to turn the allied offensive over to Montgomery for this reason ....' Your words. Read this: CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P543 ‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’ THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945 Rick Atkinson LITTLE BROWN 2013. This paperback edition published in 2013. P245/246 ‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said. MONTY The Field-Marshal 1944-1976 NIGEL HAMILTON HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1986 P42 For Monty now to cancel the British part of 'the main effort' of the Allies because of stiffening enemy resistance, even had he wished to do so, would thus have been tantamount to insubordination, leaving him open to charges of timidity at a moment when American forces were thrusting towards the German border. Moreover the Arnhem—Nijmegen axis had been Monty's own proposal, making it doubly hard to rescind Eisenhower's directive was not the only signal committing Monty to the continuation of his planned thrust via Arnhem on 9 September for during the afternoon a 'Secret' cable arrived from the War Office, sent by the VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke: Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared. By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to 'rope off' the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites. To Nye Monty thus signalled back: Your 75237 re V 2. As things stand at present it may take up to two weeks but very difficult to give accurate estimate. There are aspects of the present situation which cause me grave concern and these are first the present system of command of the land battle and secondly the admin situation. My letter being sent by DAWNAY will give you all the facts. These matters affect the time we will take to do what you want. To Eisenhower Monty also signalled, recording his disquiet: Have studied your directive no. FWD 13765 carefully and cannot see it stated that the northern advance to the RUHR is to have priority over the eastern advance to the SAAR. Actually 19 US Corps is unable to advance properly for lack of petrol. Could you send a responsible staff officer to see me and so that I can explain things to him. 'The Poles caught the brunt of it and were decimated....!!' Your words. 21.1% of 1st Airborne got back to safety, 42.5% of the glider pilots got back to safety, 88% of the Poles got back to safety. But who else was there to play " hero" for England's armed forces ?? What evidence is there that 'England's armed forces' needed anyone to play " hero"?
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  44.  @nickdanger3802  Its a definite no. MONTY The Field-Marshal 1944-1976 NIGEL HAMILTON HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1986 P48-49 In fact by 10 September Monty had discarded any notion of getting to Berlin in the immediate future. As he said after the war to Chester Wilmot: I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic. ‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue: Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine. In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue. N.B. Tedder was more of Montgomery's harshest critics. N.B. You can mess with the rest, but not the best - me.
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  45. No.
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  46. The Nazi Party member, and SS man Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands was shown door by both British, and US intelligence organizations due his supect loyalties. Only his royal connections kept him out prison in the 1970s, due to the Lockheed scandal that engulfed the Dutch Royal family.
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  47.  @stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85  Also Stephen, Its of little interst to me, but after HUSKY, Patton and Montgomery and never equals. Patton was passed over for Army Group command by the US Army. Perhaps because he started attacking his own soldiers. Who can say? If Patton had been put in command of a US Army Group, how many more US troops would he have sacrificed in order release his son-in-law a few weeks before the end of the war?
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  48. kennethquinnies6023 How was 'bagging the german 15th army before they got away to the arnem region' to be achieved before MARKET GARDEN?
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  49. MARKET GARDEN, in particular the inclusion of Arnhem in the plan, was an answer to an urgent request for action to be taken to stem the launching of V Weapons against Britain. An urgent message sent to Montgomery on the 9th September, 1944, from the VICGS (Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff), in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke, which read: 'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared.' Where is there evidence that 'Market Garden was an ego project for Montgomery'?
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  50. 'Will watch, but my first thought was Montgomery trying to imitate Patton, and he just didn’t know how. Started out as bad plan, just got worse' In that case, you will need second, and third thoughts.
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  51.  @peterkiviat9969  North Africa was no side show. Victory there prevented the Axis powes from reaching the persian oilfields, and from obtaing imports from outside of mainland Europe. Victory there, and in Sivily freed up a million tons of allied shipping. Subsequent operations in Italy tied down 50 German divisions in Italy and the Balkans.
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  52. @peterkiviat9969 All clear now?..
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  53. @itinerantpatriot1196 'Monty responded that had he ordered such a futile and poorly planned out attack during WWII Ike would have been well within his rights to fire him on the spot.'
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  54. SWhat battle did Patton ever win?
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  55. ‘A Can-Loan 1st Gordon Highlanders Para Vet of Arnhem, taught 2 generations of Canadian Officers Infantry the dangers of "my man will do it" disease. Monty did not double-check his staff. His bloody-minded "make my plan work" top-down manner gave him a staff unwilling to raise inconvenient truths. Hence:’ Your words. It’s a definite no. Montgomery had already cancelled COMET because of advice from his staff. His decision to include Arnhem in MARKET GARDEN was taken after consulting his staff. ‘1. Monty & his staff Ignored the Inconvenient Truth of plain RAF Photo Recce showing a full Panzer heavy Division. Couldn't contradict Monty's of an empty Drop Zone.’ Your words. It’s a definite no. The ‘Photo Recce’ can be seen on line. Far from showing a ‘full Panzer heavy Division.’, they are grainy overhead shots of a few heavily camouflaged German Mark lll tanks from a training battalion. The tanks can probably only be discerned experienced photo interpreters. Montgomery had no had no final on the airborne MARKET plan. On this, the evidence is clear: CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY P 588 The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave. THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945 Rick Atkinson LITTLE BROWN 2013. This paperback edition published in 2013. P 265 ‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’ UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN By Charles B. MacDonald CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993 P132 ‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’ ‘2. Monty & his staff inexcusably failed or refused Net In, Test, & Exercise their Radios. No command or control save slavish devotion to Monty's Plan which was entirely grounded on the assumption of an empty Drop Zone’ Your words. It’s a definite no. The problems with radios were confined to the FAAA (That is the FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY, to save you looking it up). As I have already pointed out FAAA was not part of Montgomery’s forces. ‘3. Monty was inflexible because he was deafened by no Communications, and therefore blind. Guards Armour refused to seek or seize let alone to maintain the initiative because they knew of Monty's obsessive compulsive control freak nature. Radio up and just do it unless ordered to stop? That would take an O'Conner, or a Slim at the top. Oh, and working radios.’ Your words. It’s a definite no. XXX Corps reached Grave at 8am on the morning of the 3rd day, 50 miles from the start line. This with a 12 hour delay due to the Son Bridge having been blown up. How was that a failure to’ maintain the initiative’? ‘Sure, there are always 378 other factors. Usually rasied as excuses or fog. But these 3 all by themselves killed a golden opportunity, and relegated Mony to 3rd tier general everywhere but England. What's Monty's equivilent of Slim's ? The vainglorious tripe in Monty's autobiography on has to be some of the worst vainglorious stuff & nonsense ever published. There was no excuse for Monty's gravest blunder, Arnhem.’ Your words. It’s a definite no. Three factors that could help to explain the failure at Arnhem could be: The Germans finding a copy of the compete MARKET GARDEN plan on a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, at a US Landing zone at the very beginning of the operation. The unexpected onset of adverse weather, as cited by Churchill, Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Student. The failure to capture Nijmegen city and bridge before the arrival of XXX Corps on the morning of the 3rd day. As for Montgomery.. As a single division commander Montgomery performed with distinction in trying circumstances in France in 1940, his night march with the 3rd infantry division to close the gap on the allied left after the Belgian surrender was a foretaste of his outstanding career as an army / army group commander. As a single army commander, Montgomery won in North Africa, and Sicily. As an army group commander, Montgomery won in Normandy, the Scheldt, the Northern half of the Scheldt, and the Rhine. No other allied commander came close to matching Montgomery’s career.
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  56.  @richardmeo2503  ROTFL
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  57.  @nickdanger3802  Or was the plan for the US 82nd to avoid taking Nijmegen Bridge asap? Or for the Germans to find a copy of the complete MARKET GARDEN plan on a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, in a US landing zone inside of the first two hours of the operation getting underway.
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  58. Its a definite no. Montgomery criticized the actions of the Poles. He did not hold them responsible for Arnhem.
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  59. 'Even if Market Garden had succeeded, the Allies would have not solved their supply crisis. Had the Market Garden forces been used to clear the Scheldt estuary, rather than just be treated as a side project for Canadians to handle, WWII might have gone on very differently.' How differently?.. The banks of the Scheldt were over one hundred miles long. The defences at the North Sea end were some of the heaviest in Europe. The German were still in force on the south bank of the estuary, and many of the assets needed for such an assault were still West of the Seine.
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  60.  @johnburns4017  Why does Para Dave cite three sources for the allied conference on 5th October 1944? Nobody disputes that the conference tok place.
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  61. The Dutch underground was ignored because of the German 'Englandspiel' pentration of the Dutch underground during the previous year.
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  62.  @Heathcoatman  ‘t's actually quite funny watching this and seeing yet another British attempt to lay blame elsewhere. The common excuse is alluded to here, that General Gavin didnt prioritize the Nijmegen bridge over the Groosbeek heights. The Heights had to be taken first. Had the Germans held the heights they could have just decimated any troops fighting in and around the bridge. It's not up for debate among military scholars at all. The heights first.’ Your words. A DROP TOO MANY MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC PEN & SWORD BOOKS. 1994. P xiii The capture of this bridge would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited. It was thought that the retention of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there courtesy of a rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.’ The Groesbeek Heights are 100 ft above sea level. ‘1st, Montgomery held up the Canadian armored formation that was running up the coast just before they reached the Schelde. Had they capped the Schelde, it would have trapped the majority of the 15th Army on the peninsula, approximately 70,000 Germans. Instead this narrow access was left open, and many of the units that put pressure on the bridges came from this area. Big oops nobody ever talks about (because it was Montgomery's fault, and we never criticize Monty, right?).’ Your words. It’s a definite no. The Canadian First Army, was tasked with clearing the Channel Ports. No allied forces were in a position to contest the German 15th Army move in the Scheldt. ‘General Browning felt that his HQ unit was needed near Nijmegen with the first drop. What? With the extreme shortage of transport units, Browning's HQ ate up almost a battalion's worth of air transport......for an HQ unit......on day 1. No wonder Gavin didnt have enough troops for both the bridge and the heights.’ Your words It’s a definite no. Browning’s gliders were taken from 1st Airborne’s glider allocation, leading to two Companies of the South Staffords being left behind.
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  63. Heathcoatman ‘lets looks at his 'accomplishments'. Widely hailed as the 'winner of 2nd El Alamein' he showed up about a week before the battle as a replacement. The defenses were already set and his forces grossly outnumbered Rommel's. That victory is mainly due to the ANZAC forces who held the line a month before Monty even got there, allowing the reinforcements that followed to dig in in great defensive positions. That victory was sealed before Monty was ever a factor, but he's the hero of El Alamein (pause to let chuckles subside).’ It’s a definite no. Montgomery arrived in Egypt in Mid-August 1942. The Second Battle of Alamein began at the end of October and early November of that year. At the First Battle of Alamein, Eighth Army comprised one Australian Division, one Indian division (two brigades), one New Zealand Division, one South African Division, and three British divisions. All clear now? ‘Then there's Sicily, where Monty was Monty, dragging his feet, moving at a snails pace while the Americans took Palermo AND Messina against the bulk of the FJs, then ole' Monty claimed himself the hero again.’ Your words. Read this: MONTY MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44 NIGEL HAMILTON HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON. 1983 Pages 319-320 CHAPTER SEVEN Patton Absconds to Palermo General Maxwell Taylor later recalled: I was a Brigadier-General, and Artillery Commander of 82nd US Airborne Division. We took the north-west corner of Sicily [from Agrigento] . . . it was a pleasure march, shaking hands with Italians asking, 'How's my brother Joe in Brooklyn?' Nicest war I've ever been in! Monty—he had a different problem—he was up against Germans.³ General Truscott, commanding the reinforced 3rd US Division (which became the main formation of Patton's Provisional Corps). was later asked by the American Official Historian why 'there was no attempt to try to cut off a part of the Germans' (who were known to be retreating eastwards rather than westwards); moreover, why was `Seventh Army not directed in pursuit of the Germans towards the Catania plain?' Truscott blamed the slowness of Intelligence (`there was a lag of a day or two before the whole picture of the enemy could be assembled'), but primarily Patton's obsession with Palermo: 'I had offered to go on to take Caltanisetta, but Patton wanted to capture Palermo. . . . It is my belief that the glamor of the big city was the chief thing that attracted Gen. Patton.' 'Then there's Caen. targeted to be captured by June 7th, taken well into July with the typical Monty excuse of 'it was hard, they fought back'. Your words. There was no target date for Caen. The Only target date that Montgomery set was the allies to be at the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78. ‘Then there's MG, a bad plan to start with then executed poorly while Patton's tanks sat facing open country without any fuel. Good call.’ Your words. CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P589 It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division.’ ‘If you want to argue Monty with me, please do, I've only scratched the surface here.’ Your words. Bring it on
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  64.  @Heathcoatman  Fire away, campaign, battle, whatever. Take your pick. Or we can take them in turn. Campaigns. France 1940: Montgomery in command of a single division. North Africa: Montgomery in command of a single army. Sicily: Montgomery in command of a single army. Italy: Montgomery in command of a single army. Normandy: Montgomery in command of two army groups. The Scheldt. Montgomery in command of an army group. The Rhine. Montgomery in command of an army group, and one other army. Battles. Arnhem. Montgomery in command of an army group. And, in part three allied airborne divisions. The Bulge: Montgomery in command of an army group, and two other armies.
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  65.  @Heathcoatman  How are you getting on with that 'Pick a Montgomery led campaign'?
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  66.  @Heathcoatman  'I'm still waiting for you to pick one. ' Your waiting is over... I pick Overlord, as per the suggestion by @stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85
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  67. Montgomery Ardennes Press Conference... This from one of Montgomery’s harshest critics: WITH PREJUDICE The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder G.C.B. CASSELL & COMPANY 1966 P 636– 637 ‘In a press conference given on 7 January, Montgomery described how Eisenhower had placed him in command of the whole northern front. He emphasized that the repulse of the German onslaught had been an Anglo-American effort, but somewhat unfortunately went on to describe the battle as ‘most interesting. I think, possibly, one of the most interesting and tricky battles I have ever handled, with great issues at stake.’ Montgomery expressed his admiration for the fighting qualities of the American soldier and how grieved he was to see uncomplimentary articles about Eisenhower in the British Press. However, the subsequent handling of Montgomery’s statements by the British newspapers and by the B.B.C. caused a crisis. The Prime Minister telephoned several times to Eisenhower, who said that Bradley was most upset. He proposed to award the Bronze Star to Bradley with a citation drawing attention to his fighting qualities, and to the work of the American armies bearing the brunt of the German offensive. At a meeting on 9 January, the Supreme Commander remarked that censorship was a two-edged weapon. Anything withheld by the censors immediately acquired news value, and the Press, by inuendo or other means, invariably circumvented it. It seemed to him that he reaction of the American Press to the statements in the British newspapers would be to exaggerate the United States point of view. There would be no end to the statements which the Press of the two countries would make in reply to each other. He also remarked: ‘For two and a half years I have been trying to get the Press to talk of “Allied” operations, but look what has happened.’ ‘When de Guingand saw the British reporters in Brussels on 9 January, they were able to prove to him that their articles had given a balanced view of the picture, but that their editors had been responsible for the flaming headlines which told the British public that Montgomery had defeated the Germans in the salient. It was also learned that the radio station at Arnhem, then in German hands, had intercepted some of the despatches and had re-written them with an anti-American slant. They had been put out and mistaken for BBC broadcasts.’ And this from a reporter at the press conference: CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P683 My dispatch to the B.B.C. was picked up in Germany, rewritten to give it an anti-American bias and then broadcast by Arnhem Radio, which was then in Goebbels's hands. Monitored at Bradley's H.Q., this broadcast was mistaken for a B.B.C. transmission and it was this twisted text that started the uproar. Any quwstions?
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  68. 'Advance on a narrow front and you create a bulge that if not reinforced quickly on its flanks will be exposed to pincer movements and flanking by the enemy.' But GARDEN was reinforced.
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  69.  @edgaraquino2324  'So sorry, Montgomery had the idea for this fiasco because he wanted to be the instrument to end the war, for his glory.' How do you know what Montgomery wanted?
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  70. But not at Arnhem.
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  71.  @nickdanger3802  Without masses of Lend Lease and the US Army on one of the Germans: Alam el Halfa, Alamein, Mareth, Sicily (Patton had f*cked off to Palermo to grab personal glory). Without masses of Lend Lease: Normandy, The Scheldt, the Rhine. N.B. Lend-Lease amounted 11% of Britain's needs across the war years. N.B. Montgomey was not reponsible for British Army equipment procurement, so where his equipment came from is irrelevant to any any assessment of military ability.
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  72.  @nickdanger3802  'The shelling plan continued for five and a half hours, by the end of which each gun had fired about 600 rounds, about 529,000 shells.' Your words. There is no sense in that. No single gun was going to fire 529,000 shells in 330 minutes. That is 1,603 shells per minute.
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  73.  @nickdanger3802  And while I am about it... Name a battle won by US Army without the British Army on one of the Germans flanks. Or, an allied seaborne landing in Europe where Britain not provide most of the ships.
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  74. In the end it was an Eisenhower plan.
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  75.  @boldvankaalen3896  'Montgomery personally wrote a letter to the CIGS where he accused the Polish of fighting badly, and without "keennes", and where he made clear he did not want them under his command any more.' Your words. He did. But that does mean that he blamed the Poles for the failure at Arnhem. Those words might equally have been written if Arnhem had been taken.
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  76. davidford694 The fighting in the Scheldt involved British, Canadian, and Polish troops.
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  77.  @nickdanger3802  'When does the sun rise and set in Bedford in September?' It depends on which day in September. 'How many air miles Bedford to Arnhem?' About 290, if aircraft take the same route as they did for Arnhem in September 1944. 'How long would it take to refuel over 1,000 C47's?' Who can say? Perhaps its in Hansard?
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  78. When you find out, do tell us.
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  79.  @lauriepocock3066  This from 9th September 1944: 'VCIGS, General Nye, [in the absence of Alanbrooke] Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.' N.B. VCIGS is Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The V1 flying bomb, and the V2 rocket came from the same German specification issued to the German Army, and the German Air Force: The ability of a pilotless aircraft to deliver a one ton warhead on London. The German Army developed the V2, the German Air Force developed the V1. This is what Albert Speer, head of the German armaments production had to say on the matter of the German atom bomb. www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJCF-Ufapu8&ab_channel=SergioIQ 3hrs, 15 mins, 54 seconds onwards. As a layman, the opinions of Bradley and Eisenhower on Montgomery make little impression on me. Those two US commanders had little in the way of military accomplishments to their name. Neither of them even had any any personal combat experience, Eisenhower had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. MARKET GARDEN seems to have conformed to Eisenhower's misguided broad front strategy. It was actually a limited undertaking that took no supplies away from Bradley - his armies carried on with their activities throught the MARKET GARDEN undertaking. The only additional forces involved were parts of the FAAA.
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  80.  @lyndoncmp5751  Para Dave keeps on quoting from a work called 'A General's Story' written by one Clay Blair. A work that falsely claims to be Bradley's autobiography. It cannot be so - it was written after after Bradley died.
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  81.  @howabout8611  Its a definite no.
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  82. How so?
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  83.  @nickdanger3802  'This strategy was contested by his subordinates, particularly Montgomery, who argued that with the supply situation deteriorating, he would not be able to reach the Ruhr, but "a relocation of our present resources of every description would be adequate to get one thrust to Berlin".' Yep.
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  84.  @Bullet-Tooth-Tony-  Three of the RAF pilots wore US 'Timex' wrist watches. That was crucial to the outcome of the battle.
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  85.  @nickdanger3802  So what were the Germans going to get from those radios?
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  86.  @nickdanger3802  I doubt that.
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  87. luigi vinccenz All clear now?..
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  88.  @davemac1197  'An any army that ever held Nijmegen held the heights that's why Jerry attacked it numerous times' Para Dave / Big Woody. The Groesbeek hrights are only 100 feet above sea level. I have been there. They hardly seem to dominate the area. A view its seems that was shared by John Frost: A DROP TOO MANY MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC PEN & SWORD BOOKS. 1994... 1994 RE-PRINT. Preface P xiii ‘The capture of this bridge [Nijmegen Bridge] would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited. It was thought that the retention of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there courtesy of a rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.'
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  89. 'thats happen when you leave to british to lead some operation. dummies!!!' Eisenwer was allied and forces commander, Brereton was the head of FAAA. FAAA = First Allied Airborne Army, to save you looking it up.
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  90. The_Regulator Montgomery offered to stop British / Canadian forces so that Bradley's southern forces, including Patton could advance into Germany. Eisenhower turned down that offer.
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  91. ​ @Bullet-Tooth-Tony-  ‘Alan Brooke's own words "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...." ’ Para Dave. Notice that this diary entry is from after the conclusion of Market Garden, and thus this opinion is hindsight. The whole period of MARKET GARDEN is covered by Alanbrooke in his work, ‘Triumph in the West’, chapter 8, ‘Lost Opportunity’ -notice the chapter title. Alanbrooke was in the Americas from the time before MARKET GARDEN was agreed, to a couple of days before it ended. Notice the words ‘for once is at fault’. What else could anyone infer from that other than Alanbrooke considered that Montgomery’s judgement had been fault free up to that time. All this after five years of war (two and two thirds years for the USA), and with Montgomery having been an army / army group commander since the middle of 1942. That will do nicely… ‘Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr without Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part" ’ Para Dave. Wrong… Montgomery’s words "a bad mistake on my part" was about his belief at the time that the Canadian Army could clear the Scheldt. Unlike US commanders, Montgomery was prepared to own up to his mistakes. Montgomery did not state that an attempt on the Rhine before the Scheldt had been cleared was a mistake. Perhaps Rick Atkinson should have stopped polishing his Pullitzer Prize and checked back instead. ‘From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem’ Para Dave. ‘Now how does this Neil Barr add to the subject?, Alanbrooke’s words have been available to read since the late 1950s. No one disputes that Alanbrooke stated what he stated. By including his extract, Para Dave is merely duplicating the quote. Why would anyone think that this Dr Niall Barr (who was born decades after the war), and his PHD, would bring anything new to the subject?’ ‘How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal’ Para Dave. Tedder should have checked back when wrote this stuff. ‘With Prejudice’ was published in 1966. All he had to do was to look at Eisenhower’s memoirs, which were published in 1958, which included this statement: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words. ‘How about Monty's Chief of Staff Max Hastings, Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him ‘Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him’ ’ Para Dave. OPERATION VICTORY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947 P416 ‘I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation. It was undoubtedly a gamble, but there was a very good dividend to be reaped if it came off. Horrocks was the ideal commander for the task, and morale of the troops was high.’ Major-General Sir Francis De Guingand was Montgomery’s Chief of Staff. Max Hastings, is that bloke with the Hank Marvin glasses that they call the ‘golf club members bar bore’, who thinks he knows more about the history of warfare than the rest of the world put together. ‘How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" ’ Para Dave. Max Hastings should have checked first: 1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1. 13.09.44: ‘the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming’ SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44: ‘the enemy has now suffered, in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’ The ‘Recon Battalions intact’ was actually identified as a single battalion, the training and reconnaissance of the Hermann Goering division. Bedell-Smith did not advise that MARKET GARDEN should be cancelled, he advised that one of the US Divisions should be moved up to Arnhem. That change hardly seems likely to have been acted on by the US General Brereton, who was the head of the FAAA.
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  92.  @Bullet-Tooth-Tony-  ‘How about IKE's Private Papers? The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies’ Para Dave. How many more times?.. Eisenhower did attempt to contact until 5th September, and due to him being located at Granville, 400 miles behind the frontline, his message to Montgomery did not finish arriving until 9th. Meanwhile, Montgomery received an urgent message from London, asking what could be done about V2 attacks on London from the Western part of the Netherlands. Montgomery immediately asked for a meeting with Eisenhower, which took place on the 10th, at Brussels Airport. As a result of that meeting, Montgomery was given the go ahead to plan MARKET GARDEN, as Eisenhower later testified: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words. ‘And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later’ Para Dave. Rubbish, from a chancer who crashed in on the Second World War history scene decades after the war ended, with nothing new to add to the subject. ‘Monty, who was not interested in the estuary’. How is Beevor supposed to know what Montgomery was not interested in?.. The Scheldt could be blocked with ease in September, October, November, and so on. Taken together, both banks of the Scheldt were 100 miles long, and the Germans were still in strength of the south of the estuary in September 1944. Even if Montgomery had turned the entire 21st Army onto the Scheldt, it is hard to see how Antwerp could be used before the end of October. Meanwhile with no attempt on the Rhine, and with V2 rockets hitting London, the Germans continue their recovery after their defeat at the hands of Montgomery in Normandy. ‘Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory, Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments, the case for him was very weak’ Para Dave. This no use whatsoever, there is no way of knowing what were the words in the War Cabinet memo, and what words were Martin Gilbert’s opinion. This is what Churchill stated in a note to Roosevelt: WINSTON S CHURCHILL. THE SECOND WORLD WAR. CASSELL & CO LTD VOLUME V CLOSING THE RING 1952. ‘Prime Minister to President Roosevelt 15 Dec 43 9. Turning to the “Overlord” theatre, I propose to you that Tedder shall be Eisenhower’s Deputy Supreme Commander, on account of the great part the air will play in this operation, and this is most agreeable to Eisenhower.’ The War Cabinet desires that Montgomery should command the first expeditionary group of armies. I feel the Cabinet are right, as Montgomery is a public hero and will give confidence among our people, not unshared by yours.’ Not a word about Montgomery’s military accomplishments’. Why do people not check first?..
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  93. ​ @Bullet-Tooth-Tony-  ‘Three distinguished British officers who fought in Holland that winter and later became army commanders believed that the Allied cause could have profited immeasurably from giving a more important role to Patton. -Lieutenant Edwin Bramall said: “I wonder if it would have taken so long if Patton or Rommel had been commanding.” -Captain David Fraser believed that the northern axis of advance was always hopeless, because the terrain made progress so difficult. He suggests: “We might have won in 1944 if Eisenhower had reinforced Patton. Patton was a real doer. There were bigger hills further south, but fewer rivers.” Brigadier Michael Carver argued that Montgomery’s single thrust could never have worked: “Patton’s army should have been leading the U.S. 12th Army Group.” Such speculations can never be tested, but it seems noteworthy that two British officers who later became field-marshals and another who became a senior general believed afterwards that the American front against Germany in the winter of 1944 offered far greater possibilities than that of the British in Holland, for which Montgomery continued to cherish such hopes.’ Para Dave. Who knows?.. Whatever role was, or was not given to Patton, it was nothing to with Montgomery - they were in different armies. Where Patton was, or was not, was down to his US army superiors, Eisenhower, and Patton. As to whether Eisenhower should have reinforced Patton, then that is a matter to be considered in regard to Eisenhower, not Montgomery. Montgomery had in already, in effect stated to Eisenhower: Go with me in the North (Dempsey/Hodges), or go with Bradley in the South (Hodges/Patton), but choose one. He chose neither, and the whole Allied advance ground to a halt, due to a series of under resourced piecemeal efforts. 'might have won in 1944 if Eisenhower had reinforced Patton'. Here are some German views… CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 CHAPTER XXVII THE LOST OPPORTUNITY P 601 ‘Since the war von Rundstedt and other German generals who can speak with authority (Student, Westphal, Blumentritt, Speidel and others) have all declared that a concentrated thrust from Belgium in September must have succeeded. These generals are agreed that if even fifteen divisions had driven on after the capture of Brussels and Liege, as Montgomery proposed, the Wehrmacht would have been powerless to stop them overrunning the Lower Rhineland and seizing the Ruhr. Indeed Blumentritt says: " Such a break-through en masse, coupled with air domination, would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."’ This is what Blumentritt said after the war to Liddell Hart: "The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. The attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine"" As for Patton, and MARKET GARDEN… based on his previous behaviour, he would probably have turned left at Nijmegen and then headed towards the Dutch Capital, The Hague, just as he had done in Sicily with Palermo, and in Normandy, with Paris. Plenty of opportunities there for press photo calls and newsreel footage. Still, perhaps that was an American thing, rather than just a Patton thing. What with Mark Clark leaving allied forces in Italy in the lurch so that he could capture Rome. But back to Patton, if he had tried his Sicily nonsense of attacking Sicilian peasants in the Netherlands, he would have been given a right hander back. Then we could have seen how big and tough he was. Also, The Netherlands was nowhere Oflag XIII-B, and so it would seem that the Task Force Baum ‘operation’ to rescue his son in law would have cost a lot more than the 282 casualties that were incurred when the ‘operation’ took place in 1945. 'Patton the real doer' . Here are some German views… Here is Von Mellenthin regarding Patton's forces compared to the Germans in the Lorraine: Panzer Battles, page 317 "On 2 November Third Army was authorized to attack to the Saar as soon as the weather cleared. Patton now assured Bradley that he could get to the Saar in three days and easily breach the West Wall with six infantry and three armoured divisions, plus two groups, i.e. brigades, of mechanized cavalry. Third Army numbered approximately a quarter of a million officers and men. Its opponents, the First German Army, had a total strength of only 86,000. Seven of the eight enemy divisions were strung out on a front of 75 miles and the only reserve was the 11th Panzer Division with 69 tanks. While the German formations were necessarily dispersed defensively, Patton, with command of the air and ample mobility on the ground, had the capacity to concentrate overwhelming force at any point he chose. Even on a basis of direct comparison he had an advantage of three to one in men, eight to one in tanks and a tremendous superiority in the artillery arm" www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view/4/ 'German commanders again found Patton’s generalship to be hesitant during the Lorraine Campaign, just as their counterparts had in Tunisia and Sicily. These men included some of Germany’s top armored commanders, Eastern Front veterans who had led troops during such fierce battles as Kharkov and Kursk. As the German armies withdrew east from the invading Allies, these commanders patched together a semblance of the flexible defense they had used against the Soviets, using mobile reserves and trading space for time and survival.'
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  94. Analyst Analyst Do you really want me to dismatle this line by line?..
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  95.  @davemac1197  Big Woody (aka Para Dave) is a youngster from Cleveland, Ohio, USA who seems to have an obsession with Montgomery.
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  96.  @davemac1197  You have made some really good points here. There is little that I can add Troop numbers: WINSTON S CHURCHILL. THE SECOND WORLD WAR. CASSELL & CO LTD VOLUME VI TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 1954. Page 608 ‘Prime Minister to C.I.G.S. 10 Sept 44 I should be grateful if this [table of divisions in the West, dated 1.9.44] could be brought up to date. 2. You do not seem to have credited the British, or perhaps the Americans, with the number of Army tank brigades, two of which together should count as the equivalent of a division. 3. Even without this it would seem that, taking Italy and France together the British Empire has thirty-four divisions and the United States thirty divisions.’ De-Guingand and Market Garden: OPERATION VICTORY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947 P416 ‘I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation.' Bridging Equipment. One Robin Neillands in The Battle for the Rhine 1944, (A book I have read but I do not own a copy of), noted in words to the effect that the front end of XXX Corps was choc-a-block wih Bridging equipment.
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  97.  @jeffreyrobinson3555  Why would Montgomery wish to imitate Patton? Montgomery was more senior than Patton, was in a different army, and in a different part of the front. The Contentin Peninsula was cut off more than a month before Patton joined the war in Normandy.
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  98.  @jeffreyrobinson3555  Its nothing personal. Every time an Amereican comes here running down Britain or Britons, I come down on them like a ton of bricks. You have been outclassed. Accept it and move on.
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  99.  @nickdanger3802  I deal with it using the minimum effort. 95% of the time its easier than swatting flies.
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  100.  @tedsemonis7905  Ted. Those photos can be seen on-line. They show a few Panzer III tanks in a heavily wooded area, which were correctly identified as belonging to a training Battalion. The shots are grainy beyond belief and it must have taken hours to work out what was there.
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  101. ​ @davemac1197  'Brian Urquhart's story was discredited after the aerial photo was found in a Dutch government archive in 2015.'s story was discredited after the aerial photo was found in a Dutch government archive in 2015.' Also, am I right in thinking that there is no record of the aerial recce flight that Brian Urquhart claimed to have commissioned, ever taking place? A bloke that posted comments on YouTube, who used the name Dave Rendall, claimed to be Brian Urquhart's nephew. A claim that I stated that I was sceptical of. That notwithstanding, he stated that his Uncle never briefed General Browning on German armour in the Arnhem, and that Urquhart did not take part in MARKET because of a leg injury, rather than nervous exhaustion. The whole Brian Urquhart stuff in the Cornelius Ryan book 'A Bridge Too Far', and the film of the same name was all too neat. From memory, the photos in the film showed post-war German tanks neatly framed in oblique angle photos. I think it was this Sebastian Richie that stated that there would not have been oblique angle photos unless the pilot was briefed to photograph a specific location. There seems to be little reason to doubt what this Sebastian Richie stated on this point. I suppose that examples of aerial recce, oblique angle photos of specific places are shots are the shots taken by Squadron Leader Hill RAF of German Radar installations Bruneval, France in December 1941, and later at Domburg in the Netherlands. In each case, Hill was working to a specific brief. What were RAF recce pilots supposed to do for a Brian Urquhart brief to try to find German tanks in the Arnhem area in 1944? Fly up and down wooded areas at low level until they found tanks? How long would that have taken? How long before the aircraft were shot down? How many recce flights could have taken place before the Germans became suspicious? Why can't these people like Nick Danger think before they post on here?
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  102.  @peterkiviat9969  'The genius of Overlord by the time in goes into action as a result of Eisenhower's meticulous use of redundancies' What did Eisenhower contribute to overlord? The 'use of redundancies' was already in place. The plave had been decided, the time had been decided, but was put back by Montgomery's insistence on two additional beaches, and more troops. The land campaign plan was wholly Montgomery's. The allied deception plan was in place, the artificial harbours were in hand, as was PLUTO, as was the coodination of action with the French resistance was in hand. What did Eisenhower bring to OVERLORD? He had already made a mess of AVALANCHE. He zero personal combat experience to set opinions against. His lack of experience could have blown the whole thing. We was not even in France until well into the battle.
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  103.  @lyndoncmp5751  Yep. Even when Antwerp was liberated, the Germans were still in force on the South side of estuary at the Breskens Pocket. All 100 miles of the estuary's banks would have had to be cleared to make Antwerp usable, and many of the assets that would be needed to attack the estuary from the South side were still West of the Seine. The tenacity with which the Germans defended the Scheldt, and the fact that Antwerp was the ultimate goal of the Ardennes offensive later in 1944 shows the importance that the Germans placed on denying Antwerp to the allies. As you so rightly point out, there were stacks of mines to clear, and the allies knew then that such a clearance would take in the order of three weeks. MARKET GARDEN, or no MARKET GARDEN, it is hard to see any quick fix for the allies to get use of Antwerp in the late Summer and early Autumn of 1944.
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  104.  @Jakal-pw8yq  Why not mad respect to the Poles and British?
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  105.  @phillipnagle9651  'Hodges and Patton were held up because of extremely long supply lines because of Montgomery's failure to take the Scheldt Estuary when it was lightly defended so the allies could make use of the port of Antwerp.' Your words. Not really... The Scheldt was never lightly defended. German troops were South of the Estuary, particularly, at the Breskens Pocket. The fortifications at the mouth of the estuary were some of the heaviest in Europe. The Germans were always ready to mine the estuary The estuary banks totaled 100 miles, every single part of which, had to be in allied hands before Antwerp port could be used. If Hodges and Patton had placed any reliance on Antwerp being available when they broke out of Normandy, then that would seem to have been irresponsible, as the allies had no way of knowing when Atwerp port would be available when the break out started. 'To make it worse, Eisenhower gave supply priority to Montgomery so he could launch the ill fated Market Garden. Montgomery had the stupidity to lose an airborne division while failing to do his primary job of opening the port of Antwerp.' Your words. The priority of supply given to support Market Garden, was 500 tons of supplies per day, enough to support one division in an offensive mode. This lift capability had previoisly been used to feed the civilian population of Paris, rather than support allied ground forces. Montgomery's primary job at that time was toundertake MARKET GARDEN, as confirmed by Eisenhower: CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P333 'At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.' His words. 'His failure cost a lot of Canadians their lives when they had to go in and take the Scheldt Estuary and cost the the allies a great amount of time and men.' Your words. The capture of the Scheldt involved British, Canadian, and Polish troops. 'Of course British mythology does not allow such facts to be put forward.' Your words. And what mythology would that be?
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  106.  @phillipnagle9651  'Finally, I will match Patton's advance past Paris against anything the plodding Montgomery did.' Your words. CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P333 ‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’ His words.
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  107.  @phillipnagle9651  'An absolute lie! The 6th Panzer SS Army. the main German force was stopped cold with zero help from the British.' Your words. Really?.. Montgomery was British. ‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’. Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army. His words. “I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.” ”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...” - Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander, 7th Armoured Division. “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298. ‘There was no doubt that the Americans had had a severe shock. Their commanders had chosen to ignore the two most elementary rules of war – concentration and the possession of a reserve to counter the enemy’s moves and keep the initiative.’ Field Marshall Alanbrooke
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  108.  @johnbrattan9341  For what?
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  109.  @Bullet-Tooth-Tony-  Max Hastings, William Weidner Carlo D’este were not even there.
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  110.  @phillipnagle9651  'First, it was not the "British 21st Army Group", it was made up of two armies, one British and one Canadian.' Your words. More than half of the Canadian 1st Army was made up of British and Polish forces. The US 6th Army Group included he French 1st Army.
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  111.  @lllordllloyd  But when Montgomery and Eisenhower met on the 23rd August 1944, Montgomery offered to stop 21st Army Group, and leave US 12th Army Group to take the advance into Germany, provided that a there was a sensible use of the allied supply resources available at that time.
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  112.  @gerhardris  'any general of an army in WW2 should have been fully aware of the global situation.' Your words. You might well be right. As far as I have concluded from what I have read, of the Western allies, military leaders, only Alanbrooke had proper understanding of global military matters.
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  113.  @gerhardris  US General Marshall seems to have shown a poor understanding of military matters. He breezed into London in mid 1942 with a lunatic plan for the allies to invade France in 1942, and tried again with that same idea in 1943, in defiance of the facts in regard to shipping, and the state of the enemy He (and his US colleagues) seem to have misunderstood the solid reasons for the campaigns in Mediterranean. He (and his US colleagues) failed to control their people in the war against Japan, and they failed appeciate the big differences in fighting the Japanese where they were using sledgehammers to crack walnuts, and the war against Germany in which the odds were far closer until almost the end of the war.
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  114.  @johnlucas8479  I think that we have been here before. The point is that Montgomery could tell Brereton to do something that Brereton did not want the FAAA to do. E.G. That 21 Army Group OPERATION MARKET GARDEN report, which I know you have: 'Appendix 'R' to Part III D -1 16 Sep Lt-Gen BRERETON decided to proceed with op MARKET'
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  115. grandpavanderhof Its a definite no.
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  116.  @Heathcoatman  Antwerp was captured on the 4th September 1944, not the 8th, as you claimed. Also, not all allied supplies were coming into Cherbourg, as you claimed. The British port at Arromanches was in use, as was Dieppe.
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  117. I'n a characteristically unguarded, though private, moment after a particularly testy meeting, Ike even characterized Monty as a "psychopath". That claim is was made by the plagiarist and liar Stephen Ambrose, many years after the war ended. I hope that Ambrose's family get to read this.
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  118. 'It's pretty accurate' How do you know?
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  119.  @trident6547  ' It was of course a modern road now but still only two lanes one northward and one southward.' Really... My memory is that it is maily dual carrigeway, with places such as Son now bypassed.
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  120.  @nickdanger3802  'Patton would have known it was a bollocks plan. If he did it anyway, he would have done more than seven miles on day one.' Your words. It seems that Patton knew all bout real bollocks plans. What with his lunatic plan to land troops in penny packets all around Sicily , and his proposal to start a war with Russia in 1945. Still, the allies little notice of him after he attacked Sicilian peasants, and then, his own soldiers. The Germans took notice of him. 'he would have done more than seven miles on day one'. No doubt, if the US 101st Airborne Division had not allowed the Germans to blow up the Son Bridge.
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  121. Nope.
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  122. pepsi666 'If Montgomery had listened to the Dutch' What would Montgomery have heard?
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  123.  @JK-br1mu  'Hey Aston, name a history book you've ever read in your life. Ever heard of the breakout from Normandy? How's that for a battle Patton won. Read a book.' The breakout from Normandy was not a battle, it was a chase that saw the the Germans retreat faster than the allies could advance A break out that involved armies commanded by Crerer, Dempsey, and Hodges, as well as Patton.
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  124.  @peterbennet7145  'No one had more resources than Montgomery and used them to so little effect.' You should look at what Eisenhower and Bradley failed to do.
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  125. What do you mean by a lot?
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  126.  @Bullet-Tooth-Tony-  Aachen, 20,000 casualties, The Lorraine Campaign, 45,000 casulaties, the Bulge, 91,000 casualties.
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  127.  @Idahoguy10157  CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P 591-592 ‘At the start of September the Allied supply situation was certainly difficult, but it was not as serious as Eisenhower suggests, nor were the needs of his divisions as great as he asserts. Eisenhower says that " a reinforced division in active operation consumes 600 to 700 tons of supplies per day." This figure he quotes not from his own personal experience in command but from the U.S. War Department's Staff Officers' Field Manual, and it includes all manner of ordnance and engineer stores which are normally carried but need not be immediately replaced in a short, swift campaign. It includes also ammunition for heavy and medium artillery, most of which was grounded in September because it was not needed so long as the momentum was maintained. At this time Allied divisions, and their supporting troops, could be, and were, adequately maintained in action and advancing with a daily supply of 500 tons. (The fact that he was receiving only 3,500 tons a day did not prevent Patton attacking with eight divisions on the Moselle.) In a defensive role Allied divisions needed only half this amount. When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with little help from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’
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  128. How so?
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  129. A General's Life: An Autobiography by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley was written by this Clay Blair after Bradley had died. Anything in it purporting to have been stated by Bradley should be disregarded unless it can supported by another source.
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  130. anthonymartinez4892 Rubbish.
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  131.  @davemac1197  And that officer was in FAAA, not Montgomery's forces.
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  132. Its a definite no. There was no months involved. Montgomery was allied land forces commander - and as such, led he charge until 31st August 1944. Montgomery proposed MARKET GARDEN on 10th September. MARKET GARDEN was intended to hinder German rocket attacks on Britain by reaching the IJsselmeer, and to give the allies a Bridgehead over the Rhine. It was not expected to end the war. Montgomery sent his subordinate to the first allied commanders meeting after MARKET GARDEN. Nor did he attend the liberation parade for Paris oth 29th August 1944, he was to busy running the war. He left Eisenhower and Bradley to stand on the podium, flashing their medals.
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  133. What arrogance?
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  134. Yea, there is something in what you state.
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  135. Louisa van Dart 'Prince Bernhart said " The Netherlands can never withstand another of Montgomery's successes."' I would have told the ex SS man Prince Bernhardt to go and shag himself with a blunt instrument.. This suspect individual was was rightly shown the door by the British and US intelligence services. Only his connections kept him out of prison over the Lockheed bribery scandal in the 1970s. 'Northern Holland was still in German occupation until the end of the war. 20,000 Dutch civilians died of starvation because Market Garden failed.' Your words. No, no no, no. MARKET GARDEN did not displace any other allied plan to liberate the Western provinces of the Netherlands at that time. Further, the treatment meted out to the Dutch was no different to that meted out to other territories occupied by the Germans at that time. MARKET GARDEN liberated far more people than died in the Dutch Hunger Winter. 20,000 Dutch civilians died of starvation due to the actions of the Germans. Full stop. Don't you ever come out with that monstrous slur again.
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  136.  @Bullet-Tooth-Tony-  If YouTube deleted comments because of their poor content, you would never see a comment from Big Woody / Para Dave.
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  137.  @Bullet-Tooth-Tony-  Reminder... Big Woody also uses the name Para Dave for YouTube comments.
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  138. Analyst Analyst Not really...
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  139. Analyst, Analyst 'Montgomery forbad anyone to drive on the right side of the road where they had two lanes, just to spite the Americans' Your words. Yea, right ho. Shall we go on?..
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  140. Get lost. The Australian, Chester Wilmot was right there, reporting from the front line including D-Day, through to VE Day as BBC listeners at that time would know. Further, for his matchless work, The Struggle For Europe, he put the hours in interviews with the leading people at that time. How many times have turds like Ambrose and Beevor had refer back to Chester Wilmot?.. In any case, the Germans have stated, that Montgomery's views on the way forward in 1944 would have been the right course of action for the allies.
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  141.  @jeffreyrobinson3555  Not really... The Contentin Peninsular was nothing to do with Falaise. "In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise". From Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377 Africa. Montgomery defeated Rommel three times, and advanced 1,800 from Alamein.. Patton fought the Vichy French. Sicily. Montgomery managd to get Patton's lunatic plan to land at points all around the island dumped in favour of a concentrated lading in one place. The outcome was a triumphal success. Patton then absconded from the battlefield to go to the unimportant Palermo, and had to be enticed back to the battlefield with the promise of beimng allowed to take Messina. France. Patton as not in the fighting until August. Thereafter, his performce was little different to that of Dempsey and Hodges. Your media has lied to you.
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  142. Dave M A C is absolutely right. Sosabowski and the Polish forces were criticized for their actions during MARKET GARDEN. There is nothing to say that those criticisms would not have been made if the operation had been completely successful. The words that Browning and Montgomery used can be found on-line. Go and read them.
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  143.  @davemac1197  'Old Monty...at least the Japanese commanders had enough decency to disembowel themselves after failures like his.' Para Dave (aka Big Woody). So Patton should have been shot for deserting the battlefield in Sicily in order to gain personal glory in Palermo?.. So Clark should have been shot for deserting the battlefield in Sicily in order to gain personal glory in Rome?.. So Bradley should have been shot for failing to close the Falaise Gap? Or should he have been given life imprisonment because he owned up to what he had done?.. Should Eisenhower have topped himself for his schoolboy faliure to foresee the Ardennes attack? If Para Dave were a dog, would they have put him down by now?.. No doubt, the Social Services in Cleveland, Ohio, USA, have got a file on him.
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  144.  @richardmeo2503  Its a definite no. CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P336 ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted. CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P 591-592 'When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with little help from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’ Dont guess, check, and then post comments.
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  145.  @phillipnagle9651  'Are you that committed to British mythology or are you just plain incapable of reading a battle map. The 6th SS Panzer Army was always the lead army which was to take Antwerp. But if you feel better quoting a Nazi general who would have been annihilated had there been a counter attack from the north but was saved by the slow moving timid Montgomery, feel free.' Get real. The US high command structure fell apart as soon as the Germans fell apart. Hodges went missing for over 24 hours, Bradley made a Berk of himself by refusing move his headquarters, and was sidelined for the rest of the battle. youtube.com/watch?v=zd6LrT7Zrjo&ab_channel=USArmyWarCollege 1 hour, 4 minutes onwards. When Eisehower finally came out of hiding to meet with Montgomery, what a farce: MONTY The Field-Marshal 1944-1976 NIGEL HAMILTON HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1986 P259 Monty was therefore somewhat surprised by Eisenhower's royal arrival—as he told `Simbo' Simpson when the latter flew over to Monty's headquarters the following day. 'He said it was most impressive. The train drew into the station and immediately teams of machine-gunners leapt out, placed their machine guns on both platforms at each end of the train, and guards leapt out and took up every possible vantage point. No question of letting any German assassination troops get at the Supreme Commander. Monty commented that he himself felt rather naked just arriving with an armoured car behind him, and he felt much safer with this enormous American guard before he met Ike.' Eisenhower was, however, embarrassed and ashamed, instituting an official investigation after the battle to determine whether there had in fact been due cause for such exaggerated security measures.
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  146.  @johnvaleanbaily246  Not really... CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P 591-592 ‘When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with littlehelp from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’ MONTY The Field-Marshal 1944-1976 NIGEL HAMILTON HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1986 P126 ‘from Normandy to Holland. In Monty's eyes the true reason for the relative collapse of Allied hostilities was in no measure the absence of a deep-water port other than Cherbourg or Marseilles. It was a combination of the administrative bungle whereby a shortage of artillery ammunition had arisen in the American zone; of the growing lack of infantry reinforcements; and of Eisenhower's failure to take a firm 'grip' on the campaign. These problems were exacerbated by the paucity of ports but the failure to get Antwerp working before November was not the primary reason why the Allied offensive against Germany had ground to a virtual halt,¹ since Antwerp could never have been operational before October, even if all 21st Army Group resources had been assigned to it. 'St Malo fell on 17 August, Brest on 18 September 1944; neither was used. Monty's own chief of administration, 21st Army Group, Maj-General Miles Graham later considered that 'at the period at which the advance would have taken place we were no longer based on the Normandy beaches. The port of Dieppe was opened on September 5 and by the end of the month was dealing with over 6,000 tons a day. Ostend was captured on September 9 and opened on the 28th of the same month. Boulogne and Calais were captured on September 22 and 30 respectively. Meanwhile the depots on the Normandy beaches were being rapidly cleared by rail and road and the new Advance Base established in central and northern Belgium. An additional 17 General Transport companies with a lift of some 8,000 tons and preloaded with petrol and supplies were borrowed from the War Office and arrived in the latter half of September and early October.' Channel and North Sea Ports Liberation: Dieppe. Liberated: 01.09.1944. Operational: 05.09.1944. Le Havre. Liberated: 12.09.1944. Operational: 13.10.1944. Boulogne. Liberated: 22.09.1944. Operational: Mid October 1944 Ostend. Liberated: 09.09.1944. Operational: 28.09.1944.
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  147.  @lyndoncmp5751  CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY P 591-592 ‘At the start of September the Allied supply situation was certainly difficult, but it was not as serious as Eisenhower suggests, nor were the needs of his divisions as great as he asserts. Eisenhower says that " a reinforced division in active operation consumes 600 to 700 tons of supplies per day." This figure he quotes not from his own personal experience in command but from the U.S. War Department's Staff Officers' Field Manual, and it includes all manner of ordnance and engineer stores which are normally carried but need not be immediately replaced in a short, swift campaign. It includes also ammunition for heavy and medium artillery, most of which was grounded in September because it was not needed so long as the momentum was maintained. At this time, Allied divisions, and their supporting troops, could be, and were, adequately maintained in action and advancing with a daily supply of 500 tons. (The fact that he was receiving only 3,500 tons a day did not prevent Patton attacking with eight divisions on the Moselle.) In a defensive role Allied divisions needed only half this amount. When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with little help from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’ Notice the title of ths chapter from which this passage is taken. Chester Wilmot was not oppo who was nowhere near the war, spouting off decades later. He was actually there. It should also noted that Le Havre became operational on13.10.1944, exclusively for American use, and from which 61,731 tons of supplies were unloaded in October 1944, with the daily total increasing day-by-day.
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  148. 'Monty blaming the Poles is utter disgrace.' When did hat happen?..
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  149. gerhard ris 'Any good general would have thought thru the entire campagne after D day already in 1943.' Your words. But Montgomery was not appointed to command the Overlord land campaign until January 1944. At which point he devised a plan to take the allies to the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78, with 22% fewer than expected casualties, and giving the Germans a defeat as big as Stalingrad. Thereafter, Eisenhower took over the direction of the land campaign as of 1st September 1944. 'Monty lied after the war that the object of Market Garden was the Ruhr. Your words. CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P336 ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.' His words. On the 9th September 1944, Montgomery received this message from the VCIGS, General Nye: 'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.' N.B. VCIGS is Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff - to save you looking it up. MONTY The Field-Marshal 1944-1976 NIGEL HAMILTON HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1986 P49 [Montgomery, when interviewed by Chester Wilmot] ‘I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.’ ‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue: ‘Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.’ In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that ‘the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.’ N.B. Tedder was one of Montgomery's harshest critics. 'Monty admitted that he wasn't aware that getting both sides of the Schelt (Schelde)was essential for opening up Antwerp.' Your words. Not the case. My father was in the Schelt campaign, and at that time he atended an Army briefing in which it was stated that every single mile of the estuary would have to be in allied hands before Antwerp could be used by the allies.
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  150. gerhard ris 'He also would have then known how the Germans used seaplanes to get the Rotterdam bridges in 1940.' Your words. Where could seaplanes have landed at Nijmegen and Arnhem? 'A good general would have been on top of the planning.' 1st priority opening up Antwerp Schelde both sides 2nd priority bagging the 15th army 3rd priority getting over the Rhine 4th priority blocking off Holland in Groningen at the Wadden sea. Opening up a stage to hit the Northen German plane as excellent tank country towards the Ruhr and beyond. And, blocking further V1 and V2 attacks on Brittain out of Holland.' Your words. But Eisenhower approved 21st Army Group priorities at that time: CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P333 'At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.' His words. The matter of V weapon attacks on 'Brittain out of Holland' was an immediate priority, as I have shown with the content of the communication to Montgomery on the 9th September 1944. Groningen and the Wadden Sea were of little importance. Reaching the IJesselmeer would have hindered V2 attacks. The allies had enough resources to reach the Ruhr, without Antwerp being available. What they lacked was overall direction of allied campaign after Eisenhower took over as allied land forces commander.
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  151.  @gerhardris  'the allies needed harbours of which Antwerp was the best you are the first one ever to contest that what as far as I know all historians agree on.' Your words. CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.1954 P 591-92 ‘At the start of September the Allied supply situation was certainly difficult, but it was not as serious as Eisenhower suggests, nor were the needs of his divisions as great as he asserts. Eisenhower says that " a reinforced division in active operation consumes 600 to 700 tons of supplies per day." ² This figure he quotes not from his own personal experience in command but from the U.S. War Department's Staff Officers' Field Manual, and it includes all manner of ordnance and engineer stores which are normally carried but need not be immediately replaced in a short, swift campaign. It includes also ammunition for heavy and medium artillery, most of which was grounded in September because it was not needed so long as the momentum was maintained. At this time Allied divisions, and their supporting troops, could be, and were, adequately maintained in action and advancing with a daily supply of 500 tons. (The fact that he was receiving only 3,500 tons a day did not prevent Patton attacking with eight divisions on the Moselle.) In a defensive role Allied divisions needed only half this amount. When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with little help from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’
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  152.  @gerhardris  'seaplanes/fighing boats can land on water that the bridges cross over. Let's say a Catalina needs 400 meters to land. Google map Arnhem.' ...and it can carry how many men? Which then have to disembark...
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  153.  @gerhardris  'Eisenhower was at fault as well. But he was misled by Monty.' How was Eisenhower misled?
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  154.  @gerhardris  'Monty as soon as it was clear that Italy campagne was not going as hoped should have thought through all possible scenarios in the broadest sense.' Your words. But Montgomery was not in charge of the campaign in Italy. Eisenhower was. Montgomery warned that dispersing allied resources into AVALANCHE, SLAPSTICK, and BAYTOWN would lead to serious problems. He was proved right. Montgomery was in charge of land campaign for OVERLORD, for which he had a clear plan, to use British 2nd army to protect the allies from German attacks, in order to allow US 1st Army to capture Cherbourg and other French ports, leaving the allies to win the battle of the build up of resources. Which they did. Under his command, the allies cleared France in 90 days. After Eisenhower took over command, the allies went just another 45 miles and stopped. As in Italy, Eisenhower failed to concentrate allied resources, giving the Germans time and space to rebuild their forces. Eisenhower had zero personal combat experience and little command experience. He had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. At the time of MARKET GARDEN, he was four hundred miles behind the front. He was so out of touch with events, at one point he had to get his chauffeur to phone a front commander to see if a particular attck had gone ahead. Politics, rather than military considerations seem to have governed his decision making.
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  155.  @gerhardris  'you only have to put maybe at least 60 comandos 30 each side of the bridge. Initial surprize caputure the bridge and hold untill paras and glider troops relieve. These should follow on their hiels. Say six to twelve catalinas or other flighing boats old ones. Optimum maybe 120 comandos.' Your words. Right ho. So that 15 plus flying boats landing at Arnhem, and at Nijmegen, and then getting their troops onto dry land?..
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  156.  @gerhardris  'as said Eisenhower should take part of the blame. Anyway Monty as Eisenhower should have known about the Scheldt, Zuiderzee/Ijssellake/ afsluitdijk.' Your words. But what relevance does that have to the outcome of MARKET GARDEN? 'He incorrectly trusted Monty who came up with a plan that he was sold by primary resposible the one who concocted the plan without knowing the relevant facts he would have known when Monty had followed Sun Tzu.' Your words. What relevant facts were missing? Intelligence? SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44: ‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’ SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44: [the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’ SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44 (one day before the onset of MARKET GARDEN): ‘the enemy has now suffered, in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’ The aerial photography can be seen on line. Unlike the Hollywood film 'A Bridge Too Far', which includes a photograph of post war AFV, disguised as Second World War machines, shown in clear at a nice oblique angle, the actual photographs were grainy overhead shots, which, only after a considerable amount of enhancement showed what seemed to be a few Mark III tanks that identified as belonging to the Hermann Goering Division Training and Replacement unit. Any information purporting to come from the Dutch Underground at that time was disregarded due to the German 'Englandspiel' penetration of the Dutch Underground, unless it could be verified by other intelligence sources. MARKET GARDEN was no different to any other matter in this regard. Logistics? Montgomery went ahead with MARKET GARDEN after being given undertakings in regard to logistics from Bedell-Smith that US 3rd Army would be halted, and that its transport would be transferred to US1st Army for operations in support of 21st Army Group. None of his happened. ‘Monty delegated it and tried to blame others for what he was respocible for. If you concoct a plan you and you alone are most resposible.’ Your words. Not really. Montgomery had no final say over the FAAA and the MARKET plan. On this, the evidence is clear: CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY P 588 The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave. THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945 Rick Atkinson LITTLE BROWN 2013. This paperback edition published in 2013. P 265 ‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’ UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN By Charles B. MacDonald CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993 P132 ‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
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  157.  @gerhardris  ‘he hid even during the initial planning of his own plan. He let them worknit out whereas he should have been on top of it or appoint one in that * his * role.’ Your words. You mean Montgomery? How so? When Montgomery briefed Dempsey on GARDEN on the 10th September, that plan was the same as the ground part of COMET. Where MARKET GARDEN differed from COMET was in the MARKET airborne part, which was to be three times the size of the airborne of COMET. Planning for MARKET was entirely in the hands of the US General Brereton’s FAAA. According to one Sebastian Ritchie, so often quoted by people in YouTube comments, Montgomery did not get to see the MARKET until the 15th September, two days before the MARKET GARDEN start date. ‘Yet, Monty was out of his depth and to proudly arrogant to accept close aid of capable generals. Then he would have only to act the part and follow advice given.’ Your words. Montgomery had planned Alamein, HUSKY, OVERLORD, the Scheldt, PLUNDER/VARSITY, and sorted out the Northern half of the Bulge, after the US command structure fell apart – according to people who were around at that time. What did Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers ever do?
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  158.  @gerhardris  'Another thing Horrocks arrived on 29 August the port wasn't opened until 28 November - and that was By the Canadians and the RN and it most certainly wasn't ahead of schedule. Do the Math - not the Meth' Para Dave (aka Big Woody) It was opened by British, Canadian, and Polish forces, and the Royal Navy.
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  159.  @gerhardris  I think that you are right to raise the matter of inundations and the terrain for MARKET GARDEN. The whole of the area from Eindhoven through Nijmegen to Arnhem is above sea level. The 1953 flood of Britain and the Netherlands went no further east than the Tilburg area in the Netherlands. People ought to look properly into the matter of the geography of the Netherlands before spouting off about the subject in YouTube comment. Some prize berk on here tried to put a case that the Groesbeek heights are a dominant feature, that is a must have, for anyone trying to take control of Nijmegen. If only I could remember who that idiot is...
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  160.  @johnlucas8479  'Brereton blocking of Montgomery Walcheren attack if often quoted in relationship to Market Garden that Montgomery having no control of the Market Plan. But when you consider the issues facing an airborne attack on the Walcheren Island, without a combined attack by ground forces the airborne attack would have failed. When Montgomery proposed the attack on 3rd of September no ground forces were close to the island to provide any support to the airborne attack. Also, the terrain on the island was not idea for an airborne attack. So, Brereton was clearly justified to block the attack.' Surely the point is not whether an airborne attack on Walcheren was a good idea, it is that Brereton had the final say on the attack. He clearly did, so this adds to the evidence that Brereton had the final say on MARKRT.
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  161. Andy M Total rubbish. Montgomery won in North Africa, Sicily, Normandy, the Scheldt, the northern half of the Bulge, and the Rhine. What US commander could get anywhere near that?.. The idea that 'the English' needed someone that they could idolize' from the upper echelons of society is absurd.
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  162. simply an operation too risky with respect to the objectives to be achieved. the fact that there were 2 German armored divisions in the Netherlands, undergoing a reorganization, however, was irrelevant to me. there would have been no way of respecting the deadlines imposed by the operation. perhaps the successes of the 44 operations gave the allied staff too much security and planning the operation and did not foresee an exit plan in case things got bad. According to the historian Cornelius Rayan it was even an operation intended to use the large amount of airborne departments set up and trained. the reality is that in the south the offensive was slowly advancing and risking the lives of the soldiers. Your words.
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  163.  @johnburns4017  Big Woody / Para Dave: 'in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. He would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part" ' How would Ramsey have known what Montgomery stated after the war?..
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  164.  @Kangaxxter  ‘In North Africa, Monty inherited an army on third base and he pretended he hit a triple. His singular victory North Africa were direct results of the US landings and pulling Axis attention to the other side of Africa.’ Your words. Total Rubbish. The army that Montgomery inherited was, by the accounts of people there, fragmented, and demoralized, after defeats at Gazala and Tobruk. Auchinleck’s victory at the First Battle of Alamein was perceived as a stop-gap measure. The Second Battle of Alamein was timed to occur before the Torch landing in order to persuade the Vichy French forces not to oppose the Torch landings, which were made up of British and US forces. There is no evidence of Axis forces being drawn from the Alamein front to oppose the Torch landings. ‘Montgomery was a propaganda general for a propaganda military. He was someone that British media could idolize, not because he'd done anything great but because they needed to idolize someone to squash the "America saves the day" narrative that was gaining traction.’ Your words. Total Rubbish. British people were not looking to idolize anyone from the ruling, or governing classes, or the upper echelons of the armed forces. The whole thrust of British propaganda and media output was to emphasize the common effort, particularly the efforts of ‘ordinary’ men and women, and to the future. Montgomery gained attention because he won battles, as did anyone else who was successful against the enemy. Your claim that ‘the "America saves the day" narrative that was gaining traction’ is absurd. Britons were sure of their own survival by their own means by the middle of the war, with the story the Battle of Britain and other events already subject official history documents. If any foreign power was subject of appreciation, it was Russia, and the Red Army. As evidenced by the ‘Second Front Now’ movement, the presentation of the Stalingrad Sword to Stalin by Churchill at the Tehran Conference, and so on. My own father was called to briefing in Aldershot military town on day after Germany invaded Russia in which the officer of the day stated ‘Germany has invaded Russia, so we can’t lose now. ‘The only thing that stopped the American Army from advancing to the Rhine in Aug 44 was the preparation for Monty's insane boondoggle: OP Market Garden. If Monty had really wanted to win the War by Christmas, he should've just let Patton do his job. I mean, he knew that his plan would fail, which is why he tried as hard as possible to not be the CO of Market Garden once Churchill told Roosevelt to tell Eisenhower to listen to Montgomery’ Your words. Total Rubbish. MARKET GARDEN was not designed to win the War by Christmas. It was a limited undertaking, and its aim was to reach the Ijsselmeer and give the allies bridgehead over the Rhine. The reason that Eisenhower gave it the go-ahead was it could be mainly mounted from existing 21st Army Group resources and the First Allied Airborne Army. Montgomery had previously proposed a concentration of forces for a single thrust into Northern Germany, to be led by Montgomery. Montgomery also offered to subordinate 21st Army Group to Bradley for an allied thrust in the South, provided a decision was made to concentrate the available resources in one place. Eisenhower did neither, and the whole allied advance ground to a halt. Churchill had nothing to do with MARKET GARDEN, before, and during that operation, he travelling to, attending, and travelling home from the OCTAGON conference in Quebec.
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  165. What is stupid about trying to stem V2 rocket attacks on Britain?
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  166. Not really.
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