Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "The People Profiles"
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Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the years ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties). (20,000 casualties).
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@ronryan7398
‘Really? He won in Sicily? Patton had to come to his rescue.’
Not really…Patton tried to foist a lunatic plan on the allies of landing all around the island. Good sense prevailed and Montgomery’s plan to concentrate resources in one place was a triumphant success. Patton deserted the battlefield to take the unimportant town of Palermo and then had to be coaxed back to the real battle with the offer of being allowed to take Messina.
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
For your convenience, the link below will take you to this review…
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/the-finish-line-was-messina.html
The British couldn't get off the beaches at Normandy despite facing the least opposition.
The least opposition was at met by the US forces Utah Beach, were some of the beach exits were totally undefended. The US forces at Omaha Beach were met by the stiffest beach opposition but their problems there were made much worse by poor preparation. The far better prepared British 2nd Army met average opposition at Gold, June and Sword Beaches but were quickly ashore and able to deal with the only major counter attack of the day, in front of Caen by the German 21st Panzer Division.
‘The Americans and Canadians faced stiff opposition and were both on the move before the British.’
Definitely not, Gold, Juno and Sword Beaches quickly joined up the American setback at Omaha Beach left the allies unable to form a whole front for over a week.
‘He didn't take the Scheldt when it was practically undefended and then the Canadians, not the British, had to slug it out for months after.’
The Scheldt was never practically undefended, The German 15th Army was there in force before the 21st Army Group got to that place, particularly the Breskens Pocket. The Scheldt was taken by Canadian, British and Polish forces, under the command of Montgomery.
Arnhem? I guess we don't have to say anymore about Arnhem and his "90% successful operation"
Arnhem freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on Britain, stretched the German forces front by another 50 miles and left the allies well placed to attack the Rhine later in the war.
‘(He was an egomaniacal asshole to boot)’
You met him when?..
When the Americans were trapped in Bastoigne all Monty could do was make excuses why he couldn't relieve them despite being 100 miles closer than Patton was. Get your facts straight. And it's KNOW-nothing not NO-nothing. If you want to celebrate a British general go with Bill Slim.
Montgomery was never tasked with reaching Bastogne. He was tasked with sorting out the American mess in the North and stopping he Germans reaching the Meuse after Bradley and Hodges lost the plot.
Here is a German view of Montgomery’s actions:
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army.
Re you Arnhem comment, it's any more, not anymore.
‘I wouldn't be too hard on the Americans either. They fought the Germans and beat the Japanese by themselves. (Talk about a two front war)’
Britain also fought the Japanese and fought the Germans for six years, a year of which on their own, with the Germans 20 miles away for four of those years. (A real two front war). As far as who did what in the Second war goes, we rule.
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@nickdanger3802
'Source?'
Try these:
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P189/190/191
" May 15th. Went straight from home to St. Paul's School to attend Eisenhower's final run-over plans for cross-Channel operations. The King, P.M., Smuts and all Chiefs of Staff were present. The main impression I gathered was that Eisenhower was no real director of thought, plans, energy or direction. Just a co-ordinator,
a good mixer, a champion of inter-Allied co-operation, and in those respects few can hold the candle to him. But is that enough? Or can we not find all qualities of a commander in one man? May be I am getting too hard to please, but I doubt it."
Monty made excellent speech. Bertie Ramsay in-different and overwhelmed by all his own difficulties. Spaatz read every word. Bert Harris told us how well he might have won the war if it had not been for the handicap imposed by the existence of the two other Services. Leigh-Mallory gave very clear description. Sholto Douglas seemed disappointed at the smallness of his task, and so was I. Then Humfrey Gale and Graham on Administration, followed by Grasset on Civil Controls of France. A useful run-through. The King made a few well-chosen remarks. After lunch he presented the C.B. to Bradley and two other decorations." " Back to War Office and finished up with Monty dining quietly with me. He was in very good form and bearing his reponsibilities well."
' If I was asked to review the opinion I expressed that evening of Eisenhower, I should, in the light of all later experience, repeat every word of it. A past-master in the handling of allies, entirely impartial and consequently trusted by all. A charming personality and good co-ordinator. But no real commander. I have seen many similar reviews of impending operations, and especially those run by Monty. Ike might have been a showman calling on various actors to perform their various turns, but he was not the commander of the show who controlled and directed all the actors. A very different performance from Monty's show a few days previously.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME V CLOSING THE RING
Page 542
On Monday, May 15, three weeks before D-Day, we held a final conference in London at Montgomery’s Headquarters in St. Paul’s School. The King, Field-Marshal Smuts, the British Chiefs of Staff, the Commanders of the expedition, and many of their principal Staff officers were present. On the stage was a map of the Normandy beaches and the immediate hinterland, set at a slope so that the audience could see it clearly, and so constructed that the high officers explaining the plan of operations could walk about and point out the landmarks.
Page 543
Montgomery then took the stage and made an impressive speech. He was followed by several Naval, Army, and Air Commanders, and also by the Principal Administrative Officer, who dwelt upon the elaborate preparations that had been made for the administration of the force when it got ashore.
MONTY
MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1983
P 588/589
As in April, Monty ran through the tasks of the four armies, as well as those of the commandos and airborne troops. Turning to the wall maps he gave his strategic intentions for 'the development of Operations up to D + 90', outlining again the manner in which the British and Canadians would 'contain the maximum enemy forces facing the eastern flank of the bridgehead' while the American forces, 'once through the difficult bocage country' were to 'thrust rapidly towards Rennes', seal off the Brittany peninsula, and wheel round towards Paris and the Seine, pivoting on the right flank of the British Second Army. As Bradley recalled, 'the British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road toward Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride, this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for while we tramped around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was toward Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
This strategic vision of the Normandy campaign filled the assembled audience with a sense of pride and anticipation, as it had Monty’s own Chief of Intelligence when Monty first laid down his post-D-1 strategy soon after changing the COSSAC plan. As the American
Official Historian noted after an interview with Brigadier Williams in 1947:
Thinks as early as January or February 1944 there is this idea of a swing from the American side towards the Seine. Remembers a map showing line out from Caen running South East and a line up the Cotentin and two lines direct down south of the Cotentin and one down and around the corner and one straight down to cut the neck of the Brittany Peninsula and one straight line down inside the Loire. 'After Cherbourg Peninsula (Monty never said Cotentin) cleaned up we shall be formed up the same way. I [Williams] plotted this on my own map. Felt an immense thrill.'
Monty stepped down. 'It went off superbly, I thought, on that occasion,' his Military Assistant, Colonel Dawnay, later recalled. `Monty was at his best. He was a supremely confident man—it was astonishing how confident he was. '
In a letter of 16.5.44 the American Deputy Theater Commander, General John Lee, wrote [To Montgomery]: 'Your clear and convincing estimate of the situation at St Paul's yesterday would merit in West Point language "a cold max".
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@solomongrundy4905
'You forgot to mention that Monty had 2X the infantry, (all well-trained, excellent morale), 2X the number of tanks, 2X artillery, 3X anti-tank guns, 2X armored cars. Planes were about equal. Now add Monty's virtually limitless resources vs. Rommel's lackthereof, and his lengthy supply lines. Add Ultra Intel, and what would you expect? A five-year-old could command the Allied forces and win.' Your words.
You should take a look at the odds for US victories in Europe, or the Pacific. US commanders also had access to Ultra, and decoded Japanese messages in in the Pacific. Could five-year olds win those battles?
Just yes or no will do.
The Germans had to bring supplies from Italy to North Africa. Britain was bringing supplies around the Cape to Suez.
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@solomongrundy4905
Even some British commanders, including Air Marshal Tedder wanted to see Monty fired, especially after his ineptness during Goodwood. Ike almost did it. Why? Because Monty was a bumbling, egotisical plodder. Still thinking like a WW1 general and that cost LIVES.
What ineptness? GOODWOOD took place due to the delay in the US build up in Normany, and in order to keep the bulk of German armour in front of British Second Army. It was just part of Montgomery's victory in Normandy, which finished 12 days ahead of schedule, with 20% fewer than expected casualties.
Those people who were supoosedly trying to get rid of Montgomery during the Normany campaign shut up like lights being turned off when the size of the victory in Normandy becam e clear.
As for Tedder:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 563
According to the diary of Eisenhower’s aide, Captain Butcher, I told the Supreme Commander on the evening of 19 July that Montgomery had in effect, stopped his armour from going farther. Later, I am reported as saying that he British Chiefs of Staff would ‘support any recommendation that Ike might care to make with respect to Monty for not succeeding in going places with his big three-armoured division push’
I am sure that this record is misleading for although I strongly disapproved of Montgomery’s action, it was quite beyond my powers to speak in the name of the British Chief’s of Staff.’
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@jeffreyhutchins6527
Montgomery made no commitment regarding Caen in his planning for Normandy. The only commtment he made was to be at the Seine by D+90. He got there by D+78. With 22% fewer than expected casualties.
As for the Falaise Gap:
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
Omar Bradley: A Soldier's Story book. Page 377.
‘Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
Brian Horrocks: Corps Commander. Page 53.
What have Bradley and Horrocks got in common?.. They were actually there.
As for Percival at Singapore and McAuliffe at Bastogne. Any comparison between the two situations is absurd. Percival was thousands of miles from any help and had no means of knowing what strength the Japanese had. McAuliffe knew that three allied army groups were behind him and that as soon as the weather turned, overwhelming air power would be avaible to help him.
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@solomongrundy4905
Yes. I would need a lot more than just opinion.
The Panzer Army Africa started the Second Battle of El Alamein with 104,000 men (50,000 of them German). The Germans then took all of the Italian motor transport and fled for all they were worth.
The distances involved were huge. Alamein to the First supply port Tobruk was 375 miles. Tobruk to the next supply port, Benghazi was another 305 miles.
Both sides had been twice up and twice back before Alamein. Montgomery did not make the mistakes previously made by both sides. He ended the war in the North African desert.
As for Patton, he deserted the battlefield in Sicily to seek personal glory by taking Palermo, because it was the Island's capital city. The problem was that the real battle was at the other side of the Island:
I was a Brigadier-General, and Artillery Commander of 82nd US Airborne Division. We took the north-west corner of Sicily [from Agrigento] . . . it was a pleasure march, shaking hands with Italians asking, 'How's my brother Joe in Brooklyn?' Nicest war I've ever been in! Monty—he had a different problem—he was up against Germans.
US General Maxwell Taylor.
'I had offered to go on to take Caltanissetta, but Patton wanted to capture Palermo. . . . It is my belief that the glamor of the big city was the chief thing that attracted Gen. Patton.
US General Lucian Truscott.
Patton personally assaulted Italian peasants, and two of his own soldiers, and got himself passed over for army group command in the campaign in North West Europe.
In Normandy, as a single army commander he was not in the battle until it was three parts over, and most of the Germans had been pinned down by British Second Army.
Of the allied break out in Normandy:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’
And onwards to Germany...
DEFEAT IN THE WEST
BY MILTON SHULMAN
LONDON
SECKER AND WARBURG 1947
CHAPTER XXIII
THE RETREAT
'THE most spectacular and most significant advance, once the Seine had beencrossed, was made by Second British Army in their break-out from their bridgehead at Vernon. In less than four days their armour dashed about 250 miles to capture Amiens, Arras, Tournai, Brussels, Louvain and Antwerp.'
So there you have it, Patton in France was nothing special.
And onwards:
The Lorraine Campaign:
An Overview,
September-December 1944
by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel
February, 1985
THIRD ARMY
'Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be considered first-rate troops. Third Army encountered whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and others consisting entirety of soldiers with stomach ulcers.'
'Soldiers and generals alike assumed that Lorraine would fall quickly, and unless the war ended first, Patton's tanks would take the war into Germany by summer's end. But Lorraine was not to be overrun in a lightning campaign. Instead, the battle for Lorraine would drag on for more than 3 months.'
'Was the Lorraine campaign an American victory? From September through November, Third Army claimed to have inflicted over 180,000 casualties on the enemy. But to capture the province of Lorraine, a problem which involved an advance of only 40 to 60 air miles, Third Army required over 3 months and suffered 50,000 casualties, approximately one-third of the total number of casualties it sustained in the entire European war.'
'Finally the Lorraine campaign demonstrated that Logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful and aggressive the commanding general may be. He [Patton] discovered that violating logistical principles is an unforgiving and cumulative matter.'
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@patriciapalmer1377
Eisenhower had zero personal combat experience, almost no command experience, he had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. He was a politician in an army uniform.
He presided over a slow campaign in Tunisia. He devised a very poor plan for the invasion of Italy despite warnings from Montgomery that the dispersal of forces would lead to major problems, which it did.
He mainly kept of Montgomery's way in Normandy and as result the allies had all but cleared France by D+87, giving the Germans as big a defeat as Stalingrad.
Eisenhower took over as allied land forces Commander on the 1st September 1944,and the whole allied advance stalled. He was warned:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P520
'The plan which Montgomery presented to Eisenhower at their meeting on August 23rd was bold enough, but it meant halting Patton and confining Third Army to the defensive role of flank protection during the advance of the Second British and First American Armies to the Ruhr. "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war."'
The is it is, US poltical considerations dictating Eisenhowers military decisions.
From Alanbrooke's Diary:
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P263
‘”Arrived Monty’s H.Q. by 2 p.m. [9th August] Had a long talk with him about recent crisis with Eisenhower. Apparently he has succeeded in arriving at a suitable compromise by which First U.S. Army is to move on the right of 21 Army Group and head for area Charleroi, Namur, Liége, just North of the Ardennes. Only unsatisfactory part is that this army is not under Monty’s orders and he can only co-ordinate its actions in relation to 21 Army Group. This may work; it remains to be seen what political pressure is put on Eisenhower to move Americans on separate axis from the British.”’
And more...
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@garyholschuh8811
‘Could you imagine being a German commander going up against a British army commanded by Montgomery?’ Your words.
"Montgomery who we first encountered in 1940 was probably the best tactician of the war”
German General FW von Mellenthin
“Field-Marshal Montgomery was the one general who never suffered a reverse”
"The Americans attacked with zest, and had a keen sense of mobile action, but when they came under heavy artillery fire they usually fell back-even after they had made a successful penetration. By contrast, once the British had got their teeth in, and had been in a position for twenty-four hours, it proved almost impossible to shift them. To counter-attack the British always cost us very heavy losses.
German General Günther Blumentritt.
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
German General Hasso von Manteuffel.
‘All the way from Dunkirk to the Philippines, to North Africa, to the Netherlands’ Your words.
Err…Dunkirk saved 338,000 troops-ultimately leading to Hitler’s defeat. The campaign around that ended in disaster, but Britain only contributed 10% of the troops involved. North Africa, ended in a defeat for the Axis as big as Stalingrad. The Netherlands was liberated.
As for the Philippines…it was an American defeat with no British involvement.
‘the British and Montgomery were just in the way when it came to winning the war in Europa!’ Your words.
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
US General Omar Bradley.
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
US General Dwight D Eisenhower
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
US Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck.
Field Marshal Montgomery arrived the following day. It was my first personal meeting with him, although I had seen him in staff meetings in London before Normandy. He was impressive, a perceptive, quick-minded man, incisive in his judgments. I could understand why he had been so popular with’ the Eighth Army in North Africa. I took a liking to him that has not diminished with the years.
US General James M Gavin.
As for that ‘endless supply of equipment’ . It amounted to 16.5% of Britain’s war needs across the war years.
As for the USA…It was not in the fighting until Germany had lost all of its advantages in technology and being the aggressor against countries that were behind it rearmament, or until the Germans had been stopped from getting war materials from outside of mainland Europe, and it was irretrievable committed in Russia. The USA was three thousand miles from its nearest enemy, suffered zero attacks on its mainland from its enemies. Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers did not have a day of personal combat experience between them. This showed as they presided over bog ups in Tunisia, Italy, Normandy Metz, the Bulge and the Hurtgen Forest. Devers contributed next to nothing to the allied victory.
Ah,ah,ah...Before decide to reply, consider what the chances are that you will know more about this subject than me.
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@johnhallett5846
Its a definite no.
The North End of Arnhem Bridge was still allied hands when XXX Corps linked up with the US 2nd Airborne Division on the early morning of the 3rd day, with whole of that day to reach Arnhem Bridge, a 14 mile run. If Nijmegen Bridge and City had been allied hands, XXX Corps would have been there in... three hours?
The Intelligence on German capability was seen by Eisenhower, Brereton, and Bradley was well as Montgomery.
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
A reason why we get so many ill-informed comments on here from the US is that Americans have convinced themselves that the USA is good at fighting military campaigns, because of the outcome of the world wars.
The prosaic reality is that in both conflicts, the USA was thousands of miles from any threat to its homeland, it had modest import needs, its allies bore the brunt of the Central Powers and Axis attacks when those enemies were at height of their powers and the USA outnumbered most of its opponents.
Instead of accepting this reality, Americans like to think that this US commander was better than that allied or enemy commander, this US tactic or strategy was better than that allied tactic or strategy, and so on.
That is how we end up with rubbish comments on YouTube that have zero basis in reality, like: 'the Germans feared Patton', 'Eisenhower masterminded D-Day,' 'the Battle of the Bulge could have cost the allies the war', 'the USAAF bombed accurately', and so on and so on.
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'He's a jerk like Wellington! From the moment he has not had the opportunity either to cling to positions previously established by him, that he does not have a balance of power in his favor, these guys are tacticians of operetta! As far as Wellington is concerned, study his "campaigns" from Portugal and Spain and up to Waterloo ... he only clung to positions established by him but without the slightest tactics worthy of the name. When in Montgomery, the only times he was told to "move", he broke his face seriously. As the Americans progressed around him, after the disembarkation, he was blocked for a month in front of Caen and let's not talk about the disastrous operation of Arnhem which ended in a massacre of English soldiers launched in an operation towards which he did not want. take into account movements of SS armored units' Your words.
The vast bulk of German forces in Normandy were ranged in front of British 2nd Army at Caen, including 84% of the German armour, so the US forces could break out.
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the years ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
Learn some history before posting on here.
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@robertgoines1831
What sort of idiot would post this:
-Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare
-The V-2s were still being launched
-The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies
-Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost.
-The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease.
-Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich
-Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged
-Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army
-Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success' Probably a teenager from Cleveland, Ohio, USA.
0/10.
Field Marshall Model was there because his headquarters was in Oosterbeek. He soon fucked off when the fighting started, As I would have done. Student was there to command his forces. Army Group Commander Montgomery was at Eindhoven before the end of the battle. Eisenhower was in Ranville in Normandy, Brereton was England.
The 17,000 losses were not entirely made up of Paratroops, and those losses compare with allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000), Metz (45,000) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000).
The Dutch Honger Winter was not caused by Market Garden. It was caused by the Germans, and the German treatment of the Dutch at that time was entirely consistent with German treat of other occupied areas at that time. Market Garden displaced no plan to liberate the bulk of the Netherlands at that time. Further, Market Garden liberated far more people than died in that winter.
Deportation of Dutchmen to Germany as forced labour started long before Market Garden.
Market Garden was not designed to take the allies to Berlin, as one of Montgomery's harshest critics has confirmed:
'Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.'
Arthur Tedder, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue.
None of the allies would cross the Rhine for another six months. US 9th Army was assigned to 21st Army Group because they were where the Germans were providing the stiffest opposition.
The SS Man Prince Bernhard was distrusted by both British and US intelligence, both of whom, rightly showed him the door. Only his Royal status kept him out of prison in the 1970s.
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William Swan
‘Montgomery spent much of his career lecturing military theory’
Montgomery fought with distinction in the First World War, being wounded twice and being awarded the DSO. Montgomery performed with distinction in France in 1940, in trying circumstances, with his superbly trained division closing the gap on the allied left after the Belgian capitulation, and then bringing his division home almost intact. By the time that Bradley, Devers and Eisenhower eventually got into the war, Montgomery had already forgotten more about fighting wars than the three of them collectively were ever going to know.
Operation Goodwood was launched because delays in the US advance to the west, in order to keep German forces away from the US troops. Two thirds of the tanks supposedly knocked out at Goodwood were operational again within days.
‘"Operation Market Garden", which was highly out of character for him in its daring and risk in the face of great uncertainties. It was a deeply flawed operation, almost certainly conceived by Montgomery to prove that he had the same flair as Patton.’
What did Montgomery have to prove in regard to Patton? Montgomery was an army group commander in a different army. Paton had pratted himself by hitting Sicilian peasants and some of his own troops. The V2 attacks on Britain alone justified Market Garden.
The Remagen bridge was captured by Hodges, not Patton.
‘it is thanks to Chamberlain that Britain did not become involved in a war before it was capable of defending itself, and was in fact capable when war broke out. I wonder how many people know that immediately after giving his notorious "Peace in our time" speech for the benefit of the Germans, Chamberlain immediately ordered many measures to prepare Britain for war?!’
Hardly, when Chamberlain went the Munich conference, Britain had already, but far too late, begun to rearm. Before Chamberlain went to Munich the service chiefs told him that Britain could not be ready for a general war before 1941. When Chamberlain left office in 1940, there were still one million people unemployed in Britain.
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@solomongrundy4905
'Monty was badly embarrased at Caen because HE BOASTED HE'D TAKE IT IN 24 HOURS.' Your words.
Not really...
Montgomery made no commitment regarding the capture of Caen.
This from an eye witness to Montgomery's briefing to allied leaders at St Paul's School, 15th May, 1944:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P 393
‘Now I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen'
The only promise that Montgomrry made in regard to timings for Normandy was to get the allies to the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78.
'He demonstrated his lack of skill there by sending tanks ahead without infantry support. This led to massive tank losses for the Brits.' Your words.
Not really...
Montgomery's tank losses were in line with other senior allied
commanders, Bradley and Devers, compared to the opposition that they faced. When German armoured forces were up agaist allied tank forces, one on one, the Germany generally had the best of it.
'He screwed up at Falaise' Your words.
Not really...
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From US Army General, Omar Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377.
His words.
More to follow...
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@stephenburke5967
Wall to wall rubbish.
The ‘Market’ plan that covered how, when and where the airborne forces were to be landed, and how they fought was the responsibility of the commander of the First Allied Airborne Army, the US General Brereton.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P127
‘The first major planning conference -on Operation MARKET convened in England late on 10 September, only a few hours after General Eisenhower in a meeting with Montgomery at Brussels had given his approval.’
‘Once the ground troops overran the airborne divisions, command was to pass to the 30 British Corps. Responsibility for the complex troop carrier role fell to the commander of the IX Troop Carrier Command, General Williams.’
P132
‘’Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault.’
‘Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day.’
As to whether Montgomery had any say in Brereton’s plan, the evidence is clear:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
‘General Urquhart had warned planners that the dense forests around their landing zones would hamper their communications"which it did dramatically".’ Your words.
Where is this on record?
‘I must add the Dutch underground pleaded with London for weeks prior to Market Garden to blanket bomb the dense forests around Arnhem, Nijmegan and Lent as the Germans had put a corden around the forests with no civilian access therefore no casualties.’
I never heard of it. Where is this on record?
‘The Dutch underground had pinpointed these areas as the hiding areas of the two Panzer divisions that London were informed about but this was ignored.’
All communications purporting to come from the Dutch Underground at that time were routinely disregarded due to the German ‘Enlandspiel’ penetration of the Dutch Underground. Market Garden was no different to any other situation at that time in that regard.
‘it prolonged the war and caused further needless deaths in the theatre of war and infact caused the Russians to advance first into Berlin and the problems that caused in later years with needless deaths and hardship from the segregation of Berlin until the fall of the Wall in November 9th 1989.’ Your words.
How could Market Garden have prolonged the war? It was no bigger than a number of other allied operations at that time, none of which succeeded. If anyone caused the Russians to be in Berlin first, it was Eisenhower, with his broad front policy, which stopped the allied advance, leaving Churchill and Roosevelt with no cards to play at the Yalta Conference, and later, Eisenhower’s unilateral decision to contact Stalin to tell him that Western forces would not attempt to reach Berlin.
‘Intelligence told the planners that two Panzer divisions were in the area around Arnhem’
Your words
A SHAEF Intelligence Summary week ending September 4th 1944 stated that the Germans facing British 2nd Army was "no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms".
The 1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1 CLEARLY states that:
"..the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming"
Signed W A Taylor, Capt, IO, 1 Parachute Brigade, dated 13th September 1944.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P260
‘A SHAEF intelligence summary issued September 16 reported that “the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.” German strength facing the 100,000-man XXX Corps directly across the Dutch border was estimated at six infantry battalions backed by twenty armored vehicles and a dozen field guns; scant enemy activity had been detected in the last two days.’
P263
‘Guessing which Germans would be fought proved vexing beyond all other vexations. Radio traffic showed that Model’s Army Group B headquarters had shifted to Oosterbeek, outside Arnhem. Other intelligence suggested that enemy reinforcements of river and canal defenses, but with troops considered “low category”; some improvised Luftwaffe ground units were apparently so rudimentary that they lacked field kitchens. Ultra decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed that various battered units from Normandy had been ordered to Western Holland to refit, and subsequent intercepts indicated that this gaggle included II SS Panzer Corps. Not until September 15 had the SHAEF high command taken note that the corps’ two divisions, the 9th and 10th SS Panzer, seemed to laagered near Arnhem. Together they had suffered nine thousand casualties at Caen, at Falaise, and in the retreat across France; they had also lost much of their armor, including 120 tanks on August 19 alone. But whether the divisions were still eviscerated , where they were headed, or precisely where they were now located remained opaque.’
‘Monty knew the weather would hamper supplies’ Your words.
Nope. Market Garden was launched on the basis of a weather report on the afternoon of the 16th September, 1944, which predicted four days of good weather.
‘The road networks approaching their bridge objectives were far to narrow for quick decisive advance and this planning mistake was alone unforgiving of Montgomery.’
But XXX Corps advanced 50 miles in two days (with 12 hours lost due to the Bridge at Son being blown up), arriving at Nijmegen at the start of the third day, only to find that that the US 82nd Airborne Division had failed to capture Nijmegen Bridge.
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@richmcintyre1178
'Monty was not a good strategist. He had the Intel and ignored it. His big moment was more important.'
When did this happen?
He "won" in Africa because the US gave him 500 tanks and the Navy supplied him well beyond what the Germans could match. Just a terrible commander.
They weapon in the desert was the anti-tank gun, not the tank. The British 6 pounder versus the German 8.8cm.
The isituation facing Montgomery in North Africa, the middle of 1942, was far more challenging han a matter of supply. With four divisions against Rommel's six divisions, Montgomery won at Alam el Halfa, and then went on to re-build the Eighth Army, as people who were there later testified:
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
1957
P 475
‘without consulting Cairo, he issued immediate orders that, if Rommel attacked, all units should fight on the ground where they and that there should be no withdrawal or surrender. The effect on the Army was electric.’
P 478
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD 1951
P464
‘Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
GENERALS AT WAR
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DE GUINGAND
K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODDER AND STOUGHTON 1964
P 188
‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight. I accompanied him during the reconnaissances which resulted in decisions as to the way he proposed to dispose his forces for the defensive battles which we all expected. It would be Rommel’s last desperate to reach the Delta, and failure would remove once and for all the threat to our Middle East Base.’
Here is German Generalmajor FW von Mellenthin on Montgomery:
"Montgomery who we first encountered in 1940 was probably the best tactician of the war if not the best strategist. He made mistakes. Rommel made mistakes as he too was stubborn. Montgomery when he arrived in Africa changed the way the 8th army fought, he was a very good army trainer and was ruthless in his desire to win, he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery.'
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@richmcintyre1178
'Patton was paying bonuses to men who scronged enemy supplies' Where is this on record?
Patton did not reveal to Eisenhower and Bradley at that time that one of his corps had captured 110,000 gallons of petrol.
'He still had an army to feed and positions to defend so yes he was still receiving supplies but not the amount needed to attack.' But none of his supplies were being diverted for MARKET GARDEN.
Pattons seems to have been driven by personal ambition, rather than what might be best for the allied cause, based on available evidence:
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN
2013.
PROLOGUE
11
‘Of Patton a comrade noted, “He gives the impression of a man biding his time”. In fact, he had revealed his anxiety in a recent note to his wife. “I fear the war will be over before I get loose, but who can say? Fate and the hand of God still runs most shows.”
Patton was 100 miles from the Rhine at the time of MARKET GARDEN. His armies were facing the Saar, whereas the armies of Dempsey and Hodges were facing the far more important Ruhr.
Montgomery had already offered Eisenhower the chance to halt Crearer and Dempsey, leaving Hodges and Patton to continue the advance, at at meeting on 23rd August:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P512
'It was vitally important that a firm and clear-cut decision should be made at once, for it was long overdue. But Montgomery had no opportunity of discussing the problem with Eisenhower until August 23rd when they met for the first time in a week. Montgomery then put the issue bluntly. " Administratively," he said, " we haven't the resources to maintain both Army Groups at full pressure. The only policy is to halt the right and strike with the left, or halt the left and strike with the right. We must decide on one thrust and put all the maintenance to support that. If we split the maintenance and advance on a broad front, we shall be so weak everywhere that we will have no chance of success." '
Eisenhower did neither, and everyone stopped. Montgomery was proved right.
The Germans agreed with Montgomery:
'German general Gunther Blumentritt on Montgomery from 'The Other Side Of The Hill by B. H. Liddell Hart page 355:
All the German generals to whom I talked were of the opinion that the Allied Supreme Command had missed a great opportunity of ending the war in the autumn of 1944. They agreed with Montgomery's view that this could best have been achieved by concentrating all possible resources on a thrust in the north"'.
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@finallyfriday.
'The US crossed the Rhine In one day at 2 points. Monty took 6 more months planning Plunder and finally crossed the Rhine. And with limited succes even though by now the wars was basically over.'
Not really...
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD 1954
P759
‘Montgomery's preparations for the assault across the Lower Rhine were elaborate. His armies were confronted with the greatest water obstacle in Western Europe (the river at Wesel was twice as wide as at Oppenheim) and their crossing was expected to require, as Eisenhower has said, " the largest and most difficult amphibious operation undertaken since the landings on the coast of Normandy."’
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P423
‘Montgomery was always the master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set piece attack. In this case he made the most meticulous preparations because we knew that along the front just north of the Ruhr the enemy had his best remaining troops including portions of the First Paratroop Army.’
P427
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’
IKE & MONTY: GENERALS AT WAR
NORMAN GELB
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LIMITED 1994
P406
‘Montgomery wouldn’t hear of it. An early crossing did not fit the plan he had been devising with great thoroughness to meet all contingencies. The resourceful Germans had shown in the Ardennes that they were capable of the unexpected. Bradley, Patton and Hodges might have been willing to gamble and Montgomery was pleased that they had succeeded. But he was not interested in easy victories that might be of limited significance, and he did not believe they fully understood the risks they had taken or the extent of the far greater achievement he was aiming for. Risk-taking was for amateurs. The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties.
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@johnburns4017
'He not only didn't take Caen which was a day 1 objective and it was wide open for the taking (as was the approach to Antwerp) He putted around and didn't take it in a month. finallyfriday.
Caen never had date attached to it by Montgomery. Far from being undefended, it had the German 21st Panzer Division in front of it - which proceeded to carry out the only major German counter attack of the day, as it drove towards the coast between SWORD and JUNO beaches.
The approaches to Atwerp (The Scheldt) were far from undefended, the fortifications at Flushing were some of the most formidable in Europe, and the Germans were in force on the sothern bank, at the Seaward end of the estuary, in the Breskens Pocket. The idea that the Scheldt was there for the taking is absurd. The Germans were always going to fight fanatically to deny Antwerp to the allies, as evidenced by their V weapons campaign against that city, and that he ogjective of their ardennes offensive was Antwerp.
'While the US took most of France, Monty couldn't get off the beach.' finallyfriday.' finallyfriday.
As we all know, the vast bulk of the German forces in Normandy was rangd against British 2nd Army. The plan was always for the US 1st Army to take Cherbourg, the major port in the region and to swing round trap the German forces between the two armies. It was the slowness of the US build up that caused Montgomery to undertake a series of operations in the Caen in order to keep the Germans tied down.
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
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@Jonathanbegg
'The Alamein strategy was not his. It was Auchinleck's.'
Not really...
Read this:
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS
CASSELL, LONDON
1962
P22
‘Recently there has been discussion whether or not General Montgomery ‘adopted’ as his own the plan evolved by his predecessor for the action that was shortly to be fought – actually within a little more than a fortnight of his taking over command – in defence of the Alamein position.
I cannot conceive that General Montgomery is likely to have been interested in other people’s ideas on how to run the desert war; and in my own conversation with General Auchinleck, before taking over command, there was certainly no hint of a defensive plan that at all resembled the pattern of the battle of Alam Halfa as it was actually fought.
…as I have already indicated, the actual pattern of the battle was exclusively Montgomery’s.’
Watch this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-QlDkjzsYV8&ab_channel=PatrickRushton
15 mins, 55 seconds.
As for Arnhem...the V2 attacks on Britain alone justified the attempt.
As for propaganda:
The whole thrust of government propaganda, the works of filmmakers and of writers was to emphasize the collective effort and the deeds of the man in the street rather than the deeds of generals or politicians. Posters were all about ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘together’. The films people watched were: ‘Millions like Us’, ‘The Way Ahead’, ‘Went the Day Well’, The Foreman Went to France’. The BBC chipped in with output such as ‘Workers Playtime’ JB Priestly, and so on, and so on, and so on.
Montgomery gained attention because he won battles.
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robert colboourne
'he is over- rated.'
Yea, by Americans for decades, as they attack Montgomery from every direction: Hollywood, crap web sites, chauvisistic historians and so on. All of them splitting hairs about all of his actions whilst breezing over bog up after bog up by US commanders. If Eisenhower or Bradley had devised the Normandy campaign, there would have been films, TV mini series, statues, reverential lectures on the US lecture circuit, books by the Lorry load, with copies in some pupose built library in some Mid-West US state, and so on and so on.
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Roland Whittle
Here is an American view on Sicily…
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact, he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
For your convenience, the link below will take you to this review…
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/the-finish-line-was-messina.html
And another American source:
The Axis powers had known before the landings on Sicily that Patton was in command of American ground forces in the western Mediterranean, and knew he led Seventh Army on Sicily. But his race to Palermo through country they had already abandoned left the commanders unimpressed. Major General Eberhard Rodt, who led the 15th Panzergrenadier Division against Patton’s troops during the Allied push toward Messina, thought the American Seventh Army fought hesitantly and predictably. He wrote in an immediate postwar report on Sicily, “The enemy very often conducted his movements systematically, and only attacked after a heavy artillery preparation when he believed he had broken our resistance. This kept him regularly from exploiting the weakness of our situation and gave me the opportunity to consolidate dangerous situations.”
https://www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view.htm
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@solomongrundy4905
Montgomery and Dieppe
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE 1951.
P457
The assault was originally fixed for July 4, and the troops embarked at ports in the Isle of Wight. The weather was unfavourable and the date was postponed till July 8. Four German aircraft made an attack upon the shipping which had been concentrated. The weather continued bad and the troops disembarked. It was now decided to cancel the operation altogether. General Montgomery, who, as Commander-in-Chief of South-Eastern Command, had hitherto supervised the plans, was strongly of opinion that it should not be remounted, as the troops concerned had all been briefed and were now dispersed ashore.
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1957
P487
FIVE DAYS before the Prime Minister and Brooke returned to England, the landing in France for which the un-informed had been clamouring was made at Dieppe. Planned by Lord Louis Mountbatten's Combined Operations Staff, and officially described as a reconnaissance in force, its objectives were the capture of a Channel port, its retention for a day in the face of attack and a successful re-embarkation with data for a full-scale landing later. It had been authorised by the Chiefs of Staff in the spring and fixed originally for July. That it was purely experimental in scale and purpose was due in part to Brooke's restraining hand. When owing to un-favourable weather it had to be postponed, the officer responsible for the military side, Lieutenant-General Montgomery, had recommended that it should be abandoned in view of the security risks in remounting it. But because of American and Russian feelings and the importance of obtaining data for later landings, the Prime Minister had favoured proceeding with the operation—the most important yet undertaken by Combined Operations. To spare the French, the preliminary air bombardment was omitted from the final plan, while General Montgomery, appointed to overseas command, had ceased to have any connection with it.
'“THE PEOPLE WHO PLANNED IT (Dieppe) SHOULD BE SHOT” -W. Churchill, Aug. 1942.' Your words.
Where is this on record?..
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@BrianFrancisHeffron-1776
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
US General Eisenhower
'In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself, and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort.'
US General Bradley
`You see from the very start when I was under the command of the Marshal I got clear and definite orders what I had to do. From Bradley and my own people I never get any orders that make it clear to me what I have got to do.
US General Simpson
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough.
The German commander of the 5th Panzer Army, Hasso von Manteuffel.
"Montgomery who we first encountered in 1940 was probably the best tactician of the war if not the best strategist. He made mistakes. Rommel made mistakes as he too was stubborn. Montgomery when he arrived in Africa changed the way the 8th army fought, he was a very good army trainer and was ruthless in his desire to win, he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery. There has been much talk of using Montgomery to 'tidy up in the 'bulge' we would have done the same thing"
German Generalmajor FW von Mellenthin.
Fancy some more?..
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@richmcintyre1178
Its still a definite no.
At the time each Army Group was getting 7,000 of supplies per day. That is 7,000 tons for 21st Army Group (Montgomery), and 7,000 tons for 12th Army Group (Bradley).
Bradley intially divided his 7,000 tons by sending 5,000 tons to his subordinate Hodges, and 2,000 tons to his subordinate Patton. Before MARKET GARDEN was even conceived, Bradley shifted and additional 1,500 tons per day from Hodges to Patton. He also sent 4 divisions from Hodges to Patton. This arrangement lasted until after MARKET GARDEN had finished. There is no record of supplies being transferred from Patton to 21st Army Group.
An additional 500 tons per day had been flown in by air to help feed the civilian population of Paris. This was sent to 21st Army Group for MARKET GARDEN as the French civilian authorities were able to take over the supply needs of the City.
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@saltmerchant749
Not really...
Part One:
Eisenhower has to take final responsibility as by then, as well as being Supreme Commander, he had appointed himself as allied land forces commander. This with little command experience in battle, and with zero personal combat experience.
Montgomery had no jurisdiction over the Market plan which was under the command of the US General Brereton. Of this, the evidence is clear:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
Political pressure from Churchill, if such a term can be used, was applied via the War Office - regarding the possibility of what could be done to hinder V2 rocket attacks on London. a quite reasonable request, given the numbr of civilians that were dying.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Will you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?”
Obviously no American can possibly relate to this, their homeland was 3,000 miles from any trouble. Not that such a distance stops them from passing judgement on those that were in the real war. As for the Ameicans and Market Garden, the FAAA (First Allied Airborne Army - to save you looking it up), was an American led idea, and US Generals Marshall and Arnold were keen to see it made use of.
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@saltmerchant749
Not really...
Part Two:
Montgomery contended that the plan was 'attended by considerable risks.'
The key decisions that stopped the allies from taking Arnhem, all came from the FAAA:
The distance of the landing zones from the bridges;
No second lift on the first day;
A US soldier deciding to take a complete set of plans, leading to those plans being found by the Germans on his dead body, in a US glider, in a US drop zone within 2 hours of the start of the operation.
The decision not to attempt to take Nijmegen bridge on the first day.
The intelligence was seen by all senior officers, and was inconclusive:
1st Parachute Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1 CLEARLY states that:
"..the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming"
Signed W A Taylor, Capt, IO, 1 Parachute Brigade, dated 13th September 1944.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P260
‘A SHAEF intelligence summary issued September 16 reported that “the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.” German strength facing the 100,000-man XXX Corps directly across the Dutch border was estimated at six infantry battalions backed by twenty armored vehicles and a dozen field guns; scant enemy activity had been detected in the last two days.’
P263
‘Guessing which Germans would be fought proved vexing beyond all other vexations. Radio traffic showed that Model’s Army Group B headquarters had shifted to Oosterbeek, outside Arnhem. Other intelligence suggested that enemy reinforcements of river and canal defenses, but with troops considered “low category”; some improvised Luftwaffe ground units were apparently so rudimentary that they lacked field kitchens. Ultra decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed that various battered units from Normandy had been ordered to Western Holland to refit, and subsequent intercepts indicated that this gaggle included II SS Panzer Corps. Not until September 15 had the SHAEF high command taken note that the corps’ two divisions, the 9th and 10th SS Panzer, seemed to laagered near Arnhem. Together they had suffered nine thousand casualties at Caen, at Falaise, and in the retreat across France; they had also lost much of their armor, including 120 tanks on August 19 alone. But whether the divisions were still eviscerated , where they were headed, or precisely where they were now located remained opaque.’
A lack of air support was due to the weather being good for operations on only four days of the operation.
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@BrianFrancisHeffron-1776
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P282
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
P288
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.
P423
‘Montgomery was always the master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set piece attack. In this case he made the most meticulous preparations because we knew that along the front just north of the Ruhr the enemy had his best remaining troops including portions of the First Paratroop Army.’
Canadian troops in Europe were first, part of British 2nd Army, then when the Canadian First Amy was formed, over half of its strength was made up of British and Polish troops. It then formed part of Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Canadian troops were alongside British troops from D-Day until 1945. My own father saw Canadians in Normandy, the Scheldt and the Reichwald. In the last stages of the war, the Canadian forces were mainly left to mop up in the Netherlands while British forces advance into Germany.
Before you decide to compose an answer to me, ask youself this question: What are the chances that Brian Heffron will know more about this subject than TheVilla Aston?..
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@etangdescygnes
'Montgomery did well at Second El Alamein, but I think his leadership in Normandy, Zeeland, and Market Garden was bad. And yes, Eisenhower must take the ultimate responsibility for Montgomery’s bungling, as the SCAEF!'
What bungling?
For Overlord Montgomery undertook to reach the seine by D+90. He got there by D+78, with 22% fewer than expected casualties and inflicting a defeat as large as Stalingrad on the Germans. All this, with the disruption to the allied build-up caused by the great June storm and him being badgered by glory hungry, know nothing US Generals. Since then, Montgomery's conduct of the Battle has been subject to hair-splitting criticism. If it had been a US commander delivering such a victory, there would have been a library of books, statues, museums, Hollywood films, TV mini-series, and not a day would have gone by without a lecture on the subject, somewhere in America.
As for Zeeland, I take it you mean the Scheldt. That was hundred miles of riverbank and shoreline to clear, with the German in force the Breskens Pocket before the approach of 21st Army Group. That the Germans considered the Scheldt to be highly important is obvious, they were never going to give it up without a major fight.
Maket Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, stretched the German front another 60 miles, hindered V2 attacks on Britain and left the allies well plced to assault the Rhine later in the war. The casualties incurred compare wel to allied defeats at Aachen, Metz and the Hurtgen Forest in the same period.
'it has been stated that the obliteration of Caen on Montgomery’s orders, and Operation Goodwood, were mistakes. It has been suggested that it would have been wiser to send infantry units skirting around the eastern edges of Colombelles and Caen in predawn twilight, where they would have been far from the German guns ranged along the Dives, would have found cover, and could have turned westwards to infiltrate Colombelles and Caen in many separate places as the sun rose behind their backs. It would have been the job of the armour and artillery to then similarly skirt along the eastern edge of the built-up areas, to screen the city from German attacks across the plain between the Orne and Dives. Once secured, Caen would have provided a route to hook around the western end of the Borguébus Ridge, and supplies could have been brought from the beaches by both lorries and boats, (along the Orne). Such an operation probably had a much greater chance of success, and would have spared many civilian lives and much destruction of property. There is no reason to think that it would not also have kept the Germans pinned in place.'
Has this come from that charlatan Antony Beevor?
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