Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "The Armchair Historian" channel.

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  22.  @toekneekerching9543  From Big Woody (aka Para Dave): 'Thicko Monty just displayed his single thrust @ OMG.A concept so idiotic that pretty much everyone in Allied HQ blasted it. I mean it ended up like 1940 Norway,the Netherlands,Belgium,France,Dunkirk - complete routes.That's why the GIs had to get it sorted.....AGAIN.Hey tell the board Little Villa how mum took some Gerries prisoner.' His words. The single thrust: The Germans agreed that a concentrated allied thrust would have been the best policy... 'I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower's insistence on spreading the Allied forces out for a broader advance was wrong. The acceptance of Montgomery's plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives—on both sides—would have been saved' Hasso von Manteuffel. "The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. Gunther Blumentritt And also, it seems, one American who was there: 'if Eisenhower had not been so "wishy washy" and had backed either Montgomery or Bradley in the fall of 1944, the war would have been over by Christmas. ' Ralph Ingersoll. The 'GIs' (In particular Eisenhower) gave us [the allies] AACHEN, the HURTGEN FOREST, METZ, an under resourced MARKET GARDEN, and the ARDENNES - the ARDENNES where Montgomery had to postpone VERITABLE and then come down and sort out the Bulge. And damn right Montgomery should have told the world how it was. I can only mavel and the restraint that Montgomery showed in that press conference. Capturing Gerries...doubtless Americans have stories of US civilians dealing with Germans in the US homeland. It must have been scary, what with the Germans being a mere 3,000 miles away.
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  37. Its a definite no. Britain (and France), went to war on behalf of Poland, in spite of multiple offers of a peace deal by Hitler. The treaty with Poland only covered an attack on Poland by Germany, not an attack by any other country. The British Government went into this undertaking in 1939 despite being aware that the country could not be ready for a general war until 1941. 2,936 Fighter Command pilots took part in the Battle of Britain, 145 of them were Polish. The Polish squadrons only took part in the second half of the battle. The idea that Polish saved our ‘butts’ in the Battle of Britain is absurd. The governments of Britain and the USA were no position to be able to condemn the massacre of Polish soldiers at Katyn by the Russians, when he news came out in 1943. Such a condemnation would have meant agreeing with the Nazis at a time when Russia was bearing the brunt of the war on land. There is no evidence that Władysław Sikorski was murdered. Why would anyone risk trying to murder him in a plane crash? He was not important enough to warrant such treatment. General Sosabowski was not blamed for the failure at Arnhem. Rightly or wrongly he was criticized from his performance, and the performance of his troops at Arnhem. But that is quite a different matter from blame for overall operation. Churchill tried repeatedly to get help from Russia and the USA for assistance in airlifting supplies to the Polish Home Army during the Warsaw up-rising, without success until the very end. Poland was not betrayed at the Yalta conference. By the time of the conference, Poland was almost wholly in Russian hands, and Britain and the USA had zero leverage on Russian actions. The omission of a Polish squadron from the 1946 victory parade in London, while other Polish military units were invited to take part was a regrettable mis-judgement on the part of the government of the day, but this was more than made up for the 1947 Polish Resettlement Act. Britain fed, clothed, and housed many thousands of Polish people during the war. It is surely not unreasonable that those Poles that were able should have joined in with the fighting where they could. WINSTON S CHURCHILL. THE SECOND WORLD WAR. CASSELL & CO LTD VOLUME VI TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 1954. P563 The burden lay on British shoulders. When their homeland had been overrun and they had been driven from France many Poles had sheltered upon our shores. There was no worth-while property belonging to the Polish Government in London. I said I believed there was about .£20,000,000 in gold in London and Canada. This had been frozen by us, since it was an asset of the Central Bank of Poland. Unfreezing and moving it to a Central Polish Bank must follow the normal channels for such transfers. It was not the property of the Polish Government in London and they had no power to draw upon it. There was of course the Polish Embassy in London, which was open and available for a Polish Ambassador as soon as the new Polish Government cared to send one—and the sooner the better. In view of this one might well ask how the Polish Government had been financed during its five and a half years in the United Kingdom. The answer was that it had been supported by the British Government; we had paid the Poles about .£120,000,000 to finance their Army and diplomatic service, and to enable them to look after Poles who had sought refuge on our shores from the German scourge. When we had disavowed the Polish Government in London and recognised the new Provisional Polish Government it was arranged that three months' salary should be paid to all employees and that they should then be dismissed. It would have been improper to have dismissed them without this payment, and the expense had fallen upon Great Britain. All clear now?..
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  43. ​ Dod o  Big Woody is a liar, and this is why: Big Woody’s forgery can be seen here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2obwt4n1G0&lc=UgyXsiASB8pi_JS_WfV4AaABAg.9Afuv3FHaYc9BMmj0JXY2u&feature=emcomments Lead comment: John Cornell 3 weeks ago (as of 31 07 2020) Patton should have kept his mouth shut and concentrated on achieving his task of taking Metz, which had been his objective two weeks before Market Garden and yet still hadn't done it 8 weeks after Market Garden. The 25th reply is the lie: Big Woody 1 week ago (as of 31 07 2020) Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front! This is were Big Woody unwisely took it from: http://ww2f.com/threads/what-went-wrong-with-operation-market-garden.28468/page-5#post-389603 What went wrong with Operation Market Garden? Discussion in 'Western Europe 1943 - 1945' started by tovarisch, Feb 2, 2010. Page 5 of 14 < Prev1←34567→14Next > RAM Member Joined:Dec 11, 2007 Messages:507 Likes Received:9 ... 'Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!' ... RAM, July 28 2010 ...From another opnion in a hack forum, not from 'Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck' as Big Woody claimed.
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  68.  @bessarion1771  'Literally in the letter you posted he said " this brigade performed very badly here and the men showed no keenness to fight if it meant risking their own lives (.) " Which was a bold faced lie and Montgomery KNEW it was a lie. What a filthy gutless way to assault the allies.' Your words. Literally, what Montgomery stated may have been a lie, it may have been the truth. Wh can know? I don't. It was definately an opinion. He was entitled to his opinion, especially in a private letter to a colleague. Montgomery's opinion would seem to be in line with one Geoffrey Powell, who, in his memoir of Arnhem stated of Polish troops put under his command in the Oosterbeek perimeter: MEN AT ARNHEM GEOFFREY POWELL Pen and Sword Books 2004 P164 'At irregular intervals from the late evening onwards, clusters of mortar bombs had fallen among and around us, harming no one but preventing sleep, at least for me. Others, between spells of sentry duty, had collapsed exhausted into oblivion. Four times enemy patrols had roused them from their stupor as the night exploded into noise and light, with red tracer whipping the trees and white flares blossoming overhead. No one had been hit, but losses there had been. On stand-to rounds I had found the Polish trenches empty except for Peter, their corporal, crouched grimly behind his Bren. The rest of the party had vanished in the early hours, sensing perhaps that they had attached themselves to an unlucky unit. Peter explained nothing, but his embarrassment was clear; it was both unfair and pointless to press him for details when either pride or sense of duty had kept him there to fight on among strangers. The thought of what would have happened if the enemy had attacked from this direction against a position held by the one solitary man was chilling. It was a mistake to trust strangers. I had learned yet another lesson: rely only on those you knew.'
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