Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "AFTER ARNHEM 1944 | Q&A 9" video.

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  3. On the 8th September 1944, the first German V2 rockets landed in London, launched from the Western part of the Netherlands, in the area around The Hague. An urgent signal was sent from London to Montgomery about know what could be done about those attacks. The rockets could not be intercepted once they were in flight, and given they were launched from mobile launchers, usually in built up area, thus the chances of hitting their launch equipment were almost zero. Therefore, the only thing that could be attempted was to stop delivery of rockets to the western part of the Netherlands. When Montgomery met Dempsey on the 10th September, they discussed whether MARKET GARDEN should end at Nijmegen or Arnhem. Montgomery showed Dempsey the signal from London which settled the matter. Where is the craving for glory in that? Prior to that, Montgomery had pointed out to Eisenhower that allied logistics only allowed for two of the four allied armies to advance against Germany and that the advance should be by British 2nd Army and the US 1st Army – towards the Ruhr. Failing that decision, Montgomery would agree to British 2nd Army and the Canadian 1st Army being halted, and the resources put to Bradley’s subordinates, Hodges (US 1st Army), and US 3rd Army (Patton), provided that a decision on a single thrust was taken over the available resources being spread out over all four armies – leaving the allies being not strong enough to advance properly anywhere – which is what happened. Where is the craving for glory in that? Where is there shred of reliable evidence (contemporary documents, utterances by Montgomery), that 'Monty's main objective was to get HIS troops over the Rhine before Patton'?
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  9. TIK You have neglected to take note that by the 10th September, Montgomery had receved an urgent question from London, enquiring as to what could be done about the launching of V2 rockets at London from the the West of the Netherlands, the first lauchings having taken place on the 8th September. CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P543 ‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’ THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945 Rick Atkinson LITTLE BROWN 2013. This paperback edition published in 2013. P245/246 ‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said. It was all but impossible to intercept V2 rockets once they were airborne, and there were no fixed launching sites that could be destroyed. Market Garden offered the chance to stem the flow of rockets into the Western part of the Netherlands. British troops in the Netherlands (my own father among them), could see V wepons being launched, and quite understandably, they wanted something done about this matter. This should be taken into account when assessing the purpose of MARKET GARDEN, and why Arnhem was included in the plan for that operation.
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